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ABSTRACT 
 
Negotiating the Paradoxes of Poverty: 
Presidential Rhetoric on Welfare from Johnson to Clinton.  (December 2004) 
Martin Carcasson, B.A. Texas A&M University; 
M.A., Texas A&M University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:           Dr. Martin Medhurst  
  Dr. Jim Aune 
 
This project examines how Presidents Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, Ronald 
Reagan, and Bill Clinton discussed issues of poverty and welfare from Johnson’s declaration of War on 
Poverty in 1964 to Clinton’s signing of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act in 1996. I argue that there are four critical tensions relevant to the debate concerning contemporary 
poverty in the United States—politics vs. policy, deserving vs. undeserving, help vs. hinder, and equality 
vs. freedom—and the key to improving the manner in which the nation confronts the problem of poverty 
requires understanding and negotiating these tensions. The analysis reveals that the five presidents had a 
mixed but overall rather poor record in confronting the four paradoxes. In general they tended either to 
avoid the tensions altogether, or fall to one or the other extreme. That being said, the analysis also reveals 
that there is considerable common ground concerning some critical issues between all the presidents, 
whether they were Democrats or Republicans, ideologically moderate or more partisan. Foremost among 
these are the beliefs that equal opportunity should be the overarching ideal, work should be rewarded well, 
and those that cannot help themselves should be supported as generously as possible by the government. I 
conclude that the 1996 law, while based in part on questionable assumptions concerning the condition of 
the poor, could lead to a significant re-framing of the debate away from the generally unpopular focus on 
welfare and welfare recipients and toward the working poor and the conditions and difficulties under 
which they labor, which could potentially lead to other positive transformations beneficial to the American 
poor. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Poverty is one of the most controversial and complicated social issues in the United States. Both 
the existence of poverty as well as the efforts to combat it challenge the nation’s ideals of freedom, 
equality, compassion, family, work, individualism, and justice, and often putting them into conflict. 
Poverty represents the intersection of many of America’s most highly charged areas of political dispute, 
including inequalities of race, gender, and class; education, labor, housing, tax, and immigration policy; 
globalization and the impact of economic transformations; the benefits and flaws of capitalism; the 
“breakdown” of the traditional family; the separation of religion and government; the deterioration of the 
urban center; and the disputed role of the state in addressing these various difficulties.  
Due to its inherent complexity and broad scope, the study of poverty transcends institutional 
divisions within academia. Poverty is an economic issue, a sociological issue, a psychological issue, a 
political issue, and a philosophical issue. Moreover, poverty is a rhetorical issue. It is rhetorical in the 
sense that despite the proliferation of “poverty knowledge” during the last thirty years,1 many questions 
concerning poverty can never be answered with scientific certainty. While good scientific information is 
certainly critical to the poverty debate, the public debate over poverty will nonetheless always revolve 
around difficult philosophical questions and be shrouded by numerous uncertainties.  
Poverty is also rhetorical in the sense that beliefs regarding poverty, as well as those concerning 
its various treatments, are influenced by different value hierarchies and are highly dependent on 
perceptions and frames based more or less on substantive knowledge. Different ideological perspectives 
concerning the role of government, the “deserving” and “undeserving” status of the poor, the 
responsibilities of citizenship, the extent of true opportunity, and the intended and unintended 
consequences of government action dominate public debate concerning poverty. Assumptions concerning 
both the responsibility for poverty (whether it is structural, individual, or some combination of the two), 
and the responsibility for its treatment (public, private, or individual “self-help”) are critical to the public 
support, or lack thereof, of anti-poverty policies. Few areas of consensus arise, leaving a greater role for 
rhetorical efforts to influence public policy.  
The rhetorical nature of poverty increases exponentially when it is considered in the context of 
particular political situations. Politicians and other policy entrepreneurs must not only negotiate the 
quagmire of ideological differences and seemingly contradictory findings within the policy literature, but 
must at the same time appeal to broader audiences who hold different interests as well as different  
_______________ 
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assumptions concerning poverty. As David Zarefsky wrote in his Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty: 
To view a question of public policy as a problem of rhetoric . . . is to focus on the 
creation and exchange of symbols through which issues are perceived, defined, 
addressed, and resolved. In a government based on consent, any policy proposal can be 
examined from a rhetorical perspective. Ways must be found to persuade relevant 
audiences to support the proposal. . . . strategies must be imagined and symbols 
generated to associate the policy proposal with the audience’s values and 
predispositions. What is involved here is neither pandering to the audience nor passively 
laying a proposal before an audience in the confidence that its merits are self-evident but 
an active process of mutual adjustment.2
Policy advocacy, in other words, does not occur in a vacuum, and because any poverty program must 
generally take from the non-poor to provide some sort of benefit to the poor, the support of the non-poor is 
both inherently more difficult and more important to attain.  
During the twentieth century, the American president has clearly a critical figure in the nation’s 
ongoing struggle with poverty. The American welfare state was born at the national level when Franklin 
Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act in 1935, which included provisions for old age insurance, 
unemployment compensation, and public assistance to dependent children in need. For almost the next 
thirty years, the programs begun during the New Deal changed little beyond their gradual expansion. It 
was not until Lyndon Johnson declared a “War on Poverty” in 1964 that the role of the federal government 
in the lives of the nation’s poor significantly changed again. Toward the end of Johnson’s administration, 
support for the nation’s poverty programs began to wane for a variety of reasons, and soon popular focus 
turned more toward welfare rather than poverty. Following Johnson, both Richard Nixon and Jimmy 
Carter made significant efforts to revolutionize and “control” the growing welfare system, although neither 
was ultimately successful. In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan would come to epitomize the so-called 
“retrenchment era” in American social policy when he drastically cut funding for social programs through 
his budget policies and, his critics argue, by contributing to the nation’s anti-government and anti-welfare 
sentiments through his rhetorical efforts.3 Bill Clinton, who campaigned in 1992 on the promise to “end 
welfare as we know it,” eventually signed legislation in 1996 that ended the federal entitlement to public 
assistance established by Roosevelt, imposed work requirements and time limits, and earned the 
condemnation of many of the nation’s poverty scholars. All five of these presidents—Johnson, Nixon, 
Carter, Reagan, and Clinton—thus placed poverty or welfare reform high on their domestic agendas, and 
all five attempted to utilize the power of the rhetorical presidency in their pursuit of their respective goals 
concerning poverty and welfare. 
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 This project examines how these five presidents discussed issues of poverty and welfare from 
Johnson’s declaration of War on Poverty in 1964 to Clinton’s signing of the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in 1996. The project is guided by two goals, one primarily 
descriptive and analytical, and the other more prescriptive. The first goal is to provide a rhetorical history 
of the president’s involvement with poverty and welfare issues during this crucial time period for the 
nation’s social programs. While several excellent histories have been written on poverty in twentieth 
century America,4 and a number of rhetorical analyses on specific poverty issues are available,5 no single 
work reviews the poverty rhetoric of these presidents longitudinally. The second goal goes beyond 
description. I hope to utilize the analysis to advance the understanding of poverty politics, and to uncover 
possible strategies for enhancing the manner in which the nation assists its poor and honors its ideals. 
 The analysis is informed by the perspective, influenced by the work of Deborah Stone and Chaim 
Perelman, that public policy issues in general should be considered with a focus on the inherent tensions 
and paradoxes involved and the tough choices they present.6 In particular, I argue that there are four 
critical tensions relevant to issues of contemporary poverty politics in the United States: politics vs. policy, 
deserving vs. undeserving, help vs. hinder, and equality vs. freedom. The key to improving the manner in 
which the nation confronts the problem of poverty requires understanding and negotiating these tensions. 
 The analysis shows that the five presidents had a mixed but overall rather poor record in 
confronting and attempting to balance these tensions. In general they tended either to avoid the tensions 
altogether, or fall to one or the other extreme. That being said, the analysis also reveals that there is 
considerable common ground concerning some critical issues between all the presidents, whether they 
were Democrats or Republicans, ideologically moderate or more partisan. Foremost among these are the 
beliefs that equal opportunity should be the overarching ideal, work should be rewarded well, and those 
that cannot help themselves should be supported as generously as possible by the government. The 
analysis also provides a greater understanding of the particular mix of constraints and opportunities 
relevant to poverty politics, and thus leads to a set of conclusions of how the public debate concerning 
poverty can improve. The analysis supports the notion that both conservatives and liberals need to come to 
certain realizations regarding poverty and welfare.  
  Perhaps the most important insight derived from the analysis involves President Clinton’s 
signing of the 1996 welfare bill that “ended welfare as we know it,” which was heavily criticized by the 
American Left at the time. Viewed from the perspective of the four primary tensions and in the context of 
more than thirty years of presidential poverty politics, however, Clinton’s signing of the bill lends itself to 
a much different interpretation. As revealed in Clinton’s remarkable address at the signing ceremony, the 
law has the potential to transform the debate concerning American poverty in a positive manner and in 
turn improve the situation for many of America’s poor. Briefly stated, the law could lead to a significant 
re-framing of the debate away from the generally unpopular focus on welfare and welfare recipients to the 
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working poor and the conditions and difficulties under which they labor, which could, then lead to other 
positive transformations beneficial to the American poor. Said differently, the 1996 law essentially shifted 
how the help/hinder and deserving/undeserving paradoxes influenced the politics of poverty, significantly 
reduced the difficulty of negotiating the politics/policy paradox when seeking to help the poor.  
In this first chapter, I outline the four critical paradoxes that impact American poverty politics. 
The description of the tensions also serves as a review of research concerning poverty and welfare issues. 
Chapters two through six examine each president individually. Each of these chapters begins with 
background information on the president and his record concerning poverty and welfare issues while in 
office, followed by a review of their rhetorical efforts that outlines the major themes utilized by each 
president involving welfare and/or poverty during their administrations. The conclusion of each these 
chapters analyzes the president’s rhetorical themes through the lens of the four primary tensions. Lastly, in 
chapter seven, I present the overall conclusions of the analysis. 
 
The Paradoxes of Poverty 
 
The paradoxes of poverty represent key issues with two opposing sides that inherently work to 
complicate the manner in which poverty is discussed and remedies are proposed and evaluated. These 
paradoxes, alternatively labeled “traps” by R. Kent Weaver, create hard choices for policymakers because 
they cannot “increase the prospects that they would get more of something they wanted without also 
increasing the risk that they would get something they did not want in political or policy terms.”7 Ideally 
political actors should recognize and attempt to balance these paradoxes, but, unfortunately, the nature of 
politics typically does not reward such prudence. As a result, poverty rhetoric is often skewed, focusing 
upon only one side or the other of these various dilemmas. In a two-party political system, this 
phenomenon can easily lead to what Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones labeled “noncontradictory 
argumentation.”8 In such situations, each party adopts one side of the paradox and builds an argument that 
seems exceedingly logical to them and others who share their perspective. That argument, however, seems 
absurd to others whose logic is based primarily on the opposing side of the paradox. As a result, 
polarization occurs and understanding between the perspectives becomes exceedingly difficult. This 
polarization is encouraged by the natural human impulses of egoism and selective interpretation, which 
leads individuals to seek out opinions that confirm their point of view and dismiss those that challenge it. 
In a polarized atmosphere, political actors attempting to find the right balance between the perspectives are 
caught in a crossfire, and find very little support.  
One of the more important goals of this analysis, however, is to avoid non-contradictory 
argumentation, and focus more attention on the need to confront the paradoxes natural to these public 
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policy issues. My goals are thus clearly distinct from those of the politician. This distinction was captured 
well by Vincent and Vee Burke, as they explained the failure of Richard Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan: 
The analyst and the politician are natural antagonists. The analyst insists that when 
values conflict, society must understand that every choice sacrifices one good for 
another. . . . But the politician tries to cover up such conflicts; his rhetoric deliberately 
evades dilemmas and inconsistencies. It is not so much that the politician wants to have 
his cake and eat it too. Rather, he knows that some voters want to have it and some want 
to eat it and he wants to please them all.9
Uncovering and understanding these paradoxes as an analyst will not be enough, however. I hope to bridge 
the gap between analyst and policy maker and discover viable political paths to progress. My task 
therefore, is to function as what Celeste Condit has described as an “empathic” critic, whose role was to 
“locate pieces of common ground among various voices and to discover options for those compromises 
necessary for co-existence . . . . [and] that maximize multiple values and interests.”10 The first step in 
fulfilling this role is to lay out the difficult choices that exist which politicians must then attempt to 
negotiate.  
 
Paradox #1: Politics versus Policy 
 
 This first paradox involves the natural tension that often develops between political and policy 
goals, and represents a key tension in the essentially any public policy issue. Individually, both political 
goals and policy goals are admirable and although the two goals are not inherently incompatible, when 
pursued simultaneously they do tend to clash. Often conceptualized as the “delegate” and “trustee” models 
of representation, or in the distinctions between campaigning and governing or responsiveness and 
leadership, the question of whether politicians should follow and honor public opinion or follow their own 
preferences, beliefs, and “principles” is critical. One can assume that all politicians want to (a) get re-
elected and grow in popularity, and (b) improve society by proposing, supporting, and implementing what 
they believe is “good” policy. The problem is that the pursuit of one is often a detriment to the pursuit of 
the other, and, of course, politicians differ in their propensity or even intention to hit the mark. 
Nonetheless, the assumption that both policy and political goals are important remains, and the ultimate 
goal of perfect balance should serve as a useful target for which to strive. 
Policy goals can be considered a function of both ideology and substantive information, both of 
which have been shown to be quite important to presidential decision-making.11 As used here, ideology 
involves personal beliefs concerning the particular value hierarchy to which societies should subscribe and 
the methods to achieve them, whereas substantive information—that may originate in think-tanks, research 
universities or institutions, or bureaucracies—involves empirical data regarding the available means to 
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those ends.  Ideological beliefs also tend to serve as a filter through which substantive information passes 
and is potentially distorted or selectively interpreted. Individuals weigh ideology and information to 
various degrees, and thus the conflict between ideology and information represents a secondary dilemma 
in which political actors must attempt to find the proper balance (in other words, how much information 
does it take to change an ideological assumptions?)  
In competition with policy goals are political goals—primarily linked to popularity and re-
election—that require the servicing of numerous constituencies. As Richard Neustadt wrote in his classic 
work, Presidential Power: “A modern President is bound to face demands for aid and service from five 
more or less distinguishable sources: from Executive officialdom, from Congress, from his partisans, from 
citizens at large, and from abroad.”12 To fulfill their political goals, politicians must get re-elected, which 
means they must service these constituencies and address the needs of relevant audiences. Which 
audiences are “relevant” depends on the situation at hand: during an election, it may be eligible voters; 
during a vote in Congress, members of Congress; during the implementation of policy, bureaucrats and 
citizens; etc. Getting re-elected also typically requires funding, which in turn requires fundraising and 
brings various contributors, interest groups, and political action committees into the picture. In addition, 
popular support is a key variable concerning presidential influence over Congress,13 thus the pursuit of 
political goals such as raising approval ratings in the short term may be critical to the pursuit of policy 
goals in the long term. Overall, the point is that inattention to political goals can not only lead to 
ineffectiveness in office, but swift removal from office with the next election.  
This split between politics and policy, and the need to balance them, is evident in much of the 
literature on the presidency. Paul Light outlines three presidential goals: reelection, historical achievement, 
and good policy (the latter two I collapse into policy goals, assuming good policy would translate into 
historical achievement). Light wrote that “[j]ust as congressmen are motivated by electoral considerations 
. . . [p]residents concentrate on issues that match their personal and political goals.”14 Jeffrey Cohen’s 
work focuses on the difficulty presidents face it trying to be both leaders and responsive to the public. He 
wrote that “[m]odern presidents face not only high but contradictory expectations. The contradiction 
between providing active policy leadership for the mass public while also being responsive to its policy 
preferences strikes at the core of the modern presidency . . . . The president’s success hinges on his ability 
to maneuver between the calls for responsiveness and leadership.”15  Others such as Deborah Stone, Sam 
Kernell, Daniel Ponder have made similar comments concerning how presidents must negotiate the split 
between politics and policy.16  The split it also evident in the design of information networks within the 
presidency.17
Although policy goals may seem to be the more noble of the two, policy and political goals both 
have positive and negative dimensions, depending on perspective. Positively, “politics” can be framed as 
democratic responsiveness and “policy” as bold, courageous, principled leadership. Negatively, “politics” 
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is merely pandering and demagoguery, and “policy” is tyranny and imperialism. The extremes—all 
politics with no concern for policy, or all policy with no concern for politics—are both undesirable and 
detrimental to a democracy, therefore political actors seek to balance them in some form. Unfortunately, 
there is a fine line between Aristotle’s prudent statesman (ideal mean), Plato’s totalitarian philosopher-
king (policy over politics), and Machiavelli’s amoral prince (politics over policy).  
 The search for the ideal mean between politics and policy calls forth the concept of prudence. In 
recent years, prudence has enjoyed a resurgence through the work of Edwin Hargrove, Eugene Garver, 
Ronald Beiner, and others. Hargrove wrote that prudence was the “trait that Aristotle values in leaders 
above all. . . . This is the one characteristic that citizens need not have but that rulers must have. Prudence 
is practical wisdom about how to balance and accommodate competing interests in a constitution.”18 
Applying the notion of prudence directly to American presidents, Hargove wrote: 
presidents must use skills and embrace goals that are congruent with the historical 
context. The preeminent skill is discernment of the political possibilities at a given time. 
Of particular importance is insight into the resources for and constraints on action in the 
political culture. . . . Presidents must be prudent in their discernment of the historical 
possibilities for action if their idealism is not to become grandiosity. One must be 
prudent before one can be bold.19
Eugene Garver summarized the concept simply as the “good practical use of reason,” and it includes the 
possession of practical wisdom (phronesis) and ethical virtue (arete), as well as the application of political 
judgment (praxis).20  
In summary, the policy-politics paradox assumes that politicians cannot simply act on their own 
policy goals or even on policy information provided to them, but must always “play the game” of politics. 
Policy preferences must always be justified to a number of relevant audiences, a step that makes rhetoric 
inherently critical. Rhetoric clearly plays an important role in negotiating this tension, therefore 
considering how rhetors attempt to reconcile these competing goals is critical to the analysis and 
subsequent judgment of policy rhetoric. In the end, the tension mirrors what Donald Bryant argued was the 
function of rhetoric: seeking the ideal mean between adjusting ideas to people and people to ideas.21 Too 
much of the former is the abdication of leadership, whereas too much of the latter can often represent its 
abuse. 
 Although the policy-politics paradox is relevant to all policy issues, it is particularly difficult to 
negotiate concerning issues of poverty for a number of reasons. Put simply, there are significant political 
penalties to confronting poverty in the United States, and few benefits. Indeed, the inevitable impact of the 
remaining three paradoxes is to complicate the capacity for policy makers to negotiate this paradox. 
Additionally, politicians receive little political incentive to confront issues of poverty, in part because the 
poor have very little political power in the United States. The poor do not vote as often, and they tend not 
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to donate their time or money to political campaigns. Most policies to help the poor must on some level 
take from the non-poor to provide to the poor, thus requiring politicians to take benefits away from those 
who do vote and provide money and time in order to give to those who do not.  
  Any significant effort to confront poverty will also be expensive. Weaver labeled the high cost of 
poverty programs the “money trap,” writing that “most meaningful welfare reforms require spending more 
money than the public thinks is necessary or more than Congress wants to spend.”22 One simple fact that 
eludes many critics of welfare, for example, is that welfare programs are much cheaper than the 
alternatives designed to help people off welfare and into the mainstream workforce. Welfare is simply a 
stipend designed to keep a family fed and sheltered from month to month. A full-fledged anti-poverty 
program could necessitate funding public service jobs, job training, transportation, child care, 
neighborhood rehabilitation, housing, and health care in addition to an income stipend, all of which carry 
significant pricetags.  
 Other aspects of American political culture exacerbate the difficulty of confronting poverty. As 
evidenced by the classic works of Alexis DeTocqueville, Robert Bellah, and others, the United States is a 
highly individualistic society. That individualism works naturally against placing a focus on poverty as a 
broadly important policy issue in America. The examination of the freedom versus equality paradox will 
consider in greater detail how American individualism works against confronting poverty. American 
politics also tend to reward optimism. As Clinton speechwriter Michael Waldman wrote: “The truism in 
American politics is that the more optimistic president always wins.”23 Unfortunately, placing poverty 
high on the policy agenda is typically anything but optimistic. The complexity of the issue in general also 
increases the difficulty of negotiating the policy versus politics tension.  Substantive information 
concerning poverty is very complicated and often contradictory. Poverty intersects with controversial 
issues of race relations and gender inequality, which have their own pitfalls that politicians often seek to 
avoid. The sort of consensus that can arise and make a policy direction clear to all is rare. The complexity 
of the information also provides easy ammunition to those opposed to policy proposals, to the point that it 
seems that some sort of evidence can be found for or against any policy position.  
For the most part, the policy-politics paradox works against advocates of more generous poverty 
programs because it tends to work to keep poverty off the agenda and to keep reforms minor. Politicians 
often have several policy issues that are important to them that they hope to address during their time in 
office, but only a few issues are on the public agenda at any given time. Without necessarily resorting to 
“pandering,” it would make sense for politicians to choose to focus on those particular issues within their 
personal agenda that have a greater degree of public support and potential political benefit.24 Due to its 
inherent constraints, it would seem likely that politicians would rarely choose poverty as their signature 
issue.  
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  Interestingly, the dynamics of the policy-politics paradox switch when the dominant frame 
becomes “welfare,” rather than “poverty.” Whereas the poverty frame would favor avoidance, the welfare 
frame, at least during the latter part of the twentieth century, favored action, practically any action. Weaver 
summarized this public push against welfare by writing, “Although the evidence [public opinion] suggests 
public ambiguity rather than a clear mandate for many items on the welfare reform agenda, it also suggests 
that public antipathy toward the AFDC program was so great that people would acquiesce to almost any 
welfare reform proposal enacted by politicians.”25 Here, with personal policy goals and public opinion 
matching, the attack on welfare actually benefits from a lack of tension in the policy-politics paradox. 
When public beliefs hold such a negative connotation of welfare and welfare recipients, as documented in 
Martin Gilens’ aptly titled book, Why Americans Hate Welfare,26 politicians are rewarded when they place 
welfare reform on the agenda, especially when the assumption behind the policy proposals is that benefits 
would be reduced and harsher requirements are instilled. 
 Despite the natural disadvantages to advocating more serious confrontation with poverty, there 
remains a resilient store of beliefs in the United States that supports helping the helpless and punishes 
politicians that seem heartless or harsh to the poor. This counter-reaction to the American impulse against 
anti-poverty programs will be evident during the reviews of the equality-freedom and deserving-
undeserving paradoxes. These compassionate beliefs follow the philosophy of Adam Smith as explained in 
the Theory of Moral Sentiments, which assumed that human beings have a natural sentiment or sympathy 
for other humans that can counteract pure self-interest. Politicians therefore cannot simply dismiss the 
poor and disadvantaged, because by doing so they would be open to criticism, especially if the poor in 
question are considered “deserving.”  
 
Paradox #2: Equality versus Freedom 
 
In her insightful Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, Deborah Stone 
explained that the first task of the political analyst was to “reveal and clarify the underlying value 
disputes so that people can see where they different and move toward some reconciliation.” 
Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work also focused values and how they are debated in 
discourse. They argued that people rarely, if ever, argue that they are against positive abstract 
values such as equality, liberty, or freedom. Considered separately, most values are universally 
supported. Dilemmas arise primarily when these inherently positive values must compete with 
each other. Perelman and Olbechts-Tyteca define these situations as matters concerning the 
“hierarchy of values.”  They write: 
Value hierarchies are, no doubt, more important to the structure of an argument than the 
actual values.  Most values are indeed shared by a great number of audiences, and a 
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particular audience is characterized less by which values it accepts than by the way it 
grades them. . . . . The reason why one feels obliged to order values in a hierarchy, 
regardless of the result, is that simultaneous pursuit of these values leads to 
incompatibilities, [and] obliges one to make choices.27 (emphasis added) 
Combined with Aristotle’s theory that virtue corresponds with finding the ideal mean between extremes, a 
key issue in public policy deliberation can be framed as the quest for finding the right balance between the 
various competing values relevant to that issue. The second primary paradox thus focuses on the particular 
value dilemma between the glorified American ideographs of freedom and equality.  
In Political Communication, Dan Hahn argued that the primary question of American politics is 
“how much freedom versus how much order?” The question falls easily into Aristotle’s construct. The 
extreme of complete freedom with no order would represent anarchy, whereas an extreme of complete 
order with no freedom would be tyranny. The question of ideal governance becomes a question of finding 
the right balance between the two, which inherently leads to the question of the appropriate role of 
government. This tension between freedom and order greatly influences issues of poverty and welfare in 
the United States. “Order” is this case is framed as “equality,” in the sense that equality is not a natural 
occurrence in a capitalistic society, therefore some outside authority is typically necessary for equality to 
be realized. Both freedom and equality are principles that have been highly valued throughout American 
history. In a political context, “freedom” signifies the absence of undo authority and an individual right to 
make important choices in life such as whom to vote for and where and how to live and work. In an 
economic context, freedom is typically framed with a focus on individualism and self-reliance. As Alexis 
DeTocqueville and Robert Bellah have so clearly documented, individualism is likely the most strongly 
held value in the United States. From the American Revolution of the late 1700s to the Conservative 
Revolution of the late 1900s, this individualistic impulse has consistently fed the criticism of government, 
the glorification of work, and the sanctification of private property. 
Based on the proclamation in the Declaration of Independence that it was a “self-evident truth” 
that all men were created equal, equality has also served a critical role in American mythos. During the 
20th century, as chronicled by Celeste Condit and John Louis Lucaites, the ideograph of equality served as 
the basis of the Civil Rights Movement and moral calls for the United States to live up to its cherished 
ideals.28 Similar to freedom, equality can be framed both politically and economically. When framed 
politically, both equality and freedom seemingly work together. Equal political rights serve the notion of 
political freedom. Hence the various movements that sought to bring change to American society 
throughout the 20th century could all wrap their arguments within the values of both freedom and equality 
and essentially call for change in the name of having both realized.  
In their respective economic framings, however, freedom and equality can diverge. Whereas the 
rhetoric of economic freedom has typically focused on individualism and freedom from government, calls 
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for economic equality often require or demand action from outside authorities to bring about equality. In 
most cases, that outside authority is government. Government, in other words, can play the dual role of 
villain and provider, depending on which value is held dominant.  
Applied to the issue of poverty, the equality-freedom dilemma essentially defines the primary 
political positions. If equality serves as the overriding premise, poverty is deemed un-American and anti-
poverty efforts are much more defensible. Government intervention is clearly necessary in order to 
overcome barriers that hold back the disadvantaged. The villains in this narrative are often the rich, who 
are often portrayed as greedy and hateful of the poor. The poor, on the other hand, are victims of the rich, 
the racist, and/or the sexist, or, in a more neutral storyline, of the unforgiving economic system. This is the 
primary narrative in the mindset of the American Left.  
Alternatively, if economic freedom and the individualism it supports dominate the primary frame, 
then anti-poverty efforts rather than poverty are seen as violating cherished American ideals. Not only do 
government programs represent government paternalism, but the taxes that must be collected to fund such 
programs are viewed as an infringement of private property rights. From this perspective, poverty is often 
interpreted as the natural result of lack of effort, talent, or proper behavior, and wealth as the natural result 
of superior effort, talent, or behavior. The villains are the poor themselves and the government and its 
supporters (“bleeding heart liberals”) that serve as enablers. This is the narrative that is typical to many on 
the political right, with social conservatives focusing on pathological behavior and free market 
conservatives focusing on welfare’s perverse economic incentives. 
In the American ethos, the conflict between equality and freedom is often transcended through 
the notion of “equal opportunity,” an almost universally accepted ideal of the American system. Even 
controversial conservative scholar Charles Murray has argued that he supports “[b]illions for equal 
opportunity, not one cent for equal outcome—such is the slogan to inscribe on the banner of whatever 
cause my proposals constitute.”29  Most political differences are not based on whether equal opportunity 
should be the goal, but rather the extent to which equal opportunity exists and the appropriate role of 
government in closing any gap. In many ways, whatever presumption dominates that issue—the extent of 
equal opportunity—will dictate the presumption concerning the need for anti-poverty efforts.  
The conflict between equality and freedom becomes even more complicated when economic 
freedom is redefined from the dominant negative frame of “freedom from” to the more progressive 
positive frame of “freedom to.” This is essentially what Franklin Roosevelt did in order to justify the New 
Deal philosophically within the American tradition. In his famous speech to the Commonwealth Club 
during the 1932 presidential campaign, Roosevelt turned the tables on those attacking his ideas as affronts 
to personal liberty by providing an extensive account of American history that traced the role of 
government and its necessity to adjust as environmental conditions dictated. Equating the feudal barons of 
the 18th century to the huge corporations of the 20th, and the constraints to political freedom then with the 
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constraints to economic freedom now, Roosevelt presented the argument that in the economic environment 
at the time government must step in to assist the individual in order to restore free enterprise. In doing so, 
Roosevelt united the normally disparate values of freedom and equality by shifting the focus from political 
freedom to economic freedom. Interestingly, Roosevelt never really invoked the value of equality. He 
focused on a rhetoric of economic freedom that served as a surrogate to the rhetoric of equal opportunity. 
In other words, Roosevelt somewhat paradoxically called for more government control as the basis of 
insuring more individual freedom.30 As noted by Robert Eden, these arguments served as the basis of the 
regime of pragmatic liberalism that would dominate American politics for the rest of the century.31   
Roosevelt’s redefinition of “freedom” clearly worked to balance the two ends of the equality-
freedom paradox. In the same speech, Roosevelt employed another rhetorical construct that also served to 
balance the two values:  
The Declaration of Independence discusses the problem of government in terms of a 
contract. Government is a relation of give and take—a contract, perforce, if we would 
follow the thinking out of which it grew. Under such a contract rulers were accorded 
power, and the people consented to that power on consideration that they be accorded 
certain rights. The task of statesmanship has always been the re-definition of these rights 
in terms of changing and growing social order. New conditions impose new 
requirements upon government and those who conduct government. 
Roosevelt then built on the metaphor of the “social contract” by enumerating which rights government 
should enforce. Borrowing from the Declaration of Independence, the first right Roosevelt discussed was 
the “right to life,” which he interpreted as “a right to make a comfortable living” which an individual “may 
by sloth or crime decline to exercise. . . but it may not be denied him.” The argument became a critical 
element of Roosevelt’s philosophy.  
 The social contract became a device that rhetorically established the respective roles of both 
government and individuals within a society. Government is called upon to provide true opportunity to its 
citizens (a “chance”), whereas citizens have the responsibility to take those opportunities seriously and do 
their part, namely to give sincere effort and not partake in activities that may squander their opportunity. 
The metaphor of the social contract, therefore, mediated between individualism based on freedom that 
denied equality and government paternalism based on equality that violated American notions of freedom.  
Key to understanding Roosevelt’s argument was that during the expansion of the country before 
the Industrial Revolution, the nation’s agrarian base and vast “safety valve” of the Western prairie, the 
social contract was honored without the need for much governmental interference. “No one who did not 
shirk the task of earning a living,” Roosevelt explained, “was entirely without opportunity to do so.” In 
other words, Roosevelt was arguing that any individual willing to work hard could go west, claim land, 
and make a decent living. The “right to a make a comfortable living” being naturally supplied, the role of 
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government was understandably limited. With the Industrial Revolution, however, the situation changed. 
From this perspective, the New Deal was not constructed as a response to the Great Depression, but rather 
to the Industrial Revolution, or, more specifically, to the end of Jefferson’s dream of a nation of self-
sufficient farmers.  
At the conclusion of this speech, Roosevelt again addressed the likely criticism that his policies 
would violate the liberties of some in the name of the liberty of others. Directly confronting the inherent 
tensions, he explained that “individual liberty and individual happiness mean nothing unless both are 
ordered in the sense that one man’s meat is not another man’s poison . . . . We know that liberty to do 
anything which deprives others of those elemental rights is outside the protection of any compact, and that 
government in this regard is the maintenance of a balance.” Roosevelt then closed the speech with the call 
to “recognize the new terms of the old social contract,” a line Clinton would borrow sixty years later.32  
In the speech, Roosevelt was able to construct his new image of progressive government by 
appealing to traditional conservative icons. The rhetoric of the social contract was essentially a moderate 
argument that required government to insure the obligation implicit in the myth of the American Dream: if 
you work hard, you should have a decent standard of living. Roosevelt was thus able to redefine liberalism 
yet remain consistent by shifting the emphasis from political freedom to economic freedom. The enemy of 
freedom was thus redefined away from tyrannical government and more toward unregulated business and 
the dogma of laissez-faire economics.  
 Whereas Roosevelt’s abstract notion of the social contract was able to transcend the competing 
values of equality and freedom and justify an activist role of government that also respected American 
individualism, in its practical application it remained open to criticism from both sides. Both the 
government and the individual could be charged with violating the terms of the contract. If the government 
did not provide equal opportunity to its citizens, then government could be held to blame and an increased 
government involvement could be justified. However, individuals could also be blamed for failing to live 
up to their end of the bargain. The existence of poverty, therefore, is not sufficient to assume a lack of 
equal opportunity. The particular attribution of that poverty—whether environmental or dispositional—
becomes a key issue, for the establishment of causal blame inherently dictates treatment responsibility. 
And in a nation that glorifies individualism as the United States does, the undeserving poor—the poor that 
are poor due to their own actions or lack thereof—are not seen as warranting assistance. This rhetorical 
tension between the “deserving” and “undeserving” is the focus on the third primary paradox of American 
poverty. 
Roosevelt’s New Deal, and specifically the Social Security Act of 1935, represents the first time 
the American president has become significantly involved in the issue of poverty. Before then, the issue 
was primarily handled at a local level. The Great Depression and the extremely high unemployment it 
brought forced the issue onto the national stage. Roosevelt also provides a strong example of prudential 
 14
rhetoric. Whereas the question of whether Roosevelt had hit the ideal mean is certainly open to 
interpretation, it is clear that in his reframing of freedom and in his rhetorical construction of the social 
contract, Roosevelt provided future political actors with two means by which to negotiate the freedom-
equality dilemma. Rather than simply appeal to one side or the other, Roosevelt offered a position that 
considered both sides seriously and attempted to balance them properly. Roosevelt, therefore, will serve as 
a template from which to compare the five presidents that represent the focus of my analysis. 
 
Paradox #3: Deserving versus Undeserving 
 
Much of the traditional American perspective concerning poverty took Elizabethan England as its 
model. A primary feature of the English poverty ideology was the division of the poor into the deserving 
(those who were not able to work, such as the disabled, the elderly, or widowed women, or those out of 
work due to circumstances out of their control, such as seasonal layoffs or injuries) and the undeserving 
(the rest of the poor). From one extreme, all poor are victims, thus deserving of the help of the non-poor, 
with no questions asked or expectations levied. At the other extreme, all poor are implicated in their own 
poverty, thus undeserving of help.  
According to Michael Katz, author of The Undeserving Poor, the justification of governmental 
assistance for the deserving poor fits effortlessly within dominant Judeo-Christian ideals, and does not run 
counter to the American ideal of individualism.33 The undeserving poor, on the other hand, present a 
difficulty. Within this paradigm, poverty was normally considered a moral deficiency. Such assumptions 
have a long history in the United States. Social Darwinists, following the work of Darwin and the ideology 
of Jeremy Bentham, believed that, although unfortunate, the poor must pay the price demanded by nature 
and essentially be allowed to die out. Helping the poor was thus interpreted as unnatural and detrimental to 
the common good. Following the teachings of John Calvin and Martin Luther, the Protestant religious 
tradition has often also supported the position that “economic success was a sign of favor. Poverty, 
therefore, was also a sign of God’s will.”34 Sociologist Christopher Jencks explains that the undeserving 
poor “have always posed a problem for compassionate liberals. When the poor are doing all they can to 
better themselves, it is easy to argue that they deserve a helping hand. . . . But when sane, healthy adults 
refuse to follow norms of behavior that most of society endorses, the claim that we should help them 
arouses intense controversy.”35 In other words, whether the poor are perceived as deserving or undeserving 
essentially defines responsibility for the cause of poverty, and at the same time assigns responsibility for 
its treatment. The deserving-undeserving line thus presents policymakers with a dilemma: policies must be 
symbolically constructed to help the deserving poor but not the undeserving poor, or, conversely, cuts to 
social programs must be viewed as harmless to the deserving poor while disciplining or punishing only the 
undeserving. In most cases, of course, the line is far too indefinite to allow such careful negotiation 
 15
between the two. For example, in what R. Kent Weaver terms the dual clientele problem, punishing 
“undeserving” parents will often harm “deserving” children.36
 The distinction of whether someone is deserving or undeserving of help is made through a 
communicative act called an attribution. An attribution is a particular answer to the question “what caused 
the observed behavior and its consequences?”37 The study of attributions involves the analysis of “the 
basic processes involved in perceiving the self, other persons, and the setting in which people function,” 
and concerns “behavior, behavioral consequences, and the circumstances under which behavior occurs,” 
along with the cognitive connections between these various components.38 In its most basic form, an 
attribution is an argument concerning the allocation of responsibility for an action or phenomena to 
particular actors, structures, or both.  
Attributions, in other words, are inherently rhetorical in the sense that they are arguments that 
always deal with somewhat uncertain phenomena. Attributions delve into conscious and subconscious 
processes and concern questions of causation and influence, topics that have always and most likely will 
always elude clear validation.  Attributions at times masquerade as empirical observations—and indeed 
attributions can be more or less supported by evidence—but are often nothing more than exercises in 
mind-reading, or, as Fritz Heider, an early pioneer in attribution research, described it: “naïve 
psychology.”39 Most often, attributors simply consider whatever manifest data can be perceived, and 
attempt to postulate (rationally or irrationally) backward in time and inward in motivation, often making 
numerous mistakes along the way. The issue of poverty is perhaps the most extensively examined issue 
within attribution research. Millions have been tested, polled, and interviewed concerning how they 
explain poverty.40 In addition, hundreds of books have been written by scholars from a variety of 
ideological perspectives attempting to explain empirically or rationally the phenomenon of poverty.41 
Within every explanation are explicit or implicit attributions of responsibility.  
Manifest poverty is empirical in the sense that a poverty rate can be established, or that a poor 
person can be perceived (although looks can obviously be deceiving). The critical question, however, is 
the storyline leading up to the resulting poverty. Here the research in social psychology concerning 
attributions provides some interesting insights that are particularly relevant to this project. First, the most 
basic distinction made in the literature is between external and dispositional attributions. External 
attributions place responsibility or credit outside the individual, whereas dispositional attributions place 
responsibility or credit on the individual. Labeling the poor as undeserving, therefore, is a dispositional 
attribution, and labeling them as deserving is an external attribution. Second, research in social-
psychology has also revealed the existence of “actor-observer effect,” an inherent trait that leads 
individuals to attribute positive events dispositionally and negative events environmentally when they 
happen to them, and vice versa when they happen to other people.42  
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Applied to American poverty, these egotistical phenomena help explain in part a natural reaction 
of the non-poor to tend to blame poverty on the poor. Doing so absolves the non-poor of being implicated 
in having a hand in causing the poverty, and, due to the individualism that dominates the United States, 
also absolves them of responsibility for the treatment of poverty. In addition, if success in general is 
attributed dispositionally, the non-poor’s success is interpreted as individual effort, not a forgone 
conclusion. In his classic Blaming the Victim, William Ryan succinctly captured some of the dynamics of 
attributional egoism concerning poverty and racial inequality, writing: 
So our potential Victim Blamers are in a dilemma. . . . They cannot bring themselves to 
attack the system that has been so good to them, but they want so badly to be helpful to 
the victims of racism and economic injustice. Their solution is a brilliant compromise. 
They turn their attention to the victim in his post-victimized state. . . . They explain 
what’s wrong with the victim in terms of social experiences in the past, experiences that 
have left wounds, defects, paralysis, and disability. And they take the cure of these 
wounds and the reduction of these disabilities as the first order of business. . . . This is 
the solution of the dilemma, the solution of Blaming the Victim. And those who buy this 
solution with a sign of relief are inevitably blinding themselves to the basic causes of the 
problems being addressed. They are, most critically, rejecting the possibility of blaming, 
not the victims, but themselves. They are all unconsciously passing judgments on 
themselves and bringing in a unanimous verdict of Not Guilty.43
All else being equal, therefore, a political argument geared to the non-poor that frees the non-poor from 
responsibility for poverty will have a persuasive advantage over a political argument that hold the poor 
blameless, and thus, as a result, creates an expectation that the non-poor must share some responsibility 
and act. This phenomenon thus increases the difficulty of political actors who hope to advocate policies 
based on the assumption that poverty is an environmental attribution. The bottom line is that the non-poor 
want to believe the poor are undeserving. 
 Another difficulty of the deserving versus undeserving paradox could be labeled the “victimage 
dilemma.” This dilemma occurs when proponents of poverty programs seek to establish clearly the 
external attribution of poverty. Although the external attribution, if accepted, should lead to the non-poor 
being more amendable to policies designed to help the poor, at the same time that attribution also can 
work to remove any sense of self-efficacy from the poor. An argument that the poor are not to blame for 
their poverty is also an argument that the poor are not in control of their situation. They must therefore be 
passive and hope for the non-poor to help them. As a result, arguments that are successful in seeking the 
support of the non-poor may also work to reduce the perceived efficacy concerning efforts of the poor. 
Due to this dilemma, stories of individuals that were able to overcome their poverty on their own become 
curious rhetorical controversies. Such stories provide inductive evidence that the poor can overcome 
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poverty, thus it supports a dispositional attribution. Advocates of poverty programs, therefore, tend to 
disapprove of such stories, as they work against the broader argument that poverty is an environmental 
condition. The relevant question becomes whether these stories are the exceptions to the rule or simply 
examples of the rule. In the end, an odd situation arises where the poor need to hear such stories and 
believe in the hopeful logic of the “American Dream,” but the non-poor should not take too much stock in 
them.  
One major limitation of the attribution research, as well as the construct of the deserving-
undeserving poor, is its simplistic either-or logic. The question of deserving versus undeserving cannot be 
considered a simple yes or no question; few cases of poverty would hold that sort of clarity. In most cases, 
individuals would fall somewhere in between the extremes of deserving and undeserving. The problem, of 
course, is what happens to those that are “somewhat” deserving? Where does society draw the line?  The 
extreme cases seem easy to define. An individual who was given all opportunity to succeed but through 
laziness turns to crime and drugs and as a result falls into poverty may not garner much sympathy. The 
child born into poverty who was never provided an opportunity for an suitable education, on the other 
hand, typically would garner significant concern. It is the gray areas that are the most important to 
consider, but, indicative of much contemporary political debate, the gray areas tend not to get the 
attention. 
 Proponents of either extreme can garner significant evidence pointing toward the deserving or 
undeserving status of the poor. Proponents of the deserving poor can point to the low-wage economy, 
inequality in the education and health care system, racial or gender discrimination, the appalling 
conditions of the inner-city, among others. Opponents of the undeserving poor, in turn, point toward 
“pathologies” such as drug use, crime, laziness, and sexual promiscuity that leads to single parent families, 
among others. The former focus on the lack of opportunity, while the latter focus on the lack of 
responsibility. The former blame either the system itself or those that benefit disproportionately from the 
system (“the rich”), while the latter blame the poor. Evidence is inherently inconclusive, however, because 
statistics can never tell the entire story. A proficient snapshot of the current situation can be provided 
outlining the degree of racial or gender inequality, educational deficiencies, drug use, crime, or the number 
of single-parent families, but the story behind the numbers and the actual impact of those numbers on 
poverty remains rather elusive, at least to anything approaching consensus.  
The cyclical nature of many of the pathologies exacerbates the confusion. For example, does drug 
use lead to poverty, or did pre-existing poverty lead to drug use? As a result, research on poverty typically 
serves as ammunition for both sides in constructing arguments that are persuasive to those audiences that 
already support that side, but are generally dismissed by those that hold the opposing perspective. In other 
words, the research that attempts to shed light on the deserving-undeserving line tends to polarize 
positions, rather than focus on finding the right balance. 
 18
 Another important concept that helps explain the distinctions made between the deserving and 
undeserving poor is the role of sympathy. Sympathy is a critical emotion to those advocating programs 
that assist the poor, especially if those programs expect some sacrifice from the non-poor. Simply put, if 
the non-poor have sympathy for the poor, they are more likely to see the poor as deserving rather than 
undeserving. This assumption is not new.  In The Rhetoric, Aristotle defined pity as “a certain pain at an 
apparently destructive or painful evil happening to one who does not deserve it and which a person might 
expect himself or one of his own to suffer.”44 Aristotle also argued that people feel pity for those “like 
themselves in age, in character, in habits, in rank, in birth; for in all these cases something seems more to 
apply also to the self; for in general, one should grasp here, too, that people pity things happening to others 
in so far as they fear for themselves.”45 Aristotle thus provided two necessary conditions for sympathy: the 
target of sympathy must be undeserving of their fate, and the target must have enough in common with the 
sympathizer that they could imagine suffering the same fate. 
 Applied to the politics of contemporary American poverty, this notion of “there but for the grace 
of God go I” is certainly relevant. If the non-poor can see themselves as potentially poor or similar to 
people that are poor, they are more likely to support programs for the poor. The stereotypical image of 
poverty held by the non-poor so evident in the literature, therefore, becomes even more critical. The 
tendency for the poor to be geographically isolated from the non-poor, especially with the increasing 
concentration of poverty in the inner-city, works to decrease potential development of sympathy, as do 
racial and gender differences. This stereotypical image, however, is exaggerated. As economist Rebecca 
Blank wrote in 1997, “In the last decade, we have consistently misunderstood the nature of poverty in 
America, believing that it is more behavioral, more ghetto-based, and more a problem experienced by 
people of color. Hence, for many middle-income Americans, the poor have come to seem alien and less 
‘like us’ than they actually are.”46 This “misunderstanding” is an important one, because it works to 
decrease the natural sympathy the non-poor have for the poor.  
Two examples will help exhibit the importance of sympathy. Of all the various major social 
programs, social security has traditionally been the most popular. Clearly its popularity is partly due to its 
universal nature: all contributors are supposed to receive its benefits eventually, not just the poor. But 
considering polls show that many current contributors never expect to receive the benefit, something more 
must be at work. Considering the role of sympathy, it is clear that everyone is either currently elderly, has 
close friends or family that are elderly, or can at least imagine that they may be elderly one day. The 
elderly also generally have a positive public image. They tend not to be cognitively connected to 
pathologies, and are not expected to be entirely self-sufficient. The elderly poor therefore tend to be 
considered deserving of help, and most people can sympathize with them. 
The popularity of the New Deal programs during the Great Depression represents another 
example. At that time, a majority of the population was unemployed and millions were newly poor. The 
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large numbers made it clear that the poverty should be attributed environmentally, not dispositionally. It 
was thus easy for the remaining non-poor to imagine being poor, and thus to be sympathetic. Both 
conditions were again in place: the poor seemed undeserving of their poverty and many of the poor were 
very similar to the non-poor. As a result, the programs remained popular. 
In recent decades, however, the public image of poverty and the corresponding public support for 
poverty programs has waned significantly. Indeed, the analysis in chapters two through six will show how 
the support for poverty programs began to decrease during the late 1960s and continued to drop 
throughout the next thirty years. This increasingly negative view of the poor was a primary characteristic 
of the conservative perspective concerning poverty that moved from the fringe to the mainstream during 
this time period.47 This conservative viewpoint, which many liberal scholars argue is infused with both 
racism and sexism,48 often focuses on the image of the “welfare recipient” or of the “underclass,” two 
labels closely tied to the undeserving poor. In 1992, Christopher Jencks argued that instead of simply 
talking about the “poor,” “we now talk about the underclass, which by common consensus includes only 
the undeserving poor: men who have no regular job, women who depend on welfare to survive, street 
criminals, winos, and addicts. . . . The popularity of the term thus signals a political shift: instead of 
blaming poverty on society, as we did in the late 1960s, we are now more inclined to blame poverty on the 
poor.”49  
Research in the field of social psychology provides more evidence for this shift, and has 
consistently shown that the non-poor generally attribute poverty to individualistic causes.50 In a 1996 
article, Heather Bullock summarized the research, writing: “Among middle-class persons, perceptions of 
welfare recipients and the welfare system are overwhelmingly negative. Poor people and welfare 
recipients are typically characterized as dishonest, dependent, lazy, uninterested in education, and 
promiscuous.”51  
The construct of the deserving/undeserving line has been generally attacked by scholars on the 
left, such as Herbert Gans,52 but it nonetheless represents a public belief that can be manipulated from both 
ends of the political spectrum. Indeed, the history of poverty policy throughout the twentieth century can 
be framed as alternative trends in the line between the deserving and undeserving poor, with the Great 
Depression and Great Society as twin peaks in defining the poor as deserving of help, and the late 1980s 
and early 1990s as the height of the period when they were viewed as undeserving.  
To illustrate this point further, an important quirk in the polling research must be considered. As 
demonstrated in Tom Smith’s 1987 article “That Which We Call Welfare by Any Other Name Would 
Smell Sweeter” public opinion is steadfastly opposed to welfare, but continues to support efforts to help 
the “poor.” Evidently, the two labels—the poor and the welfare recipient—were completely dissociated in 
the public mind, with the latter label firmly considered to denote the undeserving poor. Research published 
in 1995, for example, showed that while 41 percent of respondents had a negative view of “people on 
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welfare” and 85 percent believed they were “too dependent on government assistance,” only 4 percent had 
a negative view of “poor people.” In addition, 66 percent believed government spent too much on 
“welfare,” whereas only 15 percent felt too much was spent on “assistance to the poor.” In their 2004 
article entitled, “Hate Welfare but Help the Poor: How the Attributional Content of Stereotypes Explains 
the Paradox of Reactions to the Destitute in America,” P. J. Henry, Christine Reyna, and Bernard Weiner 
reviewed the literature and concluded: 
Stereotypes of those on welfare portray them as lazy people who are capable of working, 
but instead choose to engage in morally questionable strategies in order to increase their 
monthly welfare checks. . . . Through the propagation of these stereotypes via the media 
and political rhetoric, the image of the welfare recipient has developed into that of a 
person who epitomizes laziness and yet is reaping the benefits of our social system. This 
stereotype not only represents a violation of American values, but also reminds 
Americans that the welfare system has failed. On the other hand, Americans are more 
sympathetic to poor people, who are stereotypically portrayed as working hard to make 
ends meet. If poor people work hard, yet still encounter environmental or economic 
barriers to success, then they are seen as deserving of assistance. Government programs 
designed to give these individuals an extra economic boost to get ahead are supported 
because these programs reward hard work and benefit the “deserving.” 
Martin Gilens, in his 1999 book aptly entitled Why Americans Hate Welfare, lends further support with the 
argument that while welfare is hated, anti-poverty measures perceived to benefit the deserving poor 
remain popular. Robert Reich labeled this public disdain for handouts but support for the working poor as 
the “the moral code at the heart of capitalism.” In sum, the American people were willing to help the poor, 
especially the working poor, just not welfare recipients, even though they were often one and the same.53
 In sum, the paradox for policy makers concerns the need to help the deserving while not helping 
the undeserving, a difficult balance to hit when no clear distinctions exist. The public image of the poor is 
thus critical to public support for poverty programs, especially the questions of whether the poor are seen 
as deserving or undeserving of help, and whether the non-poor can develop identification with and 
sympathy for the poor. An important focus of this project, therefore, is the image of the poor articulated by 
these American presidents. For each of the five presidents I will examine what stories the president tell 
about the poor, what labels they use, and whether they directly or indirectly attribute poverty 
dispositionally or environmentally.  
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Paradox #4: Help versus Hinder 
 
The fourth and final paradox focuses on intended and unintended consequences of social 
programs. The paradox itself revolves around whether poverty programs help or harm the people they 
serve. At one extreme, all poverty programs are justified because they are designed well and do what they 
are supposed to do, and thus represent money well-spent. At the other extreme, poverty programs are not 
justified because they are counterproductive and harm the people they are supposed to help, and thus not 
only represent wasted public resources, but public resources that cause rather than alleviate public 
problems. Similar to the other paradoxes, unfortunately, much of the public debate is noncontradictory on 
this subject, as those on the left focus on how programs help the poor and those on the right focus on how 
programs harm the poor. Ideally, policy makers would understand that social programs are not inherently 
at either extreme, and thus would seek to design a program with a clear purpose that would be cognizant of 
the possibility of counterproductive tendencies. The discussion of this fourth paradox will focus on three 
issues: the various purposes of anti-poverty programs, the degree to which poverty programs accomplish 
their intended purposes, and, perhaps most importantly, the role of unintended consequences in the debate 
over social policy programs.  
The first issue within this paradox involves the intended purpose of the anti-poverty programs. 
This issue is not a major point of discussion within the literature or the political conversation, but is an 
issue that I found to grow in importance as this project developed. Indeed, I would argue that the issue 
should become more of a concern in the debate. At the most basic level, anti-poverty programs have one 
of two primary purposes: they either seek to solve the problem of poverty, or to treat its symptoms. These 
two purposes have important differences, especially in terms of how the program should be evaluated. If 
the purpose of a program is to “solve” or “end” poverty, then success is defined as the program’s 
beneficiaries no longer being considered poor, perhaps even becoming self-sufficient. Ultimate success for 
such a program would lead to the program no longer being necessary. If the purpose of the program is to 
treat the symptoms of poverty, rather than end it, then success is defined as the program’s beneficiaries 
being better off with the program than without it. They would, however, still be expected to continue to 
need the benefits. The benefits must continue or else the beneficiary would fall right back to where they 
were before.  
The reason why this distinction is important is that if a program designed to treat symptoms is 
judged as a program to solve the problem, it will inevitably fall short. This is precisely what seems to have 
happened to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which was established in the 
1934 Social Security Act. The program was designed to alleviate the suffering of women with children 
who could not provide for themselves. At the time, most of the program’s beneficiaries were widows, and 
women then were not expected to be able to support themselves, especially “single mothers.” The program 
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provided a small stipend to these mothers with the purpose of providing them with at least, it was hoped, a 
bearable standard of living from month to month. The program was not designed, however, to lead 
mothers to self-sufficiency. It was designed to keep them from starving from one month to another. By 
focusing on these rather limited goals, the program itself remained rather inexpensive. All the government 
had to do was send a small monthly check. 
As the years went by, the population served by the program changed, as did the work 
opportunities and social expectations placed on single mothers. A higher and higher percentage of the 
women were divorced or never married, rather than widowed, thus their poverty was more susceptible to 
assumptions of a less “deserving” dispositional attribution rather than an environmental one. As more and 
more women worked, a program that provided for certain women who “chose” not to work became more 
controversial, especially when other women were now working, paying for day care as well as taxes that 
helped support the women on welfare. When the AFDC became the primary target of the critics of welfare 
in the last third of the twentieth century, one of the primary arguments was that the program was failing 
because it provided a disincentive from work and caused dependency. The program, however, was 
designed to replace work and it was assumed that the women enrolled would be dependent on the funds 
provided. The program, in other words, was routinely attacked for doing what it was designed to do. In the 
words of Rebecca Blank, “To claim that these programs have failed because they haven’t removed people 
from poverty is to expect something that these programs were never designed to accomplish.”54
Part of the complexity of anti-poverty programs is the myriad of programs that can be considered 
as part of the fight against poverty. Until it was replaced with Temporary Aid to Needy Families in the 
1996 bill, AFDC was the main program viewed as “welfare” by the American people. A number of other 
programs, however, are also relevant, including Food Stamps, low-income housing assistance, Social 
Security, health programs, job training programs, public works programs, child care and child support 
programs, tax programs, unemployment insurance, special programs for the disabled, even educational 
services. Some of these programs are available to the poor and non-poor alike, such as Social Security, and 
some are “means-tested,” meaning that only those individuals that fall within certain guidelines are 
eligible. Some of the programs are designed for temporary relief, such as unemployment insurance, while 
others assume beneficiaries would be served long term. As already mentioned, some programs seek to 
solve the problem, while others primarily treat the symptoms. The key issue, I would argue, is that the 
purpose of the program must be clear to those evaluating its performance. With this in mind, the analysis 
of the five presidents pays particular attention to how the presidents frame the purposes of the various anti-
poverty programs when the support or attack them.  
The second issue of relevance within the help versus hinder paradox focuses on the degree to which the 
programs actually fulfill their intended purposes. The evaluation of public policy is a major area of 
research now in the social sciences, both in the universities and in the growing number of think tanks 
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around the nation. Interestingly, the focus on welfare programs, at least for the last few decades, has 
typically been on the unintended consequences of these programs rather than the intended consequences. 
While the unintended consequences are certainly worthy of examination, the framing of the evaluations in 
general often give the impression that the programs never do what they are designed to do, which is 
clearly untrue. Simply put, food stamp programs have helped millions eat a better diet, housing programs 
have given millions better homes, welfare programs have alleviated some of the symptoms of poverty for 
millions, Medicaid has improved the health of millions. Whether or not these programs achieved their 
goals efficiently or not is certainly a difficult—and relevant—question to ask, but the practical absence of 
any sense that these programs do provide some real benefits to people is rather astonishing.  
 The third relevant issue within the help versus hinder paradox focuses on the unintended 
consequences of anti-poverty programs, clearly the most important issue during the current debate over 
welfare policy.  It involves what has become perhaps one of the most important contemporary 
conservative arguments concerning social policy: the “perversity thesis.” As explained by Albert O. 
Hirschman, the perversity thesis assumes that any social program will “backfire” due to unintended 
consequences.55 In the case of anti-poverty programs, the primary application of the perversity thesis is 
that welfare causes more poverty.  
Of course, the notion that anti-poverty programs could have unintended effects did not begin with 
conservative intellectuals writing in the 1980s. Franklin Roosevelt was clearly aware of the hazards of 
some of the programs we passed during the New Deal. Toward the end of the 1934, Roosevelt seemed to 
be growing more and more concerned with the expansion in the federal government’s relief efforts, 
especially direct cash relief. In his 1935 Annual Message, Roosevelt confronted the subject directly: 
More than two billions of dollars have also been expended in direct relief to the 
destitute. Local agencies, of necessity, determined the recipients of this form of relief. 
With inevitable exceptions, the funds were spent by them with reasonable efficiency, 
and as a result actual want of food and clothing in the great majority of cases has been 
overcome. But the stark fact before us is that great numbers still remain unemployed. A 
large proportion of these unemployed and their dependents have been forced on the 
relief rolls. The burden on the Federal Government has grown with great rapidity. . . . 
The lessons of history, confirmed by the evidence immediately before me, show 
conclusively that continued dependence upon relief induces a spiritual disintegration 
fundamentally destructive to the national fiber. To dole our relief in this way is to 
administer a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit. It is inimical to the dictates 
of a sound policy. It is in violation of the traditions of America. Work must be found for 
able-bodied but destitute workers. The Federal Government must and shall quit this 
business of relief. (emphasis added) 
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The final sentence of this excerpt tended to dominate newspapers the next day, and its forcefulness have 
led some scholars to believe the “Second New Deal” in 1935 was more conservative than the first from 
1933-1934.56 I tend to disagree with this opinion. I would argue that a leftward shift is evident if the attack 
on the dole is not considered out of context, as it usually is. Roosevelt’s attack on the dole cannot be 
understood without the accompanying call to provide decent, respectable work for the able bodied. The 
intended purpose of the relief program was to provide temporary relief to the unemployed until 
Roosevelt’s other programs that were designed to improve the economy began to show results. By 1935, 
Roosevelt realized that the “temporary” relief programs were going to be more than temporary, as the 
economy had not yet recovered. As a result, more, not less, help was needed. 
The Social Security Act, which was introduced to Congress shortly after this speech, created 
unemployment insurance, social security, and Aid to Dependent Children, which would later be changed 
to Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Unemployment insurance was designed to provide temporary 
relief to unemployed workers, and thus soften the blow of the cyclical economy. Social security was 
designed to provide relief to the elderly, and in part, at the time, to encourage more retirements, thus 
releasing jobs to younger workers. As mentioned earlier, ADC was designed to provide ongoing relief to 
single mothers, a category of individuals who at the time were not expected to work. These programs 
supplemented the massive public works programs that were also a part of the New Deal, which were 
designed to provide temporary work to the able-bodied until the economy recovered and returned them to 
the private sector. In sum, Roosevelt was against providing the able-bodied with cash, partly because he 
believed such a program had the unintended consequences of “destroying the spirit.” However, 
Roosevelt’s move away from the “narcotic” of the dole was not an attack on the poor, it was rather a 
realization that the government had to do more to help the poor, namely create jobs and make sure the 
poor had the skills and access to those jobs. This early shift from “welfare to work” represented Roosevelt 
attempting to shift from a focus on treating the symptoms of poverty to treating the problem, which was a 
much more significant and expensive job. 
Later in the century, the unintended consequences attached to welfare once again became one of 
the primary points of the debate, especially from those on the right. The most well-known contemporary 
exposition of the perversity thesis as applied to welfare came from Charles Murray, whose influential 
work, Losing Ground,  was published in 1984.57  Utilizing statistics and government figures, Murray 
argued that welfare programs were counterproductive because they rewarded the poor for being idle, 
primarily because the welfare benefits were higher than the wages they could earn going to work. Murray 
also argued that those same social programs discouraged marriage and encouraged illegitimate children, 
because benefits were higher for unmarried women with children. Throughout the 1990s, Murray became 
a fixture in the editorial pages and congressional hearings, arguing that illegitimacy and dependency were 
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the key issues in the welfare debate, and that anti-poverty programs were to blame for encouraging both. 
Murray’s work has been heavily criticized from the left, but its impact has nonetheless been substantial.58
Other conservative writers added to Murray’s thesis. Lawrence Mead’s primary point of focus in 
several books has been how the government’s paternalism has resulted in the recipients not being able to 
learn the importance of work.59 Marvin Olasky, who would later become an important advisor to President 
George W. Bush, wrote in The Tragedy of American Compassion that welfare programs have had the 
unintended effect of reducing the non-poor’s attachment to the poor because federal efforts worked to 
eclipse local efforts and the charity work of private institutions.60  
The perversity thesis has critical rhetorical importance to the public logic concerning poverty. 
The argument can actually trump all the other arguments that support anti-poverty arguments. Even if a 
program negotiates the equality versus freedom paradox and is philosophically justified within American 
values, and also negotiates the deserving versus undeserving paradox and is seemingly targeted to 
individuals that merit help, the help versus hinder paradox can still prove untenable. For if a program is 
assumed to cause more harm than good, any argument for the program can be reframed as an attempt to 
harm the poor, and doing nothing as more beneficial that doing something. Democratic party advisor 
James Carville explained the political impact of the perversity thesis as follows: 
I’ve got to hand it to the Republicans. It’s simply masterful what they’ve done so far in 
this debate. They’ve managed to convince the American people that they have only two 
choices on welfare: 1. Spend less money and cure all of society’s problems or 2. Spend 
more money and make the problems worse. . . . thanks to the Republican’s fine 
maneuver, people have a much more respectable option [than seeming greedy]: They 
can claim it’s not greed. It’s compassion. Hell, they care too much about people to give 
them a hand!61  
The perversity thesis thus has the added benefit of providing conservatives with a technical argument that 
did not actually require an attack on the poor, and thus was not as susceptible to charges of “blaming the 
victim” or “cold-heartedness.”  
 Another extension of the perversity thesis focuses on the broader economic impact of the 
programs. The Heritage Foundation, for example, published a booklet entitled America’s Failed $5.4 
Trillion War on Poverty. A large part of their argument was not only that poverty programs did not work, 
and not only that the poverty programs caused dependency and rewarded illegitimacy, but that the cost of 
the poverty programs slowed the American economy in general, thus indirectly causing more 
unemployment and poverty. The argument was practically a direct opposite of the argument that 
dominated during the hey-day of the New Deal programs, when the assumptions of Keynesian economics 
were that the spending spurred by government programs would “prime the pump” and lead to greater 
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economic growth. This extension solidified the conservative anti-welfare argument, again without having 
to attack the poor directly. 
 The response to the perversity thesis has not been very influential. The response has primarily 
been academic, as various scholars have attempted to dispel what they argue are the misconceptions of the 
perversity thesis. Several scholars point to the lack of evidence concerning the connection between family 
decisions and the welfare system.62 Others provide research that questions the assumptions concerning 
welfare and work disincentives. The notion that welfare leads to dependency is attacked with data showing 
that most stays on welfare are short term. Murray’s work in particular has been heavily criticized in a 
number of publications. Although these scholars provide convincing evidence to counter the logic of the 
perversity thesis, they have been unable to gain many converts. Indeed, the beauty of the perversity thesis 
is its simplicity. It makes sense to the non-poor.  Both sides of the debate are able to produce data to 
support their theories, and without any sense of consensus, the simple, and more guilt-free, logic of the 
perversity thesis will likely continue to dominate. Due to the important implication of a help or hinder 
perspective, this analysis of presidential rhetoric presented in this project will focus on how the presidents 
frame the purposes and intended and unintended consequences of the programs they support or criticize.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The four paradoxes of poverty represent difficult issues for any political actor attempting to 
construct policies geared toward the nation’s poor. All four paradoxes can be understood separately, but 
often work together. The poverty-politics paradox in particular is fueled in part by the other three. It is 
difficult for political actors to push for policies for the poor due to the degree of misunderstanding and 
confusion caused by the freedom-equality, deserving-undeserving, and help-hinder paradoxes. The 
paradoxes especially serve as hurdles to those arguing for increased efforts to help the poor. First, they 
must justify the policy philosophically within the American value system by negotiating the equality-
freedom paradox. Then they must show that the actual recipients are deserving. Then they must 
demonstrate that the actual policies achieve their goals and avoid unintended consequences. If these three 
hurdles are all overcome, it must still be politically viable for the political actor to seek the policy. In sum, 
the “poverty paradox” represents the notion that due to the combination of the American value system, the 
American political system, and the difficulty of the issue itself, there are significant constraints to any 
political actor seeking to support policies that help the nation’s poor. 
The four paradoxes are critical issues for the analysis of presidential rhetoric that will follow. The 
analysis shows that at times the presidents attempt to transcend them, avoid them altogether, or place 
blame elsewhere. Avoidance was perhaps the most typical response, as the presidents tended to proceed as 
if no tradeoffs were necessary. As a result, public debate concerning poverty becomes strained and 
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disjointed, with both sides accusing the other of causing intentional harm to the disadvantaged, abusing the 
authority of government, and subverting American ideals. In the end, the quality of the policies actually 
passed or continued, and in turn the poor themselves, suffer. Unfortunately, a final potential response to 
the paradoxes—explaining them and confronting them in a realistic manner—is rarely attempted, in large 
part due to the various political constraints inherent in a two-party system and the prevalence of “non-
contradictory argumentation” it tends to sustain. At times, however, the presidents do seem to offer ideas 
with the potential to negotiate the tensions. The analysis in the following five chapters, therefore, seeks 
both to evaluate the performance of the presidents through the lens of the four paradoxes, as well as 
uncover possible promising strategies that could be useful in the future. 
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CHAPTER II 
LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE WAR ON POVERTY 
 
No American president discussed poverty to the extent and with more conviction that Lyndon 
Baines Johnson. Lyndon Johnson ascended to the presidency with the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 
1963. Starting in 1964 and continuing into 1965, Johnson led “one of the most remarkable outpourings of 
major legislation in the history of the country.”1  Johnson not only enjoyed large Democratic majorities in 
the House and Senate, but he was also supported by the American people who were, in David Zarefsky’s 
words, “[a]roused by President Kennedy’s untimely death,” and thus “long[ing] for redemption through 
sacrifice.”2 In his first State of the Union address, Johnson declared “unconditional war on poverty in 
America,” and with that declaration, the issue of “poverty” rose from a position of relative obscurity to the 
top of the nation’s agenda. Indeed, until 1964, the word “poverty” did not appear as a heading in the index 
of the Congressional Record or the Public Papers of the President.3  
 
Johnson’s Record 
 
 Johnson signed the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (EOA) on August 20th. It was the primary 
piece of legislation of his War on Poverty, and included ten programs, including the Job Corps, work-
training programs, community action programs, and VISTA, a domestic peace corps. Two weeks later, 
Johnson signed the Food Stamp Act, which had begun as a Kennedy administrative order, and was now 
funded for $375 million over three years. After a landslide victory in the 1964 election gave the Democrats 
their largest margin in Congress since 1937, Johnson continued to push progressive legislation. He signed 
his first major “Great Society” measure, the Appalachian Regional Development Act, on March 9, 1965. 
In April, he signed a major Elementary-Secondary Education bill that authorized additional federal funds 
for public and private schools and he extended and expanded federal manpower programs for three years. 
On July 30, 1965, he signed the Medicare bill, which ended a 20 year fight begun by Harry Truman. The 
following month, he signed a $7.8 billion Omnibus Housing bill that provided major increases in rent 
supplements for low-income families. Finally, in October, amendments to the EOA were signed that 
doubled the first-year authorizations, thus increasing the funding to $1.785 billion.4
The year of 1966 brought forth the Child Nutrition Act, additional Manpower Development and 
Training Act Amendments, Demonstration Cities legislation, and an increase and expansion to the 
minimum wage. The momentum of the War on Poverty began to slow, however, while the amendments 
signed in 1966 continued the funding for the programs, but more and more restrictions began to be added. 
As explained in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, “With the public increasingly concerned with 
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inflation and the Vietnam War, Congressional Republicans found new Democratic allies in the effort to 
curb the ‘Great Society’ – not only its spending programs but almost any measure providing social reform. 
Despite strong persuasion efforts by the president, numerous priority bills became casualties.”5 The 
president suffered outright defeats on Civil Rights, the repeal of right to work laws, and unemployment 
compensation. According to David Zarefsky, the president himself became increasingly preoccupied with 
Vietnam by 1966 and had begun to “lose interest” in his anti-poverty programs.6 During the mid-term 
elections, the Republicans, utilizing the catchphrase of “guns or butter” and exploiting Johnson’s 
“credibility gap,” gained 46 seats in the House, 3 in the Senate, and 8 governorships. 
1967 was a year of qualified victories for Johnson, and was seen as “clearly the least productive” 
of his five years.7 He passed the largest school aid bill in history in January, but the three other major 
pieces of Great Society legislation were passed only with major compromises by the administration. The 
Social Security Amendments increased benefits by 13%, rather than Johnson’s request of 15%. His Model 
Cities program was funded for a “level far below the amount” Johnson had asked. Finally, the 
amendments to the EOA decreased funding, although they did provide funding for two years, rather than 
one, and, for now, Republican attempts to spin off the specific programs into other executive departments 
were turned back. It was clear that frustration over Vietnam, the urban riots, and the rising government 
spending in the face of a sluggish economy was taking its toll on Johnson and his popularity.  
In 1968, Johnson’s problems continued to mount, as inflation and crime continued to rise, the 
conflict in Vietnam worsened, and the disorders in the nation’s ghettoes and campuses continued to 
escalate. Johnson did manage to pass a Housing and Urban Development bill that was considered a major 
victory, and provided new and rehabilitated housing for low and moderate income families.8 On March 2, 
the Kerner Commission released its report on the rioting, implicating white discrimination and detailing 
the extreme poverty, unemployment, inadequate housing, and poor education in the inner city. Johnson, 
however, did not ever directly respond to the findings of the commission, much less promote its 
recommendations. On March 31, Johnson surprised the nation when he announced he would not seek 
reelection. After a national campaign in which the Republicans “fiercely attacked the OEO,” Republican 
Richard Nixon won the presidential election in November.9  
Although Johnson was unable to add much to his Great Society in his last few years, he did 
manage to institutionalize the programs he had passed in 1964 and 1965 to some extent. His programs in 
health, education, and housing continued to be funded and expanded long after his presidency. Many of 
the EOA programs continued past 1968, although not necessarily under the Office of Economic 
Opportunity.10  Scholarly interpretations of the War on Poverty are rather varied. Conservatives use the 
War on Poverty as the prime example of the failure of “big government” and wasteful spending. Liberals 
defend the war by pointing to some of the clear successes of Johnson’s programs, such as the significant 
decrease in poverty among the elderly and the increase in access to health care due to Medicare and 
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Medicaid. Liberals also focus on the lack of funding for all of the various programs, especially considering 
the programs eventually only reached six percent of those in poverty at the time.11 Many of the primary 
programs attached to the War on Poverty, such as the community action programs and job training 
programs, did not seem to have a significant effect on poverty. Many Americans did escape poverty during 
the Johnson years, but that can partly be attributed to the economy, which in turn was partly due to the 
spending on the war. 
 
Johnson’s Justification for His Anti-Poverty Program 
 
 Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Johnson’s rhetoric, especially in comparison to the 
rhetoric of the four other presidents examined in this project, is the variety and intensity of his rhetorical 
appeals focused on justifying his War on Poverty specifically and the responsibility of the government in 
addressing poverty in general. As biographers have argued,12 Johnson was sincere about his goal of 
providing more opportunity to the nation’s poor, and that sincerity was evidenced by an array of 
arguments that have rarely been heard from the president since then. The major appeals of Johnson’s 
rhetorical justification for the War on Poverty included a philosophical argument that justified his activist 
approach to government, a self-interest appeal based on the logic of the free market assisted by the 
government, and a strong “hypocrisy” appeal that attacked the existence of poverty in an abundant land. 
 The most important of the arguments was the philosophical backing Johnson provided for his 
vision of society. Similar to Roosevelt, Johnson worked to provide strong abstract reasoning for the 
program that served to negotiate the equality-freedom paradox by calling on the realization of equal 
opportunity and economic rights, in part through the call for full employment but balanced with a certain 
economic conservatism.  
On January 1, 1964, in a statement concerning the Report of the Task Force on Manpower 
Utilization, Johnson offered the vision of society he held that supported the War on Poverty he would 
introduce a week later during his State of the Union address. Johnson explained that he wished “to see an 
America in which no young person, whatever the circumstances, shall reach the age of twenty-one without 
the health, education, and skills that will give him an opportunity to be an effective citizen and a self-
supporting individual. This opportunity is too often denied to those who grow up in a background of 
poverty.”13 In the statement, Johnson had both established an ideal as well as revealing reality falling short 
of that ideal, thus justifying action.   
 During his State of the Union on January 8th, Johnson lamented that “many Americans live on the 
outskirts of hope” and set “our task” to be to “help replace their despair with opportunity” by declaring 
“unconditional war on poverty in America.” Throughout 1964, Johnson continued to repeat the philosophy 
of his administration. In March, he explained that “[a] fundamental objective of this Nation is to assure all 
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Americans full and fair opportunity to develop and apply their maximum productive and earning 
potential.”14 During a special address to Congress proposing the War on Poverty, Johnson once again 
established the gap between the real and the ideal, saying: 
we have never lost sight of our goal: an America in which every citizen shares all the 
opportunities of his society, in which every man has a chance to advance his welfare to 
the limit of his capacities. We have come a long way toward this goal. We still have a 
long way to go. The distance which remains is the measure of the great unfinished work 
of our society. To finish that work I have called for a national war on poverty. Our 
objective: total victory.15
In April he promised not to relax his efforts until “every man who wants a job and who is willing to work 
has the chance to get a decent job.”16 In a commencement addresses in May, Johnson applied the Great 
Society label to his vision, telling the students of Ohio University: “And with your courage and with your 
compassion and your desire, we will build the Great Society. It is a Society where no child will go unfed, 
and no youngster will go unschooled. Where no man who wants work will fail to find it.”17 
 Within Johnson’s rhetoric, the role of government was very clear: it existed to increase the 
quality of life of its citizens, especially the disadvantaged, and especially in terms of providing jobs to 
those able and willing to work. Johnson’s Great Society was, in Johnson’s words, “the grandest design of 
all—a design which creates a state whose only reason for existence is the welfare and the happiness of its 
people.”18 In his 1967 State of the Union, Johnson hoped to be remembered as a president who “tried to 
improve the quality of life of every American—not just the rich, not just the poor, but every man, woman, 
and child in this great Nation of ours.”19 Later, he labeled “the welfare of the American people” the 
“central business of our governments,” explained that he was using the federal system of government to 
“improve the quality of American life,” and expressed that the “primary purpose of government to expand 
the opportunities for all citizens to share in our economic and social progress.”20  
 During his Howard University Address in 1965, Johnson upped the ante somewhat on the 
philosophical basis for his programs, tied especially to the government’s role in helping African-
Americans overcome the legacy of slavery and discrimination. The speech was reminiscent of Roosevelt’s 
Commonwealth Club address, where Roosevelt called for the provision of equal opportunity in the name 
of helping American citizens realize the true meaning of freedom. Here, Johnson actually transcends 
freedom, and sets his sights on true opportunity. After praising the passage of the Voting Rights Act, and 
labeling that as the beginning, rather than the end, of needed reform, Johnson continued, saying: 
That beginning is freedom; and the barriers to that freedom are tumbling down. Freedom 
is the right to share, share fully and equally, in American society—to vote, to hold a job, 
to enter a public place, to go to school. It is the right to be treated in every part of our 
national life as a person equal in dignity and promise to all others. But freedom is not 
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enough. You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by saying: Now you are free to go 
where you want, and do as you desire, and choose the leaders you please. You do not 
take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up 
to the starting line of a race and then say, "you are free to compete with all the others," 
and still justly believe that you have been completely fair. Thus it is not enough just to 
open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens must have the ability to walk through 
those gates. This is the next and the more profound stage of the battle for civil rights. We 
seek not just freedom but opportunity. We seek not just legal equity but human ability, 
not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result.21  
Johnson’s redefinition of equal opportunity in this speech would later be cited as the true birthplace of the 
logic behind affirmative action.22  
Despite Johnson’s call for “equality as a result” in the Howard University speech, in general the 
basis of Johnson’s programs had many conservative tendencies. First, there was no mention of the need for 
redistribution of wealth or even any clear sense of obligation in the part of the non-poor. Within Johnson’s 
rhetoric, his goals were to be reached by job training programs, increased education, and the reduction of 
discrimination. The only thing Johnson seemed to ask of the non-poor was to continue paying their taxes 
as usual. The economy was rolling along so well during the advent of the Economic Opportunity Act 
programs that additional taxes were not necessary to fund them at first. It was not until the “guns and 
butter” days of the late 1960s that the cost of the programs became an issue. 
Secondly, Johnson made sure to praise the benefits of the free market system, at one point even 
thanking God for the “enduring vitality of the American competitive system, the American free enterprise 
economy.”23 Whenever he praised free enterprise, however, he tended to also include a position for 
government as well to “assist” and “work together.”24 For Johnson, government had the obligation to 
“make the economy a better servant of human purpose,”25 and as evidenced by the existence of poverty, 
the prosperity brought about more naturally by the strong economy simply was not enough. The clearest 
explication of this assumption was presented in a remarkable address when Johnson accepted an honorary 
degree to the University of Rhode Island in 1966, when he focused on the notion of economic rights: 
We decided long ago that our economic system should not be controlled by government 
decree. We chose freedom in the marketplace, just compensation for all, and for all a 
chance to share in the country's wealth. And if that share can be obtained through the 
free markets, so much the better. But where it is denied to some because of the wretched 
circumstances of their birth, or the poverty of their education, or the foul environment 
that surrounds them, the sickness that weakens and the despair that crushes them, we 
believe that the Nation should act. We believe that just as a man has the right to choose 
those who shall govern the state, so does he have the right to live in a decent 
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environment, so does he have the right to acquire the skills that useful work requires, 
and so does he have the right to secure and to hold a job despite the color of his skin, or 
the region of his birth, or the religion of his father.26
Johnson’s War on Poverty, like Roosevelt’s New Deal, was not premised on changing or criticizing the 
economic system, but on making the necessary tweaks in order to have the prosperity reach a broader 
audience. Those tweaks, for the most part, involved changing the poor themselves by providing them with 
education, training, and hope. 
Johnson even expanded the connection between the War on Poverty and the economic system by 
presenting an argument on several occasions that justified his programs based on how they would improve 
the economy and thus lead to greater prosperity for all. During the 1964 State of the Union when the War 
on Poverty was first introduced, while warning the American people of the difficulty of the task, Johnson 
also appealed to their self-interest: “It will not be a short or easy struggle, no single weapon or strategy 
will suffice, but we shall not rest until that war is won. The richest Nation on earth can afford to win it. We 
cannot afford to lose it. One thousand dollars invested in salvaging an unemployable youth today can 
return $40,000 or more in his lifetime.”27 Speaking of the benefits of Headstart in particular, Johnson 
professed that “The bread that is cast upon these waters will surely return many thousandfold.”28 “Success 
in breaking the cycle of poverty,” Johnson later argued, would “yield returns in increased tax revenues, 
lower social welfare costs, and better education, housing, and health care for future generations of 
Americans.”29  He promised that “[e]very dollar spent will result in savings to the country and especially 
to the local taxpayers in the cost of crime, welfare, of health, and of police protection.”30 He told an 
audience of Democratic fundraisers that “we must eliminate poverty. We want this out of compassion for 
the oppressed and the awareness that the entire economy will rise as more people share in the benefits of 
our society.”31 He vowed that his programs would make “taxpayers” out of “taxeaters.”32 The existence of 
poverty was thus framed as economic inefficiency and the waste of valuable resources, and the programs 
designed to lift the poor were simply designed to tap into these latent resources. For example, in a letter to 
Congress, Johnson argued that 
a growing Nation cannot afford to waste its human and natural resources—too often 
neglected and unused in distressed areas. Nor can we afford to shut out large numbers of 
our fellow citizens from the fulfillment of hope which is shared by the rest of us. The 
millions of people living in those areas and regions of our Nation which have not shared 
fully in our general prosperity are in urgent need of help.33  
Full employment was thus not only the realization of an American ideal and the assistance of the 
disadvantaged, but also represented an economy running at maximum efficiency. Two of Johnson’s 
primary goals—helping the disadvantaged and economic growth—were thus welded together cyclically. 
Helping the disadvantaged helps everyone. Johnson thus went beyond Kennedy’s notion that “a rising tide 
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lifts all boats.” Johnson was essentially arguing that by helping to lift boats seemingly anchored to the 
ocean floor, the tide itself will rise higher for all other boats. 
Of all the various appeals to justify the War on Poverty, the one that Johnson turned to most often 
was a “hypocrisy” appeal. Simply put, Johnson attacked the notion that the richest country in the world 
could accept that poverty within its borders. The appeal appeared from the beginning to the end of 
Johnson’s time in office, and took several forms. At times, Johnson simply referred to the United States 
wealth, describing the nation as “the richest and . . . most powerful nation on earth,” the “richest and most 
powerful country which ever occupied the globe,” “at the height of our prosperity, ” “a land that is 
bursting with abundance,” “affluent America,” “the richest nation ever known to man,” “the richest, the 
mightiest, the most productive nation in the world,” or “the richest nation the world has ever known.”34 
That argument was often tied to the shame of the existence of poverty in such a nation. A couple weeks 
after announcing the War on Poverty, for example, in his annual economic report to Congress, Johnson 
wrote:  
Americans today enjoy the highest standard of living in the history of mankind. But for 
nearly a fifth of our fellow citizens, this is a hollow achievement. They often live 
without hope, below minimum standards of decency. . . . We cannot and need not wait 
for the gradual growth of the economy to lift this forgotten fifth of our Nation above the 
poverty line. We know what must be done, and this Nation of abundance can surely 
afford to do it.35
Elsewhere, Johnson explained how in “a nation as rich and productive as ours we cannot tolerate a 
situation in which millions of Americans do not have the education, health, and job opportunities for a 
decent and respected place as productive citizens.”36  In later speeches, he attacked the existence of 
“poverty in the midst of the land of plenty” and explained how many “are surprised and a little ashamed 
that our rich country has so many sloughs of despondency.”37 He labeled poverty as simply “inexcusable 
in the richest land on earth.”38
 In his inaugural address in 1965, he again returned to the argument, complete with a religious 
reference: 
In a land of great wealth, families must not live in hopeless poverty. In a land rich in 
harvest, children just must not go hungry. In a land of healing miracles, neighbors must 
not suffer and die untended. In a great land of learning and scholars, young people must 
be taught to read and write. . . . Under this covenant of justice, liberty, and union we 
have become a nation—prosperous, great, and mighty. And we have kept our freedom. 
But we have no promise from God that our greatness will endure. We have been allowed 
by Him to seek greatness with the sweat of our hands and the strength of our spirit. . . . 
In each generation, with toil and tears, we have had to earn our heritage again. If we fail 
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now then we will have forgotten in abundance what we learned in hardship: that 
democracy rests on faith, that freedom asks more than it gives, and the judgment of God 
is harshest on those who are most favored.39
The final sentence of that excerpt represents another key aspect of the hypocrisy argument: the notion that 
with the nation’s wealth comes an added responsibility. Johnson often talked about applying “the power of 
America's new abundance to the task of building a better life for every Americans,” the need to “turn our 
wealth and our power to a larger purpose,” how “our wealth imposes a solemn responsibility on every 
citizen,” or, put it rather simply, “Having the power, we have the duty.”40   
 The sense of sacrifice and responsibility evident in the arguments above was tempered somewhat 
by the final aspect of the hypocrisy argument, which focused on how because of its wealth, the nation 
could “afford” meetings its responsibilities. This argument was especially prevalent later in his time in 
office, when Congress began to pare back his programs.  In February of 1968, for example, Johnson 
seemed to chide Congress for its frugality: 
This Nation can afford to meet its responsibilities to the poor among us. Poverty is 
declining, but even today I am ashamed to say that one American out of every seven is 
still poor among us. In the wealth of our abundance there is enough to continue our 
attack, I think, on poverty and the evils that attend it: poor housing, inadequate education 
and training, ill health and personal frustration and despair, and still defend our freedoms 
and protect and preserve our liberties.  We have the wealth. The question is, do we have 
the wisdom and do we have the will and do we have the determination to apply strength 
to remedy weakness, to give up a part of what we have as an investment in the future 
that I think will pay good returns?41
In a few instances, Johnson would even add a note of the historical uniqueness of the opportunity to 
confront poverty. Johnson argued, for example, that the United States was the “first large nation in the 
history of the world wealthy enough to end poverty within its borders.”42 Such arguments tended to temper 
his robust call to action with the feeling that such action would be rather painless considering the wealth 
the nation enjoyed.  
 In summary, Johnson had an elaborate array of arguments that served to justify government 
action against poverty. The prominence of these arguments are especially notable when compared to the 
four remaining presidents examined in this project. Johnson trumpeted the classic American ideal of equal 
opportunity, exposed the gap between reality and that ideal, and explicitly challenged the morality of 
poverty in an affluent nation as well as the financial benefit of its termination. After Johnson’s 
administration, these arguments rarely would be heard from the American president, although arguably the 
logic behind them would not seem to have been significantly altered.  
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Johnson’s Framing of Poverty and the Poor 
 
 Throughout Johnson’s time in office, he presented a consistent, though complicated, picture of 
poverty and those that suffer from it. First, using a variety of appeals, Johnson’s description of poverty 
clearly established an environmental attribution for poverty. Second, Johnson relied on the metaphor of the 
“cycle” of poverty to depict its complicated nature and to reframe the hopelessness from which many of 
the poor suffered. Third, Johnson attempted to make race a secondary issue to poverty. Fourth, Johnson 
presented a four-pronged categorization of the poor, with each group having different characteristics and 
requiring different programs to assist them. Lastly, Johnson told a number of stories about the poor that 
attempted to paint a sympathetic picture of the poor and increase the identification and understanding of 
the poor by the non-poor.  
 
Poverty Is External 
 
 From the beginning and continuing throughout his administration, Johnson’s perspective on 
poverty was clear: the poor were innocent victims. In speech after speech, Johnson made subtle or not-so-
subtle references that presented an unmistakable environmental attribution to poverty. Alluding to 
Franklin Roosevelt’s famous words, Johnson explained that the poor were “ill-clad, ill-fed, ill-housed” and 
that for too many “the door of self-improvement and opportunity is closed.”43 At times, he confronted 
assumptions that poverty was deserved, as he did in North Carolina in May of 1964 during his “poverty 
tour” of several Appalachian states: 
In the past 2 weeks I have visited nine States in the Appalachian area. I have seen two 
kinds of people: those who have a chance to earn a decent living, and those who don't. 
There are a lot of people in this country who deserve a better chance. There are more 
than 30 million Americans who live below the poverty line. They deserve a better break. 
There is a difference between being poor and being in poverty—a big difference. Many 
of us grew up poor. I was born the son of a tenant farmer in a family of seven. But while 
we were poor, we were not the prisoners of poverty; we were not caught in the backlash 
of an industrial revolution as the people of Appalachia are today. We had a chance to 
break out and to move up, a chance many Americans don't have tonight. Right here in 
North Carolina, the State where I stand, poverty has left its mark. Some people say that 
if these Americans are poor, it is their own fault. I have even heard others say that God 
ordains poverty for the poor. Well, I don't believe them, and I don't believe God believes 
them either. I believe the reason most poor people are poor is that they never got a 
decent break. I believe the reason most people are poor is they never had a fair chance 
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when they were young, and they never got it later on. Some people never got that break 
because they were born in the wrong part of the country. Some people never got that 
break because they were born with the wrong color of skin. Some people never got it 
because they went into farming and they couldn't get enough land to make a decent 
living when farm prices were too low and operating costs were too high.44  
Within this paragraph, Johnson presented a number of his typical arguments. He attacked the idea that 
poverty is a sign of God’s judgment.45 His dissociation between “being poor” and “being in poverty” was 
clearly a vehicle to solidify the external attribution of the latter by divorcing it from the gray area of the 
former. “Being poor” here translates into the lack of income, whereas “being in poverty,” as Johnson’s 
other speeches attest, involved a number of factors that go far beyond the simple lack of income. He 
presented poverty as a result of “not having a fair chance,” or, in other words, as the violation of equal 
opportunity. This violation of equal opportunity was attributed to a variety of factors, including the 
industrial revolution, geography, discrimination, and economic constraints, all of which would generally 
be considered external.  
 During a 1967 message to Congress on poverty, Johnson quoted the words of poverty scholar 
Jacob Riis: 
The slum is as old as civilization. Civilization implies a race to get ahead. In a race there 
are usually some who for one cause or another cannot keep up, or are thrust out from 
among their fellows. They fall behind, and when they have been left far in the rear they 
lose hope and ambition, and give up. Thenceforward, if left to their own resources, they 
are the victims, not the masters, of their environment; and it is a bad master .... The bad 
environment becomes the heredity of the next generation.46  
The “slum” or “ghetto” became a central issue in the external attribution of poverty. Typically, the slum 
was described as a “prison” or even a “breeding ground” for hopelessness and crime.47 It represented a 
place caught in a “web of circumstances” that “blocked progress.”48 By attributing the root of poverty to a 
geographic area, Johnson was literally providing an environmental attribution. This focus on place would 
also translate clearly to support Johnson’s community programs, although they would also work against 
Johnson when many of these slums erupted in violence during the summers of the later 1960s. Those riots 
clearly hurt Johnson’s attributional assumption, as much of the public tended to attribute the riots 
dispositionally. The Kerner Commission report on the riots directly attributed the riots to external forces 
and suggested drastic measures to counteract those causes, but, rather oddly, Johnson essentially ignored 
their findings.49 
 One of the more controversial arguments Johnson relied on while attempting to establish his 
attribution for poverty was when he attributed crime environmently, which he did on several occasions. 
During a special message to Congress on crime in 1966, Johnson explained that while the “vast majority 
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of our citizens who suffer poverty and discrimination do not turn to crime . . . . where legitimate 
opportunities are closed, illegitimate opportunities are seized.”50 At a conference later that summer, 
Johnson made his opinion on crime clear: 
But for the long-range prospects of this Nation, I look not to the anticrime laws but 
instead to the antipoverty laws. Crime is elusive. Criminologists rack their brains to put 
their finger on the potential criminal and to find out and to determine why, oh why, does 
he act the way he does. I believe a large part of the answer—possibly, conceivably, the 
largest part of all-was given to us many years ago by George Bernard Shaw when he 
said, "The greatest of evils and the worst of crimes is poverty." Poverty. There is the real 
enemy. Strike poverty down tonight and much of the crime will fall down with it. Punish 
the criminal? By all means. But if we wish to rid our Nation of crime, if we wish to stop 
hacking at its branches, we must cut its roots and we must drain its swampy breeding 
places—and that swampy breeding place, you know where it is—it is in the slums of this 
Nation. There are very few affluent and educated Americans that are attracted to crime, 
and very few that have criminal records. But as we bring a fairer measure of prosperity 
and education to our 32 million poor people in this country, I believe that the crime rate 
whose growth frightens us tonight will begin to shrink significantly.51
Johnson sent a message on “Crime in America” to Congress in February of 1967 where he again attacked 
the “conditions that breed crime.”52 Rising crime would became a critical issue in Nixon’s “law and order” 
campaign during the election of 1968, but Johnson nonetheless continued to focus on the environmental 
causes of poverty late in his tenure. In March of 1968, Johnson explained to a group of Southern Baptist 
leaders how crime can be prevented: 
crime and violence and despair arise from one cause-from a cause of ignorance and 
poverty and joblessness. And I think there is very good evidence to that effect. They 
suggest that the cure for joblessness is a job. They suggest that the cure for ignorance is 
some training and some education. They suggest that the cure for bad rat-infested slum 
housing is better housing. And the ultimate cure for crime is to give every citizen a sense 
of pride and a chance to participate in the development of his community—a sense of his 
stake in law and order.53
In the years after his presidency, the environmental attribution of crime would become a key characteristic 
in the conservative attack on the liberal perspective, and the perception of “being soft on crime” would 
work against Democratic candidates into the 1990s, until crime rates began to fall significantly and the 
issue finally descended from the agenda.54  
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The Cycle of Poverty 
 
The second primary theme within Johnson’s construction of poverty revolved around the use of 
the “cycle of poverty” metaphor. The cycle of poverty was first mentioned in Johnson’s annual economic 
report to Congress in January of 1964. There he described the cycle of “inadequate schools, drop-outs, 
poor health, unemployment-creating delinquency, slums, crime, disease, and broken families—thereby 
breeding more poverty.”55 Later, in 1967, he provided a similar list of “enemies” of the War on Poverty: 
“lack of jobs, bad housing, poor schools, lack of skills, discrimination—and each aspect of poverty relates 
to, and intensifies, the others. That is the vicious circle that you must break.”56 Johnson seemed to use the 
“cycle of poverty” argument to emphasize three key issues about poverty: poverty was a complicated issue 
that would not be conquered easily, poverty bred poverty to subsequent generations, and poverty led to 
hopelessness. All three of these issues worked to supplement Johnson’s overall environmental attribution 
of poverty. 
Johnson’s description of poverty as an exceedingly complicated issue worked not only to justify 
the vast array of programs Johnson was supporting, but also served somewhat as a caution toward high 
expectations. During his address at the University of Rhode Island, for example, Johnson admitted that 
“the vicious cycle of poverty persists” and no “single act of government, or a single program or 
combination of programs, could break that chain overnight” because the “causes and the conditions of 
poverty are too deep, too various, too subtle, and too firmly interlocked for simple remedies.” 57  Later, he 
flatly explained, “Poverty defies simple description. It is a cycle which begins with an infancy of 
deprivation, continues in a youth of hopelessness, extends to a jobless adulthood, and finally ends—for 
those who survive—in a bleak and despairing old age. At every stage, the conditions of life are poor 
housing, inadequate education and training, deficient health care, and often, gnawing hunger.”58  
 Johnson alluded to the inter-generational aspect of the poverty cycle often. During his poverty 
tour of Appalacia, for example, he quoted Franklin Roosevelt’s words, saying, "It is not the pinch of 
suffering, the agony of uncertainty that the adults are now feeling that counts the most—it is the heritage 
our children must anticipate."59 He later lamented that “the vicious cycle of poverty persists, hobbling the 
human personality from generation to generation.”60  In his final budget message before leaving office, 
Johnson brought these arguments together, writing: 
22 million Americans still living under conditions of poverty do not enjoy the comforts 
and abundance most of us take for granted. There is no single cause of poverty, nor is 
there a single cure. Lack of education, inadequate or outmoded skills, poor health, racial 
injustice, substandard housing—these are the conditions on which poverty feeds. 
Without a concerted national effort, these conditions are passed along from one 
generation to the next, in a vicious cycle of hopelessness and dependency.61  
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The significance of the inter-generational argument was never clearly outlined by Johnson. Considered 
through the lens of equal opportunity and the deserving-undeserving line, it would seem clear that a child 
born in poverty would represent an obvious violation of equal opportunity and the epitome of the 
deserving poor. The argument also worked against those who preferred procrastination or reliance on 
eventual economic growth, considering the assumption that poverty not only affects the poor but the 
following generation as well.  
 The final aspect of the cycle argument concerns the hopelessness that results from poverty, and 
its corresponding effect.  It was expressed most clearly during Johnson’s notable “To Fulfill these Rights” 
speech at Howard University. Although in this particular case Johnson was speaking specifically of 
African-Americans, the argument was applied elsewhere to poverty in general. During that Howard 
University address, Johnson discussed the damage done by poverty: 
Men are shaped by their world. When it is a world of decay, ringed by an invisible wall, 
when escape is arduous and uncertain, and the saving pressures of a more hopeful 
society are unknown, it can cripple the youth and it can desolate the men. There is also 
the burden that a dark skin can add to the search for a productive place in our society. 
Unemployment strikes most swiftly and broadly at the Negro, and this burden erodes 
hope. Blighted hope breeds despair. Despair brings indifferences to the learning which 
offers a way out. And despair, coupled with indifferences, is often the source of 
destructive rebellion against the fabric of society.62  
The propensity of poverty to cause the “loss of hope and ambition,” as Jacob Riis put it in the passage 
Johnson had quoted in 1967, presents a difficult gray area for the deserving-undeserving line. If poverty 
causes hopelessness, and then that hopelessness causes certain behaviors—whether crime, alcohol or drug 
abuse, or simply allowing the discouragement to affect one’s education or job search negatively—the line 
between dispositional and environmental attributions become unclear. To an outside observer, especially 
those influenced by the typical egoistic tendencies of human nature, the behaviors serve as manifest 
evidence of an undeserving nature, regardless of any latent phenomenon of “hopelessness.” Hopelessness 
is also a key link in the cycle of poverty chain, because even if opportunities become available and 
constraints are removed—perhaps through government programs—the continued existence of 
hopelessness may make such opportunities futile. For Johnson, hopelessness was clearly considered an 
environmental attribution. 
 The cycle theory is essentially a form of the “culture of poverty” thesis, which was originally 
introduced by Marxist scholar Oscar Lewis, as a phenomenon that defined poverty as a cultural issue 
rather than an economic one.63 For Lewis, similar to Johnson, the culture of poverty defined poverty as an 
environmental issue—poverty was transmitted inter-generationally—and thus justified outside help. But 
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the paradoxical nature of the culture of poverty thesis worked to support the opposite argument as well. As 
explained by poverty historian James Patterson: 
But writers like Harrington and Lewis did not always qualify the culture of poverty 
argument. Some, including Harrington, used the term carelessly to promote active public 
measures against poverty. Others, such as the conservative Saturday Evening Post, 
employed it to confirm crude and unflattering stereotypes about the poor and to excuse a 
policy of neglect. The considerable attention given the notion—in scholarly debates, by 
the Council of Economic Advisers, by editorialists—suggested that many people wanted 
to believe the worst of the very poor. Like the metaphor of contagion as applied to the 
urban slums of 1900, the stereotype enabled more fortunate Americans to relieve 
themselves of guilt and anxiety.”64
Johnson’s reliance on the cycle theory of poverty was a key point in David Zarefsky’s analysis of 
Johnson’s War on Poverty. Zarefsky argued that through the cycle theory Johnson “identified the enemy 
so as to assimilate the social into the individualist theory, offering a unified perspective.” Thus it 
inherently combined dispositional and environmental attributions. Zarefsky added that the use of the cycle 
of poverty led to the War on Poverty being primarily aimed at changing individuals—providing education, 
skill, access to jobs, etc.—and thus was “fundamentally conservative, consistent with Social Darwinism.” 
65  In the end, similar to the history of the culture of poverty thesis, the cycle of poverty worked both for 
and against Johnson. On one hand it helped establish the complexity of poverty and thus justify the broad 
variety of programs. Due to the cycle, action anywhere on the cycle would theoretically positively 
influence the remainder of the cycle. Unfortunately, the same logic also worked in reverse. As the results 
from Johnson’s programs fell short of expectations, the complexity and interconnectiveness of the cycle of 
poverty began to work against any one specific program, because any effort at any single point on the 
cycle seemed meaningless overall because of the negative influence of all the other points.66  
 
Poverty in Black and White 
 
 The third key aspect of Johnson’s framing of poverty involved his attempt to avoid constructing 
poverty as a racial issue, while at the same time making it clear that African Americans suffered 
disproportionally from poverty due to the additional constraints that affected them in particular. Zarefsky 
argued that in 1964 “every effort was made to portray economic deprivation and race as two distinct 
fates”67 The most obvious rhetorical tactic Johnson used in his attempt to put a white face on poverty was 
his “poverty tour” of nine Appalachian states during May of 1964. Johnson did not, however, completely 
dissociate the two issues—poverty and race—as he typically referenced race and discrimination along 
with the other causal factors of poverty in many of his speeches. During that Appalachian tour, for 
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example, Johnson explained poverty by referencing geography, skin color, and farm prices,68 In 1966, 
lamenting the fact that 32 million Americans remained in poverty, Johnson explained that “America's 
abundance leaves behind too many who are aged, who are stranded in declining rural areas, who are in 
broken families, who are uneducated or handicapped or victims of discrimination.”69 In both of these 
examples, race is framed as simply one of many of the external root causes of poverty.  
 Johnson also attempted to dispel the public misconception that poverty was primarily a racial 
issue, usually through the use of statistics. During a conference in 1967, for example, Johnson explained 
that though the people “sometimes may think of it is a Negro affliction. . . seven in ten poor people are 
white.” In his 1968 economic report to Congress, Johnson made a similar appeal, explaining that while 
many of the poor are Negro, “two-thirds are white.”70 Public miscalculation of the degree to which poverty 
is dominated by minorities continued throughout the rest of the 20th century.71
 In other speeches, Johnson focused on the special condition of Negro poverty, which shared all 
the difficult features of poverty in general, but with additional difficulties. Having “dark skin” becomes an 
added “burden” to those in poverty. 72 Johnson made this argument explicit during his Howard University 
Address in 1965: 
the harsh fact of the matter is that in the battle for true equality too many—far too 
many—are losing ground every day. We are not completely sure why this is. We know 
the causes are complex and subtle. But we do know the two broad basic reasons. And we 
do know that we have to act. First, Negroes are trapped—as many whites are trapped—
in inherited, gate-less poverty. They lack training and skills. They are shut in, in slums, 
without decent medical care. Private and public poverty combine to cripple their 
capacities. . . . But there is a second cause—much more difficult to explain, more deeply 
grounded, more desperate in its force. It is the devastating heritage of long years of 
slavery; and a century of oppression, hatred, and injustice. For Negro poverty is not 
white poverty. Many of its causes and many of its cures are the same. But there are 
differences—deep, corrosive, obstinate differences—radiating painful roots into the 
community, and into the family, and the nature of the individual. These differences are 
not racial differences. They are solely and simply the consequence of ancient brutality, 
past injustice, and present prejudice. They are anguishing to observe. For the Negro they 
are a constant reminder of oppression. For the white they are a constant reminder of 
guilt. But they must be faced and they must be dealt with and they must be overcome, if 
we are ever to reach the time when the only difference between Negroes and whites is 
the color of their skin. [emphasis added]73
Thus Johnson first focused on the similarities between black and white poverty with his typical 
environmental attribution, and then introduced the additional influences that are specific to black poverty.  
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 By the time the urban ghettoes exploded in violence during the later 1960s, Johnson’s programs 
had fallen under the perception that they were primarily geared toward black America. Zarefsky explained 
a variety of reasons for that perception, including the simple logic that black poverty was much more 
concentrated than white poverty, thus it became an easier target for the anti-poverty warriors to address 
with their limited resources. In the end, “the focus on the ghetto, like the foci on youths and job training, 
proved to be harmful—not only because it failed to conquer the enemy but also because it alienated whites 
whose support for the war was crucial.”74  
 
Categorizing the Poor 
 
 The final key aspect of Johnson’s framing of poverty was the manner in which he categorized the 
poor and their situations. In general, four categories were relevant: the unemployables, the “frictionally” 
unemployed, the hard-core unemployed, and the working poor. For each of these categories, Johnson 
painted a different picture and suggested a different type of government intervention. Consistent with his 
poverty rhetoric in general, all four groups of the poor were considered deserving within Johnson’s eyes. 
In Johnson’s 1967 economic report to Congress, he gave a summary of how each group stood at the time. 
He counted six and a half million families who “were poor because the heads of their households were 
unable to work: either aged, severely handicapped, or a widowed or deserted mother with young children.” 
Another three million workers were unemployed, two thirds of which were "frictionally" unemployed. For 
Johnson, this included “new entrants to the labor force in the process of locating a job; persons who quit 
one job to seek another; workers in the ‘off’ months of seasonal industries; those temporarily laid off but 
with instructions to return.” Their unemployment was considered temporary and generally normal, and for 
the most part they were assumed to have the skills to find labor. The other million unemployed were the 
"hard-core" unemployed, who lacked the necessary skills to find other than intermittent work.” The hard-
core unemployed were the “victims of past or present discrimination; those unable or unwilling to move 
from depressed areas and occupations; the physically or emotionally handicapped.” Up to another million 
of these hard-core unemployed were without jobs but not officially unemployed because they had “long 
ago abandoned any search for a job. Some had never tried.” Finally, two million “breadwinners” worked 
year-round, but were earning incomes considered insufficient to support “a minimum standard of decent 
subsistence.”75  
 Johnson’s four-pronged categorization was rather sophisticated. It clearly went beyond the simple 
dissociation between the deserving and undeserving poor, even though it actually did not include the 
undeserving poor at all. Roosevelt had primarily relied on a two-pronged distinction of the poor, including 
only the unemployables and everyone else. The New Deal was based on this simple distinction, and was 
designed to provide the unemployables with an income to counteract some of the symptoms of poverty, 
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whereas everyone else was expected to work. To Roosevelt, to provide the “dole” to the able poor, 
regardless of the reason for the poverty, was detrimental to their spirit. This belief was not necessarily 
punitive or unfair to the poor, considering many of the able poor preferred some sort of work rather than a 
handout, and it typically would cost the government much more to create jobs rather than simply provide 
an income. Of course, the major difference during the New Deal was that single mothers, then primarily 
widowers, were considered unemployable and deserving of help, an assumption that would slowly change 
throughout the 20th century. 
Johnson supported the notion that unemployables must be a public responsibility. A month into 
his tenure in the White House he promised a “compassionate program” to help those “who cannot take full 
part in the competitive race—the aged, the handicapped, the mentally retarded, the illiterates, the dropouts, 
the unemployed and their dependent children, the uneducated.”76 At an event commemorating the 30th 
anniversary of the signing of the Social Security Act Johnson proclaimed the “assurance of a level of 
income for every citizen of this Nation who is too young or too old to work, or has become physically or 
mentally disabled, or who is unable to find work that is sufficient to assure health and decency” as a 
“national goal.”77  He maintained the assumption until the end, arguing in his economic message to 
Congress in January, 1969, that “[n]o matter how well we succeed in other efforts, cash assistance will be 
needed by many of the poor—the elderly, the disabled, and some mothers with sole responsibility for the 
care of young children.” In that message, he clearly admitted that such programs “do not directly remove 
the causes of poverty,” but rather simply “sustain life and hope and help prevent poverty from being 
bequeathed from one generation to the next.”78 The idea that people unable to work should be supported 
by others is not a controversial one—the analysis in the following chapters will show that all five 
presidents examined here agreed on the issue—the question, on the other hand, is who is deemed as 
“unable to work.” The most controversial figure, of course, would become the single mother, whom 
Johnson still typically listed along with the disabled and the elderly. 
The frictionally unemployed, Johnson’s second group, was not as critical. Unemployment 
insurance was already in place to help these individuals, they were assumed to have relevant skills, and 
most of the frictionally employed were in that position temporarily anyway.79
The “hard-core” unemployed, on the other hand, presented a different situation and represented 
the focus of Johnson’s War on Poverty. The hard-core unemployed were the primary issue in Johnson’s 
special address to Congress with the interesting title of “To Earn a Living: The Right of Every American”: 
The question for our day is this: in an economy capable of sustaining high employment, 
how can we assure every American, who is willing to work, the right to earn a living? 
We have always paid lip service to that right. But there are many Americans for whom 
the right has never been real: —The boy who becomes a man without developing the 
ability to earn a living. —The citizen who is barred from a job because of other men's 
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prejudices. —The worker who loses his job to a machine, and is told he is too old for 
anything else. —The boy or girl from the slums whose summers are empty because there 
is nothing to do. —The man and the woman blocked from productive employment by 
barriers rooted in poverty: lack of health, lack of education, lack of training, lack of 
motivation. Their idleness is a tragic waste both of the human spirit and of the economic 
resources of a great Nation. . . . Our past efforts, vital as they are, have not yet 
effectively reached the hard-core unemployed. These hard-core are America's forgotten 
men and women. Many of them have not worked for a long time. Some have never 
worked at all. Some have held only odd jobs. Many have been so discouraged by life 
that they have lost their sense of purpose. In the Depression days of the 1930's, jobless 
men lined the streets of our cities seeking work. But today, the jobless are often hard to 
find. They are the invisible poor of our Nation.80
All the arguments Johnson discussed concerning the environmental attribution of poverty tended to work 
with his perspective on the hard-core unemployed. Economic growth would not be enough to bring them 
out of poverty. They needed not only jobs, but education, training, and for many of the worst off, hope. 
Essentially, Johnson’s goal was to terminate the category of “hard-core unemployed.” He realized that 
unemployables and the temporarily unemployed will always exist, but the hard-core unemployed were not 
intrinsic to the economy, and thus seemed to defy American ideals. In his words, he hoped to “to reduce 
unemployment to the point where all that remains is the result of inevitable movements within the work 
force, irreducible seasonal factors, and a small number of people whose disadvantages or circumstances 
preclude their satisfactory employment.”81  
 Johnson’s fourth category, the working poor, did not receive much attention rhetorically. Johnson 
did manage to increase minimum wage from $1.25 to $1.60 in 1966, and he extended it to a broader range 
of workers. At a news conference explaining the bill, Johnson provided several examples of the people 
who would benefit from the program, one of the few times Johnson provided stories of the working poor 
rather than the hard-core unemployed.82 Although Johnson admitted in his economic messages to 
Congress that millions of the working poor did not earn wages sufficient enough to bring them out of 
poverty,83 his rhetoric and his programs typically focused much more on the hard-core unemployed. 
 
Johnson’s Storytelling 
 
 The final aspect of Johnson’s rhetorical construction of poverty and the poor focuses on the 
stories Johnson told about the poor. Johnson explained the importance with his storytelling in 1964 after 
being asked why he was getting people “riled up” to enlist the War on Poverty. He answered: 
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Well, I don't know how I can get them riled up. I hope by picture, and letting them look 
at conditions that exist in their own communities, with their neighbors; I hope by public 
speeches outlining what we have seen, and what the conditions are that exist; I hope by 
messages and by legislation; I hope by leadership . . . that the people can be concerned 
with the problem and then do something about it. I believe there has been more 
consideration given to poverty and to conditions of the 10 million families that are in 
that group during the last 30 days than has been given almost during the entire 30 years. 
The more we think about it the more we talk about it, and the more we plan about it the 
more will likely result. 84
The stories Johnson told served as inductive evidence of his broader assumptions concerning the 
environmental attribution of poverty, and likely served the intent of building sympathy for the poor and 
reducing misconceptions about them. Perhaps the most obvious misconception Johnson attempted to 
dispel was the notion that the poor were lazy and simply wanted an easy life supplied by others. He 
explained that the “people of America are not asking for handouts. They want a chance to support 
themselves. They want a fair chance to get ahead.”85 Many of the stories asked the audience to imagine 
being in the place of the poor. At an address at a Steelworkers Union Hall in 1964, for example, Johnson 
said: 
Just put yourself in the position of the man who gets up in the morning and walks the 
street all day looking for a job that can't be found, and he goes home and talks to his 
wife that night. You put yourself in that position and apply the Golden Rule and do unto 
others as you would have them do unto you and we will clear up a lot of these problems 
that are requiring a long debate in the Congress.86
His “poverty tour” to Appalachia provided Johnson with a number of stories including one in which a 
hungry child was forced to take turns with her siblings on what day they would be allowed to eat.87 
Johnson also attempted to bring his own humble upbringing into the storytelling, identifying himself 
directly with the poor that struggled with poverty and unemployment, and were forced to do menial jobs.88 
He also compared a tenant farmer in North Carolina to his own father’s work as he grew up in Texas 
working the “halves” picking cotton.89 His stories depicted the poor as hard-working, and focused on the 
similar values of the poor despite their dissimilar environment.  
Johnson also used stories to work against the notion that poverty was something that happened to 
people far away from the non-poor. At a speech in New York, for example, Johnson told the gathered 
audience that 
poverty stalks not only in the hills and the valleys of Appalachia. It is here today. It is 
here in this city on all sides of the track right around where you live. It is the widow 
around the corner barely surviving on a pension of $70 a month. It is the teenager down 
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the block unprepared by schooling and unwanted by an employer. It is the retired factory 
worker, sick of body and tired of soul, depending on charity for his medical needs.”90
Johnson used stories to build more understanding between the poor and non-poor. In a speech at the 
Conference on Women in the War on Poverty, Johnson compared the lives of the poor and the non-poor as 
they wake in the morning, attempt to see doctors, and deal with legal problems.91  
Many scholars of poverty have focused on the gap that exists between public assumptions and the 
reality of poverty, in terms of who is poor, why they are poor, and where they live. In the face of such 
public misconception, the rhetorical power of the presidency only increases. Whereas Johnson did reveal 
his knowledge of these gaps in some of his speeches,92 he tended not to focus on this information in major 
speeches such as his State of the Union addresses or any nationally televised addresses.  
 In summary, throughout his time in office, Johnson remained consistent in his external attribution 
of poverty and his positive framing of the poor. He constructed a rather sophisticated picture of the 
different types of poor, and realized that different poor necessitate different treatments. Johnson’s rhetoric, 
and his War on Poverty itself, focused primarily on the “hard-core” poor, which were the most 
controversial and least popular of the four groups he discussed, as well as the most difficult to aid. Johnson 
also relied on the use of narrative to build more identification between the poor and the non-poor.  
 
President Johnson’s Rhetorical Construction of His Anti-Poverty Programs 
 
 There are three relevant issues concerning how Johnson presented the “weapons” of the War on 
Poverty. The first was his reliance on the metaphor of war and its implications. The second was the 
manner in which Johnson dissociated the programs of the War on Poverty from the “dole.” And the third 
is how Johnson explained the positive effects his programs were having. 
 
The Metaphor of War 
 
 When Johnson announced his intentions concerning a massive government effort against poverty 
during his State of the Union address on January 8, 1964, he chose to rely on the metaphor of a “war” on 
poverty.  The metaphor was diverse enough to allow Johnson to frame poverty as the “enemy,” feature 
various programs as the “weapons,” employed on various “fronts,” while calling on the American people 
as a whole to “enlist” as his “army.” Zarefsky discussed how the metaphor worked to legitimize the central 
command of the federal government, de-emphasize comprehensive planning and stress quick, massive 
action, and thus help Johnson overcome the inherent burden of proof against change.93 By defining the 
enemy as poverty, rather than the rich, the opposing party, or the economic system, Johnson was also able 
to bring the American people together, rather than divide them. As Kenneth Burke has argued, one of the 
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most effective strategies for building identification is to define a common enemy. Johnson hoped the 
metaphor would work not only to unify, but motivate the American people to action, a strategy that 
seemed particularly appropriate at the time, considering the nation had been “[a]roused by President 
Kennedy’s untimely death,” and was thus longing for “redemption through sacrifice”94  
 The war metaphor seemed to work well at first in terms of mobilizing the nation and giving the 
programs a strong label and a sense of moral purpose. Once the perception that the war was not meeting 
expectations began to grow, however, the metaphor began to work against Johnson. Like in any war 
without a clear objective, the American people grew weary. Once the Vietnam War escalated, and brought 
with it its own controversies, the metaphor had run its course and likely lost its impact. Johnson would 
periodically mention the War on Poverty in 1967, but rarely in conjunction with its related terms, and it 
was completely absent in 1968 in relation to poverty. 
 
Anti-Dole 
 
 Throughout 1964 and 1965, while proposing and later defending the Economic Opportunity Act 
and its various programs, Johnson made a significant effort to dissociate between his programs and the 
“dole.” Similar to Franklin Roosevelt, Johnson realized that the dole was a label that held a universally 
negative connotation with the American public. It tended to exude an image of the lazy, undeserving poor 
living off the efforts of others. Johnson realized from the beginning that he needed to avoid that perception 
for his programs. Johnson began his dissociation at the ceremony at which he signed the Economic 
Opportunity Act: 
This is not in any sense a cynical proposal to exploit the poor with a promise of a 
handout or a dole. We know—we learned long ago—that answer is no answer. The 
measure before me this morning for signature offers the answer that its title implies—the 
answer of opportunity. For the purpose of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 is to 
offer opportunity, not an opiate. For the million young men and women who are out of 
school and who are out of work, this program will permit us to take them off the streets, 
put them into work training programs, to prepare them for productive lives, not wasted 
lives. We are not content to accept the endless growth of relief rolls or welfare rolls. We 
want to offer the forgotten fifth of our people opportunity and not doles. Our American 
answer to poverty is not to make the poor more secure in their poverty but to reach down 
and to help them lift themselves out of the ruts of poverty and move with the large 
majority along the high road of hope and prosperity. The days of the dole in our country 
are numbered. I firmly believe that as of this moment a new day of opportunity is 
dawning and a new era of progress is opening for us all.95  
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The dissociation is unmistakable. The dole represents a handout, exploitation, an opiate, endless growth in 
relief rolls, and a waste. Johnson’s programs represent opportunity, productivity, hope, prosperity, and 
progress.  
 Johnson would go on in other speeches to explain that the War on Poverty is “not a program of 
giveaway” or a “program of doles” but a “program that is concerned with skills and opportunities, with 
giving the tools for the job of growth, in making taxpayers out of taxeaters. We are investing in 
opportunity and giving them the skills to seize it.” 96 The War on Poverty was thus an investment, 
something worthwhile both to the recipient and the provider, rather than a “waste,” which is useless to 
both. Later in the year, Johnson would again emphasize that his program would help the poor “not through 
charity or handouts,” but would “help people lift themselves from the ranks of the poor.”97 Johnson further 
explained that the War on Poverty “rejects the approach that America has outgrown. It rejects handouts, it 
rejects the dole. It rejects complacency. It rejects growing relief rolls.”98  In 1965, upon signing a bill 
providing services to Appalachia, Johnson flatly proclaimed, “The dole is dead.”99
 After placing such negative focus on “the dole” in 1964 and 1965 while establishing the War on 
Poverty, Johnson actually increased his attack on the “traditional” welfare programs in 1967 and 1968 as 
he fought for the continued funding of his programs. In his 1967 economic message to Congress, Johnson 
introduced a series of arguments which would later become the heart of the conservative attack on welfare: 
Our system of public assistance is now 30 years old and has obvious faults. The 
standards of need set by many States are unrealistically low; benefits are further 
restricted by excessively stringent eligibility conditions. In some respects the system 
perpetuates dependency.….With minor exceptions, payments under public assistance are 
reduced dollar for dollar of earnings by the recipient, removing any incentive to accept 
part-time work. We should encourage self-help, not penalize it. It is time to put an end to 
this 100 percent tax on the earnings of those on public assistance.100  
Johnson’s framing of welfare placed the blame on the system, not the individuals. He depicted the 
recipients of welfare as trying to help themselves, only to be punished for it with a “100 percent tax.” 
What started in 1967 as a brief mention that “in some respects” welfare perpetuated dependency would 
later become the primary issue of welfare reform thirty years later. Johnson signed legislation that required 
states to “disregard” the first $30 a month earned by recipients of welfare in 1967, and created the Work 
Incentives Program (WIN) that required states to register recipients for training or employment programs. 
However, the program was poorly monitored and had little impact.101  
 In January of 1968, Johnson would call for a special commission to study welfare, explaining that 
the “outmoded” welfare system “pleases no one.” Johnson explain that the program was “criticized by 
liberals and conservatives, by the poor and the wealthy, by social workers and politicians, by whites and 
by Negroes in every area of the Nation.”102  The irony of Johnson’s anti-welfare rhetoric was that the 
 55
welfare rolls actually increased exponentially during his years in office. Poverty did decrease, especially 
elderly poverty, but much of that was due to the strong economy and increases in social security rates, not 
necessarily Johnson’s innovative programs in community action or job training.103 Welfare rolls, however, 
shot up sharply. The increase did not necessarily represent an increased number of individuals suffering 
from poverty, but rather a greater percentage of the poor who were actually enrolled. AFDC rolls 
expanded from 3 million in 1960 to 4.3 million in 1965, and then to 10.2 million by 1971. Participation 
rates rose from 33 percent in the early 1960s to 90 percent in 1971.104  
Zarefsky explained that the increase was easy to explain in retrospect. As the War on Poverty’s 
community action programs took root, one of their first actions was typically to secure already recognized 
rights for the poor, among which included welfare benefits. These programs would both advertise the 
availability of benefits, and walk potential recipients through the process.105 Considering the overall 
assumption of environmental attribution for poverty, especially among blacks at the time, it is likely that 
the typical social stigma working against receiving the “dole” was lessened. Welfare was an “entitlement” 
since its establishment in 1935, but it was not until the 1960s that it really came to be seen as a right 
society owed the poor. The 1960s also saw the rise of organizations, such as the Welfare Rights 
Association, that helped the poor secure benefits.106  
 Despite his earlier promises about ending the dole along with poverty, Johnson avoided the issue 
of the rising welfare rolls. As the opposition grew against welfare, Johnson never addressed any possible 
connection between his programs and the increases. In retrospect, Johnson’s reticence likely helped 
concede the power of framing to his conservative opponents. In the end, Johnson ironically added to the 
public animosity of the so-called “dole” with his rhetoric, while millions were being added to the dole, at 
least in part due to his programs.  
 
Limited Successes 
 
 The final aspect of Johnson’s rhetoric concerning his programs focuses on how he framed their 
consequences. It is particularly important in the overall context of this project because this sort of rhetoric 
was rather rare during the thirty-year period. Johnson actually discussed the results of his programs and 
attempted to establish that they were having some sort of positive effect. Compared to the grand promises 
Johnson made at the beginning of his “unconditional War on Poverty,” however, the stories of success he 
provided were rather limited. Overall, Johnson argued that the programs had helped millions, but also 
admitted that the programs not fallen short of expectations, and that millions more deserved help. 
 This type of rhetoric did not begin to appear until 1967, and it was primarily defensive as Johnson 
fought Congress for continued funding of his programs. Johnson would admit that the War on Poverty did 
not bring “total victory,” but had helped “many millions of Americans take their first steps toward full and 
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meaningful participation in this society.”107 At times, he would provide specific numbers. In March of 
1967, for example, Johnson outlined how his programs helped 102,500 Americans in a variety of ways.108 
Johnson readily admitted that he did “not have all the answers,” but had nonetheless given a “great many 
people . . . the opportunity they needed, when they needed it, in a way that called on them to give the best 
of themselves.”109 Johnson discussed how the programs served as “sturdy ladders in the deep well of 
poverty” that helped individuals escape from “hopelessness and despair.”110 Tied together with Johnson’s 
focus on the hopelessness of the cycle of poverty, Johnson’s rhetoric concerning the effect of his programs 
would often mention the rejuvenation of “hope” and “self-respect” they spurred.111  
 
President Johnson and the Four Paradoxes of Poverty 
 
 Interestingly, the politics versus policy paradox actually worked in reverse at the  
beginning of Johnson’s administration. Due to the remarkable circumstances at the time, including a 
nation looking for meaning after the assassination of Kennedy, the rediscovery of poverty spurred 
somewhat by books such as Michael Harrington’s The Other America, a strong economy, a president with 
majorities in Congress, an electoral mandate, and Johnson’s impressive legislative skills—poverty was 
actually specifically chosen as the ideal issue for Johnson to establish his presidency if not his legacy.112 In 
1964 and 1965, the importance of the poverty-policy paradox, therefore, was rather limited, although it 
likely served to limit the degree to which Johnson tried to avoid raising the cost of the War on Poverty to 
the point that it would require a specific tax increase. It was not until the latter years that the paradox 
began to have a noticeable effect as the programs began to fall short of expectations, the economy slowed, 
and the face of poverty became more and more tied to less popular images such as rioters and criminals. 
Part of the reason why the politics-policy paradox grew in importance during Johnson’s term is linked to 
the other three paradoxes. 
 Evidenced by his variety of arguments that worked to justify his anti-poverty programs, the 
equality-freedom paradox was clearly relevant within Johnson’s rhetoric. Johnson’s War on Poverty was 
very much based on the argument that equal opportunity was a cherished American ideal that was being 
violated by the existence of poverty, especially the environmentally attributed poverty that Johnson 
depicted. Johnson thus tended to focus attention on the equality side of the tension, and how the lack of 
equality justified significant action. Like Roosevelt, Johnson could also utilize appeals to freedom based 
on the notion that those stuck in the “prisons” of poverty did not have freedom, an argument that was most 
evident during Johnson’s Howard University Address where he sought to go beyond freedom to 
opportunity. However, in attempting to establish the shame of American poverty in the face of American 
prosperity through his incessant “hypocrisy” appeals, Johnson actually lessened the sense that significant 
sacrifice would be necessary. In so doing, Johnson gave the impression that equality for all could be 
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achieved without the violation of the freedom of some (through higher taxes, the redistribution of wealth, 
or other means). Again, Johnson supported an activist role for government, but his philosophy was also 
based on the typical American faith in the free market and the presumption of economic growth providing 
enough prosperity that with some additional tweaking by government to help the disadvantaged, equal 
opportunity could still be achieved. At the same time, there was very little sense of responsibility or 
expectation placed on the poor. The notion of equal opportunity works to transcend the equality-freedom 
paradox in part because it tempers the expectation of equality by providing an equal starting point while 
also assigning individuals the responsibility for taking advantage of those opportunities.  Johnson never 
mentioned the responsibility of the poor. In other words, on both counts, Johnson did not confront the 
equality-freedom paradox, he avoided it.  
 Perhaps the most obvious point to be made concerning Johnson’s rhetoric in terms of the four 
paradoxes of poverty was the extent to which he defined the poor as deserving rather than undeserving of 
outside aid. To Johnson, all the poor were victims. On the other hand, Johnson also defined the problem to 
be the poor themselves, not the system. Although outside forces were to blame for the poor lacking in 
education, skills, and hope, the solution was focused on changing the poor. Such an argument was 
precarious, because it was easily susceptible to redefinition that would place the blame solely on the poor. 
Such was the danger of the culture of poverty thesis, both politically and academically, as Oscar Lewis 
would attest. What was especially notable about Johnson’s framing of poverty was that of the various 
forms of poverty he outlined, he chose to focus on the most controversial and unpopular, and thus the most 
likely to be considered undeserving by the non-poor. Johnson made the focus of many of his programs the 
“hard-core unemployed,” rather than the aged, or disabled, or children, or the working poor, or any 
number of more sympathetic figures. In doing so, he certainly made it more difficult to find political 
support for his programs, and made it more difficult for his programs actually to be successful. Johnson 
should be commended for attempting to place the focus on the most difficult cases, although in the long 
run, that choice likely contributed to his inability to fund these programs fully and ultimately the failure of 
his programs. Johnson clearly framed the hard-core unemployed as victims of circumstances outside of 
their control, but the non-poor likely had little sympathy or identification with them. 
 Lastly, negotiating the help-hinder paradox seemed to be a primary concern of Johnson 
throughout his time in office. Johnson’s rhetoric revealed an understanding of the differences between 
programs that treat the symptoms of poverty and those that work on the roots of poverty, and the War on 
Poverty was certainly specifically directed toward the latter. Indeed, what made the War on Poverty 
different than what was already in place was the switch from treating symptoms to seeking a cure. Johnson 
was also aware of the possibility of both intended and unintended consequences to government actions. In 
defending his programs, he took the time to outline some of the successes that had occurred thus far, while 
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readily admitting their limitations. He did not, however, attempt to explain why his programs did not 
succeed as he had promised, other than vague references to the need to spend more. 
Johnson’s anti-welfare rhetoric was particularly interesting. While establishing his programs, 
Johnson revealed a clear disdain for the “dole,” even though he never clearly explained why. Later, in 
1967 and 1968, Johnson began to attack directly welfare and its unintended consequences, especially in 
terms of discouraging work and causing dependency. Johnson signed a bill adding some work incentives 
and allowing recipients to keep more of their earned money, and also called for more study of welfare’s 
effects. Johnson was silent, however, concerning welfare’s prodigious increases in clientele and cost 
throughout the 1960s, even though those increases were exactly opposite of what he promised in his 
epitaphs for the “dole” in 1964. Thus Johnson seemed aware of the important differences between welfare 
programs that solely treat the symptoms of poverty and anti-poverty programs designed to create true 
opportunity in 1964, but did not attempt to educate the American people on those differences later in his 
tenure once the public disdain for welfare started on its path to the top of the public agenda. As a result, it 
can be argued that the backlash against welfare that occurred during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s was 
essentially consistent with Johnson’s rhetoric. 
According to David Zarefsky, the War on Poverty’s primary impact was rhetorical. On the one 
hand, Johnson had established that government had an important role in addressing poverty. Johnson’s 
War had, “at least for a time . . . expanded the nation’s consciousness of fundamental social problems and 
inspired dedicated people to attack them. . . . That the government ought to combat poverty became an 
axiom of politics.”113 More significantly, perhaps, was the War’s rhetorical impact on the liberal argument, 
which Zarefsky believes was harmed by the limited success of Johnson’s programs. The liberal 
assumptions included the beliefs that the existing order was fundamentally good but in need of reform, 
that orderly changes must occur through the system, that economic growth was critical, and that the poor 
can gain without strain to the rich.  
As popularly interpreted, the War on Poverty was a program based on these assumptions that 
failed, thus leading to increased doubt concerning those underlying assumptions. In a manner of speaking, 
the War on Poverty might have created a chilling effect on anti-poverty programs in the future, 
representing a clear example that such reform would not be successful. Indeed, by not explaining the 
failure himself, Johnson allowed others to frame its interpretation. Once the optimistic liberal assumptions 
were in doubt, the American psyche could fall either to the left or to the right. To the left were more 
drastic assumptions that relied more on the need for the redistribution of wealth and changes to the system 
overall, whereas to the right Johnson’s ideals of equality were relaxed either due to a notion of the 
undeserving poor or the perversity thesis that assumes all government programs would backfire. Before 
leaving office, Johnson remarked that the American people “will soon have to decide how best to help 
those who cannot earn enough to escape from poverty.”114 Unfortunately for him, he would no longer have 
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a significant say in that debate. By winning the presidential election in 1968, President Nixon ascended to 
the position of “chief inventor and broker of the symbols of American politics.”115
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CHAPTER III 
RICHARD NIXON AND THE EMERGENT WAR ON WELFARE 
 
 Richard Nixon’s record and rhetoric concerning welfare and poverty is a study in contradiction. 
Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan (FAP), if passed, would likely in retrospect be considered the most 
progressive piece of legislation since the Social Security Act of 1935. On the other hand, compared to the 
other presidents examined in this study, Nixon was clearly the most critical of the welfare system and the 
most belligerent to the poor, especially welfare recipients. While he attacked welfare “loafers,” however, 
he also discussed the necessity of helping poor children and the need to support the American 
“workingman.” He attacked the inefficiency of government, but continued to uphold broad ideals 
concerning full employment. Although he continued to sign the extensions of the Economic Opportunity 
Acts, he slowly transferred the programs of the Economic Opportunity Act to old-line agencies until the 
OEO was essentially no longer viable.  
This chapter examines how Nixon discussed issues of welfare and poverty. Welfare reform was 
perhaps the most important domestic issue of Nixon’s administration. He spoke on the issue often, 
including a nationally televised address on August 8, 1969, that attacked the current welfare system and 
proposed the FAP. As Robert Asen argues, that address clearly exhibited the historical contradictions that 
plague poverty policy.1 The legislation was passed by the House of Representatives twice, but never 
escaped committee to come to a vote in the Senate. To support the program, Nixon released a barrage of 
attacks on the welfare system in general and the idle welfare poor in particular, which, in the end, 
symbolized the national shift from the focus on poverty during the Johnson years to a focus on welfare for 
the next thirty years and counting.  
 
Nixon’s Record  
 
 Richard Nixon took office on January 20, 1969. The Democrats still controlled both houses of 
Congress, however, and as a result the first session of the 91st Congress closed with the lowest legislative 
output in 36 years according to Congressional Quarterly. Nixon went to the national airwaves on August 
8th to announce his Family Assistance Plan. Under Nixon’s plan, every unemployed family of four would 
receive $2,400 a year from the federal government, and the working poor would be allowed a minimum of 
$1,600 a year up until their earnings reached $4,000. Adult recipients, however, would be required either 
to work or to be enrolled in a training program to be eligible.2 The draft bill was not sent to Congress until 
October, and the proposal made little progress the rest of the year, although the House Ways and Means 
Committee did hold hearings. 
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In 1970, Nixon did sign a measure continuing appropriations to the Office of Economic 
Opportunity through fiscal 1971 and another raising the appropriation of the food stamp program. Nixon 
originally proposed a one-year extension of the OEO on February 19th, but changed his recommendation to 
two years in June in order to better allow the agency to focus on the “innovative, experimental approach” 
Nixon envisioned for it.3 As part of that plan, Nixon utilized executive orders to reorganize the OEO, 
transferring Head Start to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Jobs Corps to the 
Labor Department, closing 59 Job Corps camps in the process. Lastly, he signed a sweeping tax bill 
included a measure that increased social security benefits by 15 percent effective January 1, 1970. 
 In 1970, the FAP passed the House of Representatives April 16 by a surprising vote of 243-155. 
The Senate Finance Committee did not vote it out of committee however. They did finally allow a one-
year trial version to be considered by the Senate as a whole, but even that limited version was removed 
from a larger bill in late December. Both the House and the Senate separately passed an additional 
increase to social security, but the conference committee was unable to reconcile their differences.  
 Foreign policy dominated the agenda throughout 1971, and many of Nixon’s domestic 
recommendations remained bogged down in congressional committees. In his State of the Union address, 
Nixon stressed six great domestic goals for his administration, which included welfare reform, but he was 
never able to garner significant progress on any of them. The FAP did pass the House of Representatives 
for the second time, and the Senate Finance Committee began hearings on the legislation. However, Nixon 
asked for the implementation of welfare to be delayed for a year due to other economic concerns, thus the 
FAP once again failed to clear the committee and come to a vote in the Senate. According to the 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, what had been the president’s top priority had become a “lost priority” 
by 1971.4 In December, Nixon vetoed an appropriations bill for the continuation of the OEO that also 
provided $2.1 billion for the establishment of day care centers to help working mothers.   
 In 1972, any momentum the FAP had finally dissipated. The Senate could not agree on which of 
three alternatives to focus, so they approved three test programs for 2 to 4 years to gather more 
information. In the process, the provisions within the FAP specifically designed for the aged, blind, and 
disabled were separated from the FAP, passed, and signed by Nixon as the Social Security Amendments of 
1972. Meanwhile, the OEO was extended for another two years, and Social Security was once again 
increased across the board and an automatic cost of living increase was added. Congress also attempted to 
pass a minimum wage bill, but the House and Senate were unable to agree on the final bill to send to the 
president. After being reelected, Nixon announced his plans for his second term, and welfare reform was 
no longer given a prominent place on the agenda.5
 1973 proved a quiet year for welfare and poverty issues. Nixon formally abandoned the FAP in a 
human resources message in March.6 Nixon announced in January that the OEO would be abolished on 
July 1st, despite being funded through 1974, but a U.S. District Court ruled the premature abolition 
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unconstitutional. Nonetheless, by December all of the office’s functions had been transferred to other 
agencies and departments except for its community action, legal services, and economic development 
programs. Congress finally passed a minimum wage bill, but Nixon vetoed the bill on grounds that it was 
inflationary and did not allow for a subminimum wage for youths. Once again, Social Security benefits 
were increased, along with SSI benefits. 
 In 1974, the Watergate crisis resulted in the October resignation of Richard Nixon. Before that 
resignation, Nixon did sign a minimum wage bill on April 8 that increased the minimum wage to $2 an 
hour for most non-farm workers, and extended coverage to more workers, including domestics. It was the 
first increase since 1966.  
 
Nixon and the Role of Government 
 
 Nixon’s vision for America and the role of government within that vision did not differ 
significantly from that of Lyndon Johnson. Nixon continued to glorify an ideal of full employment, and 
although he tended to express the limitations of government at times, he nonetheless clearly expected 
government to play a significant role in helping the disadvantaged. Although Nixon was much less 
dramatic than Johnson in his criticisms of the United States, he was also not satisfied with the present level 
of opportunity, and expressed concern over the continued existence of poverty and inequality, especially 
as manifested in the lives of the nation’s children. The analysis also examines how Nixon glorified 
“work,” and how that keyword served as the center point of his philosophy. These basic beliefs then 
served as the basis for Nixon’s criticism of the welfare system and his development and defense of an 
alternative. 
  During the presidential campaign of 1968, Nixon expressed his perspective on the role of 
government on a number of occasions. During a campaign speech in Charlotte, North Carolina, for 
example, Nixon explained that “government will play a great role” in his vision of society. He added that 
“Government will provide for the field of education all that we all want for our children, the best 
education that the world has ever seen. Government will provide for the aged and for the needy and all 
those that cannot care for themselves. Government will provide that equal chance at the starting line.”7 
After the election, Nixon continued to express this activist position of government. In his Inaugural 
Address, he explained how his administration would not represent a major change in terms of social 
programs: 
In this past third of a century, government has passed more laws, spent more money, 
initiated more programs than in all our previous history. In pursuing our goals of full 
employment, better housing, excellence in education; in rebuilding our cities and 
 71
improving our rural areas; in protecting our environment and enhancing the quality of 
life—in all these and more, we will and must press urgently forward.8
Although he seemed to agree with Johnson’s activist perspective, Nixon tended to back off somewhat 
from Johnson’s broader goals and calls to action in two ways. First, while Nixon envisioned an active 
government, he also limited the possible impact of government by explaining that government must work 
better, and must work more in “a new partnership between government and people.”9  Comments such as 
“the Federal Government cannot solve all the nation's problems by itself,”10 and "the need is not to 
dismantle government but to modernize it"11 were common. He tended, in other words, to combine the 
role of government with the role of the people, as “partners” or “supplements” to each other.12 
Government remained a necessary entity, but was not considered sufficient on its own. 
Second, whereas Johnson used the wealth of the United States as an object of shame in the face of 
continuing poverty, Nixon framed that wealth as evidence that in general the American system was 
working well, although it still had flaws. Nixon would brag that the nation had “grown enormously in 
wealth” and claim that that wealth was “more widely distributed than ever before,” but would also admit 
that “need persists.”13 During a 1968 campaign speech, Nixon applied this argument to the notion of the 
American dream: 
In America today there are many of us who have been fortunate to have seen the 
American Dream come true. Most Americans have that equal chance at the starting line, 
and the only thing that will stop them is their own failure to go up. They can go as high 
as their talents will take them. But in this land of ours, as you know, there are many 
Americans--some of them are black Americans, some of them are Indian Americans, 
some of them are white Americans, some of them are Mexican Americans--who do not 
have that equal chance. I want a kind of America where every child in this country can 
have a chance to go as high as his talents will take them. That is what I want. That is 
what you want and that is the kind of America we are going to build.14
Nixon criticized the assumption that the War on Poverty started with Johnson’s programs, but nonetheless 
he again pointed to the fact that too much poverty remained: 
I can say to you that in our new administration we shall take this country on a new road 
to progress in which we will recognize this fundamental fact. America is a great nation, 
but the war on poverty didn't begin five years ago. Let us never forget that. It began 
when this country began, and it has been the most successful war on poverty ever 
waged. There's too much poverty left, and we are going to deal with it. But never forget 
today we have more wealth, more equally shared than in any nation in the world…. 
 You know what created it? America is a great country, not because of what 
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government did for people, but because of what people did for themselves. That's the 
answer, and that's the way that we shall move.15
Said differently, Nixon seemed to consider that the glass was almost full, rather than partially empty. 
Nonetheless, he did focus some attention and disappointment on the lack of fullness, and clearly supported 
a role for government to improve the situation. 
One additional aspect of Nixon’s expression of his philosophy of government relating to poverty 
is his glorification of work. A number of times Nixon expressed an ideal of full employment, and he 
justified his somewhat activist perspective on government based on the idea that full employment was not 
yet realized.16 This focus on full employment seemed to be directly tied to Nixon’s glorification of work. 
“Work” was clearly a key term for Nixon, and he spent considerable time explaining its inherent benefits 
and its critical role in the success of individuals and the nation as a whole. He explained, for example, that 
“Hard work is what built America, and it is time in this country we demonstrate a new appreciation of the 
dignity of work and what it means.”17 In another speech, he even questioned using the word “welfare” for 
public assistance, because “when we think about the welfare of this country and the welfare of an 
individual, in the best sense, that means a job.”  A job was what was “truly in the best interest of the 
welfare of the Nation and the welfare of every individual, because with that job comes dignity, dignity that 
cannot come, of course, from being on public welfare, no matter how high we are able to raise it, no matter 
how much we are able to do.”18 As I will show in the analysis of Nixon’s depiction of the poor, Nixon 
praised the “workingman,” and Nixon’s welfare proposals were designed in part to be fair to the “working 
poor,” a group he discussed often in sympathetic terms. Like many of Nixon’s arguments, this 
glorification of work also had a hard edge which turned to criticism of those who supposedly did not 
accept the “work ethic” that Nixon argued was an integral part of the American character. At times, 
especially later in his administration, work was elevated at the expense of welfare or “loafing,” and the 
work ethic was measured against the “welfare ethic.”19 While work provided sustenance and dignity, 
welfare stifled both.  
Perhaps the most forceful application of Nixon’s admiration for work and disdain for those that 
did not respect its importance was when he attacked the notion of “menial jobs” during a number of 
speeches in 1971. Nixon’s arguments were in response to a respondent at a hearing who had dismissed the 
idea of taking a menial job rather than staying on welfare.20 To Nixon, work by definition could not be 
menial because “any job that puts food on the table and buys shelter and clothing and education for a 
man's family is not a menial job.”21 “Scrubbing floors, emptying bedpans—my mother used to do that—it 
is not enjoyable work,” Nixon discussed elsewhere, “but a lot of people do it. And there is as much dignity 
in that as there is in any other work to be done in this country, including my own.”22 To the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, Nixon argued that “[n]o job is a menial job if it opens the door to a lifetime of work and the 
development of self-reliance.” He even turned the tables, explaining that the “most menial job” he could 
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think of was “the one held by the able-bodied person who makes a career out of living off of the hard-
earned dollars of his neighbors.”23 For Nixon, the value of work was derived not only from the product 
supplied or the wage earned, but also in the dignity it provided and the character it produced. 
 This glorification of work, therefore, worked alongside Nixon’s acceptance of the ideal of equal 
opportunity by placing responsibility on the individual to work once it was provided, regardless of the type 
of work. Equal opportunity, in other words, was a right, but equality as a result was not. “The goal of the 
American system is not to guarantee everybody a living,” Nixon argued, “it is to guarantee everybody an 
opportunity, a fair chance, to be rewarded for his work.”24 Full employment was thus the concrete 
embodiment of the abstract ideal of equal opportunity. If no job was menial and all jobs provide 
sustenance and respect, and full employment means all who are “able” and searching are employed, then 
full employment represents equal opportunity. Nixon’s philosophy, therefore, offered a particular balance 
on the values of equality and freedom based on the government insuring equal opportunity, and the citizen 
accepting the burden of work.  
 
Nixon’s Categorization of the Poor 
 
 Whereas Lyndon Johnson discussed the poor in terms of the four major categories of the 
unemployables, the working poor, the temporarily unemployed, and the hard-core unemployed,  Richard 
Nixon generally discussed only three categories: the unemployables, the working poor, and idle welfare 
poor. The first two categories were framed positively, whereas the welfare poor, for the most part, were 
constructed negatively. The primary rhetorical attribute of Nixon’s depiction of the poor was the manner 
in which he explicitly dissociated the welfare poor from the rest of American society, especially the 
unemployables, the working poor, and the “hardworking taxpayer.” Nixon’s attack on the welfare poor 
was in fact clearly the most pronounced of the five presidents examined in this project. This negative 
construction of the welfare poor was not as evident early in Nixon’s time in office, but became more and 
more pronounced as his tenure continued.  
 
The Unemployables 
 
 Although Nixon never actually used the term “unemployables,” his rhetoric revealed the typical 
categorization of “helpless” individuals that could not be expected to care for themselves and thus are the 
rightful beneficiaries of government largess. Included in the category were “the sick, the disabled, the 
blind, the needy children and the dependent elderly, the mothers who must care for their children, and 
cannot work.”25 From the beginning, during the presidential election of 1968, Nixon dissociated those 
“who cannot care for themselves” from those who can. For the former, Nixon promised to take “great care 
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of them, the best we possibly can, that this rich nation should be able to afford.”26 He explained that the 
United States would have “the most generous welfare for everyone who needs it.”27 Nixon even 
campaigned on the argument that in “many cases” the payments to the unemployables were “inadequate” 
and “meager.”28 He called often for a “generous” welfare program for those “in need.”29 Each time such 
generosity was promised, however, it served as an introduction to the companion argument that generosity 
to those not in need—those able to work—was not appropriate. In his 1971 State of the Union Address, for 
example, Nixon asked Congress to “generously help those who are not able to help themselves,” and then 
continued by saying, “But, let us stop helping those who are able to help themselves but refuse to do so.” 
30 Nixon would also further link the two by arguing that “the way to be able to provide more generously 
for those who are unable to help themselves is to quit helping those who are able to help themselves and 
refuse to do so. That is what we have to do.”31
Children were a significant part of the “unemployable” category for Nixon. In general, children 
represent the ultimate symbol of the deserving poor. It is difficult to attribute poverty to a child, which 
generally means that when the face of poverty is a youthful one, the non-poor would be inherently more 
sympathetic. Such a phenomenon explains why the public face of poverty is typically not a youthful one. 
Nixon, however, tended to put significant focus on children in his rhetoric. One of the likely reasons was 
the prevalence of new scientific studies at the time of Nixon’s election that elevated the importance of the 
health of young children and its impact on the rest of their lives. Nixon, in turn, noted that “There is no 
single ideal to which this administration is more firmly committed than to the enriching of a child's first 5 
years of life.”32 He hosted a White House Conference on Children in December of 1970, and confirmed 
that there was a “large and vital role government must play in insuring the best possible opportunity for 
the child.”33 One of the myriad arguments against welfare was the negative impact welfare had on 
“millions of children” who “suffer” in “degrading and deplorable conditions.”34  
 In the end, Nixon’s celebrated FAP program did not pass the muster of Congress, but one of its 
remnants that focused only on the unemployables, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), did eventually 
become law. At the signing of that legislation, Nixon made his support of the deserving poor clear: 
It reaffirms and reinforces America's traditional efforts to assist those of our citizens 
who, through no fault of their own, are unable to help themselves. America has always 
cared for its aged poor, the blind, and the disabled—and this bill will move that concern 
to higher ground by providing better and more equitable benefits. . . . This legislation 
once again provides dramatic and heart-warming evidence that America is the country 
that cares—and translates that humanitarian care into a better life for those who need, 
and deserve, the support of their fellow citizens. The American way of life is the high 
achievement of our era and the envy of the world, and responsive and responsible 
legislation such as this is one major reason why.35
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SSI specifically targeted unemployables, and the passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1972 
brought many of these more clearly “deserving” poor out from the other welfare programs and into their 
own. One of the important rhetorical implications of that move was its detrimental effect on the public 
support for the remaining poverty programs. By creating a program specifically for them, Nixon had 
removed the deserving poor from the larger more general welfare programs such as AFDC. The remaining 
poor, therefore, were likely seen as more “undeserving” because they were generally healthy and able to 
work.  
 
The Working Poor 
 
 The working poor actually received more attention from Nixon than they did from Lyndon 
Johnson. The FAP was sold in part because it provided benefits to the working poor, unlike AFDC, which 
was “unfair” to them. As Nixon explained during the announcement of the FAP on August 8, 1069, with 
his program “for the first time, the government would recognize that it has no less an obligation to the 
working poor than to the nonworking poor.” Nixon labeled the working poor as the “forgotten poor” and 
hoped to provide them a “fair share in the assistance given to the poor.” 36 Three days after his nationally 
televised speech, Nixon continued to focus on its benefits to the working poor in his message to Congress, 
writing: 
The most glaring inequity in the old welfare system is the exclusion of families who are 
working to pull themselves out of poverty. Families headed by a non-worker often 
receive more from welfare than families headed by a husband working full-time at very 
low wages. This has been rightly resented by the working poor, for the rewards are just 
the opposite of what they should be.37
In a 1971 letter to the House Committee on Ways and Means, Nixon defended FAP by explaining that the 
“working poor” would be distinguished from the welfare poor, and assigned to the Department of Labor. 
In that letter, he specifically defined the working poor as “families headed by an individual presently 
working, but at wages below the poverty level.”38 In 1972, Nixon made a brief comment concerning the 
working poor that did not appear elsewhere, but is nonetheless critical. During a special message to 
Congress on welfare reform, Nixon wrote that “[w]e must hit head-on the cruel fallacy that any income, no 
matter how low, is sufficient for an American family merely because that money comes from full-time 
work.”39 This admission of the insufficiency of work to escape poverty was significant because it revealed 
that Nixon was aware of that public misconception. Nixon certainly relied heavily on the argument that 
welfare was often more attractive than low-wage work when attacking the welfare system, but for the most 
part that attack was levied through an assumption that welfare benefits were too attractive, rather than the 
point that low-wage work perhaps was not as attractive as it should be. The FAP would have increased the 
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value of low-wage work, but that aspect of the program was never a significant focus of Nixon’s rhetoric 
in defense of the FAP.  
Nixon also often indirectly praised the working poor through his exaltations of work and 
“workingmen” in general.40 In the end, similar to his depiction of the unemployables, the picture Nixon 
painted of the working poor could only be properly interpreted through the comparison with the welfare 
poor.   
 
The Idle Welfare Poor 
 
 The final and most important category of poor discussed by Nixon was the idle welfare poor, who 
received heavy direct criticism from the president, especially during his later years in office. The idle 
welfare poor were described in many ways. At first, during the campaign of 1968, Nixon would refer to 
“those who can care for themselves” but evidently were not. His framing of the welfare poor during that 
campaign consisted primarily of an environmental attribution that placed most of the blame on the welfare 
system itself. During a 1968 radio campaign speech, for example, Nixon discussed “another category of 
welfare recipient” distinct from the “helpless” to whom “payments have been worse than inadequate; to 
them, welfare has become addictive, dulling ambition, penalizing initiative and reaching into another 
generation to perpetuate dependency. To some Americans, who are not helpless, welfare has become a 
way of life.”41 The idle welfare poor, from this perspective, were victims of a poorly designed system.  
  During the address on August 8, 1969, Nixon’s seemed to attack the poor in one sentence and 
then defend them in the next. In his analysis of the speech, Robert Asen argued that Nixon’s “attitude 
toward recipients vacillated between compassion and hostility.”42 Slowly and surely, however, Nixon’s 
depiction of the idle welfare poor began to rely more and more on dispositional attributions. For example, 
the progression of statements from Nixon concerning what to do with those able to work but not working 
reveals a clear trend. During the 1968 campaign, when a man is “able to work,” Nixon asked to “give him 
a job rather than welfare,”43 a rather benign statement. Later in the campaign, he stated “If a man is able to 
work and if we can find him a job, get him a job. He ought to work and get off welfare.”44 The addition of 
“he ought to work” included some sense that the individual may resist work and choose welfare, but was 
in general still not overly critical. During the August 8th address, after discussing the unemployables, 
Nixon asked “But what of the others—those who can work but choose not to?” Here, not working had 
become a choice.45  
Three days later, Nixon discussed the issue in greater detail in his message to Congress. Again he 
began by complimenting the poor, but then turned the tables: 
I believe the vast majority of poor people in the United States prefer to work rather than 
have the government support their families. In 1968, 600,000 families left the welfare 
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rolls out of an average caseload of 1,400,000 during the year, showing a considerable 
turnover, much of it voluntary. However, there may be some who fail to seek or accept 
work, even with the strong incentives and training opportunities that will be provided. It 
would not be fair to those who willingly work, or to all taxpayers, to allow others to 
choose idleness when opportunity is available. Thus, they must accept training 
opportunities and jobs when offered, or give up their right to the new payments for 
themselves. No able-bodied person will have a "free ride" in a nation that provides 
opportunity for training and work.46
A year later, during the mid-term election of 1970, Nixon’s tone had become more belligerent with the 
welfare poor. In a series of speeches delivered as he crossed the country campaigning for fellow 
Republicans, Nixon began to pit “people who work hard” and “people who pay their taxes” against 
“people who are not working, and some of them could work if they would just go out and do so.”47 During 
a speech in Kansas City, he explained that “if a man is able-bodied, if a man is trained for a job, if a man 
then is offered a job and if he refuses to work, I say the taxpayers should not subsidize him for loafing.”48 
The charge of “loafing” was leveled on the idle welfare poor in at least ten other speeches during that 
campaign.49  This dissociation between the “loafing” welfare poor and the “hardworking taxpayer” left 
little to the imagination. It presented not only a clearly dispositional attribution of poverty—thus 
decreasing sympathy—but also worked to increase the resentment of the welfare poor by focusing on how 
the taxpayers were footing the bill for the “loafers.” Not only were the poor to blame for their poverty, but 
what income they were receiving was essentially framed as theft.  
By the 1971 State of the Union, the argument had progressed to the point were Nixon called for a 
stop to “helping those who are able to help themselves but refuse to do so.”50  Later in 1971, Nixon tied his 
attack on the idle poor with his expression of the ideal of equal opportunity, framing the idle poor as a 
threat to that goal: 
The goal of the American system is not to guarantee everybody a living; it is to 
guarantee everybody an opportunity, a fair chance, to be rewarded for his work. The 
American people will not be denied that goal by those who could work or who could 
take training, but who prefer to take it easy. This is wrong. It is bad for them, bad for the 
country, and it is especially bad for those who really do need help. The able-bodied 
people who think they can take a free ride are just going to have to get out and push with 
the rest of us.51
Another rhetorical device that Nixon used to support his attack on the welfare poor was the citation of the 
number of jobs available in the cities that were experiencing significant increases in their welfare rolls. 
This rhetoric again began in earnest during the mid-term election of 1970, and often consisted of Nixon 
referring to newspapers with “want ads, pages after pages, offering work for people, and no takers.”52 
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Again, according to Nixon, no jobs could be considered menial, thus any unfilled job during 
unemployment was disappointing, and blame was inherently placed on the poor. 
In sum, Nixon’s depiction of the poor focused attention on the almost willful avoidance of work 
by the idle welfare poor. The idle welfare poor were loafers, who refused to help themselves, and preferred 
to take it easy and be subsidized by others. Nixon directly juxtaposed the idle poor to the unemployables 
(who deserved more assistance), to the working poor (who deserved some assistance), and to the taxpayer 
(who deserved tax relief). Despite the growing negativity directed toward the idle poor, overall Nixon’s 
primary target was the welfare system itself, rather than the recipients of its benefits. 
 
Nixon’s Anti-Welfare Rhetoric 
 
 The hallmark of Nixon’s poverty rhetoric was his all-out attack on the welfare system, which he 
maintained throughout his time in office. In his nationally broadcast speech August 8, 1969 introducing 
the FAP, Nixon introduced many of the arguments that would be repeated often throughout the next five 
years: 
Whether measured by the anguish of the poor themselves, or by the drastically mounting 
burden on the taxpayer, the present welfare system has to be judged a colossal failure. 
Our States and cities find themselves sinking in a welfare quagmire, as caseloads 
increase, as costs escalate, and as the welfare system stagnates enterprise and 
perpetuates dependency. What began on a small scale in the depression 30's has become 
a huge monster in the prosperous 60's. And the tragedy is not only that it is bringing 
States and cities to the brink of financial disaster, but also that it is failing to meet the 
elementary human, social, and financial needs of the poor. It breaks up homes. It often 
penalizes work. It robs recipients of dignity. And it grows. . . . The present system 
creates an incentive for desertion. . . . The present system often makes it possible to 
receive more money on welfare than on a low-paying job. This creates an incentive not 
to work, and it also is unfair to the working poor. It is morally wrong for a family that is 
working to try to make ends meet to receive less than a family across the street on 
welfare. This has been bitterly resented by the man who works, and rightly so—the 
rewards are just the opposite of what they should be. Its effect is to draw people off 
payrolls and onto welfare rolls—just the opposite of what government should be doing. 
To put it bluntly and simply—any system which makes it more profitable for a man not 
to work than to work, or which encourages a man to desert his family rather than to stay 
with his family, is wrong and indefensible. We cannot simply ignore the failures of 
welfare, or expect them to go away. In the past 8 years, 3 million more people have been 
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added to the welfare rolls—and this in a period of low unemployment. If the present 
trend continues, another 4 million will join the welfare rolls by 1975. The financial cost 
will be crushing; and the human cost will be suffocating….The cost of continuing the 
present system, in financial as well as human terms, is staggering if projected into the 
1970's….We cannot produce productive people with the antiquated, wheezing, 
overloaded machine we now call the welfare system [emphasis added].53
Nixon’s attack on the welfare system was wide-ranging and unforgiving. The two most frequent 
arguments revolved around welfare being anti-work and anti-family, and thus counterproductive. 
Secondary arguments focused alternatively on how welfare caused dependency, was demeaning and unfair 
to the poor, caused frustration and violence, was suffering skyrocketing costs, and was laden with waste 
and abuse. As a whole, these seven arguments painted a picture of a program that harmed everyone and 
helped no one. The victims of welfare included the deserving poor (who did not receive adequate or equal 
benefits), the idle poor (who suffered from welfare’s perverse incentives), the working poor (whose hard 
work was not rewarded), taxpayers (who were forced to foot the bill), cities and states (who suffered from 
the crushing financial burden), welfare workers (who were forced into becoming demeaning “snoopers”), 
and finally “American society” (which suffers from the various effects of welfare including how it breaks 
up homes, creates social unrest, and robs children of the “joy of their childhood”). To provide a clear 
picture of Nixon’s rhetoric, I will review how he structured each of his seven criticisms of the welfare 
system. 
 
Welfare as Anti-Work 
 
 The lynchpin of Nixon’s attack on welfare was the opposition between work and welfare. 
Overall, work is associated with responsibility, American values, independence, and self-reliance, whereas 
welfare is associated with irresponsibility, the rejection of American values, and government waste and 
dependency. During the campaign of 1968, Nixon constantly called for the need for more Americans on 
“payrolls” rather than “welfare rolls.” Nixon explained early and often how welfare “penalized” work 
because it created a situation where it was “more profitable for a man not to work than to work.”54 Indeed, 
some form of the latter phrase appeared in at least thirteen speeches from 1968 to 1974. In 1972, he 
actually suggested an Eleventh Commandment: “No one who is able to work shall find it more profitable 
to go on welfare than to go to work.”55 Nixon’s clearest exposition of these arguments was during a speech 
at a Republican Governors’ Conference in 1971: 
The abuses in this system are not only unconscionable, they are contagious as well, as 
you know. It is a system which not only destroys the incentive of those who are on 
welfare to get off of it but it attacks the motivation of those who are not on welfare, the 
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working poor, to stay off. It is incredible that we have allowed a system of law under 
which one person can be penalized for doing an honest day's work and another person 
can be rewarded for doing nothing at all. It can happen, and it does happen under the 
present system. The person on welfare can often have a higher income than his neighbor 
who holds a low-paying job. Every Governor around this table knows that that is the 
case in his State. Tragically, these situations often exist right in the same neighborhood, 
side by side in the same apartment houses, and you can see what the effect is. It is 
entirely corrosive. It creates bitterness on the part of the worker, and, in the end, I would 
imagine that it creates resignation, and we end up with just another person on welfare. 
“Give up the job. Go on welfare. Everybody else is at the trough, why not me?”56
According to Nixon welfare’s anti-work nature resulted in a situation where it kept those receiving welfare 
on welfare by discouraging work, it attracted those not on welfare by offering an easier and more lucrative 
path than low-wage labor, and it caused resentment and bitterness between the two.  
Nixon typically used his Labor Day Address each year to glorify the value of work and attack the 
welfare system. In his 1972 Labor Day Address, with the election looming, Nixon compared the American 
“work ethic” with what he termed the growing “welfare ethic.” While doing so, he again pitted the idle 
welfare poor against the American taxpayer: 
Today, this Nation is operating under a system that is rooted in the values that built 
America: We believe that an able-bodied person should earn what he gets and keep most 
of what he earns. . . . We believe it is wrong for someone on welfare to receive more 
than someone who works. …We are faced this year with the choice between the "work 
ethic" that built this Nation's character and the new "welfare ethic" that could cause that 
American character to weaken. Let's compare the two:  The work ethic tells us that there 
is really no such thing as "something for nothing," and that everything valuable in life 
requires some striving and some sacrifice. The work ethic holds that it is wrong to 
expect instant gratification of all our desires, and it is right to expect hard work to earn a 
just reward. Above all, the work ethic puts responsibility in the hands of the individual, 
in the belief that self-reliance and willingness to work make a person a better human 
being. The welfare ethic, on the other hand, suggests that there is an easier way. It says 
that the good life can be made available to everyone right now, and that this can be done 
by the Government. The welfare ethic goes far beyond our proper concern to help people 
in need. It sees the Government, not the person, as the best judge of what people should 
do, where they should live, where they should go to school, what kind of jobs they 
should have, how much income they should be allowed to keep. The choice before the 
American worker is clear: The work ethic builds character and self-reliance, the welfare 
 81
ethic destroys character and leads to a vicious cycle of dependency. The work ethic 
builds strong people. The welfare ethic breeds weak people.57
Thus, once again, the flaws of the welfare system threatened much more than taxpayer dollars. The 
welfare system undermined American values and the American system all together, it destroyed character, 
and “breeded” weak people. Considered together with Nixon’s philosophy of government, it is easy to see 
why the welfare system became such an important target of reform in his eyes. 
 
Welfare as Anti-Family 
 
 The companion argument to welfare being anti-work was welfare being anti-family, especially in 
terms of welfare providing an incentive for fathers to “desert” their families. The main issue behind these 
criticisms was the fact the AFDC was primarily available only to families with single mothers, in part due 
to the original assumptions that most single women would be widows, and thus deserving. During the 
announcement of FAP, Nixon walked the audience through the argument: 
The present system creates an incentive for desertion. In most States a family is denied 
welfare payments if a father is present—even though he is unable to support his family. 
Now, in practice, this is what often happens: A father is unable to find a job at all or one 
that will support his children. And so, to make the children eligible for welfare, he 
leaves home—and the children are denied the authority, the discipline, the love that 
come with having a father in the home. This is wrong.58
Similar to Nixon’s rhetoric concerning the idle welfare poor, the force with which the system affected the 
family seemed to grow the longer he stayed in office. Early in his administration, Nixon calmly explained 
that “[u]nder the present system, sometimes a father must desert his wife and children to make them 
eligible for benefits.”59 Later, he would alternatively argue that the system “breaks up homes,” “disrupts 
family life,” “drives families apart, instead of bringing them together,” “rewards leaving family,” 
“encourages families to break up so that they might qualify for assistance,” “induce[s] fathers to leave 
home so that their families can qualify for welfare,” “contribute[s] to the breakup of poor families, rather 
than reenforcing the role of the family in our national life,” or  “offers a man a bounty to desert his 
family.”60  During the mid-term campaign of 1970, Nixon’s typical stump speech almost always included 
the point that the welfare system had “the effect of encouraging a man to desert his family rather than to 
stay with it.”61 During the same Republican governor’s convention mentioned above, Nixon discussed the 
effect of welfare on the family in greater detail: 
At a time when we see all about us the problems of the disintegration of the family, what 
we are doing is continuing with the system that encourages family disintegration. And 
that is what the present welfare system does. Let's look at the man out of work, or one 
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struggling to support his family with a low-paying job. He sees that his family can have 
a higher income on welfare, and yet he is torn by the knowledge that they cannot qualify 
for welfare as long as he is there in the house—and so what does he do? He leaves. His 
children grow up either entirely without a father, or with a father who sneaks in and out 
of the house one step ahead of the welfare worker. Now, what conclusion should his 
children draw about the morality and the compassion and the justice of a system which 
forces their father to desert them in order to feed them? This is wrong. It must be 
changed. We have got to change it in this country, and I pledge to you we will.62  
This quotation in particular reveals the complexity of the situation in terms of the attribution concerning 
the father’s act of abandonment. Nixon practically offers sympathy for the father who seemingly would 
prefer to stay home, but is “forced” to desert his children due to the system.  
 
Secondary Criticisms 
 
 Nixon’s third typical argument against welfare centered on how welfare caused dependency, 
which, similar to the anti-work argument, was framed as anti-American, particularly in terms of being 
anti-freedom. During the 1968 presidential campaign, Nixon devoted an entire speech to welfare that 
relied primarily on the dependency argument. There he described welfare as “addictive, dulling ambition, 
penalizing initiative and reaching into another generation to perpetuate dependency,” thus becoming “a 
way of life.” Somewhat misrepresenting the origins of the welfare system, Nixon explained that welfare 
was “designed as a half-way house along the road from poverty to prosperity,” but had become “a dead-
end street.” Once again Nixon tended to blame the system more than the individual, arguing by “locking 
people who are not helpless into a permanent system of government welfare,” the welfare system 
essentially denied them the “blessings of liberty.” Welfare, he continued, “doled out its pittance to the 
poor and exacted in return their independence and their dignity.”63 Throughout his tenure in office, Nixon 
would return to the argument, often mentioning how the welfare system perpetuates dependency and how 
his FAP program would work against the spread of dependency. The dependency argument represents an 
interesting twist within the freedom-equality paradox, as it turns the tables on Roosevelt’s economic 
freedom argument and focuses on how welfare works against freedom while avoiding the issue of poverty 
altogether.  
 Nixon’s fourth criticism was based on the argument that the welfare system demeaned the 
welfare recipient. This argument focused on how the various rules and regulations tied to administering 
welfare required social workers to act as “welfare snoopers”64 that were forced to investigate individuals 
on welfare to make sure they were not co-habitating or receiving payments for working off the books. As a 
result of these “flagrant invasions of the privacy of those on welfare,” Nixon often argued that the welfare 
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system was “demeaning,” “degrading,” or “dehumanizing” to the poor. He said often that the system 
“robbed” its recipients of “their pride and dignity.”65 During his speech at the White House Conference on 
Children in December of 1970, Nixon explained how the demeaning quality of welfare influenced 
children. He argued that a “welfare segregation” had developed as a result of the “stigmatizing of welfare 
children.” He compared the poverty he grew up in to the poverty suffered by children under the welfare 
system. Although his family was certainly poor, they did not realize it and were not treated differently. 
“Today's welfare child,” he argued, “is not so fortunate.” Nixon explained that even though a poor child in 
1970 may actually be less poor in a material sense, 
he knows they are poor and he can feel that soul-stifling patronizing attitude that follows 
the dole. Perhaps he watches while a caseworker—a caseworker who himself is trapped 
in a system that wastes on policing talents that could be used for helping—he watches 
while this caseworker is forced by the system to poke around in the child's apartment, 
checking on how the money is spent, or whether his mother might be hiding his father in 
the closet. This sort of indignity is hard enough on the mother. It is enough of a blow to 
her pride and to her self-respect. But think of what it must mean to a sensitive child. We 
have a chance now to give that child a chance—a chance to grow up without having his 
schoolmates throw in his face the fact that he is on welfare and without making him feel 
that he is therefore something less than other children.66
The demeaning argument was tied together with the anti-work argument in the sense that for Nixon work 
was the ultimate provider of self-respect and dignity, whereas welfare actually took both away. The 
demeaning argument also focused blame on the system, not the individual.  
 The fifth criticism was most evident during the campaign of 1968, when the devastating riots of 
the just completed summer were fresh on the public’s mind. In a number of speeches during that 
campaign, Nixon would directly attribute blame for the riots on Johnson’s government programs. Nixon 
questioned the “billions of dollars” that had been spent that had not “worked” but rather “reaped” a 
“harvest” of frustration, hatred, and violence. In a speech in California, for example, Nixon argued that 
“[p]rogram after program aimed at establishing domestic tranquility and securing the general welfare has 
had almost the opposite effect--less tranquility and more violence, more public welfare and less personal 
well-being.”67 This argument, in other words, fit right along with the other arguments whose basic logic 
was that welfare was counterproductive.  
 Nixon’s sixth criticism of welfare was its skyrocketing cost. At first, Nixon merely attacked the 
“billions of dollars” spent on Johnson’s programs and millions added to the welfare rolls “with no end in 
sight.”68 Later, the criticism began to focus more on the impact of rising costs on state and local 
governments. Nixon argued that the welfare system had become a “crushing and growing financial 
burden” or a “suffocating burden” that was “driving the States toward fiscal bankruptcy.”69 On a number 
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of occasions Nixon cited specific figures concerning the rapid increase in both the cost of the programs 
and the number of recipients.70 The assumption that these increases would continue was also self-evident 
within Nixon’s rhetoric.  
 Nixon’s final criticism, which focused on the waste and abuse within the welfare system, did not 
begin to appear consistently until 1972, but became perhaps Nixon’s primary attack on the welfare system 
once the FAP had essentially been scrapped. During a message to Congress in 1972, Nixon introduced a 
typical argument that would reach a crescendo during the Reagan administration. Citing state “quality 
control surveys,” Nixon revealed that as many as one in twenty welfare recipients were actually ineligible 
for benefits, and one in four received inaccurate payments. He described welfare as a “quagmire of red 
tape,” a “web of inefficient rules and economic contradictions,” and “a crazy quilt of injustice and 
contradiction.”71 He repeated similar charges and statistics again a year later, adding that the 
administration of AFDC was “unacceptably loose” and its definitions “inconsistent and unclear.”72 During 
his 1974 State of the Union, Nixon commended his own “concerted effort” to improve the administration 
of welfare programs that had actually stopped the expansive growth in welfare programs from 1972 to 
1973. Nonetheless, Nixon went on to claim that 40 percent of AFDC benefits were incorrect as the result 
of fraud and a system “so complex and so riddled with obscure, obsolete and incomprehensible regulations 
that it defies fair and efficient administration.”73  
 In summary, when Nixon discussed issues of poverty and welfare, he was primarily criticizing 
the current welfare system. Through a varied array of arguments, Nixon attacked the welfare system, 
AFDC specifically, from all angles, to the point that little or no benefit from the system was admitted, and 
the victims of the system included essentially everyone in American society. Each criticism seemed to pile 
on the others, as each was framed a sufficient criticism on its own.  
 
Nixon’s Alternative: The Family Assistance Plan 
 
 Considering the degree to which Nixon disapproved of the welfare system, and, to somewhat a 
lesser degree, most of its recipients, the development of an alternative was obviously necessary. Nixon’s 
alternative to AFDC and the various programs connected to it was the Family Assistance Plan, or FAP. 
The plan was in part the result of a new approach toward confronting poverty sparked originally by 
conservative economist Milton Friedman’s concept of the negative income tax. The FAP itself was the 
brainchild of Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who offered his own recollections of the events in The Politics of 
Guaranteed Income.74 Nixon introduced the FAP in a nationally televised address in August of 1969, just 
months after entering office, and spent the next few years defending it and attempting to get the legislation 
through Congress. The FAP was labeled “Nixon’s Good Deed” by historian Vincent Burke, who wrote the 
definitive history of the origins and ultimate failure of the legislation.75 The failure of the plan to become 
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law is perhaps the ultimate example of the paradoxes of poverty serving as constraints to progress. The 
plan was attacked from both sides of the political spectrum. Liberals, including welfare rights 
organizations, attacked the low level of benefits provided and its work requirements. Conservatives balked 
at the price tag and the millions who would be “added” to the welfare rolls. The question of how much 
Nixon actually supported the plan remains unclear.  
 The most significant argument for the FAP was simply that it was not AFDC, which clearly 
Nixon viewed as a wasteful and counterproductive program. All of the arguments against welfare were 
inherently arguments for FAP, and indeed Nixon’s framing of the FAP fit well in alleviating the problems 
Nixon continuously attacked concerning AFDC. The FAP was designed to avoid the disincentives to work 
and to help families stay together. It was to be simpler to administer, thus produce less waste. By 
eliminating the need for rules of behavior and the stigma of “the dole,” it also hoped to avoid the 
demeaning of its beneficiaries. And while the cost would be higher in the short term, Nixon argued it 
would ultimately prove very cost effective as it beneficiaries left the program. 
 An examination of Nixon’s framing of the FAP reveals that he sought fundamentally to redefine 
the purpose of the welfare. His intentions were revealed early, during a nationally broadcast radio speech 
during the campaign of 1968: 
It is time to start anew, to look hard and honestly at the nature, the purpose and the scope 
of our welfare program. What should a welfare program do? First, it should meet the 
immediate needs of those who cannot help themselves--the poor, the disabled, the aged, 
and the sick. And it should do this in a way that preserves the dignity of the individual 
and the integrity of the family. Second, it should offer opportunity and incentive, for 
those who can, to move off welfare rolls onto private payrolls. 
Nixon thus followed the typical split between the unemployables and the able poor. For the 
former, the program would change little beyond simplification of the administration and some 
equalization of the national benefits. For the latter, however, major changes were in store. For 
them, welfare should become a program whose ultimate goal was to no longer be necessary. 
Rather than a program that provided sustenance, it was to become a temporary transition program 
that helped its recipients join or return to sustaining employment. The program thus joined 
together with Nixon’s typical glorification of work: 
Our present approach to welfare, born in the despair of the 1930's, is inappropriate to the 
1960's, and would be disastrous in the seventies. . . . The welfare dilemma is this: We 
have to motivate the able-bodied to get off welfare, without shaming the helpless about 
accepting welfare. There are reforms we can make in the present system to bring an end 
to that dilemma. A man in need is still a man with self-respect. Ours is a work-oriented 
society, and most Americans—including those on welfare—seek employment. 
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Later in the speech, Nixon was even more clear on his new vision of welfare: 
While we are taking these steps we must keep in mind one critical goal of a welfare 
program: Helping everyone capable of work to secure the blessings of economic liberty. 
Our emphasis should be on creating the conditions that will enable people to break away 
from welfare. . . . Welfare in America must do more than help a human body survive; it 
must help a human spirit revive, to take a proud place in the civilization that measures its 
humanity in terms of every man's dignity. 76
The critical point here is that welfare, at least the AFDC program that represented welfare for most people, 
was not designed as a temporary measure or to encourage its recipients to become self-sufficient. For the 
able poor on AFDC, Nixon was calling for a fundamental change in purpose. The goal—sustaining work 
for all able-bodied Americans—was actually the same on Johnson’s goal for the War on Poverty. The 
difference, however, was that Johnson tended to avoid associating his programs with welfare, while Nixon 
addressed the welfare system head on. 
 During his national address announcing the FAP, Nixon proposed to “abolish the present welfare 
system” and replace it with a program that, unlike the current system, is “designed to correct the condition 
it deals with and, thus, to lessen the long-range burden and cost.” He explained that the American people 
“cannot talk our way out of poverty; we cannot legislate our way out of poverty; but this Nation can work 
its way out of poverty. What America needs now is not more welfare, but more ‘workfare.’”77 In his 
message to Congress on the legislation three days later, Nixon emphasized that his “new approach” would 
“make it more attractive to go to work than to go on welfare.” He explained that his proposal would 
provide a “basic income” to those American families that could not care for themselves, and then allow for 
those families “good reason to go to work” by allowing them to keep the first sixty dollars a month 
without a reduction in benefits. He proposed that the program apply to those presently working in order to 
“encourage them to go on working and eliminate the possibility of making more from welfare than from 
wages.” All “employable persons” would be required to register for work or job training to receive 
benefits, and Nixon promised additional job training and day care facilities in order to meet the new 
demand.78 Throughout the remainder of his time in office, he continued to defend the FAP with the same 
arguments: a floor of dignity for unemployables, work incentives for the able poor, and fairness to the 
working poor with the goal of creating self-sufficient independent families. 
 One final important point concerning Nixon’s defense of his program concerns his attempt to 
differentiate the FAP program from a guaranteed income program. The two programs were similar in the 
sense that they essentially worked as a negative income tax by relying on a sliding scale of benefits 
designed to reduce benefits as income from work increased, but at a rate that would maintain the actual 
benefit of working. The distinction, according to Nixon, was the inclusion of the work or training 
requirement for the recipients.79 Otherwise, Nixon argued, the program would continue to discourage 
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work. Indeed, by 1972, Nixon had begun to refer to his welfare reform plan as “workfare” in order to 
emphasize the work requirement and further distance himself from the perception that the plan offered a 
guaranteed income.80
 
Nixon and the Dilemmas of Poverty 
 
 Nixon’s experience with the Family Assistance Plan perhaps represents the most obvious 
example of how the paradoxes of poverty make significant reform difficult. Nixon represented a good 
chance for serious reform of the nation’s welfare system. As explained by Vincent Burke, Nixon “liked to 
think of himself as a modern-day Disraeli, a Tory bringing social progress.”81 According to Burke, he was 
convinced by Moynihan that he could establish his legacy by reforming the despised welfare system,82 but 
in the end, no form of the legislation ever made it to his desk for his signature. The innovative nature of 
the program with its sliding benefit scale seemed to have been designed to negotiate the deserving-
undeserving and help-hinder paradoxes directly, but Nixon still could not overcome the politics of poverty.
   
Equality versus Freedom 
 
 Nixon seemed to offer a similar philosophy of government as Johnson, at least in the beginning. 
The role of government was to help achieve the goal of equal opportunity, primarily through full 
employment. Whereas Johnson tended to focus on the lack of equal opportunity and the need to provide 
more opportunity for the nation’s disadvantaged, especially the “hard-core unemployed,” Nixon’s rhetoric 
revealed a sense that the real was not as far from the ideal. Nixon still admitted that a gap remained, and 
that government still had a role in addressing the gap, but for Nixon the main impediment to the 
realization of equal opportunity was the welfare system, not the cycle of poverty and its various 
component parts. Thus whereas Johnson’s representative poverty group was the hard-core unemployed, 
Nixon’s representative group was the idle welfare poor.  
Considering Nixon’s anti-welfare rhetoric, welfare actually violated both of the primary 
American values of freedom and equality. The dependency welfare inevitably caused worked against 
freedom, while welfare’s disproportionate relationship with the idle poor, working poor, and taxpayers 
made it a vehicle of inequality. Later in his administration, when Nixon began to focus more and more on 
the cost of the welfare system to taxpayers, he expressed the ideal that “an able-bodied person should earn 
what he gets and keep most of what he earns.”83 He was thus framing welfare as a violation of the freedom 
of others as well. In sum, by all counts, welfare undermined American values. 
Nixon’s glorification of work is also relevant to the freedom-equality paradox. For Nixon, work 
was the polar opposite of welfare and thus the key to negotiating the tension. Government had the 
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responsibility to insure the opportunity to work to its able-bodied citizens in order for them to have true 
freedom, and the citizens must take the responsibility to accept what work was available. The problem 
with relying on work as the solution to the equality-freedom dilemma is that it requires a number of 
additional assumptions to function properly. There must be jobs available for all able-bodied, those jobs 
must be sufficient to provide a decent standard of living, the able-bodied must have the skills and 
education to succeed at those jobs, and finally the able-bodied must be willing to accept the job and do 
their part. Nixon seemed to take the first and third assumptions for granted for the most part, although he 
did to some extent support the creation of public jobs and the continuation of unemployment and 
manpower training programs.84 The question of whether the jobs would be sufficient to provide a decent 
standard of living, however, was an important question for Nixon. On one hand, Nixon’s insistence that no 
work was menial because it provided dignity and respect and “put food on the table” seemed to imply that 
any work was sufficient to provide true freedom (and thus equality). On the other hand, Nixon also 
referenced “the cruel fallacy that any income, no matter how low, is sufficient for an American family 
merely because that money comes from full-time work.”85 The FAP was designed in part to alleviate some 
of the deficiency from low-wage labor by providing an income benefit to the working poor to supplement 
their wages. While Nixon did discuss this supplement at times, it was clear from his rhetoric that he 
choose to focus on how the FAP would require work and decrease the relative value of welfare, rather than 
increase the relative value of low wage labor.  
The final remaining assumption necessary for work to qualify as the primary instrument of equal 
opportunity was the question of whether the able-bodied were willing to accept the job. Nixon’s 
continuous criticism of welfare “loafers” along with his attack on those who rejected menial jobs certainly 
made his opinion clear on this matter. For Nixon, this final requirement was the responsibility of the 
individual, not the government. As Nixon explained, “if a man is able-bodied, if a man is trained for a job, 
if a man then is offered a job and if he refuses to work, I say the taxpayers should not subsidize him for 
loafing.”86   
Rather than focusing on the lack of equality within the American system in terms of rich and 
poor, Nixon chose to focus on the lack of equality of treatment and effort between the working poor, the 
“hardworking taxpayer,” and the idle welfare poor. Rather than the existence of poverty being framed as 
anti-American and a violation of freedom, the “morally bankrupt” welfare system and the dependency it 
caused to its recipients and the financial burden it cost to everyone else was framed as anti-American and a 
violation of the freedom of both groups. In the end, the welfare system, and the character flaws of the 
“loafing poor,” were the only major impediments to the American system. 
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Deserving versus Undeserving 
 
 The notions of the deserving and undeserving poor were clear in Nixon’s rhetoric. He argued for 
increased and less stigmatizing benefits for the unemployables and fairness for the working poor, which he 
alternatively labeled the “forgotten poor.” The idle welfare poor, however, were targeted for heavy 
criticism, especially later in his administration. Nixon strongly supported the growing public assumptions 
concerning the laziness of the able-bodied on welfare, and at times provided a clear dispositional framing 
that implied many of the people on welfare had chosen the “free ride” of welfare rather than taking jobs 
which were evidently available and inherently non-menial. Nixon encouraged the growing resentment 
between the “hard-working taxpayer” and the welfare “loafer,” and tended to sell the FAP more on the 
grounds that it would force these idle poor to work rather than because it would provide benefits to the 
working poor.   
 Even though Nixon’s rhetoric distinguished between the deserving and undeserving poor, and 
was quite critical of the latter, the program his rhetoric was attempting to sell would likely have blurred 
the distinction between the deserving and undeserving. By offering benefits to all families under the 
poverty line in a graduated fashion, all three groups of the poor that Nixon had pitted against each other—
the unemployables, the welfare poor, and the working poor—would all receive varying benefits from the 
same program. By including the working poor within his program, Nixon was expanding the program to 
millions that were not previously eligible for AFDC, millions that were generally considered 
sympathetically by the non-poor. The critical issue was whether the recipients of the FAP as a whole 
would be perceived more as the undeserving idle poor or the deserving working poor. Considering 
Nixon’s work requirement, one could assume the dominant perception would have been of the latter. Due 
to the failure of the legislation to pass, that question was never answered.   
Part of the downfall of the FAP was the perception held by many conservatives that the program 
would add millions to the “welfare rolls.” The program would indeed add millions that would be receiving 
income benefits from the federal government, but those rolls would no longer be welfare rolls for many of 
those millions, at least in terms of how most interpret the meaning of welfare. Similar to how the program 
brought together the working poor and the welfare poor, it also melded both work and welfare together. 
They would no longer have been the polar opposites that Nixon described. The FAP combined the two to 
varying degrees, and most of its recipients would have been working at least part time. 
Ironically, when the FAP was finally abandoned and the only section that become law was the 
SSI, the effect on the deserving – undeserving line was directly the reverse. Because SSI was targeted 
solely on the unemployables, essentially members of the deserving poor such as the aged, disabled, and 
sick, the program actually increased the division between the deserving and undeserving poor. SSI 
essentially removed a large group of the deserving poor from the population receiving welfare, leaving 
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those left behind with less of a chance for public support. Nixon spent five years attacking the idle welfare 
poor while defending a program that would essentially end that category. In the end, the insults remained, 
and the welfare poor were left with even less public support. 
A final necessary point concerning Nixon’s depiction of the deserving-undeserving poor is the 
manner in which the idle welfare poor were overwhelmingly framed as men. Perhaps this could be 
explained simply through the grammatical conventions of the day, but the fact remains that a large 
majority of the welfare poor during the early seventies were either women or children. The FAP would 
certainly assist many men who were presently the working poor, and perhaps, if Nixon’s logic held, more 
men would utilize the benefits as an incentive to stay home with their families and work, but the 
percentage of beneficiaries of the FAP, or AFDC for that matter, that were men was minimal. By depicting 
the idle poor as men who had chosen not to work, Nixon was misrepresenting the difficulty of the 
situation. Finding suitable and sustainable work is much more difficult for single mothers, because not 
only did they tend to have less skills and experience, but going to work would also require child-care. 
Requiring the mothers of young children to work was especially controversial, but Nixon seemed to avoid 
these dilemmas by focusing on the limited image of the male idle poor.  
 
Help versus Hinder 
 
 Whereas Johnson introduced some of the basic anti-welfare arguments late in his term in office, 
Nixon practically elevated welfare bashing to an art form. By identifying the welfare system as an anti-
work, an anti-family program that demeans the poor and leads to dependence, high costs, waste and abuse, 
and violence, Nixon was placing himself quite firmly on the hinder end of the help-hinder tension. Indeed, 
Nixon did not clearly mention a single benefit of welfare.  
 Nixon’s FAP plan seemed to be designed with a specific understanding of some of the dilemmas 
inherent in devising an anti-poverty program. At one point, for example, Nixon explained the “welfare 
dilemma” as the need to “motivate the able-bodied to get off welfare without shaming the helpless about 
accepting welfare.”87 The FAP was also designed not to encourage the already working to stop working, 
but in order to do so, the program had to be expanded to cover the working poor, and the cost of such an 
expansion was certainly one of the reasons the program failed politically. One of the primary difficulties 
of establishing any benefit for the disadvantaged is to draw the eligibility line. Wherever it is drawn, those 
just above it would be provided an incentive to fall behind and thus take advantage of the benefit. Those 
just below would lack any incentive to move up, for fear of losing the benefit. The FAP sliding scale of 
benefits in part avoided such problems. By having the benefits adjust slowly with income, the relative 
benefit at each point on the scale decreased, while the overall benefit to increase income remains 
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throughout. Nonetheless, in order for such a gradual sliding scale to function properly, the program had to 
span a much wider range of incomes, which in the end proved politically untenable. 
 Nixon’s attack on welfare was clearly unbalanced. Again and again he repeated all the various 
possible sins associated with the program as if they were obvious, even though many of the cause-effect 
relationships Nixon identified—such as welfare’s negative effect on work ethic and family decisions—
remain controversial issues for social scientists to this day. Nixon’s exaggeration can be partly understood 
considering he was attempting to pass legislation that would abolish the program he was bashing and his 
proposal was designed to avoid many of the specific perceived sins of its predecessor, but, once again, 
when the program failed, all that was left was the negative public image of welfare and its recipients that 
Nixon continuously emphasized. In a similar vein, in the process of selling the FAP, Nixon redefined the 
purpose of welfare, moving away from sustenance to a program with the intent of helping individuals 
achieve self-sufficiency. When the FAP died and AFDC continued, the welfare system remained tied to 
sustenance, but the public perception likely was more focused on developing the need for self-sufficiency. 
This mismatch between the designed and assumed purpose certainly contributed to the public’s negativity 
toward welfare. 
 
Politics versus Policy 
 
  The politics versus policy paradox plays a key role in the downfall of the FAP. Again, the failure 
of the FAP is perhaps the clearest example of the power of the paradoxes and the difficulty of being 
prudent in the American political system. In the beginning, there was good reason for optimism. The FAP 
was certainly designed as a program that would attempt to balance competing perspectives concerning 
welfare and poverty. It was developed by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, formerly of Lyndon Johnson’s 
administration, and then proposed by Richard Nixon, a Republican president, to a predominately 
Democratic Congress. It was a mix of carrots (increased benefits and more work allowances) and sticks 
(work requirements). It would force some of the so-called “idle poor” to work, but it also extended 
benefits to millions previously not covered, and was designed to reduce the demeaning aspects of public 
assistance by blurring the line between the unemployables and the working poor.  
 Unfortunately, like many proposals designed to balance competing perspectives, the FAP was 
also attacked from both sides of the political spectrum. As Asen explained, “[a]udiences reacted to the 
FAP as both a reckless expansion of the existing welfare system and a draconian imposition of work 
requirements on poor mothers.”88 The FAP theoretically worked against the disincentives to work and 
incentives to break up families, key conservative concerns, but did so at the expense of added costs and an 
expanded federal government. In general, Nixon’s rhetoric in defense of the FAP was rather conservative, 
but Nixon and the other FAP supporters could not seem to avoid the frame that the FAP represented an 
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increase in the nation’s welfare rolls.  Considering the attacks Nixon was levying on the welfare system, 
expanding it seemed counterintuitive to conservatives. Although the lack of strong support from 
conservatives was detrimental to the case of the FAP, it should also have been somewhat expected. The 
FAP was an expensive program that essentially guaranteed a minimum income to millions of Americans, 
and represented a significant increase in the number of people assisted economically by the federal 
government. Even though based on the ideas of Milton Freeman, the FAP still seemed to be a clear step 
away from free market principles and self-reliance.  
 The lack of support from the American left, however, is more difficult to understand, especially 
in retrospect. Burke was especially critical of the liberal reaction to the FAP, writing: “Nixon’s failure to 
advertise the truth about his radical bill, which would have alienated his natural constituency, cannot 
excuse the liberals for failing to recognize it and support it, for failing to educate their constituency.”89  A 
number of issues that partly explain the liberal opposition to the FAP can be noted. First, the program was 
introduced by a Republican president, and was for the most part cloaked in conservative rhetoric that was 
at times rather derogatory to the poor. Second, there was likely a sense from many on the left that patience 
would be rewarded with a more generous program. Unfortunately for the left, the opposite was actually 
true, as the public support for government programs in general and welfare programs specifically 
decreased throughout the rest of the century to the point that the FAP would have been considered far too 
generous of a program if introduced in the eighties or the nineties. Third, the guaranteed floor remained 
rather low. For example, a family of four under the plan would still be approximately $2000 under the 
official poverty line.90  
Exhibiting yet another of the inherent difficulties to poverty programs, the proposal’s support 
suffered in part because it would have affected different liberal groups to varying degrees. One of the more 
controversial aspects of the FAP to those on the left was that it would have brought more equality to the 
nation’s income support rates. The rates would still be adjusted for geographical cost of living, but 
otherwise would have been equal. At the time, there was a wide variety in the rates from state to state and 
even from city to city. The larger cities in the north had higher than average rates, even after being 
adjusted for inflation. As a result, recipients of welfare in those cities would have received little or no 
additional benefit from the FAP, while recipients in the southern states, where rates were far below 
average, would have received an increase. The problem was that the development of welfare rights 
organizations and the community action groups coming out of the War on Poverty programs were tied 
primarily with the recipients from these larger cities. The influential National Welfare Rights 
Organization, for example, lobbied hard against the FAP.91  
 In addition, the nation’s unions were against the FAP because it would decrease the relative 
power of their organizations. If the federal government guaranteed a minimum income, and those benefits 
were available even to the working poor, the federal government was essentially usurping one of the more 
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important roles of the unions—providing some semblance of security to the working poor. Union leader 
George Meany, for example, argued that “Decent wages are the obligation of the employer, not of the 
taxpayer.” As a result, both the AFL-CIO and the United Auto Workers “vigorously” opposed the bill.92
 The left was also weary of the FAP’s work requirements. Work incentives and work requirements 
became part of the welfare system starting with the 1967 amendments, although at that point they applied 
only to a small percentage of welfare recipients. The FAP would have greatly expanded the role of both 
work incentives and requirements, although, again, the FAP did allow for a category of unemployables 
that would not be expected to work, including single mothers of young children over three years old.  
The framing and subsequent public perception of these work requirements is critical to their 
support or lack thereof. From one perspective, a work requirement could practically be framed as forced 
labor or even slavery, especially, as Nixon argued, when no work was considered menial. On the other 
hand, a work requirement puts significant pressure on government to insure that work is available and 
viable. Welfare certainly had its problems, but it was also a rather cheap way for the government to sustain 
those in poverty. If all the able-bodied were expected to work, the government would likely have to deal 
with some of the difficult issues involved. As long as welfare continued, it tended to garner most of the 
attention and distracted from other important issues.  
Additionally, work requirements can be criticized because they may not represent the best path to 
true self-sufficiency. For the unskilled and uneducated, the range of suitable jobs is rather narrow, and 
these jobs rarely hold much promise for advancement. For many, a better long-term solution would focus 
on increasing education and developing additional skills, rather than focusing on any available work. 
Finally, the left was likely critical of the FAP’s underlying assumptions that there would be enough 
suitable jobs for all the able-bodied poor that would be sent into the work force. The fact that the FAP’s 
benefits extended to the working poor should have alleviated some of these concerns, but, again, Nixon’s 
rhetoric tended to focus on the FAP’s anti-loafing aspects rather than the benefits it provided to the 
working poor, which likely did not help the situation. 
 Race also likely played a role in the downfall of the program, considering by the 1970s many 
voters were already assuming welfare was primarily a program for minorities. Similar to Johnson, Nixon 
tended to dissociate race and welfare, although the public likely did not maintain that dissociation. 
Minorities were disproportionally represented in the programs, but they were also disproportionally poor, 
and a majority of welfare recipients were white.  
  Even Nixon’s support for the FAP was unclear. Rhetorically, he continued to label the proposal a 
top priority, but the question of whether he would rather have the program or the political issue is unclear. 
Clearly one of the reasons Nixon introduced the plan was it represented a win-win situation for him. If it 
passed, he reformed a hated institution, and if it did not, he could blame the Democratic Congress for 
continuing one. During the 1970 and 1972 elections, it seemed more and more that Nixon preferred the 
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latter. During the 1970 mid-term elections, for example, welfare reform was a topic in almost every 
speech, but Nixon primarily used his time to bash welfare recipients as loafers rather than sell the specifics 
of the FAP program.  
In conclusion, the Nixon years represent a fascinating time in the history of American 
welfare and poverty politics. The FAP plan would have revolutionized how the nation treated 
poverty. By blurring the lines between the deserving and undeserving poor and between work and 
welfare, it would also have dramatically altered the rhetorical dimensions of poverty. In some 
ways, the situation seemed ideal for a major and necessary prudent change to the nation’s anti-
poverty program. The failure of the FAP represents a clear example of the difficulty of 
negotiating the political paradoxes of poverty. Nixon did seem to be cognizant of some of the 
dilemmas of poverty, but he also clearly avoided others and presented an unbalanced view of the 
merits and flaws of welfare and its recipients. Perhaps to satisfy his political needs, he tended to 
focus much more on the evils of welfare rather than the considerable benefits to the FAP. 
 If the FAP was enacted, however, the nation’s focus perhaps would have shifted from welfare’s 
perverse incentives and the deserving and undeserving poor and to the more significant issues of the 
availability and sufficiency of low-wage labor and the appropriate public response to the growing number 
of single mothers. FAP’s failure, however, only worsened the situation as Nixon’s public criticism of the 
welfare program and its recipients likely contributed to the public’s animosity. During Nixon’s years in 
office, the shift from the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare began in earnest and would continue into 
the 1990s.  
 After Nixon’s resignation, Gerald Ford completed Nixon’s second term, but never placed welfare 
or poverty high on his agenda. Ironically, while Ford did not address these issues to any significant extent, 
he did sign into law one of the most significant anti-poverty programs in American history, particularly to 
the working poor. In a tax bill in 1976, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was created. The program 
works somewhat as a negative income tax by providing a refund to the working poor. The benefit was 
only available once a year, but nonetheless was significant in bringing millions above the poverty line and 
making low-wage labor more sustainable. The program was also targeted specifically to the deserving 
poor, thus could be expected to continue to receive significant political support. Ford’s role in the 
development of the EITC appeared rather minimal, however, as he did not even mention the EITC, 
positively or negatively in his public papers.   
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CHAPTER IV 
JIMMY CARTER AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT 
 
 When Jimmy Carter presented his second major welfare reform proposal in May of 1979, he 
captured perhaps the key point of this work when he explained that “No legislative struggle in the last 
decade has provided so much hopeful rhetoric or so much disappointment and frustration.”1 Carter 
campaigned on welfare reform in 1976, where his tag line promising to reform the “welfare mess” 
captured large applause throughout the campaign. Once in office, Carter formed a research team and 
promised comprehensive reform based on clear principles that he consistently supported. His Program for 
Better Jobs and Income (PBJI) was announced on August 6, 1977, but much like Nixon’s FAP, odd 
acronymns and all, the program languished in Congress. Despite Carter’s advantage of having a 
Democratic Congress with which to work, he could not overcome many of the same political barriers and 
policy dilemmas that doomed the FAP. In addition, Carter was not as political savvy as Johnson or Nixon, 
and faced a weaker economy and a public increasingly wary of the efficiency and trustworthiness of 
government. 
 Of the five presidents in the study, Carter seemed to struggle the most with the difficulty of the 
situation. Poverty and welfare reform was high on Carter’s domestic agenda, but, unlike Johnson and 
Nixon, it was not at the top. For the most part, problems with the economy, especially inflation, kept 
Carter preoccupied, along with the energy crisis and the Middle East. He nonetheless presented a major 
program to Congress for the “complete overhaul” of welfare in 1977, and then, after it failed, presented a 
more incremental proposal in 1979. At times he discussed the issue often, and at times it would be absent 
from his everyday discussions for months at a time. Overall, his rhetoric concerning welfare gives readers 
a sense of his feelings of disappointment for being unable to solve this issue that seemed to have so much 
momentum for change. At times, Carter seemed to grasp the inherent dilemmas of the situation, but he 
nonetheless was unable to overcome them. Carter was known as a principled Christian man who in the 
post-presidency continues to have a strong natural sympathy for the disadvantaged and for the issue of 
human rights. During his presidency, however, Carter was also generally conservative for a Democrat, 
especially in terms of his vision of the role of the federal government and the issues he chose to focus 
upon. The inconsistencies between these two impulses caused within Carter was evident in his rhetoric, as 
he hoped to fulfill lofty ideals but also continuously warned of the dangers of government.   
  In general, Carter’s rhetoric was similar to Nixon’s, although Carter was much less openly 
belligerent to the poor themselves and tended not to pit them against each other. Carter expressed a similar 
philosophy of government based on equal opportunity and full employment, with some additional degrees 
of specificity. Carter relied heavily on the typical unemployable / employable split evident in Nixon’s 
 102
rhetoric, and also focused more on the negative features of welfare than its benefits or even the problem of 
poverty itself. He also presented his own unique set of relevant characters. At certain points, however, 
Carter made brief comments that revealed a greater understanding of the situation and that remain curious 
in their opposition to much of Carter’s other rhetoric. In particular were Carter’s assumptions that ninety 
percent of individuals on welfare could not work, and the admission that most of the poor already do work. 
These comments worked against Carter’s welfare plan, which was based around work requirements and 
work incentives to “force” more of the able poor into the workforce. In the end, Carter’s experiences 
represent simply another example of the difficulty of poverty politics. 
Unlike Johnson and Nixon, welfare and poverty were not major topics of discussion for Carter. 
Each of his proposals was accompanied by significant comments, and Carter answered a number of 
questions during press conferences and interviews concerning his welfare proposals, but otherwise he 
tended to focus his attention elsewhere. Nonetheless, this analysis of his rhetoric reveals some interesting 
conclusions and comparisons to the other presidents. Carter’s rhetoric was unique in the sense of struggle 
that was evident. Nixon’s welfare rhetoric certainly had its contradictions, but Nixon seemed either 
oblivious to them or understood their political necessity or utility. Carter seemed almost surprised at the 
difficulty of the issue and was at times much more open to admitting the inherent dilemmas and allowing 
for the need for study and debate. Such a perspective has its own advantages and disadvantages, of course. 
Carter was perhaps more realistic and true to the difficulty of the situation, but his lack of confidence also 
likely cost his programs support.   
 
Carter’s Record 
 
 Jimmy Carter entered in the White House in 1977 after eight years of Republican rule, giving the 
Democrats control of both houses of Congress and the White House once again.  During a nationally 
televised address two weeks after his inauguration, he discussed the need for a “complete overhaul” of the 
welfare system, and announced he had put together a team to research the issue.2 At a briefing on May 2, 
Carter provided his “goals and guidelines” for welfare reform, which called for the present system to be 
“scrapped entirely” and the new program to have no additional initial cost.3 Then, during a news 
conference on August 6, President Carter revealed his welfare reform proposal, the Program for Better 
Jobs and Income (PBJI).4 The bill was similar to Nixon’s FAP in that it combined elements of a 
guaranteed income with work requirements. Carter sought to replace AFDC, SSI, and food stamps with a 
two-tier program, an upper tier for those who cannot be expected to work, and a lower tier for those that 
could. The initial proposal allowed for $4,200 a year for a family of four in the top tier and $2,300 for the 
lower tier, with a sliding scale of allowances for income at a fifty percent rate. All in the lower tier would 
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be expected to work, and mothers with children ages 7 to 14 were expected to work part time in the upper 
tier.  
The plan was similar to Nixon’s FAP, but with a greater emphasis on public service jobs and 
training programs for those required to work. Indeed, Carter promised 1.4 million public jobs at minimum 
wage. Carter admitted that the program would have a higher initial cost—breaking his earlier promise—
and gave an estimate of $30.7 billion for the new program, $2.8 billion more than the combined cost of the 
programs it was replacing. This estimate later proved quite conservative, as the Congressional Budget 
Office offered a number that pointed toward $17.4 billion in added costs.5 No significant action occurred 
in Congress on the legislation in 1977. Carter did, however, sign bills in related areas, including bills that 
increased minimum wage, eliminated the cash requirement for food stamps, and increased payroll taxes 
sharply in order to put social security on better financial footing.6
 In 1978, the PBJI was unable to make its way out of the House Ways and Means or the Senate 
Finance Committee. According to Congressional Quarterly, welfare reform, similar to Carter’s major 
proposals for health insurance, tax revision, and urban renewal, “never got off the ground.”7 In February, a 
House subcommittee was able to vote out a bill consistent with Carter’s proposal, but the standing 
committees did not take it further. In the spring, Congress acted on some of the less controversial parts of 
the bill, including fiscal relief for state and local government, simplifying administration, expanding EITC, 
and adding more public service jobs. These actions represented yet another of the difficulties of passing 
comprehensive welfare reform. Congress will tend to break off the less difficult aspects of reform and pass 
them individually, leaving the more difficult issues with fewer supporters. By June, House Speaker Tip 
O’Neil called for an end to the efforts to hammer out a compromise bill between the committees. Carter 
did sign the mostly symbolic Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act in 1978. The bill expressed a 
“goal” of reducing unemployment to four percent by 1983, but provided little to make that happen. In the 
words of social welfare scholar Walter Trattner, the bill was “diluted and relatively meaningless.”8 Carter 
was criticized by some of his Democratic allies for not supporting the bill more strongly, and the bill was 
eventually passed only after “swallowing changes that they had previously considered unacceptable.”9  
In the 1978 elections, the Democrats lost members in both Houses, but nonetheless maintained 
their dual majority in Congress. In 1979, with the PBJI effectively dead, Carter retreated, offering a scaled 
down version of welfare reform through two proposals announced on May 23, the Social Welfare Reform 
Amendments of 1979 and the Work and Training Opportunities Act of 1979.10 The plans retained the same 
AFDC structure, but established national minimums to alleviate some of the geographic inequality in 
benefits, required states to allow two parent families if unemployed, and offered states some fiscal relief. 
The House passed the reforms in November, but the Senate did not act.  
 By 1980, the presidential campaign was in full swing, and comprehensive reform seemed 
unlikely. Carter focused primarily on the energy crisis and the double-digit inflation. Carter’s latest 
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welfare reform package died quietly, and was never even considered by the Senate Finance Committee. 
With the Congress intend on trying to balance the budget, the high cost of welfare reform was too high a 
barrier to overcome. Carter’s newest social initiative, a major youth employment bill, passed the House by 
a wide margin, but never came to the Senate floor. For the second year in a row, Congress had to act to 
prevent the shutdown of the Food Stamp program, whose costs had grown in size from $31 million in 
1964 to $5 billion in 1977.  
 In the end, Carter, like Nixon was unable to pass significant welfare reform despite, as his 
rhetoric will attest, Carter’s significant displeasure with the current system. By the end of the 1970s, $68 
million was being spent on welfare annually, an average of $2,750 per individual in poverty. Twenty-five 
million Americans were living in poverty, which translated into eleven percent of the population. Without 
the income transfers coming from the government’s various programs, that number would have been 
sixteen percent.11  
 
Carter and the Role of Government 
 
 Jimmy Carter’s rhetoric concerning his philosophy of government and the ideal he held for 
American society included an element that was rather new to American politics: restraint. Coming off of 
Vietnam, the Watergate scandal, a decade of racial strife, and with a shaky economy, the American mood 
was rather somber in the middle 1970s. Fitting with this mood, Carter did not seem to exude the same 
confidence as his predecessors. The notion of the limits of government and the difficulty of progress was a 
primary feature of his rhetoric. Nonetheless, he continued to cite lofty goals and ideals for American 
society, with government playing an important role in achieving those goals. This tension between goals 
and limits was often manifested specifically within the issue of welfare reform. 
 From the very beginning of his presidency Carter cited the importance of understanding 
limitations. In his inaugural address, typically a time of celebration and optimism, especially with a change 
of parties, Carter nonetheless explained, “We have learned that more is not necessarily better, that even 
our great Nation has its recognized limits, and that we can neither answer all questions nor solve all 
problems. We cannot afford to do everything, nor can we afford to lack boldness as we meet the future. 
So, together, in a spirit of individual sacrifice for the common good, we must simply do our best.”12 Two 
weeks later during a nationally broadcast address outlining his legislative goals, Carter made sure 
expectations would not be too high, admitting that “[a]s President, I will not be able to provide everything 
that every one of you might like. I am sure to make many mistakes.”13 These statements are not 
monumental, but they did begin the Carter presidency with a sense of caution and revealed a little about 
the man in the White House, especially compared to Johnson’s proclamations of ending poverty and 
creating a “Great Society.”  
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 Throughout his presidency, Carter continued along similar lines, especially in nationally televised 
addresses. During his 1978 State of the Union, for example, he once again focused on the limits of 
government: 
As President, I've had to ask you, the Members of Congress, and you, the American 
people, to come to grips with some of the most difficult and hard questions facing our 
society. We must make a maximum effort, because if we do not aim for the best, we are 
very likely to achieve little. I see no benefit to the country if we delay, because the 
problems will only get worse. We need patience and good will, but we really need to 
realize that there is a limit to the role and the function of government. Government 
cannot solve our problems, it can't set our goals, it cannot define our vision. Government 
cannot eliminate poverty or provide a bountiful economy or reduce inflation or save our 
cities or cure illiteracy or provide energy. And government cannot mandate goodness. 
Only a true partnership between government and the people can ever hope to reach these 
goals. Those of us who govern can sometimes inspire, and we can identify needs and 
marshal resources, but we simply cannot be the managers of everything and 
everybody.14  
During his 1979 State of the Union, Carter once again discussed the difficulty of the problems the nation 
faced and the corresponding insufficiency of government: “the problems that we face today are different 
from those that confronted earlier generations of Americans. They are more subtle, more complex, and 
more interrelated. At home, we are recognizing ever more clearly that government alone cannot solve 
these problems.”15 Of course, the most well known example of Carter’s constrained style was his infamous 
“Crisis of Confidence” speech delivered on national television on July 15, 1979.16 Into the 1980 campaign, 
Carter even attempted to use his restraint as a campaign issue as he differentiated himself from Reagan. 
During his nomination acceptance address, for example, he explained how his experience in office helped 
him understand that difficulty of the job: “Let me talk for a moment about what that job is like and what 
I've learned from it. I've learned that only the most complex and difficult task comes before me in the Oval 
Office. No easy answers are found there, because no easy questions come there. The only way to build a 
better future is to start with the realities of the present. But while we Democrats grapple with the real 
challenges of a real world, others talk about a world of tinsel and make-believe.”17  
 Despite the sense of limits Carter often provided, he nonetheless expressed some lofty ideals. 
Perhaps the most relevant ideal Carter expressed was that of full employment. Both Johnson and Nixon 
supported the need for full employment and equal opportunity, but Carter went a bit further in expressing 
the ideal in more specific terms. Oddly, however, Carter was also criticized for not strongly supporting the 
more substantive aspects of the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment bill.18 He did offer rhetorical 
support for the bill’s ideals, but evidently did not push strongly for the bill’s specific measures. 
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Nonetheless, the notion that a job should be available to all able-bodied Americans, and that job should be 
sufficient to lift that individual’s family out of poverty was an interesting component of Carter’s 
philosophy. During a television interview in July of 1977, Carter proclaimed the goal “that every family in 
the United States, that at least one member of that family will have a job, either in private life or a public 
job that pays a wage adequate to finance that family.”19  A week later, the goal had elevated to the point of 
being a “guarantee”: “Our goal is to make sure that every single family has a member of it with a 
guaranteed job, by government if necessary, and this is a goal that we intend to reach.”20 In response to a 
question concerning the Humphrey-Hawkins bill, Carter answered that he believed “every person in our 
country that's able to work ought to have an opportunity for a job.”21 During the 1978 State of the Union, 
he labeled a “job opportunity” and the “chance to earn a decent living” as a “basic human right, which we 
cannot and will not ignore.”22 In later speeches he added that “[m]eaningful job opportunities ought to be 
available for all Americans who wish to work” and hoped to “ensure that, for every family containing 
children and parents who want to work, there will be a job,” thus “[m]ost families containing an 
employable person will see their income rise substantially above the poverty line.23  
Carter’s welfare reform proposal was a critical vehicle in his hopes to fulfill this goal. During the 
announcement of the PBJI, Carter promised that under the plan “every family with a full-time worker will 
have an income substantially above the poverty line for the first time.”24 Later in the year, he explained 
that one of the major elements of the legislation was “ensuring that every family with a working adult 
would have a total income above the poverty line.”25 Overall, Carter’s word choices throughout these 
statements are interesting to consider. They ranged from a “guarantee” and a “basic right” to a job, to the 
considerably less firm notion that individual “ought” to have an “opportunity” for a job. At times the job 
was unspecified, at others Carter hoped for an “adequate wage,” and in still others he promised wages 
above or “substantially above” the poverty line. The PBJI, with its sliding scale of benefits to the working 
poor and its expansion of the EITC, would have improved the income of full-time workers, although 
whether those incomes would be considered substantially above the poverty line was questionable. Thus, 
while Carter’s rhetoric remained somewhat unclear on the subject, he did with these comments question 
the common assumption that any work on its own would be sufficient. 
 Also relevant to Carter’s philosophy of government was his call for government to be “competent 
and compassionate,” a typical tagline in his 1976 campaign speeches that was repeated during his 
inaugural address. Accompanying them as key terms of Carter’s in describing government was efficient 
and effective, which actually seemed to replace competent and compassionate by the 1980 campaign.26 
One of Carter’s clearest expositions of his philosophy of government was in response to a question 
concerning a comment he had made earlier about being more similar to John F. Kennedy than Ted 
Kennedy, his opponent, was: “Well, philosophically, I think so. I don't believe that the Federal 
Government ought to do everything. I don't believe in establishing a whole big array of massive Federal 
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Government spending programs to take care of the needs of our country. I believe in tight management; I 
believe in making the existing programs efficient. I believe in saving money; I believe in trying to have 
fiscal responsibility in managing the budget; and another, I believe that John Kennedy would have agreed 
with all those things.”27 Carter’s use of terms such as competence and efficiency fit within his broader 
points about the limits of government. He sought, in other words, to improve and reform, rather than 
revolutionize.  
 
Carter’s Depiction of the Poor 
 
 Carter presented an interesting cast of characters when discussing welfare and poverty issues. He 
primarily relied on the distinction between welfare recipients that “can work” and those that could not. 
From this base, however, Carter also presented a variety of both positive and negative depicitons. Carter 
would tend to focus on a certain character for an extended period of time, and then move on to another. 
Thus, unlike Johnson’s hard-core unemployed or Nixon’s welfare loafers, Carter’s representative character 
changed during his administration. Early in the campaign of 1976, Carter focused on welfare recipients. 
Toward the end of the campaign and into his presidency, his focus switched to the newly unemployed 
head of household, an image for which he offered significant sympathy. Later in his term, Carter began to 
focus more and more on the “disadvantaged,” especially minority youth, which were framed positively but 
were unlikely to garner much sympathy from the general public.  
From the beginning, it was clear that Carter relied heavily on the can work / cannot work division 
of the poor, particularly as applied to those receiving welfare. Throughout the campaign of 1976, Carter 
attacked the welfare system in part because it treated the two different groups similarly. Similar to both 
Johnson and Nixon, Carter sought to redefine the purpose of welfare for those that could work from a 
program that sustains life into one that lead to self-sufficiency. Unlike both Johnson and Nixon, however, 
Carter actually specified what percentage of welfare recipients could work and not work. A Carter 
advertisement during the 1976 campaign, for example, included the following passage:  
We've now got 12 million people on welfare chronically. First of all we need to separate 
that 10 percent of welfare recipients who can work completely out of the welfare 
program and put them under the Labor Department, Education Department, teach them 
how to work, give them job training, match them with a job and offer it to them. If they 
don't take it, when it's offered to them, I wouldn't pay them any more benefits. 
Carter cited the 90/10 split on a number of occasions during the campaign.28 The number itself was an 
interesting one. Carter seemed to present the number of able welfare poor as if it was unexpectedly high, 
although I imagine most Americans at that time would have likely estimated the number much higher than 
ten percent. Nixon relied on a similar split of unemployables and the idle welfare poor, but, if his rhetoric 
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is any indication, he certainly focused to a much greater extent on the idle welfare poor as if they were the 
majority, not a small minority of those on welfare.  
For each of these two categories, Carter offered different programs and different rhetorical 
treatment. For the unable to work, which included the aged, disabled, and mothers of young children, 
Carter called for understanding, fairness, concern, compassion, respect, love, attention, fairness, and 
dignity.29 He attacked both the low level and the lack of uniformity in their benefits. Carter’s sympathy for 
these unemployables was presented in comparison to his wary preoccupation for their counterparts, able-
bodied welfare recipients. During a question and answer session in February of 1977, for example, Carter 
stressed the importance of making the distinction clear: 
This was one of my major themes during my campaign. Let me say this: About 90 
percent of the people on welfare cannot work. The other 10 percent can work. I am 
perfectly willing to give humane and adequate aid to those who are not able to work. I 
am not willing to support those who are able to work and won't. The separation of that 
will be a major thrust of my government [emphasis added].30  
Carter discussed the split often during the campaign and when introducing the PBJI in 1977, but by 1978, 
the unable to work were rarely mentioned by Carter anymore, despite the fact that they supposedly 
represented 90 percent of the welfare poor.  
Carter’s depiction of the “can work” was rather unclear. He tended to bounce back and forth 
between positive and negative attributions. The key point was certainly the need to have the able-bodied 
working, what was unclear was the barrier to this goal, whether it was lack of motivation, lack of 
opportunity, or simply the perverse incentives of welfare. Carter’s rhetoric would tend to alternate between 
the three. In the excerpt quoted above, Carter seemed rather unsympathetic (he was “not willing” to 
support them). At times, he would use negative terms such a “cheaters,” or, using rhetoric very similar to 
Nixon, would explain that if the able welfare poor were taught, given training, matched with a job, and 
offered a job, and then do not accept the job, they would be “cut off “from benefits. Such statements, 
which came in various similar forms, tended to give the impression that at least some of the ideal poor 
would choose to avoid work.31  
Oddly enough, the most derogatory Carter ever was toward the poor was primarily through 
passive acceptance of some highly stereotypical comments by questioners. During a town hall meeting on 
July 31, 1979, for example, a citizen asked Carter, “Yesterday morning I heard on the news there were 
over 6,000 illegitimate children born last year alone. As a taxpayer, I would like to know if there would be 
job openings for mothers after the first child whereas the taxpayer would not have to support them, buy 
them homes I mean, you know, help give them homes and steaks and cars to ride around in.” Carter not 
only did not flinch at the wording of the question, but he actually commended the questioner, saying: 
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I think your question's a very good one, and this is what we're trying to do, to give 
people who really need welfare payments and who cannot work an opportunity to live a 
decent life, to provide mothers who want to work a chance to keep their children in a 
good day care center and get jobs. And people who are able-bodied and don't have 
children, I don't believe in any welfare payments for them. I think they ought to go to 
work.32
A similar exchange occurred during a session in Oklahoma in 1979.33
Elsewhere, Carter placed the responsibility on the lack of true opportunity or on the welfare 
system itself, following Nixon in continually labeling the system as “anti-work.” At times, “ought to 
work” was replaced with “ought to have a chance to work.”34 Carter defended the work ethic of the poor at 
times, explaining that they “want to work,” “prefer work to welfare,” and “would rather work if given the 
opportunity.”35 Later, he defended the PBJI in part because it “recognizes that this is a Nation of men and 
women who do not wish to be wards of the Government but who want to work and to be self-sufficient.”36  
 Carter’s was the most sympathetic with the poor during the campaign of 1976, at least in part 
because recent increases in unemployment were used by the campaign to attack Ford. In a series of 
speeches in October of 1976, Carter presented an image of the newly unemployed head of household 
forced to take welfare after a lifetime of work, in part due to Republican policies. In his nomination 
acceptance address, for example, Carter presented a dissociation between the rich and poor, explaining 
how the rich are unable to understand the struggles of the poor.37 Throughout the remainder of the 
campaign, Carter continued to tell hypothetical stories that focused on the difficulties faced by the newly 
unemployed. For example, in a speech in Dallas Carter asked the crowd to do some role-playing in order 
to identify more closely with the poor: 
Think about a father proud like you are, competent like you are, self-reliant like you are. 
The head of a household--like many of you, or a mother, eager to work--can't find a job. 
They come home at night, face the children with the authority and the responsibility and 
the respect that should go to the breadwinner stripped away. Put yourself in that 
position. Think of going down and drawing your first welfare check. When you've 
worked all your life. It tears a family apart. It destroys their self-respect; it eliminates 
basic human dignity. And in this last two years, two and a half million more Americans 
have had to accept that circumstance.38  
A week later, he asked the Republicans to role play, asking if they considered what it was like “to be men 
or women who are laid off, and can't find work, and can't provide for their children, and have to go stand 
in an unemployment line or a welfare line after a lifetime of honest and satisfying work?”39  Often he 
would focus on the knowledge gap between the poor and the non-poor, as he did in Los Angeles on 
October 7th:  “We in this room, almost without exception, don't have to worry about unemployment in our 
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own families. We don't know what it means to be out of a job. Having worked fifteen or twenty years, and 
all of a sudden drawing unemployment compensation for six months or a little longer. And then going 
home and having to cash the first welfare check.”40 Similar comments were made during campaign 
speeches in Indianapolis, South Bend, and New York.41   
These stories all presented external attributions for poverty and welfare, tended to focus on the 
inherent similarities between the poor and nonpoor, and in particular the difficulties faced by the poor. By 
having the individuals in the examples newly unemployed, Carter was more likely to provide the sense 
that something similar could happen to those listening. Depicting them as hard-working individuals 
responsible for a family also increased the natural sympathy others would hold for them. Once the election 
was over, however, Carter did not offer such narratives again.Similar to Nixon, therefore, Carter’s 
attribution of able-bodied welfare recipients alternated between positive and negative frames. Once again, 
however, if that lack of clarity is considered in the context of the public’s pre-consisting negative 
stereotype of welfare recipients, Carter’s rhetoric clearly did not challenge those stereotypes and likely 
contributed to their solidification.  
Carter generally focused on the can work/cannot work split among welfare recipients when 
discussing issues of poverty, but during one conversation in May of 1979, he provided a significant 
revelation that muddied the water somewhat concerning that simple distinction: 
The present system provides insufficient opportunities for families to move off cash 
assistance and into productive jobs. The great majority of family heads receiving cash 
assistance want to work. Most of the poor who are able to work do in fact work, but 
usually in low paying and sporadic jobs. In 1977, more than three-fifths of the 3.8 
million families with children with incomes below the official poverty line had either a 
part-time or a full-time worker. Over a million of these families were headed by women, 
most of whom supplemented their meager earnings with welfare. Yet, only one-fifth of 
these working poor families had a worker who was able to find a full-time, year round 
job. In addition, almost three million other families with children live close to the 
poverty line despite the efforts of one or more family workers.42
With the recitation of these facts, Carter seemed to undermine his own proposal. He had argued that 90 
percent of the welfare poor could not work and 10 percent could work but did not. His welfare reform was 
focused on improving the care of the former and either “forcing” or “encouraging” the latter to work. Now 
Carter was explaining that most of the poor actually did work, but that work was not sufficient. Of course, 
the total number of those under the poverty line is much larger than the number receiving welfare, so the 
percentages do not directly compare, but nonetheless these statistics seem to point to a different problem—
the insufficiency of work—rather than the perverse incentives of welfare.  
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 Two additional characters within Carter’s welfare rhetoric are relevant. First, was the manner in 
which he tended to use “family” as his basic unit rather than “man” or “individual.” He was dismayed over 
the number of “families” falling into unemployment, impressed with the work ethic of the “family,” and 
sold the PBJI in part due to the number “families” it would lift out of poverty. His ideal was that every 
family would have a full time worker with a job that provided sufficient income. He explained in his 
inaugural address that strengthening the American family was the “basis of our society,” and held a White 
House Conference on Families.43 Family has always been an inherently positive word in American 
politics, and Carter relied on it rather heavily throughout his presidency. 
 The last categorization of the poor provided by Carter was most prevalent during the latter part of 
his tenure. Starting early in 1978 and continuing throughout 1979 and 1980, the group Carter seemed to 
discuss most often was disadvantaged youth, especially minority youth. Carter frequently cited figures 
concerning unemployment among youth, with the minority figures specified separately, and called for a 
number of programs to treat the problem. He explained how the economic recovery had left this segment 
of the American people behind, and sought to redirect efforts to them and others that were considered the 
“most disadvantaged.” Interestingly, Carter’s change of focus from the 1976 campaign (the newly 
unemployed head of household) to the second half of his term (minority youth) represented practically a 
180 degree turn in terms of garnering the potential sympathy of the common American. Although youth 
unemployment may have been an important problem, it likely did not register too highly on the public 
agenda. These youth were essentially within a period of time where they were too old to be considered 
deserving children, and too young to be considered the deserving working poor. Similar to when Johnson 
focused on the hard-core unemployed, Carter’s focus on minority youth likely worked against anti-poverty 
programs overall by making a less sympathetic figure the face of poverty. Nonetheless, these youth clearly 
became a focal point of Carter’s during these years, both rhetorically and legislatively. It represents 
another aspect of the deserving-undeserving tension in that the most in need of help are likely to be the 
most difficult for which to find support. 
 In summary, the cast of characters within Carter’s rhetoric primarily fit within the norm in terms 
of relying on the typical can work/cannot work distinction, as well as its dual presentation of dispositional 
and environmental attributions for the able-bodied receipt of welfare. However, Carter also seemed to 
question that simple distinction when he presented statistics concerning the number of poor that work yet 
remained below the poverty line. Rather than have one representative character, Carter seemed to shift his 
characters chronologically. Carter painted a very sympathetic picture of the newly unemployed head of 
household thrust into poverty and welfare due to external factors during the 1976 campaign. While 
presenting this image, Carter also offered interesting arguments concerning the realities of poverty and the 
difficulty of the non-poor to understand the struggles of the poor. These stories, however, did not reappear 
once the election was over. Welfare reform, and the can work/can’t work split dominated during the early 
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part of his presidency. Once welfare reform was effectively dropped, Carter began to focus on 
disadvantaged youth. He was able to pass some legislation to provide work and training for these youth, 
but he also likely de-emphasized the importance of the issues he discussed during the first half of his 
presidency, such as the problem of the welfare system and the plight of the newly unemployed.  
 
Carter’s Anti-Welfare Rhetoric 
 
 Despite his Democratic party affiliation, Jimmy Carter followed Richard Nixon in presenting a 
significant attack on the welfare system, although he did not disparage its recipients nearly as much as 
Nixon. Considering Carter’s overall rhetoric, it is clear that the issue of poverty had been eclipsed by 
welfare in American politics and the War on Poverty had shifted into the War on Welfare. Carter utilized 
an attack on welfare as a primary campaign issue, and offered a similar laundry list of problems with the 
welfare system throughout his presidency. Overall, Carter offered a three-pronged attack on the welfare 
system. The primary charge was that it was irrational and overly complex, which led to problems of 
inefficiency, waste, fraud, abuse, and inequality. The second and third charges matched Nixon’s basic 
criticisms of the system being both anti-work and anti-family.  
 Considering his philosophical rhetoric regarding the need for efficiency and effectiveness, 
Carter’s displeasure for the welfare system was not surprising. Again and again, Carter used terms such as 
irrational, incoherent, overly complex, confused, and overlapping to describe the system. It was a 
“hodgepodge” of  programs, and a “crazy quilt-patchwork stitched together over decades.”44 This 
complexity led to a number of other problems, including waste, redtape, abuse, and “almost inevitable 
fraud.”45 Carter was especially vexed with the manner in which the program treated similar people 
differently and different people similarly.46 The important issue to consider here is that Carter was placing 
the blame for many of the problems of welfare on the system, not on its recipients, administrators, or 
anything outside the system. In fact, everyone was a victim of the system that “robs the taxpayers who 
support it, discourages the people who administer it, and sometimes degrades the people who really do 
need help.”47
The second major problem with welfare was its propensity to discourage work. Work 
and welfare were once again pitted against each other as if they were mutually exclusive. Most 
often, Carter would simply label the system as “anti-work.”48 During his August 6, 1977, press 
conference and his message to Congress the same day, Carter provided specific numbers that 
revealed the disincentive to work.49  
 The third prong of Carter’s attack was that the welfare system was anti-family, a point he tended 
to make in every speech that welfare was mentioned, and was often combined with the anti-work 
argument.50 The welfare system “forced” or “encouraged” fathers to leave home by “providing incentives 
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for family breakup.”51 Homes were being divided by “silly rules.” 52 In his news briefing on May 2, 1977, 
Carter actually walked those gathered through an example of how welfare was anti-work and anti-family: 
For instance, a father who heads up a family with four people in it, either a mother and 
two children or three children, in Michigan, working full time at the minimum wage, has 
a total income of $5,678. A same-sized family without the father in the home with still 
four people there, not working at all, has an income of $7,161. A family with the head of 
the household—a mother and three children—if she goes to work at the minimum wage, 
has a total income of $9,530. This shows that the best thing that a working father can do 
to increase the income of the people that he loves is simply to leave home.53
During the announcement of the PBJI, Carter provided another specific example.54 Similar to 
welfare’s violation of Carter’s overall focus on efficiency, therefore, welfare also violated 
Carter’s emphasis of protecting and improving the American family. 
 In summary, Carter provided a similar attack on welfare, albeit with less details than Nixon. The 
importance of this attack is not only that Carter, a Democrat, accepted all the perverse incentives that were 
such an important part of Nixon’s rhetoric, but also that Carter defined the primary problem as the welfare 
system and its perverse incentives, even though by his own admission these incentives only influenced a 
possible ten percent of those receiving welfare. In brief moments, often in response to questions, Carter 
admitted to the lack of availability and sufficiency of full time work, but in general his rhetoric focused on 
the issue of welfare, not poverty or inequality.  
 
Carter and the Program for Better Jobs and Income 
 
 Considering Carter’s ideals and his attack on the welfare system, the structure of his own 
program is rather straightforward and expected. First, Carter clearly rejected incremental reform. In the 
campaign and early in his administration, he emphasized the need for a “complete overhaul.” “Tinkering” 
or “minor modifications” would not be enough, the program had to be “thoroughly redesigned,” “scrapped 
entirely,” and be a “complete and clean break.”55 His program was designed primarily to fix the three 
major flaws with the current system: its complexity and its anti-work and anti-family effects. PBJI’s two-
tiered program applied directly to Carter’s split between the can work and cannot work, although it did 
include the working poor along with the able-bodied welfare poor, a feature which significantly increase 
the cost. By ending AFDC, with all the various rules it had accrued since 1934, along with the food stamp 
and SSI, and replacing them with one program with more universal application, Carter hoped to simplify 
administration and therefore better control waste, fraud, and abuse. By having the program apply to all 
families, not just single mothers, Carter hoped to counteract the anti-family aspects of the previous 
program. And by including the working poor within the program, instilling work requirements, a sliding 
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scale for income, 1.4 million public service jobs, and expanding the EITC, Carter hoped to eliminate the 
disincentive to work. In Carter’s words, the program would “transform the manner in which the Federal 
government deals with the income needs of the poor, and begin to break the welfare cycle.”56
 Although Carter hoped to simplify the welfare system, he was also aware of welfare’s inherent 
dilemmas. During a session with the state legislature of Illinois, for example, he explained that: 
The welfare system is condemned from almost every vantage point, but it's almost 
impossible to hammer out a welfare system that gives needy people an adequate income 
to preserve their human dignity and at the same time can be a constant inducement for 
those who are able to work to go to work.57  
Carter also seemed aware of the peculiar rhetorical dynamics of welfare and poverty. During his August 6 
press conference, Carter was asked if he deliberately avoided the term “welfare” in his presentation due to 
its negative connotation. He answered: 
Yes, I think there's a great deal of stigma attached to the word "welfare." And I can't 
shape the vocabulary of the Nation, obviously, but we've decided to call this program, 
during its work phase, a Program for Better Jobs and Income. And this is what we are 
trying to do. I think the people of the country, according to my own interaction with 
them during the campaign and as President-and also my information derived from public 
opinion polls is that they don't like the word "welfare," but they do favor the programs 
that are provided for poor people, both those who work and those who cannot work.58
Nonetheless, during the presidential campaign, Carter had clearly established welfare as the issue, not 
poverty, jobs, or lack of income, and opponents of his program were certainly going to work to label 
Carter’s program as an expansion of welfare.59
After his committee had studied the problem and reported back to him, Carter admitted the 
system was “much worse than we anticipated.”60 It presented an “extraordinarily complex and difficult 
problem, even more so than [Carter] had expected.”61 The theme of the difficulty of the problem and the 
need for debate rather than decisive action would grow more and more important as the legislation 
attempted to makes it way through Congress.62 In October of 1977, just two months after sending the 
program to Congress, Carter told reporters at a news conference that it may take “3 or 4 more years to 
reach a final conclusion on welfare reform.” Moving away from the need for a complete overall, Carter 
explained:  
I think it's better to get it on the table, have an open debate, let the people be involved in 
it, let the Congress start learning about it, let me learn more about it, let the private 
sector of our country become involved in the debate, the universities, the economists, the 
business leaders, the labor leaders. And I don't see anything wrong with it or anything 
that I would have done differently. The fact that the easy solutions have not come 
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forward immediately don't concern me, because they are not questions that can be 
resolved easily. But I think that in the long run, certainly in retrospect after this year 
goes by, there will be a general realization that none of these questions should have been 
delayed.63
To review, Carter had promised a major overhaul during the 1976 campaign, promised no initial cost once 
he was elected, admitted to an increased cost when announcing the program, and then two months later 
was comfortable that the debate may last three or four years. 
  From August of 1977 when Carter announced the PBJI on through 1978, Carter periodically 
mentioned welfare reform, but certainly not with much prominence. In 1978, Congress passed some of the 
more popular aspects of Carter’s plan, leaving the plan as a whole with much less support. With the PBJI 
shelved, Carter introduced two additional programs in April of 1979: the Social Welfare Reform 
Amendments of 1979 and the Work and Training Opportunities Act of 1979. These programs moved away 
from the comprehensive reform and large price tag, but still attempted to alleviate some of Carter’s 
primary issues with welfare by providing 620,000 jobs and training slots, adding work requirements, and 
simplifying administration. Once again, Carter did not elevate the program to a prominent place on his 
agenda, and while they passed the House, they never progressed significantly in the Senate. 
 
Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Poverty 
 
 President Carter’s attempt at welfare reform in many ways mirrored Nixon’s. Their goals were 
similar, their plans were similar, their focus on and criticisms of the welfare system were similar, and 
eventually the fates of their proposals were similar. The PBJI experience adds even more evidence to the 
notion that significant reform would be difficult in this area. Carter seemed to have some significant 
advantages to achieving reform. He had a Democratic Congress with which to work. The need for welfare 
reform seemed to fit well within Carter’s ideology, especially in terms of the need to improve its 
efficiency, its affect on family, and its relationship to the goal of full employment. As a more conservative 
Democrat, Carter would perhaps be more likely to be able to understand some of the inherent dilemmas 
within welfare reform, rather than simply avoid or ignore them. Unfortunately, Carter’s reform never 
really seemed to have a chance, as his agenda was continuously filled with other issues, and the same 
political constraints that stopped the FAP stopped the PBJI.  
 
Equality versus Freedom 
 
 The equality versus freedom dilemma was not especially prominent during the Carter years. 
Carter did not attack the welfare system in terms of the dependency (or lose of freedom) that it caused, and 
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while he did discuss inequality in racial terms, it was not typically framed economically. Like both 
Johnson and Nixon before him, Carter endorsed the ideal of full employment as the primary vehicle to 
negotiate the equality-freedom dilemma. In expressing that ideal, Carter ventured beyond his predecessors 
in clearly expressing the goal that every family with a full time wage earner should be comfortably above 
the poverty line. Of course, Carter would at times frame this ideal in language that allowed significant 
leeway in application (“every American able to work ought to have an opportunity to work”64). In 
addition, while he expressed the ideal more specifically than before, he did not press on the degree to 
which the nation was falling short of that ideal, both in terms in the continued existence of unemployment, 
and the continued insufficiency of employment. Carter’s welfare reform plan had some provisions to help 
in this area, but those provisions were not one of the selling points most often expressed by Carter. In 
other words, while Carter endorsed the ideal, he did not press its realization, and thus the dilemma never 
fully came to the surface.  
 
Deserving versus Undeserving 
 
 For the most part, Carter’s depiction of the poor was typical. Carter’s primary distinction between 
the can work and the cannot work followed the norm at least since the days of Roosevelt. His clear defense 
of the “cannot work” and ambiguous presentation of the able-bodied welfare poor was also typical. Carter 
certainly did not attack the “idle welfare poor” or pit them against each other to the degree Nixon did, but 
neither did he spend significant time defending or rehabilitating their image. Even though Carter’s 
program would have essentially transformed all the able-bodied poor into the working poor, Carter rarely 
discussed the working poor. For the most part, Carter focused on the welfare system itself, rather than the 
people.  
 Where Carter did stray from the norm was in presenting his two secondary images of poverty, the 
newly unemployed head of household and the disadvantaged minority youth. The former, a focus during 
the 1976 campaign, was a highly sympathetic image. Carter’s depiction was practically textbook in terms 
of developing sympathy. The main character in his stories was typically a father with the responsibility of 
children, who had worked all his life until recent economic woes had thrown him out of work and forced 
him to unemployment and later welfare. Such a story could certainly resonate with many Americans who 
found themselves living paycheck to paycheck in difficult economic times. It certainly offered a different 
image of the welfare recipient. This image, however, was not used by Carter once the election was over. 
Its abandonment may serve as evidence of the difficulty of sitting presidents relying on such rather somber 
images of poverty and unemployment. They may be useful as attacks by candidates on incumbents, but 
once in office such images go against the optimism that tends to be rewarded so highly in American 
politics.  
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 Carter’s other secondary character, on the other hand, was unlikely to attract much sympathy. The 
image of the unemployed minority youth was prominent during the latter half of his presidency. It is 
unclear why Carter chose to place so much emphasis on this figure, beyond the obvious point that the 
unemployment rate for minority youth was much higher than for youth in general, and the rates for youth 
were higher than the rates overall. Unfortunately, teenage youth are unlikely to be considering deserving, 
thus Carter’s continued focus on them during 1979 and 1980 was likely counterproductive to his social 
agenda overall.  
  Interestingly, the failure of the PBJI, similar to that of the FAP, represented another failed 
opportunity in redefining the dynamics of the deserving-undeserving line. If enacted, the two-tiered 
program would have worked to transform all able-bodied welfare recipients into the working poor, and 
thus would have made them more sympathetic figures to the public and thus more politically influential. 
Once again, Carter relied on some negative images of the idle welfare poor in order to build support for 
reform, then once the reform fell apart, the negative images were merely strengthened.  
 
Help versus Hinder 
 
 By the time his special committee had reported to him and Carter was ready to introduce the 
PBJI, it was clear that he had been educated on welfare’s difficult dilemmas. He took on one dilemma 
straight on when he admitted that in order to resolve the problem of welfare being potentially more 
profitable than low-wage labor, his plan would be more expensive than the status quo. Carter also openly 
admitted the difficulty of designing a program that provides to the needy in a sufficient and dignified 
manner without attracting others.  
Overall, Carter seemed to understand both the advantages and disadvantages of welfare. On one 
hand, Carter clearly attacked the counterproductive nature of welfare programs in his rhetoric, and his plan 
was specifically designed to alleviate some of those effects. On the other hand, he was also aware of the 
need for welfare, and how it provided important benefits to those that could not work. His plan was also 
designed to improve the delivery of those benefits. Carter realized that the welfare system was not the 
proper vehicle to provide help to the able-bodied, and hoped to restructure the nation’s programs for those 
individuals.  
In the end, therefore, Carter did provide a rather prudent response to the help versus hinder 
dilemma in his proposal and his rhetoric. Where Carter fell short, however, was the extent to which he 
educated the public on these dilemmas. The rhetoric discussing these issues was often in press conferences 
in response to specific questions or in written messages to Congress. With Carter’s agenda dominated by 
other issues, he never directly appealed to the American people with a consistent message to sell his 
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proposal and the overall redefinition of welfare for the able-bodied as well as financial assistance for the 
working poor.   
 
Politics versus Policy 
 
 Once again, the politics versus policy dilemma likely led to the downfall of the PBJI. Although 
some of the dynamics had changed from the FAP, Carter’s program nonetheless fell into the same trap of 
attracting criticism and opposition from both sides of the political spectrum. Conservatives balked at the 
price tag and the perception that the program would greatly increase the number of Americans “on the 
welfare rolls.” Liberals again were unimpressed with the level of benefits and the work requirements. Part 
of the simplification of the program involved a leveling of unequal benefits received in different parts of 
the country. This meant that once again welfare recipients in the northern cities would receive little or no 
benefit from the legislation, while those in the south would receive significant increases. The welfare 
rights organizations were not as active as they were during the Nixon era, but nonetheless the politicians in 
the northern cities would have difficulty supporting an expensive program that on balance transferred 
benefits away from their constituents. Labor unions were again wary of the program, even more so due to 
the millions of public jobs Carter had promised. Turf battles between the Department of Labor, 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Department of Agriculture also complicated 
matters.65
 The politics versus policy dilemma also likely kept Carter from pressing the program further. The 
implementation of the program was originally set for 1981 in order for Carter to meet a target for a 
balanced budget. Continued economic problems, especially inflation, also worked against Carter’s support 
of the program due to its expense. Welfare reform provided a useful issue for Carter during the 1976 
campaign, primarily because the dilemmas within welfare reform make it a very easy target to criticize 
from the outside. Once in office, however, those same dilemmas worked against Carter’s program and 
hindered progress.  
 The failure of Carter’s welfare reform provided further evidence of the difficulty of progress in 
this area. Following Johnson and Nixon, Carter was the third president in a sixteen year period that 
expressed significant dissatisfaction with the welfare system but was unable to change its mechanisms 
significantly. The combined failures of both the FAP and the PBJI were particularly disheartening. Both 
plans had significant merit. Both Nixon and Carter expressed an ideal of full employment that should have 
received strong public support, and their programs attempted to work toward that ideal. Both Nixon and 
Carter understood that overcoming the work disincentive to welfare would require additional spending in 
order to increase the relative value of low-wage labor. Both Nixon and Carter understood that instilling 
work requirements would also necessitate increases in job training and job creation, although Carter’s plan 
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certainly allowed more funds for such programs. Both Nixon and Carter proposed programs that would 
have significantly affected the public perception of those that received public assistance because the 
typical deserving-undeserving split would have been less relevant as all the able-bodied would have been 
required to work.   
 The comparison of Nixon’s and Carter’s rhetoric to that of Johnson’s also reveals the extent to 
which welfare had come to dominate over the issue of poverty. By the end of the 1970s, the War on 
Poverty was a distant memory. The public image of poverty was increasingly a negative one tied to a 
hated welfare system, despite Carter’s own admission that only ten percent of welfare’s recipients could 
work, and that a high percentage of those in poverty due actually work in jobs insufficient for them to 
escape poverty. AFDC, the program most identified with “welfare,” had grown considerably, but 
nonetheless was only a small part of the government’s overall efforts. Much of the money spent on social 
programs were still going to the non-poor through programs such as Medicare, but nonetheless the public 
antipathy was clearly focused on “welfare.” More and more, the welfare system came to symbolize the 
failure of an increasingly unpopular government. Year after year of intense presidential criticism followed 
by congressional inaction certainly did not help. As the economy worsened and inflation and taxes 
increased, the American middle class grew more and more impatient with a program that was perceived as 
violating many of America’s cherished values, especially freedom, equality, work, and family, while 
rewarding the undeserving. Within this environment, Ronald Reagan would find fertile ground for his anti-
government message.  
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CHAPTER V 
RONALD REAGAN AND THE DANGERS OF GOVERNMENT 
 
 When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, along with the first Republican senate since 1953, he 
and his policies took the debate over welfare and poverty to a different level. Reagan brought with him an 
anti-government message that relied in part on the welfare system as a key example of government’s 
ineffectiveness, extraordinary cost, and counterproductive tendencies. Reagan pushed for and ultimately 
signed legislation that reduced costs and tightened eligibility of the nation’s various poverty programs, 
resulting in what one sociologist described as “eight years of unremitting horror for the nation’s poor”1  
 This chapter focuses on Reagan’s rhetoric concerning welfare and poverty during his 1980 
campaign and his two terms in office. Reagan has typically been heavily criticized for his “attacks” on the 
poor. Jean Stefancic and Richard Delgado, for example, argued that the Reagan administration waged 
what they characterized as a “relentless attack on the poor, depicting them as deviants unwilling to fit into 
mainstream America.”2 When examined closely, however, Reagan’s anti-welfare rhetoric was actually 
rather subdued. Reagan’s infamous attack on the Chicago “welfare queen,” for example, was an exception 
to the rule. For the most part, this rhetorical analysis of Reagan’s welfare rhetoric reveals that the poor 
were rarely targets for Reagan, rather government bureaucrats most often received the brunt of his 
criticism.  
 A key finding of this analysis is the manner in which Reagan’s particular framing of the role of 
government and the causes of poverty worked to neutralize three of the primary dilemmas of poverty and 
reduce the impact of the fourth. In doing so, Reagan was able to avoid the difficult tensions inherent to the 
dilemmas, and provide the American people with a simple, optimistic worldview that clearly resonated 
with many of them. Although Reagan’s theory worked to justify the policies that cut programs to the poor, 
it nonetheless supported the broad progressive ideals of full employment and equal opportunity.  
 The analysis presented here also reveals that Reagan’s welfare rhetoric had two distinct stages. 
From 1980 to 1986, unlike Johnson, Nixon, and Carter, Reagan’s overall rhetorical goal was not to justify 
increased spending and controversial new ideas in order to redefine the welfare system. Rather, his goal 
was to defend cuts that were perceived by many as disproportionally falling on the poor. As explained by 
Michael Weiler, “Reagan’s central political challenge was to cut poverty programs while at the same time 
avoiding the appearance of indifference to the needs of the poor.”3 This dilemma caused Reagan’s rhetoric 
to read often like an apologia as he offered a wide array of responses to the charges levied against him and 
his policies.  
During these first six years, therefore, Reagan’s cost-cutting rhetoric represented a fundamental, 
yet temporary, shift in rhetoric from his predecessors, as the focus on reducing the cost of welfare, rather 
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than improving its impacts, required a new problem definition. Reagan’s vision of welfare returned to the 
original purpose as imagined by Franklin Roosevelt: the sustenance of unemployables, and nothing more. 
Absent from Reagan’s rhetoric was the need to redefine welfare as a vehicle to turn the idle poor into more 
productive members of society that was so critical to Johnson, Nixon, and Carter. In the end, Reagan’s 
plan to fix welfare was rather simple, cut welfare back to help only the “truly needy,” which would 
eventually help stimulate the economy and create more jobs, so that everyone other than the truly needy 
would be gainfully employed. In other words, Reagan’s philosophy represented a return to the pre-New 
Deal assumptions that free enterprise would provide full employment as long as government did not 
interfere by trying to do too much.  
Reagan’s adjusted problem definition explains, in part, his reluctance to criticize the poor, as 
Reagan relied primarily on an argument that many of the poor were simply unneedy rather than either 
unworthy of assistance or in need of more extensive help. Reagan’s philosophy required a rather positive 
image of the poor, since they could not require any real assistance to become self-sufficient. Reagan’s 
rhetoric from 1980 to 1986 also for the most part avoided specific discussions or criticisms of welfare and 
its impacts on individuals, but rather focused on government programs in general and their impacts on the 
economy, which in turn hurt all Americans, both rich and poor. From 1980 to 1986, Reagan’s rhetoric 
consistently followed this new problem definition despite the extensive barrage of criticism he faced, 
especially concerning the hardships his policies were accused of inflicting on the poor.  
Starting with the 1986 State of the Union and continuing to the end of his presidency, however, 
Reagan’s welfare rhetoric shifted back to the familiar pattern established since the 1960s, with two key 
differences. Once again welfare’s specific flaws took center stage, particularly its link with dependency, 
and once again the solution to these flaws would require a redefinition of the purpose of welfare from 
sustenance to rehabilitation. Reagan did, however, frame this shift within a strong anti-Washington 
rhetoric that called upon the genius of states and communities to design solutions to welfare’s anti-work, 
anti-family, and dependency-causing nature. Although Reagan would not propose the expensive solutions 
offered by Johnson, Nixon, and Carter, nonetheless philosophically his rhetoric from 1986 to 1988 was 
similar to even that of Johnson. Finally, in 1988, Reagan would support and sign the Family Support Act, 
a bill that rejected the sustenance-only vision of welfare that Reagan had supported earlier in his 
presidency.  
Ronald Reagan’s attack on government made him an enemy in the eyes of many social policy 
scholars.  Interestingly, Reagan’s efforts actually worked to return poverty and inequality to the national 
agenda to some extent, in response to Reagan’s cuts. Poverty historian James Patterson wrote that from 
1980 to 1985 “poverty again became a source of considerable discussion and controversy, in part because 
the Reagan administration continued to assail various aspects of the welfare state. His rhetoric and that of 
other conservatives placed liberals on the defensive and sparked renewed debate over social policy.”4  Due 
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to the negative response to his policies—practically every press conference included direct questions 
concerning the harm Reagan’s policies was inflicting on the poor—Reagan in turn offered a rather 
elaborate set of arguments to defend both his policies and character. 
 
Reagan’s Record 
 
Of all the presidents examined in this study, Reagan was the most successful at hitting the ground running 
and pushing his agenda quickly before the glow of his election win dimmed. He went on national 
television on February 18, 1981, to press his Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Bill,5 and, with the 
assistance of some obscure Congressional Budget Reconciliation rules utilized by David Stockman, was 
able to get the massive bill through Congress and on his desk by August 13. The bill included provisions 
to “tighten eligibility” for AFDC, food stamps, and student loans, and decrease funding for subsidized 
housing programs, school lunch, and Medicaid subsidies. The tightening of eligibility for AFDC was 
accomplished primarily by decreasing benefits for programs that assisted the working poor, such as 
income disregards, child care credits, and credits for work expenses. The bill also ended the job programs 
stemming from the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), which provided 300,000 jobs 
at the beginning of 1981.6  Fifty-seven different categorical programs such as the Community Services 
Administration were consolidated into seven block grants and cut twenty-five percent. Additional cuts 
were made to Child Nutrition Programs, Women-Infant-Children food program, VISTA, and Legal 
Services.7
The exact figures on the extent of the cuts is difficult to target, in part because the continuing 
recession would have caused a significant jump in spending since many of the programs were means-
tested entitlements. Overall, the bill decreased program funding roughly ten percent, primarily levied on 
the means-tested programs. Congressional Quarterly cites a figure of a $35.2 billion cut from a $740 
billion budget through fiscal 1982. According to David Stoesz and Howard Jacob Karger’s research, 
408,000 people lost their eligibility, and another 299,000 had their benefits reduced, at a “savings” of $1.1 
billion. The benefits of thirty-five percent of recipients who had been working were terminated by the 
legislation.8 The bill also gave states permission to use their Work Incentive Program funds to begin 
workfare programs (Community Work Experience programs) similar to the program Reagan had used in 
California as governor. These programs would essentially require able-bodied recipients to “earn” their 
benefits by working at a minimum wage level. By 1986, twenty-five states had taken advantage of that 
opportunity. While Reagan was very successful with his agenda in 1981, he did suffer some defeats. 
Congress did not consider Reagan’s social security overhaul proposal, and a second round of cuts 
announced in September received a negative response from Congress.  
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In 1982, the economy worsened, and unemployment reached a post World War II high of 10.8 
percent. Pressure increased on Reagan concerning the cuts, but he held firm in his opposition to most 
spending programs. In his State of the Union address, Reagan introduced a proposal that would send 61 
federal grant programs, including AFDC and food stamps to the states in return for the federal takeover of 
Medicaid. The plan was never introduced in Congress, however. Both the House and the Senate passed 
large public works programs, but Reagan’s veto threats killed both bills before they reached his desk. 
Additional cuts were made to Medicare, food stamps, and AFDC, although not as drastic as Reagan 
originally proposed. Reagan did sign bills that increased unemployment benefits, as well as a new job-
training program that replaced CETA but did not include public jobs and provided a larger role for state 
and local governments. Over two million additional U.S. Americans fell under the poverty line in 1982, 
increasing the percentage from 11.7 percent to 14 percent. At the same time, the number of people 
receiving AFDC and food stamps decreased.9  
 The Republicans lost seats in the House during the midterm elections of 1982, but maintained 
their majority in the Senate.  In general, Reagan and Congress turned their focus to foreign affairs in 1983. 
The economy had begun to improve, but the deficit nonetheless hit a record $195.4 billion. Domestically, 
the debate over the federal deficit tended to dominate, and Reagan for the most part attempted to avoid the 
fray.  A compromise social security overhaul bill was passed that once again “rescued” the program from 
fiscal problems. Congress also passed a $4.6 billion jobs program that was designed to fit within Reagan’s 
$5 billion limit, as well as extending supplemental unemployment benefits on two occasions. A second job 
program failed to pass, in part due to Reagan’s opposition and because the unemployment rate began to 
improve later in the year. 
 In 1984, Reagan met with “many disappointments on Capitol Hill,” according to the 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac.10 Congress worked to restore some of the earlier cuts to social-welfare 
programs, but was primarily focused on the deficit problem. The economic recovery was stronger in 1984, 
alleviating some of the criticism directed at Reagan concerning the increasing poverty and unemployment. 
With the election looming, some minor bills concerning child support, child care, and Head Start were 
signed, but nothing major. Reagan did veto a program similar to Roosevelt’s Civilian Conservation Corps 
that would have provided $225 million over three years. The House passed bills restoring funds to food 
stamps and other child nutrition programs, but they stalled in the Senate. In October, Reagan was re-
elected by a landslide, and brought an additional 16 Republicans with him into the House, and only lost 
one Senate seat.  
 The deficit clearly dominated Reagan’s agenda in 1985. On December 12, Reagan signed the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Anti-Deficit bill that mandated a balanced budget by 1991. The bill would have 
the effect of severely limiting additional spending, though House Democrats were able to exempt most of 
the welfare programs from the bill, including AFDC, food stamps, SSI, and Medicaid. Amidst reports of 
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growing hunger, Congress worked to expand eligibility and benefits for food stamps, and were able to 
procure Reagan’s signature. Unemployment benefits were pared down when Congress phased out special 
assistance to the long-term unemployed. Congress had sought to extend the program, but Reagan’s veto 
threats were too much to overcome. Congress worked on bills to reform welfare and expand Child 
Nutrition programs, but they failed to clear. The poverty rate had begun to improve with the growing 
economy, although it remained higher than when Reagan took office. 
 Congress compiled an impressive record in 1986, essentially ignoring the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act and defying Reagan by restoring or increasing funding for many of the social programs that 
had been cut during his first term. Congress expanded coverage of the Job Training Partnership Act, and 
re-authorized child nutrition programs and the federal government’s non-entitlement anti-poverty 
programs such as Head Start, Low Income Home Energy Assistance Programs, and Community Service 
Block grants. Spending was trimmed on Medicare and Medicaid, however. Reagan placed welfare reform 
high on the agenda during the State of the Union address, but little was accomplished during the year. 
Reagan was able to fulfill his primary goal with a major tax reform bill that dramatically reduced income 
tax rates and was considered the most significant rewrite of the tax code since 1942. Most importantly for 
the working poor, the 1986 Tax Reform Act increased phase-in ranges and phase-out ranges for the 
Earned Income Tax Credit, and allowed a larger credit for families with two or more children. During the 
elections of 1986, the Democrats were able to recapture the Senate by winning back eight seats, and 
increased their House majority by five. 
 Congress continued its remarkable legislative record in 1987. The Democrats were not able to 
complete their high priority items in health, education, and welfare reform, but nonetheless pushed 
through a new version of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, a Medicaid expansion, the Stewart B. McKinney 
Homeless Assistance Act, and the Older Americans Act. The latter two bills provided over $2.5 billion in 
aid to the needy. Reagan once again highlighted the need for welfare reform in his State of the Union, and 
both houses of Congress addressed the issue. After four attempts, a welfare reform bill passed the House 
in December, but Reagan vowed a veto due to its cost. Daniel P. Moynihan was working hard in the 
Senate on a compromise bill, but it never came to a vote. Economically, 1987 was a good year for Reagan, 
as unemployment fell to the lowest rate during his tenure in office.  
During Reagan’s final year, a major welfare reform bill finally became law. The legislation, the 
Family Support Act, was certainly helped by Reagan’s efforts in three consecutive State of the Union 
addresses, but significant credit must be given to Moynihan for engineering the bill through Congress, as 
well as to a group of governors, including Arkansas governor Bill Clinton, for refusing to allow the bill to 
die. At a cost of $3.34 billion, the bill required all states to accept AFDC-UP and operate work, education, 
and training programs for adult welfare recipients, strengthened child support enforcement, and offered 
extended child-care and medical benefits to individuals leaving welfare for work. Combined with the 
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extension of the Work Incentive Program that Reagan signed in July, the welfare bill continued the shift of 
emphasis in welfare reform from income maintenance toward work and training that was integral to both 
Nixon’s FAP and Carter’s PBJI. In doing so, however, it represented a distinct change from Reagan’s 
earlier approach, which sought to target benefits to only those that could not work. Reagan’s final year in 
office was also an unprecedented seventh consecutive year of growth during peacetime, and 
unemployment dropped to a near “full employment” level of 5.3 percent. After peaking in 1982, the 
poverty rate did drop throughout the rest of his term, but nonetheless remained over 12 percent of the 
population, higher than anytime in the 1970s. 
 
Reagan’s Rhetoric on the Role of Government 
 
Ronald Reagan represented an interesting character in the sense that he became the head of the 
federal government by attacking the ineptitude of that government. Reagan thus represented a return to a 
pre-New Deal philosophy, although Reagan himself typically identified himself with Roosevelt’s New 
Deal, while presenting Johnson’s Great Society as a gross over-extension of the appropriate role of 
government. During his famous Commonwealth Club Address, Franklin Roosevelt explained the need for 
the federal government to come to the aid of the individual in the face of big business in order to “save” 
individualism. Government, in other words, joined together with the people to insure true freedom. 
Reagan, however, returned to the earlier philosophy that government was the enemy of individual 
freedom, not its insurer, thus freedom was served by limiting government.11  
In Reagan’s first nomination acceptance address, he made his concern clear. He explained that 
“government is never more dangerous than when our desire to have it help us blinds us to its great power 
to harm us,” and then went on to claim that it was “clear our federal government is overgrown and 
overweight.”12 Perhaps Reagan’s clearest exposition of his overall perspective was during his first 
Inaugural Address, when he explained that in the “present crisis,” government “is not the solution to our 
problem; government is the problem.”13 Throughout his speeches, Reagan blamed the nation’s economic 
problems, including inflation, unemployment, and slow growth, on the runaway spending policies of the 
Democrats and the inherent flaws of government. He warned of the “cult of overwhelming government” 
and the “Federal Goliath, unleashed and uncontrolled,” which had brought the country to the “economic 
brink.”14 As argued by James Aune, Reagan tended to avoid relying specifically on free market rhetoric, 
but rather focused his attack on government while glorifying the values of freedom, work, religion, and 
family.15 These two points joined together through the simple argument that big government worked 
against those values, as evidenced most clearly, it would seem, through the workings of the welfare 
system, whose flaws were already very well known by the public. The solution to the current problems, 
therefore, was simple: government had to be reduced, and the problems would dissipate. The optimistic 
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argument clearly resonated with the American people, as did its author, who would become known as the 
“Great Communicator.”16  
 Despite the overall focus on the “dangers” of government and the need to control its excesses, 
Reagan continued to support many of the same broad progressive ideals expressed by his predecessors, 
including equal opportunity, full employment, and the need to care for unemployables, whom Reagan 
termed as the “truly needy.” Throughout his tenure, Reagan frequently invoked the goals of equal 
opportunity and the realization of the American Dream. His 1981 Program for Economic Recovery, for 
example, stated that there was “widespread agreement on the legitimate role of government in protecting 
the environment, promoting health and safety, safeguarding workers and consumers, and guaranteeing 
equal opportunity.”17 He also listed equal opportunity alongside individual freedom and personal dignity 
as the “principles that are the hallmark of our nation.”18 Although these ideals were similar to those of 
Johnson, the application of Reagan’s philosophy to these ideals resulted in an important shift in emphasis. 
With government as the problem, not the solution, the best path to full employment and equal opportunity 
for Reagan was, again, simply for government to get out of the way. 
Although he expressed such ideals, he also understood that the nation was falling short of them, 
placing the blame, as expected, on overgrown government. In addition, Reagan often framed such goals as 
goals for the society, not necessarily just the government. While clearly acknowledging a government role 
in these endeavors, he often quickly moved to identify the important role of free enterprise and the 
“volunteer spirit” in assisting in their fulfillment.19 In his nationally broadcast address to the nation on his 
“Program for Economic Recovery” in September of 1981, he announced a “nationwide effort” to spark 
volunteer programs where “need exists.”20 In particular, Reagan called upon America’s religious 
institutions to play the important role they once played as the “primary source of help for the less 
fortunate,” before they “seemed” to be “co-opted by government.”21 He strongly supported the growth of 
“private sector initiatives” which, he argued, were “almost invariably far more efficient than government 
in running social programs.”22 Reagan would later praise the record of growing and record setting level of 
volunteering in the United States, pointing to statistics concerning the number of hours and dollars given 
charitably as key evidence of American exceptionalism.23
 In sum, Reagan’s political philosophy served as an important overarching frame on his policies. 
Reagan’s strict anti-government philosophy represented a change from his predecessors. Whereas 
Johnson, Nixon, and Carter all criticized government, and welfare in particular, they nonetheless 
continued to rely on government solutions to address social problems. Reagan, however, identified 
government as the problem, rather than simply identifying specific government practices as problematic. 
Nonetheless, Reagan continued to support broad progressive ideals for American society. The optimistic 
goals, therefore, had not changed, rather Reagan had broadly redefined government as a problem, thus 
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inherently framing the reduction of government, with the aid of volunteerism, as the primary path to 
achieve those goals.  
 
Reagan’s Depiction of the Poor 
 
Reagan’s anti-government political philosophy relied in part on the assumption that the poor 
would be better off with less government. Such an assumption required a shift in the dominant image of 
the poor expressed by the previous presidents. The key distinction to Reagan’s depiction of the poor was 
the line he drew between the “truly needy” and, one must assume, the not-so-truly needy. Reagan 
supported government assistance to the truly needy, and accepted that such assistance would essentially 
consist of the government providing continued sustenance to them. Reagan went to considerable lengths to 
frame his spending cuts as falling solely on the not needy rather than the truly needy. Reagan presented a 
rather sympathetic image of the truly needy, although the rhetorical importance of the image was more 
likely focused on its comparison to its opposite. Reagan’s depiction of the not needy was varied. 
Primarily, he presented three different versions: the negative image of the welfare cheater, and the 
somewhat neutral images of the welfare dependent and what I will term the rational not needy. Reagan 
also relied upon two additional key depictions: a sympathetic depiction of the unemployed, and a sharply 
negative image of the bureaucrat. The latter did not represent a depiction of the poor, but is nonetheless 
exceedingly relevant to Reagan’s overall perspective on welfare and poverty. 
 Reagan’s welfare rhetoric thus focused upon these six primary characters: the truly needy, the 
welfare cheat, the welfare dependent, the rational not needy, the unemployed, and the bureaucrat. As 
argued by David Zarefsky, Carol-Miller Tutzauer, and Frank E. Tutzauer, Reagan’s use of the phrase the 
“truly needy” represented a key dissociation that worked to divide two groups that had originally been 
considered as one. Through this dissociation, Reagan managed to reaffirm the government’s commitment 
to helping the needy, while also serving notice that his administration would represent a significant break 
from the past. Reagan offered the typical list of the deserving poor as his truly needy. Announcing his 
program to Congress on February 18, 1981, for example, Reagan explained that the government would 
“continue to fulfill the obligations that spring from our national conscience. Those who, through no fault 
of their own, must depend on the rest of us—the poverty stricken, the disabled, the elderly, all those with 
true need—can rest assured that the social safety net of programs they depend on are exempt from any 
cuts.”24  The phrase “through no fault of their own” was a common one for Reagan when he discussed the 
truly needy, fitting within traditional deserving-undeserving assumptions.25 Later in that speech, Reagan 
specified the programs that would continue to serve the truly needy, including “social insurance benefits 
for the elderly, basic unemployment benefits, cash benefits for the chronically poor, and society's 
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obligations to veterans.”26 For the most part, therefore, the truly needy was composed of individuals not 
expected to work, or as others have termed them, the unemployables.  
Reagan’s second primary character, the welfare cheat, was clearly the most negative of Reagan’s 
three-part depiction of the “not needy,” but was also the least frequent. Whereas Reagan’s reference to a 
“welfare queen” attracted considerable attention, he actually only referenced the example twice, both 
times in response to questions, and neither occurred during a major address. The first instance was during 
an interview with newspaper editors in December of 1981. Reagan explained that his cuts were “aimed at 
the abuses in the program, people that are collecting disability benefits and are not disabled.” He went on 
to explain that “This is the type of thing that we think there's much more of it than anyone realizes, as was 
evidenced in Chicago a couple of years ago with the—or a few years ago—with the welfare queen who 
went on trial. And it was found that in addition to collecting welfare under 123 different names, she also 
had 55 social security cards. So, this is where we were going to try and make some of the changes.”27 
Reagan used the Chicago example again during a question and answer session with high school students in 
January of 1983.28  
In general, however, Reagan relied on his experiences of reforming the welfare system in 
California as governor and getting the “cheaters and undeserving off the rolls” there to support his 
assumption that many on the welfare system were fraudulent.29 Reagan typically offered ambiguous 
assertions when explaining how reforms in California that required welfare recipients to register for work 
or training resulted in a significant reduction in the rolls. In March of 1981, for example, he offered this 
explanation for what happened after 350,000 people were cut off from welfare:  
We never had a single case of anyone suddenly appearing and saying, “I am destitute. 
I've been cut off welfare.” As a matter of fact, most of those people disappeared of their 
own free will, which led us to believe that under the regulations which bound us in our 
administrative ability, we were unable to really pin down how many people might be 
getting more than one welfare check. And when they just disappeared as the spotlight 
began to be turned on, possibly out of recognition that they were now going to be 
caught, the rolls just shrank. And it's this theory that is behind what we are doing.30  
In 1983, he described the California welfare recipients as “paper people” who were not “legitimately 
needy” and had realized they could be caught and thus simply disappeared.31 Reagan referenced the 
example again in 1986.32 Beyond this handful of examples, however, Reagan in general avoided directly 
disparaging the poor. He certainly focused on “waste, fraud, and abuse,” but he tended to cite figures and 
the results of studies in doing so, rather than tell specific stories of cheaters. Even the welfare queen 
example was as much of an indictment on the system as the person. Reagan’s ire was clearly more often 
targeted to government and its bureaucrats, not the poor themselves.  
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Much more common in Reagan’s rhetoric was the image of the “welfare dependent,” an image 
that framed the welfare poor as victims rather than villains. In several speeches, such as during the 1987 
State of the Union, Reagan described the welfare recipient as willing to work, but trapped in the 
dependency of the system.33 On a number of occasions, Reagan used “slavery” metaphors to attack the 
welfare system, calling for its recipients to be “emancipated.”34 Reagan also told a story about a woman in 
California that managed to escape her welfare “security blanket” thanks to Reagan’s reforms: 
After we undertook our welfare reforms in California, I received a letter from a woman 
with several children who had been on Aid to [Families With] Dependent Children. She 
wrote that she had become so dependent on the welfare check that she even turned down 
offers of marriage. She just could not give up that security blanket that it represented. 
But she said that she'd always known that it couldn't go on, couldn't last forever. So 
when our reforms began, she just assumed that the time had come and that somehow she 
would be off welfare. So she took her children and the $600 she had saved from her, as 
she put it, so-called "poverty," and went to Alaska, where she had relatives. And she was 
writing the letter now not to complain about our reforms, but to tell me that she had a 
good job and that working now had given her a great deal of self-respect, for which she 
thanked me, and then one line that I'll never forget. She said, "It sure beats daytime 
television."35  
In general, Reagan defined government as the problem that blocked the progress of its recipients, not a 
lack of effort on the part of the recipients themselves. Reagan often repeated that people on welfare were 
not lazy but rather wanted independence from the welfare system and its social workers. In his remarks to 
the National Alliance of Business in October of 1981, for example, he explained that welfare recipients 
“are economically trapped in welfare. They'd like nothing better than to be out in the work-a-day world 
with the rest of us. Independence and self-sufficiency is what they want. They aren't lazy or unwilling to 
work, they just don't know how to free themselves from that welfare security blanket.”36 Many of the sins 
of the welfare system that Reagan listed, especially during his second term when welfare reform was high 
on the agenda, worked to deflect negative attention from welfare recipients themselves. Welfare 
demoralized the poor, and robbed them of not only their self-respect and their dignity, but of “the tools to 
break the cycle of dependency” as well.37  
In sum, welfare was a trap, a “creator and reinforcer of dependency,”38 and its dependent 
recipients its victims, hence worthy of sympathy. These dependent figures were, however, still considered 
to be among the “non-needy.” Within Reagan’s logic, the act of removing them from welfare was all that 
was necessary. Government could help the most by not helping at all, thus, similar to the woman in the 
story above, the individuals would become self-sufficient.  
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 Reagan’s third key depiction of the “not needy” will be entitled the “rational not needy.” This 
group was not clearly defined, but was certainly distinct from the welfare cheats and the welfare 
dependent. Reagan framed the rational not needy primarily as individuals who were not truly in need of 
government services such as welfare, food stamps, or free school lunches, but were nonetheless accepting 
their benefits. At times Reagan would frame them negatively by calling them “greedy” or accusing them 
of “taking advantage” of the various programs.39 But again, for the most part, Reagan placed the blame on 
the complicated system, its calculating bureaucrats, or the spendthrift Democrats. Here is where Reagan 
most clearly dissociated the truly needy from the not needy. More than once, for example, Reagan 
contrasted the “technically” eligible from the “morally” eligible.40 With this dissociation, Reagan was 
implying that while these individuals were not being fraudulent—they were following the rules as 
written—they were nonetheless receiving benefits despite not having “the need that justifies their being 
there.”41 He explained that there was no “moral or legitimate reason” for them to be recipients of these 
services.42 They had made their way unto the rolls due to “abuses in the interpretation of regulations” and 
“overbroad criteria”43 They were not truly needy, but were “on the periphery,” and represented the “fat” 
Reagan’s cuts would eliminate.44 Reagan would cite examples where people 150 percent or 185 percent 
over the poverty level continued to receive benefits.45 Simply put, Reagan defined that the problem was 
“not government doing too much for the needy, but government doing too much for the non-needy.”46  
In policy impact, this position translated into a decrease in benefits to the “working poor,” 
although Reagan avoided that label. Many of Reagan’s cuts in the 1981 OMBR were designed to reduce 
payments made to welfare recipients that were also working. Thus, rather than take the position supported 
by Nixon and Carter of increasing benefits to the working poor in order to increase the incentive to work. 
Reagan, in part supported by framing the same group as the “non-needy” rather than the “working poor,” 
did the opposite. These policy changes also likely worked to decrease the political viability of the 
programs. As the programs grew during the 1970s to include more of the middle class, they also garnered 
stronger support. By “retargeting,” “redirecting,” and “tightening” eligibility for the programs,47 Reagan 
was not only decreasing the cost of the programs, but he was also limiting their political support in the 
long run.  
Reagan’s position was backed both by the overall assumption that government assistance was 
counterproductive, and by the argument that providing so many benefits to the non-needy increased costs 
to the point that it was actually jeopardizing the assistance provided to the needy. Both these arguments, 
known respectively as the perversity and jeopardy thesis, were outlined by Albert Hirschman in his 
Rhetoric of Reaction.48  The jeopardy thesis was particularly powerful for Reagan in this case because it 
specifically pitted the non-needy versus the needy. Reagan cited examples from his California experiences 
of how cutting the non-needy from the welfare rolls allowed them to increase benefits to those 
remaining.49 Reagan explained the need to get those “not deserving of welfare” off welfare because “every 
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time someone who has the means and yet is subsisting on the help of their fellow citizens . . . they are 
reducing our ability to care for the truly needy.”50  Reagan also pitted the non-needy with their “taxpaying 
neighbors,”51 and explained how the non-needy were cheating both the truly needy and the taxpayers by 
accepting benefits they did not really need. He made the point to explain how neighbors may be paying 
taxes to support programs that benefit neighbors who actually earned more money than them.52  
  In addition to the truly needy and the three-part depiction of the not needy, two other characters 
figured prominently in Reagan’s poverty and welfare rhetoric: the unemployed and the bureaucrat. Reagan 
was strongly sympathetic with the former, at least rhetorically. As unemployment increased, and the 
criticisms of Reagan’s economic policy rose with it, Reagan began to discuss the unemployed more and 
more. He provided a clear external attribution for their troubles, and often noted their wish to work rather 
than receive a “handout.”53 During his 1982 Labor Day Address, for example, Reagan offered support for 
the unemployed, saying: 
Unfortunately, on this Labor Day, however, too many of our fellow citizens are 
unemployed. That's a terrible word, "unemployed." It means hardship, uncertainty, 
frustration, helplessness. Many who are unemployed feel caught up in something they 
don't understand and over which they have no control. And they're right. It's not the fault 
of the laid-off fellow in Detroit that he's out of work. It's not his fault the autos aren't 
rolling down the assembly line. It's not the fault of the unemployed mother in Delaware 
that the printing plant closed down, throwing her out of a job. 54
Interestingly, Reagan actually worked to humanize the disheartening statistics concerning unemployment. 
During a nationally televised address in October of 1982, for example, Reagan attempted to put numbers 
in “human terms”: 
Some economic indicators are down; others are up. But the dark cloud of unemployment 
hangs over the lives of 11 million of our friends, neighbors, and family. At times, the 
sheer weight of all these facts and figures make them hard for anyone to understand. 
What do they really mean, and what can we do to make them better? Well, the first step 
is to understand what they mean in human terms—how they're affecting the everyday 
lives of our people, because behind every one of those numbers are millions of 
individual lives—young couples struggling to make ends meet, teenagers looking for 
work, older Americans threatened by inflation, small businessmen fighting for survival, 
and parents working for a better future for their children.55
In a radio speech a month later Reagan expressed his “personal ache” for the “real people who were 
hurting” behind the “cold government statistics” on unemployment.56 In 1983, he again rejected the notion 
that the unemployed were “just statistics,” but rather represented “human hardship and suffering” and 
“unhappy families with lifetime savings eaten up and dreams for the future destroyed.”57 Reagan often 
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discussed his own experiences during the Great Depression in order to express his identification with the 
difficulties of unemployment.58  
 Despite Reagan’s sympathy for the unemployed, he tended not to act strongly for their cause. 
Once again, within his philosophical perspective, short-term efforts to help the unemployed would result 
in more problems in the long term. Reagan therefore tended to point toward other economic trends that 
were improving, and asked the unemployed to have patience as his economic program took effect. Reagan 
could be sympathetic with their plight but inactive partly because he blamed government programs for 
their plight, thus, once again, inaction, or even retrenchment was the best policy in Reagan’s eyes. Reagan 
also often pointed to newspaper want ads as a device to lessen the importance of unemployment figures.59 
For many, these references were assumed to be attacks on the unemployed, implying that jobs were 
available but they simply did not want to work. Reagan, however, sought to deflect this criticism, arguing 
that the issue was not lack of effort, but rather the mismatch between skills and jobs.60 Overall, therefore, 
Reagan presented a positive image of the unemployed, but nonetheless continued to maintain the need for 
cuts and reject calls for additional government programs to help them. 
 The final relevant depiction to discuss concerning Reagan’s welfare rhetoric is clearly the most 
negative: the bureaucrat. Of all his characters, the bureaucrat was the villain in Reagan’s American story. 
Reagan was particularly clear on his opinion concerning the ulterior motives of the bureaucrat. Simply put, 
bureaucrats were calculating figures intent on “defending” and “growing” more bureaucracy in order to 
insure their middle-class lifestyle. Bureaucrats “must justify their existence,” and were primarily interested 
in “preserving bureaucracy.”61 They were “not interested in doing anything to help the people get off 
welfare.”62 Bureaucrats were “more worried about losing their position rather than helping the people they 
represent,”63 at least in part due to their “vested interest” or “economic self-interest” in welfare 
dependency.64 Bureaucrats made a “nice living,” because poverty was a “career for a lot of well-paid 
people.”65 Sometimes the “prime order” of a bureaucracy, Reagan argued, was to “preserve the 
bureaucracy.”66  Reagan complained often that the “biggest share” of money going to many programs, 
especially training programs, went to the bureaucrats, not the poor (much less the “truly needy”).67  The 
War on Poverty had created an “army of professionals” and a “new upper-middle class of bureaucrats” 
intent on “growing” bureaucracy and giving it “eternal life.”68 When criticism of Reagan’s policies toward 
the poor grew, Reagan again blamed the bureaucrats, this time accusing them of fabricating stories and 
“suggesting distress” in order to “create an image” of Reagan “picking on the poor.”69 Reagan explained 
that a protest march on Washington was primarily made up of bureaucrats, again fighting for their 
interests.70  In sum, bureaucrats were not only connected with a government that was inherently 
counterproductive, they also were accused of having hidden motives that harmed the poor (by increasing 
dependency) as well as the nonpoor (by increasing spending and thus causing higher taxes and slowing the 
economy).  
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 In conclusion, Reagan presented an interesting array of characters when discussing welfare and 
poverty issues. The “welfare queen” is perhaps his most well known, especially to poverty scholars, but in 
reality was only a minor character mentioned twice in passing in minor addresses. Indeed, rhetorically, 
Reagan was much more supportive of the poor than Nixon. The villain for Reagan was not the idle poor, 
but the calculating bureaucrat, and to a much lesser extent the non-needy taking advantage of the 
sprawling welfare system. The most important issue evident within Reagan’s characterizations of the poor 
was the shift from the deserving - undeserving distinction to the truly needy - not truly needy. Reagan was 
not arguing that the not needy were undeserving of help, he was arguing that they were not in need of help. 
The typical image of the undeserving poor was one that consisted of blaming those poor for their poverty, 
thus justifying the lack of outside assistance. Nixon, for example, focused on the image of the idle yet 
able-bodied welfare poor, who were undeserving because they could work to support themselves if they 
wanted. For Reagan, the emphasis would not be on this idle poor, but rather on individuals receiving 
benefits that did not need them. For the most part, this included individuals who were working while also 
receiving benefits from AFDC, food stamps, or one of the other programs. In other words, Reagan 
reframed the working poor as the unneedy poor. Indeed, from this perspective, the problem of poverty was 
simply too much government that was causing dependency, and costing so much it slowed the economy, 
which in turn caused unemployment.  
One last point concerning these characters concerns the degree to which Reagan seemed to pit 
their interests against each other. The bureaucrats, and to a lesser extent welfare cheats and the rational not 
needy, were the leading causes of the increase in spending that in turn threatened the benefits of the truly 
needy and caused more unemployment. The bureaucrats were also guilty of supporting the growth of the 
programs that trap the welfare dependent and lure the rational non-needy. Based on this logic, cutting 
benefits to all but the truly needy would help the sympathetic characters (the truly needy and the 
unemployed, as well as the rest of the nation through lower taxes and a stronger economy), and only harm 
the negative characters (the welfare cheat and the bureaucrat), while freeing the dependent poor from their 
“slavery” and taking away unnecessary temptation from the rational not needy. Also notable is the 
practical absence of any discussion of the “working poor,” an important depiction to prior administrations.  
 
Reagan’s Attack on Government and Welfare 
 
 Reagan’s rhetoric concerning the welfare system will be considered in two rather distinct stages. 
From the 1980 campaign until 1986, Reagan’s anti-welfare rhetoric represented a departure from the 
trends evident from Johnson to Carter. Rather than focus on welfare’s specific flaws, Reagan focused on 
the cost and futility of government overall and, to some extent, poverty programs in particular. Most of 
Reagan’s criticisms during this time period worked to justify his program cuts. The 1986 State of the 
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Union introduced a change in focus for Reagan, as the welfare system itself and its numerous flaws began 
to take center stage. From 1986 to 1988, Reagan’s welfare rhetoric shifted to mirror that of his 
predecessors, focusing on welfare’s perverse incentives toward work and family and its link to 
dependency. This shift is important because the change in problem definition compelled a change in policy 
direction as well. From 1980 to 1986, Reagan was primarily cutting programs, not reforming or replacing 
them, so his criticism focused on their high cost and the lack of “true need.” Reagan’s rhetoric and 
proposals from 1986 to 1988, on the other hand, matched those of his predecessors in that they were 
focused on redefining and reforming welfare with both sticks and carrots in order to help its recipients 
become more self-sufficient.  
 
Reagan on Welfare: 1980 to 1986 
 
During the 1980 campaign and the first five years of his presidency, Reagan’s attack on welfare 
was distinct from his predecessors in the sense that his target was “big government” in general rather than 
welfare specifically. The welfare system perhaps served as a key example of the failure of government, 
especially in the public mind, but nonetheless Reagan did not offer the usual litany of welfare’s flaws that 
were so prevalent in the previous administrations. During this early period, Reagan focused his criticism 
on the cost and broader economic consequences of Johnson’s Great Society and War on Poverty, as well 
as the prevalence of fraud, waste, and abuse. As a result, Reagan sought primarily to cut welfare’s costs by 
“tightening” eligibility. Reagan thus at first rejected the incentive-based approaches to welfare-reform that 
had dominated since Nixon’s presidency, and seemed to accept the original function of welfare to sustain 
the dependent at a minimal level. This perspective was supported by Reagan’s framing that those working 
and also benefiting from welfare represented the “non-needy” rather than the working poor. Three themes 
were particularly prevalent during this period: the increasing costs of the programs; the pervasiveness of 
waste, fraud, and abuse; and the strong criticism of Johnson’s Great Society and War on Poverty. Each of 
these themes supported Reagan’s attack on big government, but nonetheless tended to avoid direct specific 
criticism of the welfare system. 
In his Nomination Acceptance address in 1980, Reagan explained that he believed the federal 
government was “overgrown and overweight,” and in need of a ~“diet.”71 Throughout his early years in 
office, Reagan would turn again and again to the increasing costs of federal programs, welfare, food 
stamps, and housing programs in particular. Reagan often explained that such costs were tied to “so called 
entitlement programs,” and thus would continue to grow uncontrollably unless significant action was 
taken.72 Reagan warned of a “Federal Goliath, unleashed and uncontrolled” that had brought the nation “to 
the economic brink,” and “budgetary time bombs” that were “set to explode in the years ahead.”73 He 
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would often cite specific figures that were in reality quite alarming. During a speech at the Annual 
Convention of United States Jaycees in June of 1981, for example, Reagan told the audience: 
In 1967 those automatic spending programs, what we called entitlements, amounted to 
$57 billion—1967. Next year, they'll amount to a staggering $428 billion, and our 
elected representatives don't have any control over them. If we do nothing to change 
these laws, the uncontrollable spending will grow to an unbelievable level of more than 
half a trillion dollars by 1984. The food stamp program in 1970 cost 577 million. Today, 
because of the built-in growth, the automatic growth, that program now costs us $11.5 
billion. That is 20 times as much just in these recent years. Federal housing subsidies 
were $500 million just 11 years ago. Today, they're $6.5 billion, and without adding 
even one single new subsidy, that sum will jump to over $10.5 billion by 1985—21 
times as much as it was 11 years ago.74
In other examples he explained how entitlement programs had risen 453 percent in thirteen years, from 
$63 billion to $346 billion,75 that the overall budget increased fivefold and the cost of welfare tenfold in 
twenty years,76 that in fifteen years the cost of food stamps had increased 16,000 percent, Medicare and 
Medicaid 500 percent in 10 years,77 that the Federal budget took 170 years to reach $100 billion, but only 
8 years to reach $200 billion, just another five years to reach $300 billion, and will double in another five 
years.78 Within the context of Reagan’s overall anti-government message, these numbers were likely 
persuasive. Reagan often blamed the country’s economic woes, including unemployment, inflation, and 
high interest rates, on the “overgrown” and “overweight” government, and these statistics showed that the 
supposed sources of those problems were rapidly increasing.  
 Reagan added to the sense of alarm provided by these numbers by focusing often on what he saw 
as the “unrelenting national scandal” caused by the prevalence of waste, fraud, and abuse within the 
various programs. 79 The triumvirate was labeled as an “unchecked cancer” and a “monster” that was 
“plundering” the nation’s pocketbooks.80 To the statistics concerning the growth in costs, Reagan added 
statistics and examples that pointed toward the seriousness of waste, fraud, and abuse. Reagan cited 
special commissions or congressional committees that identified problems with waste, fraud, and abuse.81 
He discussed, for example, how $64 million had been sent to people through the social security system 
who had already passed away.82 He made light of this situation in a fund-raising dinner in Pennsylvania in 
1982, telling a laughing crowd, “Now, yes, there are individual programs in there that have been changed. 
When you find a program, for example, in which thousands of people who've been dead for an average of 
7 years are still collecting benefits from the government, I think it's proper to change that program.”83 He 
also referred a number of times to the California reporter who was able to acquire benefits through the use 
of several names.84 He ridiculed a California work program that used fifty percent of its budget to support 
eleven administrators that oversaw a total of seventeen workers.85 Later in his term, Reagan would often 
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cite the statistic that for every dollar that reached a “needy person,” two dollars were spent on 
administrative overhead.86 He even cited the fact that the infamous convicted murderer the “Son of Sam” 
was receiving benefits while incarcerated.87  He estimated that the cost of “fraud alone” was at $25 billion, 
up to ten percent of the spending on all social programs.88  
The food stamp program was the most common target. In this 1982 State of the Union, Reagan 
argued that “[v]irtually every American who shops in a local supermarket is aware of the daily abuses that 
take place in the food stamp program.”89 He provided a number of examples of problems within the 
program. He cited, for example, a study from Florida that concluded that 16 percent of recipients in the 
state had received food stamps fraudulently and another 15 percent had received too much due to 
bureaucratic errors.90 In his 1983 State of the Union, he cited $1.1 billion in food stamp overpayments.91 
This focus on waste, fraud, and abuse set the groundwork for Reagan’s argument that the cuts to the 
programs would not hurt the “truly needy,” but would merely be absorbed by the programs through 
increased efficiency. 
 Typically after citing the spiraling costs of the various entitlement programs and the prevalence 
of waste, fraud, and abuse, Reagan would further explain that while the programs were “well-intentioned,” 
they had failed to “eliminate poverty or raise welfare recipients from dependence to self-sufficiency, 
independence, and dignity.”92 President Johnson’s Great Society programs and the War on Poverty in 
particular were targets for criticism. Reagan would frequently refer to the War on Poverty in passing, 
pointing out that Johnson had declared war on poverty, but that poverty had “won” the war. According to 
the notations in the presidential papers, such comments were evidently often met with laughter from the 
audience.93 At times, citing conservative scholar Charles Murray, Reagan repeatedly made the argument 
that the Great Society programs had essentially caused more poverty, or at least were responsible for 
keeping the poor from overcoming poverty on their own. Reagan’s most extensive comments on this issue 
occurred during a fund raising dinner in 1983. Citing an article by Murray in Public Interest, Reagan 
explained how the expansion of government programs “coincided with an end to economic progress for 
America's poor people.” Reagan supported this argument with statistics on how poverty fell from 1949 
until 1964, but then in 1980, “with the full impact of the Great Society's programs being felt,” there was a 
higher proportion of people living in poverty than in 1969.94  
Reagan’s strategic choices of what statistics to reveal were critical here, as the evidence is clear 
that while the War on Poverty did not end poverty, it certainly contributed to its reduction in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, especially with the elderly. Nonetheless, Reagan continued to argue that the War on Poverty 
was not only lost, but had caused more poverty.95 While Reagan did criticize the War on Poverty, during 
this portion of his tenure, he did not focus primarily on the specifics of welfare’s supposed 
counterproductive tendencies. Rather, his argument focused on the big picture: “As social spending 
multiplied, economic growth slowed, and the economy became less and less able to generate the jobs and 
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incomes needed to lift the poor out of poverty, not to mention the fact that inflation stimulated by 
government growth hit the poor the hardest, especially by devaluating the payments of those on welfare.”96  
 When Reagan did mention specifics concerning welfare’s impacts from 1980 to 1986, he again 
tied the criticism to Johnson’s Great Society, focusing on the difference between it and Roosevelt’s New 
Deal. Reagan attacked Johnson’s programs, for example, for “fostering” a “state of dependency” and 
“creating” a “new kind of bondage for millions of American citizens.”97 In the 1985 State of the Union, 
Reagan attacked policies that “increase dependency, break up families, and destroy self-respect,” and 
resolved to “stop spreading dependency and start spreading opportunity . . . stop spreading bondage and 
start spreading freedom.”98  During a speech in Atlanta in 1983, Reagan argued that the “dramatic increase 
in dependence was clearly associated with a change in the nature of public assistance,” specifically the 
switch from “direct payments” to the poor to the development of programs that required a “growing army 
of professionals.”99 Later, he expanded on the distinction: 
During the sixties and seventies, the Great Society and other Federal programs led to 
massive increases in social spending. Why, then, at the same time, did the number of 
Americans below the poverty line stop shrinking? Why did we see a drop in the number 
of males in the work force and a huge increase in births out of wedlock? I believe the 
answer lies in the firm difference between the New Deal and the Great Society. The 
New Deal gave cash to the poor, but the Great Society failed to target assistance to the 
truly needy and made government the instrument of vast transfer payments, erecting 
huge bureaucracies to manage hundreds of social programs. The Great Society failed in 
two crucial aspects: It fostered dependence on government subsidies, and it made the 
transfer of money from Washington bureaucrats to those in need seem like a mission 
impossible.  I was a New Deal Democrat. And I still believe, today, that there is only 
one compassionate, sensible, and effective policy for Federal assistance: We must focus 
domestic spending on the poor and bypass the bureaucracies by giving assistance 
directly to those who need it. We must end dependency, eliminate quotas, and foster a 
vital, innovative economy that rewards all Americans according to their talent and hard 
work. If we do, we can enhance our democratic ideals and can make America a genuine 
opportunity society. 
As evidenced by the quotation, Reagan would mention the connection between welfare and dependency 
during his first six years, but the primary thrust of his argument continued to focus on attacking 
bureaucracy, rather than welfare’s perverse incentives. 
 In summary, from 1980 to 1986, Reagan presented a rather simple, logical argument against the 
government’s anti-poverty programs. He established that the costs were increasing at an alarming rate. He 
then began to question the usefulness of those increases by attributing significant portions of those 
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increases to the prevalence of waste, fraud, and abuse. He then argued that not only were the costs of the 
programs skyrocketing, and not only were the programs not working efficiently, but the programs were 
actually counterproductive and caused dependency. If his framing was accepted, Reagan’s solution of 
cutting government programs seemed justified. The cuts, while perhaps painful in the short term, would 
help the poor and the nonpoor in the long term, while continued increases would only harm both. 
 
Reagan on Welfare: 1986-1988 
 
In his 1986 State of the Union address, Reagan anti-welfare rhetoric shifted and began to match 
the arguments of his predecessors. During that speech, Reagan explained that welfare should be judged by 
the number of people that leave the program, rather than the number it served. In doing so, Reagan, like 
Johnson, Nixon, and Carter before him, was reframing welfare as a program to assist the poor to become 
self-sufficient, rather than a program that sustained the truly needy. With this shift, Reagan began to 
support increases in some of the programs he was criticizing earlier in his tenure. Indeed, Reagan proposed 
programs that at least in spirit mirrored the Great Society programs, although obviously with a much 
smaller scope financially. In addition, starting in 1986 and lasting until the end of his presidency, Reagan’s 
criticism of the welfare system itself grew substantially, especially how it functioned as a perverse 
incentive to both work and family stability, resulting in a debilitating “welfare culture.” In the end, the 
Family Support Act signed by Reagan in 1988 was much more in the spirit of past attempts at reform than 
the positions expressed during Reagan’s first six years. 
During the 1986 State of the Union, Reagan clearly shifted his focus and set his sights directly on 
welfare’s often discussed flaws. In that speech, Reagan introduced a new line of arguments that would 
carry on until the signing of the Family Support Act in 1988. Borrowing the words of Franklin Roosevelt’s 
speech when he proposed the Social Security Act in 1935, Reagan explained: 
As we work to make the American dream real for all, we must also look to the condition 
of America's families. Struggling parents today worry how they will provide their 
children the advantages that their parents gave them. In the welfare culture, the 
breakdown of the family, the most basic support system, has reached crisis 
proportions—female and child poverty, child abandonment, horrible crimes, and 
deteriorating schools. After hundreds of billions of dollars in poverty programs, the 
plight of the poor grows more painful. But the waste in dollars and cents pales before the 
most tragic loss: the sinful waste of human spirit and potential. We can ignore this 
terrible truth no longer. As Franklin Roosevelt warned 51 years ago, standing before this 
Chamber, he said, "Welfare is a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit." And we 
must now escape the spider's web of dependency. Tonight I am charging the White 
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House Domestic Council to present me by December 1, 1986, an evaluation of programs 
and a strategy for immediate action to meet the financial, educational, social, and safety 
concerns of poor families. I'm talking about real and lasting emancipation, because the 
success of welfare should be judged by how many of its recipients become independent 
of welfare.100
The final sentence especially represented the shift, as Reagan, following Johnson, Nixon, and Carter, 
began to focus on the need to change the welfare program in order to encourage self-sufficiency, rather 
than focusing on cutting costs and redirecting aid to the sustenance of the “truly needy.”  
 With this new focus, Reagan began to recite the laundry list of welfare’s problems. In a 1987 
speech during a White House briefing on welfare reform, for example, Reagan returned to Charles 
Murray’s research, where he discussed the “new bipartisan consensus” that “our welfare system” is “one 
of the most serious obstacles to progress for the poor.” After reviewing Murray’s argument concerning 
how poverty increased as anti-poverty spending increased, Reagan laid out the arguments for welfare 
reform from his self-identified conservative perspective: 
How compassionate is a welfare system that discourages families that are economically 
self-reliant, that takes 6,000 pages of Federal regulations to explain, and is so complex it 
confuses and demoralizes the poor? How compassionate is a system that robs the poor of 
the tools to break the cycle of dependency? Well, the emerging consensus on welfare is 
finally agreeing with us that the Federal welfare system has become a poverty trap, a 
trap that is wreaking havoc on the very support system the poor need most to lift 
themselves up and out of destitution—the family. This growing bipartisan consensus 
holds that our current welfare system is not only a failure but counterproductive—the 
institutionalization of ghetto life where, as Bill Moyers put it in his special on this 
subject last year: “Mothers are children, fathers don't count, and the street is the 
strongest school.” And I just think conservatives should have a special interest in this 
because, as I've mentioned, our original skepticism about the welfare system has been 
sadly borne out by recent research. But second, strengthening the family has been among 
our highest priorities and, believe me, no one needs that strength and help today more 
than America's poor.101  
From 1986 to 1988, Reagan focused primarily on how welfare “caused” dependency and broke 
up families, while also at times adding how it discouraged work, demoralized its recipients, and 
ultimately created an anti-American “welfare culture” that threatened the nation’s prosperity. 
Welfare’s connection to dependency was perhaps the primary focus of Reagan’s late anti-welfare 
rhetoric. Reagan clearly extended the “welfare as slavery” metaphor that was mentioned sparingly during 
the first six years of his administration. Welfare was attacked as the “creator and reinforcer of 
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dependency,”102 and his proposals were tagged as leading to “emancipation.”103  An administration study 
on welfare programs was given the title “Up from Dependency,” likely an allusion to Booker T. 
Washington’s autobiography, Up from Slavery.104 Reagan’s “Economic Bill of Rights” included a call to 
“reform the present welfare system that promotes dependency.”105 Throughout 1987, Reagan referred to 
poverty again and again as a “trap” caused in part by welfare, which, he argued, made poverty harder to 
escape. 106 Welfare acted as a “net of dependency” that took away hope and replaced it with “despair” and 
“futility.”107 This focus on dependency worked well within Reagan’s broader arguments by disassociating 
government programs from the American values of freedom and liberty. Again, unlike Roosevelt and 
Johnson who focused on positive freedom and the need for government to insure opportunity, Reagan 
returned to the earlier negative notion of freedom as freedom from government, here conceptualized as a 
welfare system that ensnared its victims in “webs of dependency.” 
 In addition, Reagan returned to the anti-family argument against welfare that was so critical to 
Nixon in particular. Reagan blamed welfare for the “breakdown” of the family, often citing statistics 
concerning the number of single parent families and children born out of wedlock. In a special radio 
address on “welfare reform” a week after the 1986 State of the Union, Reagan provided an extended 
discussion of the connection between welfare and “the crisis of family breakdowns.” He explained that 
families were not even being formed in the inner cities, where mothers were teenages and fathers were 
“often nowhere to be found.”108 Family breakdown was the key attribute of what Reagan termed the 
“welfare culture.” Reagan clearly wove the explanation together with his broader narrative concerning the 
failure of the War on Poverty programs. He also focused on how the connection between welfare and 
family served as a particular point of concern for conservatives, as well as an area of common ground with 
liberals. In his 1987 briefing on welfare, for example, he made both points clear: 
I just think the time is ripe for realizing our traditional concern with strengthening the 
family is directly related to this emerging national consensus on the welfare issue. I 
think conservatives and Republicans can now join with liberals and Democrats in 
reappraising that entire system and examining the reason for its failure. There is 
common ground. We all know it isn't working. We know there will be no easy answer—
it's the belief that there were easy answers that got us into the situation in the first 
place.109  
From this point on, welfare’s negative impact on family was a common topic for Reagan.110  
 Whereas dependency and family breakdown were the two primary charges against welfare, 
Reagan also offered a few secondary criticisms such as welfare’s propensity to demoralize the poor and 
discourage work. That welfare “robbed” its recipients of their dignity and self-respect and demoralized 
them was a common point for Reagan.111 The demoralizing influence extended even beyond the 
individual, as Reagan argued that welfare “weakens community values and self-esteem,” resulting in a 
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debilitating welfare culture.112 Welfare’s perverse incentives concerning work were mentioned, but they 
were never a key argument for Reagan. At times, Reagan would argue that welfare “undermines the 
willingness to work” or would cite economist Milton Friedman’s belief that “If you start paying people to 
be poor, you're going to have a lot of poor people.”113 Reagan also tended to glorify the importance of 
work, at times indirectly comparing welfare to work. Unlike welfare, work led to self-respect, self-esteem 
and independence.114  
 In sum, Reagan’s rhetoric concerning welfare and poverty exhibited two distinct periods. From 
1980 to 1986, Reagan tended to avoid discussing the specific issues with welfare, but rather focused on the 
cost, waste, and ineffectiveness of government programs in general. From 1986 until 1988, he began to 
focus much more intensely on welfare and its flaws, especially its links to dependency and family 
breakdown. The importance of the distinctions between two periods lies in their impact on Reagan’s 
policy proposals. Reagan’s anti-welfare rhetoric essentially served to define the problem, and therefore 
logically set up Reagan’s proposed solutions. The following section focuses on how Reagan framed and 
defended his policies.  
 
Reagan’s Welfare Policy Rhetoric 
 
 Similar to his anti-welfare rhetoric, Reagan’s solutions can be examined in two sections, with 
each logically matching his two framings of the problems associated with welfare. From 1980 to 1986, 
Reagan’s policy proposals primarily involved cutting programs, especially through the use of tighter 
eligibility requirements. The cuts came during an economic downturn, and brought out an intense 
backlash. As a result, Reagan’s rhetoric during this first period was primarily defensive, as he tried to 
deflect attacks on both his policies and his character. During the second period, from 1986 to 1988, 
Reagan’s policy rhetoric shifted to focus more on changing the nature of welfare, rather than merely 
cutting it down. This rhetoric came during much better economic times, thus Reagan did not have to be 
nearly as defensive. He then sought to redefine welfare from a program of sustenance (and dependency) to 
one that leads to self-sufficiency.  
 
Reagan’s Rhetoric of Defense, 1980-1986 
 
 When Reagan signed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Bill in 1981, he was met with 
significant backlash as many argued that he was abandoning the nation’s responsibility to the poor, 
especially considering the difficult economic times. In seemingly every press conference or “town hall” 
type meeting during his first few years, Reagan was confronted with questions concerning his “meanness” 
toward the poor. The attack on Reagan often questioned both his policies and his character. In response, 
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Reagan delivered a remarkable array of arguments to defend himself. Indeed, his rhetoric essentially 
represented an extended apologia. His apologia involved a number of specific arguments. His primary 
rhetorical strategy involved reframing the popular view of the “cuts” his policies instilled through the use 
of a number of dissociations. Each of the dissociations worked to reduce the perception that the cuts were 
actually harming the poor. Secondary strategies included attacking his attackers by questioning their 
motives, expressing deep sympathy for those harmed by the economic times; and dissociating between 
short term “fixes” that were counterproductive and his long term plan that while painful for some, would 
provide crucial long term benefits.  
 The most elaborate argument involved Reagan’s reframing of the cuts. Whereas his opponents 
were framing them as cuts that harmed the disadvantaged at a time of need, Reagan countered with several 
alternatives. Reagan’s primary reframing was that the cuts did not affect the truly needy. His key tactic 
here involved dissociation. According to B.L. Ware and Wil Linkugel, dissociation concerns “separating 
some fact, sentiment, object, or relationship from some larger context within which the audience presently 
views that attribute.” The rhetor essentially tries to create a new perspective by splitting the element into 
parts, dissociating from the more offensive part while associating with the less offensive part.115 As 
outlined earlier, Reagan split an element of the people being helped by the programs into two—the truly 
needy and the not truly needy—and dissociated from the idea of cutting aid to the truly needy (the more 
offensive side), and associated with cutting aid to the not needy (the less offensive side). “We have not cut 
the programs down at the bottom,” Reagan argued, but rather “where we have trimmed rolls, we've 
trimmed them up at the upper level.”116 Reagan bolstered this dissociation further by arguing that 
withholding assistance to the not needy would actually help the truly needy due to improvements that 
would occur to the economy.  
 In addition to the truly needy-not needy dissociation, Reagan also made a dissociation between 
cuts that actually affected those served by the programs and cuts that only reduced waste, fraud, and abuse 
or administrative overhead. For example, he discounted the “great deal of talk” about how the cuts “picked 
on the helpless, the needy, the poor, and that in some way we're seeking to deprive them of the things that 
they must have because they have no place else to turn.”  Rather, Reagan argued, “[w]hat we have really 
been getting at is the excessive amount of bureaucracy that it takes to deliver a dollar to a needy person or 
a helpless person in this country.”117 This dissociation fit logically with Reagan’s heavy criticism of the 
bureaucrat in general, especially in terms of their ulterior motives.  
Reagan also dissociated between the more offensive element of cuts that represented true 
reductions in the level of funding, and the less offensive element of cuts that merely represented 
reductions in the rate of increase of the level of funding. For example, in a response to a question asked 
during a 1981 White House luncheon concerning whether his cuts would hurt the poor, Reagan responded, 
“Well, I think you're going to be happily surprised. I think our situation has been greatly distorted. I want 
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to remind all of you of one thing. We're not reducing government's cost down to below what they've been 
getting in the previous year. We're reducing the rate of increase that has been built into them. And, no, it 
will stop short of the needy.”118 In a 1982 press conference, Reagan weaved two of these dissociations 
together:  
Now, as to the cuts in social reforms, most of what we have done in that regard has not 
been a cut. There has not been a cut in the overall spending on human resources. 
Actually, there is an increase over the year before, and there will be an increase in '83 
over '82 and on down the line. We have reduced the rate of increase in those programs. 
But much of the cut is aimed at trying to eliminate from the rolls those people who, I 
think, are unfairly benefiting from those programs.”119  
He also used the dissociation of true cuts/cuts in increases to attack the Democrats, explaining, “There 
have been no budget cuts; all we've cut is the projected increase by the big spenders, the amount they want 
to increase the budget.”120  
To bolster these dissociations, Reagan often cited figures concerning how much the government 
was still spending on social programs. These citations were not framed in terms of alarming audiences 
with the cost of the programs—although Reagan certainly did just that at times—but rather they were 
framed in terms of providing evidence that the government was still fulfilling its responsibilities to the 
poor. In other words, Reagan was defending himself by practically bragging about how much government 
was still spending, while his broader philosophy attacked that very spending. The basic argument was that 
the “safety net” was still in place. During his nationally televised “Address Before a Joint Session of the 
Congress on the Program for Economic Recovery” in 1981, Reagan provided a typical example of this 
tactic: 
Now, I know that exaggerated and inaccurate stories about these cuts have disturbed 
many people . . . . Well, I regret the fear that these unfounded stories have caused, and I 
welcome this opportunity to set things straight. We will continue to fulfill the 
obligations that spring from our national conscience. Those who, through no fault of 
their own, must depend on the rest of us—the poverty stricken, the disabled, the elderly, 
all those with true need—can rest assured that the social safety net of programs they 
depend on are exempt from any cuts. The full retirement benefits of the more than 31 
million social security recipients will be continued, along with an annual cost-of-living 
increase. Medicare will not be cut, nor will supplemental income for the blind, the aged, 
and the disabled. And funding will continue for veterans pensions. School breakfasts and 
lunches for the children of low-income families will continue, as will nutrition and other 
special services for the aging. There will be no cut in Project Head Start or summer 
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youth jobs. All in all, nearly $216 billion worth of programs providing help for tens of 
millions of Americans will be fully funded.121  
During his State of the Union in 1982, he mentioned that funding for social insurance programs will be 
“more than double the amount spent only 6 years ago,” that the Federal Government will still “subsidize 
95 million meals every day,” which represented “one out of seven of all the meals served in America.”122 
The 95 million meals were mentioned a number of times.123 He would often cite specific increases, such as 
during a rally in Minnesota in 1982: “The outlays for the elderly in 1983 will be double what they were as 
recently as 1978. The income assistance to the needy, not counting social security, which was $47 billion 
in 1980, will be more than $60 billion in the new budget.”124 At a conservative fundraising dinner, Reagan 
ridiculed the “the sob sister attempts to portray our desire to get government spending under control as a 
hardhearted attack on the poor people of America,” and explained that spending for entitlements “will 
actually increase by one-third over the next 5 years.”125 Later, he mentioned “a few examples of the level 
of human services that we're still providing in the 1983 budget,” and proceeded to provide a list 
concerning the number of households receiving subsidized housing assistance, the loans or awards will be 
available for students in higher education, subsidized meals, Medicaid and Medicare services, and training 
and employment programs. He concluded by explaining that  
while everyone is screaming that we're throwing people out in the snow to die. . . . 
[t]hese examples clearly demonstrate that we in this administration are not turning our 
backs on America's needy. There's no question that we must protect those who are truly 
needy, care for those who are sick, feed those who are hungry, and shelter those who are 
cold. And we must build a better economy that provides a job for every American who 
wants one. 126
In sum, all these various dissociations worked to lessen the charges made against Reagan’s policy and 
character by attempting to reframe the popular assumption of Reagan’s cuts. 
 The first secondary tactic in Reagan’s apologia was to turn the tables and attack his attackers, 
specifically in terms of the motives behind their attacks on him. Again and again, Reagan labeled the 
criticism against his policies as “misinformation campaigns,” “falsehoods,” “distortions,” “propaganda,” 
“wild charges,” and “pure political demagoguery.”127  He labeled his critics demagogues on a number of 
occasions, and accused them of “needlessly frightening” the poor, especially the elderly, about reductions 
in services. These criticisms were often tied to his overall attack on bureaucrats, as he explained that the 
motives behind the attacks were that the bureaucrats concerned that the cuts would negatively affect their 
bottom line, not that of the poor. As explained by William Benoit, counterattacks such as these are often 
based on the assumption that if you can reduce the credibility of the source of the accusation, you can 
reduce the damage to your own credibility.128
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 Another secondary tactic involved the expression of deep sympathy for those suffering from the 
difficult economic times, especially when their suffering was tied to unemployment. This sympathy 
worked to challenge the charges against Reagan’s character. He spoke often of how his father suffered 
during the Great Depression. Reagan’s sympathy for the poor despite his policies that cut programs toward 
them was nonetheless consistent from his ideological perspective. Since he blamed unemployment on a 
poor economy worsened in part by the size of government, to Reagan the cuts would eventually help the 
poor, and therefore were justified.  
 Lastly, Reagan used two additional arguments to bolster the view that his policies actually 
benefited the poor rather than harmed them. These arguments thus served as direct denials of the charges 
against his policies. The first argument focused on the connection between his policies and inflation. 
Reagan returned again and again to the effect his cost-cutting policies was having on inflation, explaining 
how inflation was the “cruelest tax of all” to the poor, especially the elderly poor on fixed incomes.129 
Rapid inflation, which he associated with the prior administration and with “big government” spending, 
“hit the poor the hardest” and was “more unfair” than cuts.130 Speaking to the Economic Club of Detroit in 
1984, Reagan explained in detail the effect of inflation on the poor: 
The needy were hit hardest of all. A family on a fixed income of $8,000 in 1979 was 
about $600 above the poverty line, but in 1980 it was almost $400 below it, as double-
digit inflation eroded purchasing power and pushed the poverty line up. Inflation 
reduced the real value of government benefits and especially hurt the poor who were 
forced to spend a larger share of their income on necessities. In the last administration, 
per person Aid to Families with Dependent Children fell 10 percent. The value of the 
maximum allotment of food stamps fell by almost 6 percent. Now, these policies didn't 
just create unfair hardship, they were the very essence of unfairness. Despite the great 
torrents of rhetoric about compassion, the only people who benefited from those high 
inflation and interest rate policies were people wealthy enough to invest in expensive 
inflation hedges. Working Americans and the needy were left out in the cold.131
In other speeches, the anti-inflation nature of his policies were framed as the “greatest program for the 
poor,” his “greatest success,” and the “greatest thing we have done for the poor.”132  
 The second argument Reagan offered to explain how his policies actually helped the poor 
involved his typical dissociation between the short term and long term. Essentially, Reagan would accept 
that there was perhaps some short-term suffering occurring due to the cuts, but such suffering was 
necessary to fix the economy, and in the long run his policies would benefit all. This argument worked 
hand in hand with Reagan’s expressions of sympathy, as Reagan sympathized with those suffering, while 
also explaining that his policies needed time. Indeed, all he could essentially offer was sympathy. The flip 
side of the argument attacked the short term remedies many called for—such as additional unemployment 
 151
benefits or major jobs programs—as they were seen as short term policies that created harm in the long 
run.   
 In summary, from 1980 to 1986, Reagan was forced due to criticism to defend both himself and 
his policies. In doing so, he offered a wide variety of apologic responses that attempted to reframe popular 
opinion. He spent considerable time in addressing these negative perceptions, and his responses were 
generally consistent with his overall philosophy. Reagan relied most often on the rhetorical tactic of 
dissociation, as he expanded his earlier divisions between the truly needy and not so truly needy, adding 
dissociations between true cuts and cuts to increases, between cuts to actual programs and cuts to waste 
and fraud, and between the short term and long term effects of his policies.  
 
Reagan’s Policy Rhetoric, 1986 to 1988 
 
With the 1986 State of the Union address, Reagan clearly shifted strategy in terms of welfare. By 
this point, the economy had recovered, and the cuts to the various programs had faded somewhat from the 
public agenda. During that speech, after attacking the “welfare culture” and the deterioration of the 
American family, Reagan charged the White House Domestic Council to present him with a full 
evaluation of welfare programs and “a strategy for immediate action to meet the financial, educational, 
social, and safety concerns of poor families. I'm talking about real and lasting emancipation, because the 
success of welfare should be judged by how many of its recipients become independent of welfare.”133 
Reagan iteration of the goal of welfare as assisting the poor to become independent of welfare represented 
a major change in focus. The primary image of poverty within Reagan’s rhetoric switched from the 
unneedy receiving benefits that hurt the economy back to once again one of a welfare recipient trapped in 
a bad system. As shown earlier, with this switch Reagan began to focus much more on welfare’s flaws. 
This new definition of the problem required a corresponding shift in policy solutions. For Reagan, the new 
policy direction focused on three recurrent themes: an overall focus on the reduction of “dependency” as 
the primary goal of welfare reform, and a reliance on “work” on the one hand, and state and local 
ingenuity and flexibility on the other, as the vehicles through which dependency would be reduced.   
 Reducing dependency clearly became the focus of Reagan’s welfare rhetoric from 1986 to 1988. 
The manner in which Reagan called for a “reshaping” and “a major new national strategy” concerning the 
purpose of welfare was reminiscent of Johnson, Nixon, and Carter.134 Rather than provide support to the 
truly needy, welfare was to be, as Reagan explained during his 1988 State of the Union, a “the first rung 
on America's ladder of opportunity, a boost up from dependency, not a graveyard but a birthplace of 
hope.”135 Reagan often explained that the measure of success for welfare should be the number of people 
that are able to leave welfare every year.136 Welfare would be “aimed” at “salvaging people and making it 
unnecessary for them to be on welfare” and “opening paths of opportunity.”137 He expressed the goal as 
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being “a system that gives poor Americans the opportunity and aid to escape the tender trap of welfare and 
become more productive and self-reliant contributors to American society.”138 This concern over 
dependency had a direct effect on Reagan’s policy proposals. During a 1987 radio address focused on 
welfare reform, Reagan explained that new proposal was based on his administration’s report entitled “Up 
from Dependency,” and its “central point” was “to test new ideas for reducing welfare dependency.”139  
Reagan’s proposal was given the name the "Low-Income Opportunity Improvement Act of 
1987.” It never gained much momentum in Congress, but Reagan would actively encourage other 
proposals, especially proposals coming from the state level. In a speech to the National Governor’s 
Association in 1988, for example, he promised that he would “approve any State proposal that had a 
chance of reducing dependency as long as it ensured that needs continued to be met, it created no net 
increase in Federal costs, and it could be soundly evaluated.”140 When Reagan signed the Family Support 
Act on October 1, 1988, he framed the legislation as “real welfare reform—reform that will lead to lasting 
emancipation from welfare dependency.”141 In sum, dependency was clearly identified as the key problem, 
and the purpose of welfare was redefined as an instrument to reduce dependency. Absent from Reagan’s 
rhetoric were the key images of his first seven years, including the truly needy, the welfare queens, and the 
devious bureaucrats. 
 The two key policy instruments Reagan focused upon to fulfill the new goal of dependency 
reduction were “work” and state or local initiative. Similar to Nixon, Reagan relied on the dichotomy of 
welfare and work during his final three years, while at the same time backing proposals that offered an 
obvious mix of both. The term “workfare” reappeared in presidential rhetoric, albeit not to the extent used 
by Nixon.142 Reagan did, however, expand the expectation of work beyond that of Nixon, as he attacked 
the “counterproductive exemption” that allowed mothers with children under 6 years old to bypass work 
requirements. Framing work requirements as “help,” he based his criticism on the need to “get early help 
to these women and their children before they become chronically dependent on welfare.”143
Once again relying on the rhetorical tactic of dissociation, he often divided “true” or “genuine” 
welfare reform from false welfare reform.” True reform was tied to work requirements and dependency 
reduction. Reagan threatened to veto welfare reform proposals that were not “true”: “Any bill not built 
around work is not true welfare reform. If Congress presents me with a bill that replaces work with 
welfare expansion and that places the dignity of self-sufficiency through work out of the reach of 
Americans on welfare, I will use my veto pen.”144 When the Family Support Act was passed, including 
some increases in the work requirements, Reagan announced that it was “genuine welfare reform” that was 
“geared to making people independent of welfare; and that means, among other things, that those who 
receive welfare must be required to work.” The bill only required work of one family member if both 
received welfare through AFDC-UP, but Reagan nonetheless boasted that he had “prevailed.”145 Later, 
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during a GOP fundraising dinner in 1988, Reagan continued to exalt the virtues of work, proclaiming: 
“Work means hope and prosperity will ultimately vanquish poverty!”146
 Reagan’s second policy instrument designed to lead to the reduction of dependency involved a 
greater reliance on the states and local communities for ideas concerning anti-poverty programs. In a 
November 1986 message to Congress, Reagan explained this change:
Our proposal will ask that Federal welfare requirements be waived to allow States to 
establish a series of demonstrations in welfare policy. We are not proposing to cut 
Federal welfare benefits for the truly needy. The idea is to begin a process that will tap 
the hundreds of good self-help and anti-poverty ideas currently blossoming around the 
country. For too many years our Federal welfare policies have assumed that all of the 
answers could come from experts in Washington, D.C. Those policies have had 20 years 
to work and have failed. Our demonstration strategy seeks to find solutions to poverty 
and welfare dependency in the practical genius of the States, communities, and 
individuals who must cope with those problems every day.147
In his 1987 State of the Union address, Reagan labeled his “new national welfare strategy” as a program of 
“State-sponsored, community-based demonstration projects,” rather reminiscent of both Roosevelt’s New 
Deal and Johnson’s Great Society programs.148 To a group of community members in 1987, he 
emphasized the practical nature of relying on existing community groups, and the need to allow those 
groups more resources and states more flexibility: 
And I'm told it's the first time ever that government has gone, as we have, not to the 
people who can give you a theory about getting people off of welfare, but to the people 
who've done it themselves, in practice, or helped others do it. Success, not failure; 
practice, and not theory. And that's what has shaped our welfare reform proposal, and 
that's what we've come to hear about today.. . . . That, in effect, is what our welfare 
reform proposal is all about: creating a welfare system that invests in your solutions, and 
in the solutions of thousands of others like you around America. Our welfare study . . . . 
“Up From Dependency,” which will be released today, names nearly 400 examples of 
self-help groups across the land. Our reform is intended to start a process that taps this 
spirit and mobilizes this initiative. And here's what we propose to do. We will ask 
Congress to approve legislation to allow the States to experiment with the kind of 
antipoverty ideas that you've told us about here today. Right now Federal laws and 
regulations limit what the States can do. I was a Governor of a State, and I know how 
frustrating it could be. And that's why so many of your good ideas can't be tried within 
the bounds of our current welfare system.149
 154
In speech after speech, Reagan would praise the ingenuity of states and local communities within the 
context of welfare reform, as well as criticize the arrogance of the federal government. Reagan told the 
National Governor’s Association that he wanted to “establish a process that allows States and communities 
to implement their own antipoverty ideas based on their own unique experiences.”150 During a radio 
address in July, 1987, he discussed the need to “let loose the creative energies of our States and 
localities.”151 Announcing his legislation in February of 1987, he emphasized that the bill recognized that a 
“single, national solution to the problem of poverty and welfare dependency cannot work for thousands of 
distinct communities,” and praised his bill for encouraging “diverse solutions for diverse needs and 
communities.”152 He called for legislation that would give the states “added flexibility and encouragement 
to undertake truly innovative and individualized reform experiments.”153 In his 1988 State of the Union 
address, foreshadowing a metaphor upon which his successor would rely, he praised the “thousand sparks 
of genius in 50 States and a thousand communities around the Nation,” and explained the need to “nurture 
them and see which ones can catch fire and become guiding lights.”154
When discussing this new reliance on states and local communities, Reagan often focused on key 
words such as ingenuity, innovation, spark, creativity, fresh, grass roots, and initiative. Alluding to the 
New Deal rhetoric of Franklin Roosevelt, Reagan praised the states, explaining that they “have always 
been laboratories for creative social change.”155 Reagan also redefined who should be considered experts 
concerning welfare, rejecting the role of experts in universities and think tanks for “real experts: people 
like a lady named Kimi Gray, a one-time welfare mother with five children.”156 When he introduced his 
own proposal in 1987, he explained that “[h]undreds of welfare recipients, former recipients, and self-help 
and welfare experts were consulted.”157  Later, he paraphrased Socrates, explaining “Knowing what you 
don't know is the beginning of wisdom” as he questioned the knowledge of the Federal Government and 
praised the knowledge of states and communities. He called for Washington to get a “dose of humility” 
and turn to them for help.158  
 In summary, from his 1986 State of the Union address until the end of his administration, 
Reagan’s rhetoric exhibited a distinct shift away from the themes that dominated his first six years, and 
toward themes that resembled the typical rhetoric of previous administrations. During his first six years, 
Reagan focused most intensely on the need to reduce the size of government in order to improve the 
overall economy, which translated in terms of welfare policy to a tightening in the eligibility criteria in 
order to reduce the rolls. Welfare was deemed only for the “truly needy,” essentially those unable and 
unexpected to work. In response to the significant criticism he received for the reduction in services to the 
working poor, Reagan primarily focused on defending and reframing his policies during his first six years, 
utilizing a variety of rhetorical tactics to do so. Starting with the 1986 State of the Union, however, 
Reagan began to focus specifically on the need for welfare reform, particularly the need to redefine 
welfare away from the sustenance model he championed during his first six years to a rehabilitation model 
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designed to reduce dependency and make the poor self-sufficient. Reagan called for work requirements 
and flexibility at the state and local level in his attempt to fulfill the newly defined goal, and eventually 
would sign the Family Support Act in 1988. That legislation was very much in the spirit of reform 
proposed by Nixon and Carter in terms of shifting welfare from income maintenance toward work and 
training. Considering the bill’s $3.34 billion price tag and its extension of welfare to a broader base of 
recipients, it is clear the bill was based on ideas Reagan at least rhetorically rejected during his first five 
years.  
 
Ronald Reagan and the Dilemmas of Poverty 
 
 Reagan presents a unique case in terms of how his rhetoric can be examined through the lens of 
the four paradoxes of poverty. Reagan’s political philosophy rhetorically neutralized three of the four 
dilemmas, which may explain, in part, why Reagan was able to provide the American people with such an 
intoxicating and optimistic vision of America. Simply put, Reagan’s particular framing did not require or 
expect Americans to make difficult decisions.  
 
Equality versus Freedom 
 
The freedom-equality dilemma first became particularly relevant during the Great Depression. It 
was placed at the forefront of American political philosophy with Roosevelt’s Commonwealth Club 
address, when he framed the overwhelming poverty from that time as a violation of freedom and 
individualism, and subsequently reframed the role of government as a vehicle through which to insure 
individual freedom. Until that point, freedom was primarily associated with limited government. Although 
Reagan self-identified as a “New Deal Democrat,” his philosophy actually revealed a return to the pre-
New Deal laissez-faire conceptualization of the role of government which framed government as an 
enemy of individual freedom.  
By framing government as the problem, Reagan was able to continue to express the same 
traditional American ideals of full employment and equal opportunity without having to support 
significant action in pursuit of that goal. To Reagan, government was the only primary barrier to the 
realization of the American Dream. A key point of evidence in support of these beliefs for Reagan was the 
dependency caused by welfare. To Reagan, that dependency represented the primary relevant violation of 
the notion of freedom, not poverty, inequality, or unemployment. Reagan even explicitly associated 
welfare with slavery, the ultimate denial of freedom.  
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In summary, due to his support of the laissez-faire philosophy, Reagan rhetorically neutralized 
the equality-freedom dilemma. Freedom and equality would both be served adequately as long as 
government was limited and free enterprise was allowed to prosper on its own.  
 
Deserving versus Undeserving 
 
 Reagan likely provided one of the most well known images of the “undeserving poor” when he 
attacked the “welfare queens” that took advantage of the complex bureaucracy and allegedly lived more 
than comfortable lives through the use of multiple identities. That being said, overall Reagan typically did 
not rely on a strongly undeserving image of poverty. The welfare queen was actually an infrequent 
example, appearing only twice in two minor addresses. Overall, Reagan provided a rather positive image 
of the poor. Of Reagan’s primary characters, the most negative was actually the bureaucrat. He provided 
sympathetic images of the unemployed, the truly needy, and even the welfare dependent, and a rather 
neutral image of the rational not needy. For the most part, Reagan attacked government and framed the 
poor as either victims of that government, or as individuals taking advantage of programs inherently prone 
to being taken advantage of. 
Key to understanding Reagan’s depiction of the poor was his reliance on a needy-not needy 
distinction rather than the typical deserving-undeserving split. Rather than argue that some of the poor 
were undeserving of help, Reagan argued that many of the recipients simply did not need help. The critical 
distinction between the two may explain, in part, Reagan’s generally sympathetic depiction of the poor. In 
order to argue that the poor are undeserving of help, a negative image would be necessary in order to 
overcome the natural impulses of sympathy and pity. As Aristotle argued, the emotion of pity requires the 
perceptions of some undeserved harm to occur to the subject. The deserving-undeserving image, therefore, 
has traditionally relied upon negative images of the poor to justify the lack of assistance, and, in the end, to 
justify their suffering. It was, therefore, a rather pessimistic model. It assumed poverty would always exist 
due to flaws in human nature. 
The truly needy-not needy distinction, however, does not require this negative image of the poor. 
Indeed, for Reagan’s purposes, the truly needy-not needy distinction called for a generally positive image. 
Reagan’s primary rhetorical problem during his first six years was avoiding the appearance of harming the 
poor while instilling his program cuts. Providing a negative image of the poor would likely have made this 
problem even more difficult. If the poor were unneedy, then the cuts, as Reagan argued, did not actually 
harm anyone (other than the bureaucrats with ulterior motives).  Perhaps even more importantly, by 
arguing that the poor were unneedy, rather than undeserving, Reagan could maintain the much more 
optimistic image that was key to his overall persona. Reagan was, in a way, redefining the traditional 
pessimistic conservative position on poverty. Poverty was not inherent due to human nature, but rather 
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was merely the product of overgrown government. Once again, if free enterprise was allowed to reign free, 
poverty could be diminished, even abolished. The problem was not in people, it was in government. In 
summary, Reagan essentially avoided the deserving-undeserving dilemma just as he avoided the freedom-
equality dilemma. His particular rhetorical framing made the distinction irrelevant. Whether or not the 
poor were deserving or undeserving of help was immaterial precisely because as long as government did 
not overstep its bounds, they simply should not need help within Reagan’s worldview.  
 
Help versus Hinder 
 
 Reagan’s laissez-faire perspective on government clearly translated into a position that assumed 
the tendency of government programs to cause harm greatly outweighed their capability to help. So while 
Reagan rendered the first two dilemmas somewhat moot, with this dilemma he focused only on one side 
and dismissed the other. Johnson, Nixon, and Carter understood that government programs would 
inherently include inefficiencies, but they also tended to recognize their worth. Reagan often detailed the 
harm of government programs, but rarely its ability to help. During his first six years, Reagan focused his 
attack on government in general, especially in terms of its impact on the economy. During his last three 
years, Reagan began to focus more specifically on the negative impacts of welfare, including its link to 
dependency and family breakup. Reagan did accept the notion that the government had a role in helping 
the truly needy, but to him the truly needy only included the unemployables, so the programs were not 
called upon to rehabilitate the poor, only provide sustenance. Reagan’s disregard for possible benefits 
stemming from government programs was probably best exemplified by his attack on the War on Poverty. 
While statistics clearly show that Johnson’s Great Society programs had some significant positive effects 
on poverty in general and poverty amongst the elderly in particular, Reagan’s rhetoric implied a simple 
negative linear relationship, a statistical inaccuracy.  
During his final three years, Reagan’s welfare rhetoric seemed to allow for some positive effects 
from government programs considering his support for Moynihan’s welfare reform proposals. No longer 
was welfare merely for the unemployables and the scaling back of government the only solution. That 
being said, Reagan was generally able to maintain a perception of consistency due to the particular 
framing of his support. By again framing dependency, not poverty or unemployment, as the problem, 
Reagan continued to place blame on government. Then, by relying on state and local solutions to 
dependency, while continuing to ridicule the federal government, Reagan maintained his anti-government 
stance. Essentially, Reagan was arguing for state and local governments to work to undo a barrier caused 
by the federal government, in order to allow free enterprise to once again work its magic. In the end, 
government was not called upon to have a positive effect, but rather to minimize its negative effect.  
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Politics versus Policy 
 
 The impact of the politics versus policy dilemma on Reagan can be considered from two rather 
distinct perspectives. On one hand, there is some evidence that Reagan was able to overcome the 
limitations of the politics versus policy dilemma and pursue his preferred policy agenda rather vigorously 
at first. In 1980, the country was likely particularly susceptible to an optimistic message that promised 
both lower taxes and an improved economy. After Vietnam, Watergate, and the perceived failures of the 
Carter administration in terms of the energy crisis and the Iranian hostage situation, Reagan’s anti-
government message clearly resonated with many Americans. As Stephen Skowronek argued, Reagan was 
in the strong position of serving as a reconstructive force following the perceived failure of the previous 
“liberal regime.”159 While that abstract message perhaps garnered support, its enactment—which would 
require cutting established programs—inherently gave rise to considerable political difficulties. 
Nonetheless, Reagan was able to pass the 1981 OBRA, helped at least in part by Reagan’s ability to take 
advantage of his election mandate and striking while he still had momentum.  
 Viewed from a different perspective, however, it seems clear that the tensions inherent to the 
politics-policy dilemma continued to have an impact. After Reagan’s initial success with the 1981 OBRA, 
his legislative victories were less impressive. Rhetorically, Reagan was clearly put on the defensive, 
especially regarding the impact of his cuts on the nation’s disadvantaged. As this analysis revealed, 
Reagan was forced to spend considerable energy deflecting the substantial and incessant attacks on both 
his policies and his character. In the end, the cuts Reagan was able to push through Congress were 
typically not as drastic as Reagan had initially proposed, and in some cases Congress restored funds to 
programs that were originally cut in 1981. In sum, advocating policies that many viewed as harming the 
poor still seemed to be a tough political sell.  
 In the end, the most significant impact of the Reagan years regarding the politics-policy dilemma 
concerns the legacy he left rather than how he addressed the tension. Two issues in particular are relevant. 
The first was Reagan’s support for the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Anti-Deficit bill in 1981. The new law 
had the effect of further complicating the ability of future administrations to pass major reform bills with 
significant price tags. Nixon’s FAP, for example, was a bill with a large initial cost which assumed 
eventual long term benefits. The anti-deficit legislation made such proposals practically unworkable. 
Future reform would either have to be attached to a tax raise or to significant reductions in other programs. 
The additional fact that the bill exempted many of the current welfare programs only served to increase 
this effect, considering new programs would not necessarily be provided the same exemptions. Simply 
put, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill significantly increased the inherent difficulties of negotiating the 
politics-policy dilemma. 
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 The second issue involves the manner in which Reagan’s cuts were enacted. Many of the cuts 
involved the tightening of eligibility, which essentially meant the reduction of benefits to those individuals 
who were not as poor. For example, Reagan’s cuts to the school lunch programs primarily involved cutting 
benefits to families that were at or near middle class level. These were examples of Reagan’s rational not 
needy, people not significantly in need who were nonetheless enjoying the benefits of established 
government programs originally developed to help the poor. The impact of these cuts, however, ranged 
beyond simply focusing funds on the “truly needy.” For some programs, the exclusion of the less-poor 
families spelled the demise of the programs in some areas, because the demand was no longer strong 
enough to maintain the programs. When middle class children were removed from school lunch programs, 
for example, some school districts had to end the program. Viewed more broadly, the exclusion of the less 
poor from these programs harmed their political support. The process is similar to how the passage of SSI 
worked to remove significant numbers of poor perceived to be particularly deserving from the ranks of the 
“welfare poor,” hence making those remaining appear less deserving as a group, thus less politically 
powerful.  After Reagan was able to weather the initial unpopular move of cutting the less poor from these 
programs, future cuts were made generally less painful politically, as those left in the programs would 
have even less political influence.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 Poverty scholars often point to Ronald Reagan as a villain in terms of his actions toward the 
nation’s poor. For many on the political left, Reagan epitomized the typical conservative intent on helping 
the rich as the expense of the poor. The point of this chapter, however, was not to attack or defend Reagan, 
but rather to develop a more nuanced understanding of his perspective concerning welfare and poverty 
issues as expressed in his rhetoric, in order ultimately to develop a more nuanced understanding of those 
issues in general. In that spirit, two key points concerning the Reagan years seem to be worth highlighting 
before closing. 
 Perhaps the most interesting insight from this analysis was the manner in which Reagan’s 
rhetorical framing of the issues of welfare and poverty worked to nullify the key dilemmas of poverty that 
have served as the basis of this analysis. By relying on the principles of laissez-faire government, Reagan 
essentially avoided the tensions created by the freedom-equality, deserving-undeserving, and help-hinder 
dilemmas. The first two were rendered moot, whereas only one side seemed relevant with the third. In 
addition, the absence of the tensions caused by these three likely decreased the tension produced by the 
fourth, the policy-politics dilemma.   
Due at least in part to his avoidance of the poverty dilemmas, Reagan was able to tell a simple, 
seemingly consistent story that clearly resonated with many Americans. Of particular importance was how 
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Reagan’s story was infused with optimism concerning both the future and human nature in general. Gone 
was the Social Darwinism evident in traditional conservatism which assumed that enduring flaws in 
human nature inherently refute any possibility of poverty’s ultimate eradication. With it went the 
pessimism that had in some ways held down conservatism. The United States had always been a society 
infused with optimism. After the 1960s and 1970s challenged that optimism, Reagan came along with a 
redefined conservatism that recaptured the simple optimism of laissez-faire philosophy. In doing so, 
Reagan continued to express the idealistic goals of equal opportunity and full employment. Indeed, 
Reagan framed his economic program in terms of reinvigorating the “American Dream.”  
The laissez-faire arguments were particularly intoxicating to the nonpoor when applied to poverty 
and welfare. Inspired in part by the work of Charles Murray on welfare, Reagan was offering an obvious 
choice. On one side, continue to increase government programs and continue to increase taxes, inflation, 
and hurt both the poor and the nonpoor. On the other side, cut government programs and thereby decrease 
taxes, improve the economy, and help the poor and the nonpoor. Reducing welfare in particular would 
have the effect of not only contributing to an improving economy, but would also release welfare’s victims 
from the dependency trap and mend America’s families.  With such simple choices, compassionate 
conservatism clearly had a ready-made audience. Reagan could easily point to over twenty years of 
pessimistic anti-welfare rhetoric, from Democrats as well as Republicans, to support his arguments. 
Several recent failures of that government were also fresh on the minds of the American people. 
Considering the inherent psychological need for the nonpoor to deflect the feeling of guilt concerning the 
poor, Reagan’s story was clearly welcomed by many. 
 Although Reagan’s story was certainly persuasive to particular audiences, it was equally 
distasteful to others. Johnson, Nixon, and Carter had all expressed concern over welfare’s flaws, but each 
also tended to understand the tensions involved and the need to find balance. For the most part, Reagan’s 
rhetoric did not offer any such balance. As a result, Reagan’s simple story seemed less than genuine to 
those audiences familiar with the complexities of poverty. As evident when his rhetoric is compared to the 
other presidents in this study, Reagan’s story did indeed provide a very limited frame regarding the 
problems of poverty. Whether Reagan’s story was actually genuine or simply politically manufactured is 
not the issue here, but it does seem possible that the widely disparate reactions to Reagan contributed to 
the growing polarization in American politics in general and the politics concerning welfare and poverty 
specifically. Such polarization unfortunately reduces the potential for fruitful public discussion of these 
issues. In the end, Reagan’s image will likely remain split along ideological lines. For many, Reagan is a 
political icon who captured the simple essential truth about the connections between government, welfare, 
and poverty. For others, Reagan is a skilled but dangerous demagogue who took advantage of the 
particular rhetorical situation evident in the 1980s and pushed through policies that helped the powerful at 
the expense of the weak.  
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 Finally, the importance of Reagan’s shift during the final three years is unclear. On one hand, it 
represented a move away from a strict laissez-faire perspective in its support for government programs and 
even an expansion of the number of people eligible for and worthy of government benefits. By moving 
from the sustenance to the rehabilitation model of welfare, Reagan was falling in line with his 
predecessors. On the other hand, however, Reagan continued to criticize the federal government even 
while allowing for a more active role for state and local governments. His anti-dependency focus was also 
primarily concerned with undoing damage done by government programs in the first place. Nonetheless, 
Reagan’s shift away from his simple “government is the problem” perspective and to one that at least 
called for examining different possible ways to address issues of welfare and poverty must be considered 
significant, especially when considered alongside his continued support for the progressive ideal of 
realizing equal opportunity.  
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CHAPTER VI 
BILL CLINTON AND THE END OF WELFARE AS WE KNEW IT 
 
On August 22, 1996, with the presidential election looming, President Bill Clinton signed the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 at a ceremony in the Rose 
Garden.1  The bill fulfilled Clinton’s 1991 campaign promise to “end welfare as we know it” by 
eliminating a sixty-one year federal entitlement born in Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, replacing it with 
time limits, work requirements, and block grants in control of the states.2 The bill, considered the “biggest 
shift in social policy since the Depression” and “a watershed defeat for liberalism” was designed to help 
balance the budget by saving $55 billion in federal expenditures, but was also estimated at the time to 
result in 1.1 million more children under the poverty line.3 The response from Clinton’s traditional liberal 
allies was intense. The bill was labeled a “cruel monstrosity,” “a moment of shame,” “an unconscionable 
retreat,” and “legislative child abuse.”4 Representative John Lewis called the bill “downright lowdown. 
What good does it profit for a great nation to conquer the world, only to lose its soul?” Senator Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan, a respected social policy scholar widely considered the most intellectual member of the 
Senate, was perhaps the most incensed, arguing that the “premise of this legislation is that the behavior of 
certain adults can be changed by making the lives of their children as wretched as possible.”5 Several high 
ranking officials quit the Clinton administration, included noted poverty scholars Mary Jo Bane and David 
Ellwood. 
Reports of the inner White House discussions reveal an intense rift concerning the bill. Most of 
Clinton’s policy advisors including Secretary of Labor Robert Reich and Secretary of Health and Human 
Services Donna Shalala, were adamantly against signing the bill.6 Pushing for Clinton to sign, on the other 
hand, were his political advisors, led by “chief strategist” Dick Morris and New Democrat domestic 
advisor Bruce Reed, along with vice-president Al Gore. Morris had flatly advised the president that a third 
welfare veto would transform his “fifteen point win into a three point loss” and cost him the election. He 
recalled telling the president, “What good will you do if you lose? If you veto the bill and lose, what will 
the Republicans do then to the very people you want to help?’”7 When the decision was finally made and 
Clinton announced his intention to sign, Morris reportedly exulted to a friend, “That’s it. The election is 
over.”8 Clinton was subsequently re-elected by a comfortable margin in the 1996 election. 
Overall, Clinton’s rhetoric and actions concerning welfare reform reveal a fascinating political 
story. Welfare reform was a key policy area for Clinton to demonstrate his “New Democratic” philosophy. 
During the 1992 campaign and on through the announcement of his welfare proposal in 1994, Clinton 
sought to end welfare by replacing it with work through the use of sticks (work requirements, time limits, 
and conditions concerning teenage pregnancies and out of wedlock births) and carrots (with the expansion 
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of several costly programs tied to job training, public employment, child care, health care, and more). 
During this time, Clinton also criticized welfare strongly, placing much blame on the outdated system, 
while he attempted to rehabilitate parts of the negative stereotype of the welfare recipient and glorify the 
efforts of the working poor. Once the Republicans took over Congress after the 1994 elections and began 
developing their own welfare proposals with a significantly altered ratio of sticks to carrots, Clinton 
slowly retreated from his earlier positions, and eventually agreed to sign a bill that included many of the 
punitive measures from Clinton’s original proposal, but lacked much of the additional spending to help 
make work a more attractive and viable option for welfare recipients. In his speech celebrating the signing 
of the legislation, Clinton justified his signature by explaining how the bill would transform the nature of 
anti-poverty. While Clinton’s retreat was significant and is widely considered a policy defeat for the 
political left, the progressive blueprint he laid out during the signing ceremony must not be dismissed, as it 
reveals a potential path for to push an agenda to provide significant assistance to the nation’s poor within 
the new rhetorical climate created by the 1996 welfare bill. 
In this chapter, I examine Clinton’s rhetoric concerning poverty and welfare reform from the 
1992 presidential election up until the signing of the influential welfare bill in August of 1996. The chapter 
begins with a historical review of Clinton’s first four years. I then turn to Clinton’s rhetoric from 1992-
1996. Following the pattern from the earlier chapters, I examine how he expressed his political philosophy 
as it related to the issue of poverty, how he depicted relevant characters, how he addressed the current 
welfare system, and how he framed and responded to proposals for reform. Then, due to its importance, I 
focus specifically on the address Clinton gave when signing the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1996. I conclude by examining Clinton’s rhetoric through the lens of the four poverty 
dilemmas. 
 
Clinton’s Record 
 
 As the governor of Arkansas, Clinton was a key player within the National Governors’ 
Association push for the 1998 welfare bill, the Family Support Act, that Reagan signed shortly before 
leaving office. That bill hoped to further the transition of welfare from its traditional sustenance frame to 
one with more of a focus on work. The bill required states to operate Job Opportunity and Basic Skills 
programs (JOBS), and required at least one parent of two-parent welfare families to work or be involved in 
training programs. While the bill did provide some funding for such programs, the economic recession 
significantly undermined its impact as welfare rolls soon began to skyrocket. From 1989 to 1992, the 
number of families on AFDC rose 25 percent to 4.76 million, representing 13.6 million people. At the 
beginning of the 1992 campaign, one in seven children in the United States was on welfare.9  
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In this context, Bill Clinton initiated what would become a remarkable welfare odyssey during a 
1991 campaign speech at Georgetown University, where he explained that under his philosophy of the 
“New Covenant,” he would tell people on welfare that while they would be given “training and education 
and health care for yourself and your children,” he would instill the principle that “if you can work you 
must go to work because we can no longer afford to have you stay on welfare forever.”10 Such a tradeoff 
became the cornerstone of his promise to “end welfare as we know it” during the 1992 campaign. The 
claim was repeated often throughout the campaign, including during the presidential debates and in his 
nomination acceptance address, and was considered by Jeffrey Katz of Congressional Quarterly  a “key 
plank in his successful effort to gain support from middle class and suburban voters.”11  
Once elected, however, Clinton sought to avoid the issue at first, in part due to the decision 
within the administration to focus first upon health care reform. Providing universal health care would 
have removed one of the key barriers to moving people from welfare to work, due to the fact that the 
welfare poor received Medicaid but the working poor did not. As a result, welfare reform would have been 
much easier to accomplish if universal health care existed. Since Clinton chose to focus on health care 
first, welfare reform was hardly an issue in 1993. The Republicans did offer their own plan on November 
10 which was co-sponsored by 160 of the 175 House Republicans, but it did not progress far. The key 
relevant legislation of 1993 was a significant increase in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which was 
part of Clinton’s Budget Reconciliation Act that was passed when Vice President Gore cast the tiebreaking 
vote in the Senate. The increase was an important move for Clinton’s welfare to work philosophy, as it 
increased the value of low-wage work. 
After health care floundered, not even coming to a vote in either chamber of Congress, Clinton 
finally introduced his own welfare plan in an address in July of 1994. The Clinton plan had a price tag of 
an additional $9.3 billion over its first five years. That plan was also never voted on by Congress, as the 
Republicans had turned their focus to the 1994 elections where they sought to co-opt Clinton’s call for 
welfare reform, pledging “truly to ‘end welfare as we know it’” in the Contract with America.12 After the 
Republican takeover of Congress in those elections ended 40 years of Democratic control, Congress, 
according to Congressional Quarterly, was “populated by a new cadre of lawmakers more intensely anti-
government than any other in contemporary times.”13 Even before the new Congress convened, however, 
two welfare reform bills were sent to Clinton. The first was within a deficit-reducing budget reconciliation 
bill in late 1994, and then one on its own early in 1995. Relying heavily on block grants over entitlements, 
requiring work, and punishing teen pregnancy and out of wedlock births, the first bill was designed to save 
$81.5 billion over seven years, while the stand alone bill was projected to save $64.1 billion over seven 
years.  Clinton vetoed both, but was criticized by his party for not speaking out more forcefully against 
what were considered “draconian” bills.14  
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By 1996, the Republican euphoria from the 1994 elections had subsided somewhat, in part due to 
the budget fiasco that ultimately led to the shutdown of the government which was predominately blamed 
on the Republicans, rather than the Clinton White House. Leading up to the 1996 presidential election, the 
GOP was reportedly split between only sending Clinton welfare bills he would surely veto, in order to 
attack him for not fulfilling his campaign promise, or to call his bluff and send him a borderline bill that 
was still tough on welfare recipients but would fit Clinton’s criteria enough to earn his signature. For most 
of the year, the bills working through Congress included the “poison pill” of Medicaid cuts that Clinton 
clearly had indicated would warrant vetoes. In early June, however, with the blessing of Bob Dole, 
Congress split the Medicaid and welfare bills. The welfare bill passed the House on July 18th and then the 
Senate on July 23rd. On July 31, Clinton announced he would sign the bill. Later that day, the House 
adopted the conference agreement 328-101, and the Senate did so the following day 78-21. Republicans in 
both branches were unanimous in their support. In between Clinton’s commitment to sign the bill and the 
actual signing ceremony, Clinton signed the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, which included a 
two-stage increase in the minimum wage. That increase, along with the expansion of EITC in 1994, 
significantly improved the income of the working poor. Two days after that, on August 22, Clinton signed 
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) at a ceremony 
in the Rose Garden. 
The bill was considered by many as the most significant social policy legislation since the New 
Deal. Most importantly, it removed the federal entitlement to benefits for the nation’s poor—support was 
no longer guaranteed, even to poor children—and added work requirements and restrictions to long-term 
aid. AFDC was replaced by TANF, Temporary Aid for Needy Families, which would be administered 
through block grants to the states. States would now have increased flexibility on how they could use the 
money, including wide discretion in determining eligibility. Funding for the block grants would be set for 
each state at the level of AFDC funding for fiscal 1995, 1994, or the average of 1992-1994, whichever was 
the highest. Adults receiving aid would be required to work within two years, and only parents with 
children under the age of 1 were exempt. A five-year lifetime cap of receipt was also included. By 2002, 
states were expected to have fifty percent of their welfare caseload working or risk having their allotment 
reduced up to 21 percent. The bill also toughened eligibility to Supplemental Security Income, increased 
measures to insure the collection of more child support, scaled back the food stamp program, added some 
restrictions to EITC, and cut programs for immigrants. All in all, the program was estimated to save $54.1 
billion over six years. Some controversial measures in the original Republican bills were removed as 
requirements, but remained as options states could implement, such as denying aid to new children born to 
welfare recipients and denying aid to unmarried parents under 18.15
One last relevant point is necessary. While the various welfare reform bills were making their 
way through Congress, Clinton was also busy actively encouraging and freely authorizing individual states 
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to submit waivers that would allow them temporary flexibility to develop their own programs outside of 
the current federal rules. By the time Clinton signed the welfare bill, in fact, forty-one states were actually 
working in part under different rules due to these waivers. Many of these state experiments used similar 
measures that were included in the 1996 bill, including work requirements, tougher child support 
measures, and the withholding of support for unmarried parents who move out of their parent’s home and 
drop out of school. Thus while the change the PRWORA brought about was certainly dramatic in terms of 
federal law, the actual change in services was somewhat less dramatic. 
 
Clinton’s Philosophy: The New Covenant 
 
In May of 1985, the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) was formed by a group of southern 
and western Democratic Party officials who were concerned with the leadership of the Democratic 
National Committee and the growing popular disillusionment of “New Left” Democratic politics.16 To 
many in the DLC, the easy Republican victory in the 1988 presidential election demonstrated that 
“Democratic liberalism was bankrupt nationally,”17 and that a philosophical redefinition of the party and 
its view of government was necessary. In 1991, a young, energetic governor from the state of Arkansas 
delivered the keynote address during the DLC convention in Cleveland, Ohio, as part of his bid for the 
democratic presidential nomination. During that speech, Clinton explained the “new choice Democrats can 
ride to victory on,” based on “opportunity, responsibility, choice, a government that works, a belief in 
community.” Clinton situated the new perspective apart from the two traditional choices: “Now our new 
choice plainly rejects the old categories and the false alternatives they impose. Is what I just said to you 
liberal or conservative? The truth is, it is both, and it is different. It rejects the Republicans' attacks and the 
Democrats' previous unwillingness to consider new alternatives.”18  
At the center of Clinton’s New Covenant philosophy was the oft-repeated “contract” promising 
opportunity in return for responsibility. The reciprocal relationship between these two values, which was 
also referred to variously as the “social contract,” a “social compact,” and as “America’s basic bargain,” 
was critical to the New Democrats’ attempts to reframe the Democratic party while still remaining true to 
some of its core beliefs. The stress on responsibility was a key vehicle designed to attack the perception 
that had developed accusing the Democrats of encouraging an “entitlement culture” that was not 
sufficiently concerned with a lack of individual responsibility. Pertinent to welfare politics, the Democrats 
were perceived by many as rewarding idleness over work, and being unconcerned with moral issues such 
as teenage pregnancies and out-of-wedlock births. As explained by Kenneth Baer, the New Democrats 
placed considerable emphasis on replacing the “politics of entitlement” with the “politics of reciprocal 
responsibility.”19 Thus, while the call to “demand” responsibility was designed to work against the 
Democrat’s growing negative stereotype, the corresponding promise of opportunity represented a more 
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traditional Democratic appeal. Through this connection, Clinton and the New Democrats attempted to 
present a revitalized form of “progressive” government that would serve as a “partner” to the American 
people.  
Clinton often linked his New Covenant topoi rhetorically to America’s Founding Fathers and to 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt. During his 1991 Georgetown address, for example, Clinton said, “More than 
200 years ago, our founding fathers outlined our first social compact between government and the people, 
not just between lords and kings. More than 100 years ago, Abraham Lincoln gave his life to maintain the 
union that compact created. More than 60 years ago Franklin Roosevelt renewed that promise with a New 
Deal that offered opportunity in return for hard work.” Later in the speech, he specifically invoked FDR’s 
words: 
Nearly 60 years ago, in a very famous speech to the Commonwealth Club, in the final 
months of his 1932 campaign, President Franklin Roosevelt outlined a new compact that 
gave hope to a nation mired in the Great Depression. The role of government, he said, 
was to promise every American the right to make a living. The people's role was to do 
their best to make the most of that opportunity. He said, and I quote, ‘Faith in America 
demands that we recognize the new terms of the old social contract.’ In the strength of 
great hope, we must all shoulder the common load. That's what our hope is today, a new 
covenant to shoulder the common load.20   
The choice of Roosevelt as a model was symbolic of the New Democrats’ rejection of the big government 
liberalism of the Lyndon Johnson era and the New Politics liberalism of McGovern, Mondale, or Jesse 
Jackson. In this sense, the “New” Democrats were in many ways a reincarnation of “old” Democrats of the 
Roosevelt era. 
The reciprocity theme was central to Clinton’s 1992 campaign. During his 1992 nomination 
acceptance address, for example, Clinton said: 
I call this approach a New Covenant, a solemn agreement between the people and their 
government, based not simply on what each of us can take, but what all of us must give 
to our nation. We offer our people a new choice based on old values. We offer 
opportunity. We demand responsibility. We will build an American community again. 
The choice we offer is not conservative or liberal; in many ways it's not even Republican 
or Democratic. It's different. It's new. And it will work.21
Important to this study, the new social contract worked to deflate attacks that the Democratic party favored 
“handouts” over work. In his first inaugural, for example, Clinton told the audience that “We must do what 
America does best: offer more opportunity to all and demand responsibility from all. It is time to break the 
bad habit of expecting something for nothing, from our government or from each other.”22 In his 1994 
State of the Union, Clinton applied the social contract rhetoric directly to welfare reform, saying, “to all 
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those who depend on welfare, we should offer ultimately a simple compact.  We'll provide the support, the 
job training, the child care you need for up to two years.  But after that, anyone who can work must.”23 As 
will be shown when Clinton’s rhetoric concerning his own proposals is examined below, the 
responsibility/opportunity trade off was included in practically every speech mentioning welfare reform. 
 Whereas the argument based on responsibility focused on attacking the entitlement mentality, and 
was often seen as a thinly veiled attack on unwed mothers and deadbeat parents, it was nonetheless 
balanced with the other side of the contract: opportunity. Clinton constantly returned to the need for 
government, business, and fellow citizens to provide opportunity to those that fulfilled their obligation of 
responsibility. The primary rhetorical vehicle for this call revolved around the concept of “investment,” a 
strategic term that was likely inspired by Robert Reich’s work in which he argued that in the new 
economy, a nation’s people were their most important commodity, and investment in providing them the 
necessary education and re-training was critical.24 Investment connotes short-term costs for greater long-
term benefits, and works against the idea of “handouts,” long-term dependency, or the simple 
redistribution of wealth. Clinton and Gore’s Putting People First, their 1992 campaign booklet, relied 
heavily on the rhetoric of public investment.  
 Within this reciprocal framework, Clinton provided his own particular version of the American 
Dream. Clinton explained often that he ran for president in order to “restore” the American Dream. When 
criticizing economic realities and the gap between the real and the ideal of the American Dream, Clinton 
did not attack the prevalence of poverty and inequality, as did Johnson, but rather the struggles of the 
middle class, which he argued had been “working harder and harder for stagnant wages.”25  This rhetorical 
choice was an interesting one. From one perspective, it represented a shift to the right, and opened Clinton 
up to criticism from his political left that accused him of abandoning the party’s traditional concern for the 
disadvantaged. The New Democrats, however, would argue that the party had to improve its appeal to the 
middle class, and, by doing so, would be more able in the long run to help its traditional constituencies. 
This shift would be consistent with Clinton’s strategy of drawing the focus away from the controversial 
images of the welfare or minority poor, and toward the more popular images of the working poor, to which 
he essentially added the struggling middle class. Indeed, Clinton’s message was often that more and more 
of the traditional American middle class was falling back into poverty, despite their hard work and 
“responsible” character.  
 Throughout his first four years, Clinton, perhaps more than any of the other presidents examined 
in this study, attempted to provide a concrete interpretation of the abstract promise of the “American 
Dream.” Often in conjunction with his calls for an expanded Earned Income Tax Credit or an increase in 
the minimum wage, Clinton often cited the principle that if a family with children has a full time worker, 
they should not be in poverty.26 This principle was essentially a promise that if individuals worked hard, 
the government had a responsibility to insure that work was rewarded. It was thus inherently endowed 
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with the responsibility/opportunity tradeoff, justifying significant government action but only if 
individuals exhibit responsible behavior. 
 The question of whether or not the New Democrat philosophy was primarily a political maneuver 
or a sincere shift in ideology is unclear, but regardless, Clinton was rather consistent in its expression and 
application. Its core—the balancing of opportunity and responsibility—inherently applied directly to 
welfare reform and Clinton’s related goal of “making work pay.” The philosophy allowed Clinton great 
flexibility in calling for policies that fit either side of the American political scene, but also opened him up 
to charges by both sides that he was inconsistent and unprincipled.  
 
Clinton’s Depictions of Poverty 
 
In discussing poverty and welfare reform, Clinton typically focused on four primary characters. 
His key character was the welfare mother, a complicated image for Clinton that itself represented a 
balancing act between conservative and liberal assumptions. According to Clinton, welfare mothers were 
at least partly to blame for their situations due to past behavior, but were nonetheless sympathetic figures 
endowed with potential and hopefulness. Clinton joined his qualified defense of the welfare mother with 
two other powerful and counterbalanced images: attacks on the “deadbeat dad” and defenses of the 
children in poverty. Each in part worked alternatively to blame and defend the welfare mother for her 
situation. Lastly, Clinton often presented depictions of the economically struggling “working family.” This 
final depiction differed from the others in that it represented both a goal for welfare recipients to reach as 
well a critical area for legislators to act on, especially in terms of “rewarding work” in order to help 
facilitate the process of moving families off welfare and onto meaningful and sustaining work. 
 
The Welfare Mother 
 
Of Clinton’s four primary depictions, the image of the welfare mother was the most complex. As 
governor of Arkansas and a key contributor to the deliberations concerning the 1988 Family Support Act, 
Clinton had developed considerable expertise concerning welfare and its related policy areas. Clinton 
exclaimed often that he had spent more time with welfare recipients than any other “elected official,” and 
was likely the only president ever to spend significant time in welfare offices speaking to them and their 
case workers.27 In practically every speech on the subject, Clinton would specifically establish his 
expertise concerning welfare, and profess to be able to speak for welfare recipients and to hold a 
particularly adept understanding of their situation.  
Primarily, Clinton’s rhetorical efforts in this area consisted of attempting to partially rehabilitate 
the image of the welfare mother. Clearly the public image of the welfare recipient was a negative one, 
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evidenced by polling data and attribution research by social psychologists.28 In defense of the welfare 
recipient, Clinton provided alternative and understandable explanations of their reasons for being on 
welfare, and consistently argued that they possessed the same values and goals as all Americans, including 
a hatred of welfare and belief in the importance of work and family. Although these arguments worked 
against the dominate negative conception of the welfare recipient, Clinton would also at times implicitly 
accuse the welfare recipients of irresponsible behavior, especially in terms of having children out of 
wedlock. Clinton would, however, explicitly place such behavior in the past, asking audiences not to judge 
them on the “mistakes” or “sins” of their past.  
An important Clinton tactic in the defense of the welfare recipient was to redefine the assumed 
motives behind the receipt of welfare away from laziness or a desire to have “something for nothing” to 
the regretful but understandable decisions of women put it awkward and unfair positions. Playing off his 
extended experience interacting with welfare recipients, Clinton would often attempt to explain the 
predicament faced by poor mothers. During his 1992 campaign, for example, Clinton explained that while 
it was clear the solution to the welfare problem was to put people to work, taking that step was not as easy 
as many assumed: 
I’m for making people on welfare go to work, but you’ve got to understand why they 
don’t. Most people who are trapped on welfare and don’t go to work don’t do it because 
they have no education, they have no skills. If they went on to work, they’d get a 
minimum-wage job, they couldn’t afford child care and they’d give up the Medicaid 
coverage which gives their children medical benefits. Nobody in their right mind hurts 
their kids.29
On other occasions, Clinton would specifically dismiss the notion that welfare recipients remained on 
welfare because of the “welfare check,” but rather because of the cost of child care and medical coverage 
if they left welfare.30 The welfare check, he explained in July 1993, was “no longer an incentive to stay on 
welfare…what keeps people on welfare is the cost of health care and child care for their kids and the 
inability to get a good job because of a lack of education and training.”31 In February 1994, he argued that 
the welfare check “has almost nothing to do with why people stay on welfare.”32 He would further explain 
how the value of the checks, in “real dollar terms” or “real value” was lower than 20 years before.33 
Clinton bolstered these claims by referring often to welfare as a “trap,” calling for the “liberation” of 
welfare recipients from the “shackles” of welfare.34 Such comments again worked to establish an 
environmental rather than dispositional attribution to welfare receipt. 
From February to June 1994, the time period in which health care reform was being debated, 
Clinton continued along a similar line of argument, while shifting his focus more intensely upon the link 
between welfare receipt and health care. In at least fifteen different occasions during those five months, 
Clinton attacked the policy that removed health care once welfare recipients began to work. Calling the 
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system “crazy,” “unfair,” “perverse,” and “incredible,” Clinton would provide anecdotes of women who 
would leave welfare, lose their health coverage for their children, only to then be paying taxes to provide 
health care to the women who chose not to work.35 While these comments were in large part to support 
Clinton’s call for health care reform by identifying an additional benefit of universal care—the removal of 
the disincentive to work for welfare recipients—it is nonetheless an important point concerning Clinton’s 
problem definition. Such comments worked to place blame on the system while also presenting a rational 
image of a mother seeking to do the best for her children in a difficult situation, an image with which 
middle class audiences could identify. In a sense, the women were choosing not to work due to their 
“family values.”  
In addition to trying to reframe the concrete act of receiving welfare, Clinton also attempted to 
redefine the perceived value system of welfare recipients, arguing that their values did indeed match the 
values of the American people as a whole. Speaking for welfare recipients, usually after once again 
establishing his expertise in the area, Clinton would often claim that they too “hated” welfare, were 
“absolutely dying to get out,” and that of all the Americans that disapproved of welfare, welfare recipients 
themselves were the most adamant about change.36 Establishing the notion of unanimous discontent with 
welfare, Clinton would explain that “no one” liked the system, “least of all most people who live on it.”37 
He would often specifically invite listeners to ask welfare recipients, assuring them that they would be the 
“first to tell you” that the system did not work and that they had the “deepest desire” to change the 
system.38 Indeed, through his extended experience with welfare recipients, Clinton had “almost never met 
anybody that didn’t want to get off.”39  
 Not only did welfare recipients appropriately dislike welfare, but they also, Clinton argued, were 
in line with the American values of work and family. In April of 1996, Clinton explained the potential he 
saw in welfare recipients: “[B]ased on my 12 years as a Governor, I have a very strong conviction that 
most people on welfare are dying to get off of it if they can be given the ways to work and support 
themselves and they don't have to hurt their kids.”40 Such a conditional statement was typical of Clinton’s 
rhetoric throughout his first term. They served to reinforce his primary point: the problem was not 
inherently with the welfare recipient—they had the appropriate values—but the system itself. Clinton 
especially worked to establish the idea that welfare recipients wanted to work, but could only do so if 
provided with opportunities to do so and had some key barriers removed, such as the lack of child care and 
health care for low income working families.41 Clinton would often discuss how welfare recipients wanted 
to succeed both as workers and parents, again like all Americans.42 As Clinton neatly summarized in his 
1994 State of the Union address: “The people who most want to change this system are the people who are 
dependent on it. They want to get off welfare. They want to go back to work. They want to do right by 
their kids.”43 Those dual goals would prove critical to Clinton’s rhetoric in this area, and his policies 
would later often rely on the need to provide assistance to the poor to meet both goals. Such framing 
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worked to criticize both the current system (which allowed people to succeed perhaps as parents, but not 
as workers) as well as some of the Republican proposals (which forced people to work but did not give 
them the necessary tools to succeed as parents as the same time), as well as build identification between 
the welfare recipients and the American majority. The similarities between the two was again emphasized 
during a July 1995 radio address, when Clinton said: “The vast majority of these Americans dream the 
same dreams most of us do. They want the same dignity that comes from going to work and the pride that 
comes from doing right by their children. They want to be independent.”44
 A primary means for Clinton to fortify these points was through narrative examples. During his 
1994 State of the Union address, for example, Clinton told the following story: 
I once had a hearing when I was a governor and I brought in people on welfare from all 
over America who had found their way to work. The woman from my state who testified 
was asked this question: What's the best thing about being off welfare and in a job?  
And, without blinking an eye, she looked at 40 governors and she said, “When my boy 
goes to school and they say what does your mother do for a living, he can give an 
answer.”  These people want a better system, and we ought to give it to them. 
Clinton employed the same anecdote in his 1992 Georgetown speech, when introducing his welfare 
proposal in 1994, and at the signing ceremony of the bill in 1996, when he actually had the mother from 
the anecdote speak and introduce him. The use of such positive anecdotes was often paired with the 
Reaganesque tactic of pointing to “heroes in the balcony.” At his June 1994 speech, for example, Clinton 
introduced nine proud former welfare mothers to his audience and in his 1995 State of the Union, he 
introduced Lynn Woolsey as “America’s best example . . . who worked her way off welfare to become a 
congresswoman.”45 All these examples worked to solidify Clinton’s optimism concerning the value system 
and future potential of many welfare recipients. 
Whereas Clinton clearly worked hard to rehabilitate the typical negative image of the welfare 
recipient, his rhetoric was not devoid of criticism. Clinton focused on establishing the future potential of 
welfare recipients, but was considerably less sympathetic concerning their past. Clinton never clearly 
explained, for example, how the welfare recipients were “trapped” in the first place. Elsewhere in his 
speeches, he often alluded to “past mistakes” and “past sins” made by welfare recipients, and often 
mentioned the irresponsibilities of teenage pregnancy when discussing welfare recipients.46 Such 
comments implied individualistic causation and negative behavior, and were much more in line with the 
public’s likely negative image of welfare recipients. One clear example occurred during the 1995 State of 
the Union, when he said, “I have no problem with punishing bad behavior or the refusal to be a worker or 
a student or a responsible parent. I just don’t want to punish poverty and past mistakes. All of us have 
made our mistakes, and none of us can change our yesterdays. But every one of us can change our 
tomorrows.” This statement is a clear acceptance of the deserving-undeserving distinction, followed by an 
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attempt to dismiss or forgive past behavior in the face of a promising future. The argument also fit well 
with Clinton’s oft-repeated catch phrase that welfare should be “A second chance, not a way of life.”  
In summary, I would argue that Clinton’s construction of the welfare recipient was a qualified 
purification that was ambiguously situated between the extremes of blaming or absolving the poor. He 
focused on the future potential of welfare recipients, but also implied they had made past mistakes. Clinton 
thus did not challenge the mainstream’s perception that assumed an individual attribution for poverty, but 
by arguing that the poor had the requisite values to join the mainstream, he was implicitly refuting the 
“culture of poverty” thesis that worked to dismiss any efforts to help the poor. In the end, it was clear that 
Clinton was attempting to establish that the most relevant barrier to progress was not the welfare recipient, 
but rather the system that continued to punish past behavior.  
 
The Image of the Child 
 
 The second major depiction that was consistently present in Clinton’s welfare rhetoric was that of 
children in poverty. The invocation of the poor child has always been a powerful rhetorical strategy 
heavily steeped in the American mythos of equal opportunity. Framing poverty in terms of its impact on 
children inherently places focus on overly sympathetic figures. After all, even Charles Murray wrote 
“there is no such thing as an undeserving five-year old.”47 Clinton discussed poor children much more 
often than his predecessors, but his depiction of these children remained rather limited overall. 
 In his speeches, Clinton would often make brief comments that highlighted the innocent nature of 
children. He made a number of references that simply worked to solidify the notion that children were 
innocent and undeserving of poverty. At times such references were as simple as specifically mentioning 
“innocent children” or “innocent babies” while discussing welfare and poverty issues.48 Clinton would 
also emphasize the deserving nature of poor children by explaining that they were “not the cause of the 
problems that they face in life” or that it was “not their fault what families they were born into.”49 
Speaking to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in April 1995, Clinton expanded a bit on the 
innocence of the children on welfare, saying, “Rich or poor, black, white, or brown, in or out of wedlock, a 
baby is a baby, a child is a child. It's part of our future, and we have an obligation to those children not to 
punish them for something over which they had absolutely no control.”50 During a radio address the 
following day, Clinton gave a similar appeal: 
These children didn't choose to be born to single mothers; they didn't choose to be born 
on welfare; they didn't choose to be born to women who are teenagers. We ought to 
remember that a child is a child, a baby is a baby. Whether they're white, black, or 
brown, whether they're born in or out of wedlock, anybody anywhere is entitled to a 
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chance and innocence if it's a baby. We simply shouldn't punish babies and children for 
their parents' mistakes.51  
Once again, a week later, Clinton repeated a very similar paragraph during a news conference.52  In these 
examples, Clinton actually trumped the image of poor children with that of poor babies, while also 
expressing their innocence somewhat at the expense of the innocence of their parents.  
Clinton also often discussed the increasing number of poor children. Considering children were 
inherently innocent, the mere existence of poor children could be considered a violation of equal 
opportunity. A sharp expansion in the number of poor children would thus be especially troublesome. 
Early in his first term, Clinton would mention the “millions and millions” or “legions” of poor children in 
the United States, or reveal that one in every five children in the country were poor.53 At times he would 
praise the decreasing poverty rate for the elderly, but then show concern for the increasing poverty rate for 
children, mentioning that children were becoming a much larger percentage of the poor.54 Often in the 
context of this “new poor,” Clinton would mention their inherent unpopularity and political weakness. In 
March of 1993, Clinton first mentioned that children, along with their often young, single mothers, were 
considered “a new class of poor people” that were “dramatically undervalued,” having “no advocates in 
many councils of power.”55 To the National Governors’ Association in 1995, he explained how poor 
children were “very poorly organized.”56 A month later to that same organization, Clinton mentioned that 
the “poor children lobby” was a “poor match” for political forces in State legislatures.57 Later, he told 
other groups that it was not “popular” or “fashionable” to “speak up” for the poor children today.58 Such 
comments worked to emphasize that not only were children undeserving of the poverty and growing in 
numbers, but were also limited in their ability to help themselves and improve their situation without 
outside assistance, and it was only getting worse. The changing nature of poverty therefore required even 
more involvement by the non-poor. 
Clinton most often relied on the image of the poor child when criticizing the Republican welfare 
proposals from 1994 to 1996. Clinton used the soundbite that the Republican bill was “weak on work and 
tough on children” in speech after speech throughout this time period. He also often repeated the charge 
that the bill would “punish” poor children and cause them to “suffer.”59  Clinton’s critiques of the 
Republican proposals seemed designed to shift focus away from the dominant and negative image of the 
welfare mother to the more sympathetic image of the poor child. 
In summary, Clinton clearly discussed children in this context much more often than his 
predecessors. However, despite the increased frequency of these references, Clinton’s appeals to the 
struggles of poor children remained rather limited. Most of Clinton’s comments concerning poor children 
served as warnings or attacks against Republican policies. They often did not, in other words, focus on a 
current problem that needed to be addressed, but rather a potential future problem that needed to be 
avoided. If the current predicament of poor children was discussed, the cause was often identified not as 
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low wages or lack of opportunity, but rather poor choices made by the parents of the children, especially in 
terms of having children when unmarried. Clinton’s frequent invocation of poor children, in other words, 
was often juxtaposed to his mixed depiction of welfare mothers, a comparison that worked to highlight the 
innocence of poor children by rendering a thinly veiled attack on their parents. Of course, elsewhere 
Clinton would plead with his audiences to disregard the parents’ “mistakes” of the past and focus on the 
future potential of welfare recipients, nonetheless it is clear that Clinton’s use of the image of the poor 
child was not designed as a call to action to address poverty. Although Clinton did sprinkle his speeches 
liberally with references to innocent children or babies that should not be punished or caused to suffer, he 
never actually told any stories about these poor children, nor was a poor child ever mentioned by name. 
All in all, Clinton seemed to understand the power of appealing to poor children—relying on it to paint 
Republican proposals as mean-spirited—but did not attempt to develop the appeal very strongly. 
 
The Deadbeat Parent 
 
 Of Clinton’s primary relevant depictions, the deadbeat parent was clearly the most negative, 
playing the part of the villain. Interestingly, Clinton typically referenced to the gender neutral “deadbeat 
parent,” rather than the more common “deadbeat dad,” though he did once explain after using deadbeat 
dad that it was “sometimes deadbeat moms, but usually deadbeat dads.”60 Increasing the collection of child 
support was a key issue for Clinton, and throughout his time in office he supported a number of measures 
to help with such collections, including automatically withholding payments from paychecks, denying 
drivers and professional licenses to those who refuse to pay, seeking identification of paternity in all 
childbirths, and developing more sophisticated means for tracking them from job to job and state to state. 
Clinton often called for the “toughest possible child support enforcement” and the “most sweeping 
crackdown on deadbeat parents in history.”61 Clinton’s rhetoric clearly painted deadbeat parents as 
criminals. Clinton discussed putting “most wanted posters” up in post offices with pictures of deadbeat 
parents, and called for bringing “these criminals to justice” and insuring they had “nowhere to hide.” 62 In 
a radio address in March 1995, Clinton sent a stern warning to delinquent parents, saying: “If you neglect 
your responsibility to support your children, we'll suspend your license, garnish your pay, track you down, 
and make you pay.”63  
Clinton also identified the low level of child support payments as an additional cause of welfare 
receipt, providing another justification of receipt that worked to deflect blame from the welfare mother. In 
another March 1995 radio address, for example, Clinton told the story of a mother who was forced into 
welfare due to a “deadbeat dad”: 
Eighteen years ago, Gerri Jensen's husband abandoned her and her two young sons. She 
held down several low-paying jobs, but eventually was forced to turn to welfare because 
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her ex-husband stopped paying child support altogether. She got so fed up with weak 
laws and bureaucratic runarounds that she launched a grassroots movement to crack 
down on deadbeat parents nationwide. We are all in her debt, and we all owe an 
obligation to all the people like her in America who are doing their dead-level best to be 
good parents. They deserve our support. 64
In this short anecdote, Clinton painted the father as villain, the mother as a victim at first, but then as a 
hero as she overcame her obstacles to make a difference. On a number of occasions, Clinton said that 
800,000 “mothers and children” would exit welfare “immediately” if all the money owned by deadbeat 
parents would be collected.65  
 Overall, the depiction of the deadbeat parent clearly worked to draw negative attention away from 
the welfare mother, and to increase the innocence of the poor child through the contrast effect. The 
depiction offered a target of criticism that would inherently have few supporters. Clinton could place 
blame on deadbeat parents without seeming mean or unfair to the poor, and still distract attention from 
broader systematic concerns. In other words, the tough deadbeat parent rhetoric tied in well with Clinton’s 
“responsibility” rhetoric, and served as a useful point of focus for his New Democrat perspective. It placed 
blame on lack of individual responsibility, but did so in a way that also worked to rehabilitate the image of 
the welfare mother somewhat and enhance the innocence of the welfare child. 
 
The Working Poor 
 
The last of Clinton’s four major depictions was that of the working poor. The working poor 
generally represented a sympathetic population, fitting the image of the deserving poor due to their labor, 
or at least due to their lack of idleness. Similar to poor children, the working poor were mentioned by 
Clinton to a much greater extent than his predecessors. Also similar to his discussion of children, Clinton 
for the most part simply mentioned the existence of the working poor, or, in an even more rhetorically 
loaded term, “working families.” Most often, Clinton provided the figure that eighteen percent of 
Americans who work full time were actually under the poverty line, calling them the “quiet heroes of this 
economy.”66 In remarks made in July of 1993, for example, Clinton told the National Association of 
County Officials: 
Eighteen percent of America's workers today are working and still living below the 
Federal poverty line. An enormous number of working parents go home at night to 
children, having worked a full day and a full week, and still live below the poverty 
line.67
In an interview the following day, Clinton repeated the statistic, seemingly cognizant that most audiences 
would be surprised by the number. In the interview he explained that there are “two kinds of low-income 
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people in the economy. . . . those that are working and those that aren't. Believe it or not, about 18 percent 
of all working people are still below the Federal poverty line.”68 A few days later, he went into even 
greater detail, again expressing his surprise: 
You know, it's amazing to me how many American families still live in poverty. About 
18 percent of the work force, nearly one in five families, have a worker and still do not 
reach the Federal poverty line. There are 36 million, approximately, low-income 
Americans; about 20 million of them live in a family that works, with someone working 
at least part of the year; 6 million live in families where someone works all year round, 
full-time, and the family is still in poverty. And as I said, where there is a family of four, 
about one in five, or 18 percent, have insufficient incomes to lift them above the Federal 
poverty line.69
 Throughout the summer of 1993, Clinton provided audiences with that statistic on a number of other 
occasions, primarily in support of his proposal to increase the EITC.70  At times, he specifically questioned 
the fairness of the existence of the working poor, implying that to work full time but remain in poverty 
represented a deficiency in rewarding work, and thus provided an incentive for welfare receipt. For 
example, after once again citing the eighteen percent of workers in poverty, Clinton told a conference 
audience that it is “hard to lecture people, to say, ‘Well, don't be on welfare; go to work,’ if you don't 
reward work.”71   
While supporting the EITC increase, Clinton implicitly invoked the image of the working poor 
when he frequently expressed the ideal that any family with a full time worker and children in the home 
should not be in poverty. After the EITC increase passed, Clinton often cited that the legislation lifted 15 
million “working families” out of poverty, as he did in his 1994 State of the Union address.72  
In 1994, the appeals to the working poor tapered off in frequency, and it was not until Clinton put 
a minimum wage increase high on his agenda in January of 1995 that the working poor once again became 
an important character in Clinton’s speeches. Throughout 1995, Clinton would mention that people could 
not “make a living on $4.25 an hour, especially if you have children, even with the working families tax 
cut we passed last year.”73 Utilizing his typical strategy of co-opting Republican key words and reframing 
them, Clinton would cite the need to support “family values” by improving the situation for working 
families earning only minimum wage.74 Similar to before, Clinton discussed how many families worked 
full time but remained in poverty due to low wages. For examples, in remarks made to the community in 
Iowa, Clinton said: 
You know, in Washington, there's a lot of talk about family values. Well, I'll tell you one 
thing, it's pretty hard to raise a family on $4.25 an hour. But there are millions of people 
out there trying to do it. And they're heroes to me. When I think of the people that get up 
every day, knowing they could take a powder and go on welfare and get health care for 
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their kids, and they still show up for work and they do their 40 hours and sometimes 
they do a lot more, and they do it for the minimum wage because they believe in the 
dignity of work and they want to set a good example for their children, and I can't get 
anybody to schedule for a vote raising the minimum wage to take it from $4.25 just to 
$5.15 an hour and get out of a 40-year low in earning power, that's not my idea of the 
high-tech economy. I think the American people believe we can do better than that. And 
I believe if we're going to honor work and family, we ought to do better than that. And I 
hope you will support it.75
Clinton returned to the notion of calling these working poor “heroes” in a number of other speeches in the 
following months, calling them such things as the “greatest heroes in this country,” “real heroes in my 
book,” “real family heroes,” and “[s]ome of America's greatest working heroes.”76 With each mention, 
Clinton emphasized the dual nature of the struggle to succeed both at work and at home, and how raising 
the minimum wage would “honor both work and family.”77 As he did in the excerpt quoted above, he also 
emphasized the fact that the working poor were choosing to stay off welfare despite the incentives welfare 
compared to working for minimum wage. When the minimum wage increase finally passed in July of 
1996, Clinton told the reporters gathered that it was “a very good day for America's working families” 
because “10 million hard-working Americans will get a little bit of help to raise their children and keep 
their family strong,” adding that the increase “will honor our most basic values, work and family, 
opportunity and responsibility.”78 In sum, Clinton’s comments concerning the working poor often worked 
to increase identification between the working poor and other working families, focusing on their similar 
struggles and similar values. In addition, similar to the image of the poor child, the depiction of the 
working poor tended to serve as an implicit criticism on the welfare poor, as the former were praised for 
choosing to work rather than “taking a powder” and accepting welfare.  
 
Conclusion to Clinton’s Depictions 
 
 Throughout his first term, four key depictions consistently reappeared in Clinton’s rhetoric 
concerning poverty and welfare issues. Clinton offered a conflicted image of the welfare mother, perhaps 
the most important of the four. He worked hard to establish that she held mainstream values and thus 
future potential, while at the same time Clinton certainly placed some responsibility on her for her 
situation. Clinton thus did not strongly refute the negative public stereotype, but nonetheless constructed 
an image of the welfare mother that was willing to work and thus benefit from Clinton’s policies. In other 
words, Clinton focused on providing a sense of efficacy to the public that the policies would be helpful, 
thus counterattacking the futility thesis. Clinton did not, however, attack the notion that the welfare poor 
were not responsible for their poverty.   
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Clinton also offered important depictions of poor children and deadbeat parents. Clinton used the 
image of innocent poor children to attack Republican proposals, while at the same time it was often used 
at the expense of the welfare mother. The deadbeat parent served as an alternative scapegoat to the welfare 
queen, and represented another interesting centrist argument. While it was an attack that blamed the poor 
and focused on individual behavior, it was also an implicit defense of the single welfare mother. By 
arguing that it was the father that abdicated individual responsibility by walking away from his children, 
rather than the mother that was promiscuous or irresponsible, Clinton was providing further qualified 
support for his defense of the welfare mother. 
Lastly, to Clinton the working poor seemed to represent an interesting entity that served 
practically as a link between the welfare poor and the middle class. His welfare reform policies sought first 
to move the welfare poor to become part of the working poor by requiring work and providing 
opportunity. Then two other key policies Clinton advocated during his first term—increasing the Earned 
Income Tax Credit and the minimum wage—worked to move the working poor into the middle class. At 
the same time, the ranks of the working poor was also being fed from the top, as more and more of the 
middle class had been slipping down the economic scale into poverty. Clinton’s 1992 campaign in 
particular appealed often to the anxious middle class, who, as Clinton explained in a typical campaign 
appeal, had “worked harder for less money to pay more for health care, for housing, for education, for 
taxes.” “Poverty has exploded,” Clinton added, “especially among working people.” Clinton would make 
similar appeals later in his first term, explaining that the people had been “working harder and harder for 
stagnant wages and falling closer and closer to the poverty line.”79 The working poor thus served as a 
critical link between the welfare poor and the middle class, and thus a point of identification. The welfare 
poor, at least how Clinton depicted them, hoped to “escape” the trap of welfare dependency and become 
independent (i.e. middle class). The middle class, on the other hand, feared falling to the level of the 
working poor, or, even worse, the welfare poor. Understanding the anxiety that had been growing within 
the middle class concerning their economic outlook, Clinton rhetorically constructed the situation so that 
the anxious middle class and the maligned welfare poor would find themselves as kindred spirits. In the 
process, the Democratic Party had, at least symbolically, reconstructed its New Deal constituency with the 
broadly supported image of working families. 
 
Clinton Anti-Welfare Rhetoric 
 
 “For so long government has failed us, and one of its worst failures has been welfare.”80 These 
words, part of a 1992 Clinton campaign advertisement, clearly situated Clinton’s perspective on the 
welfare system. Throughout the 1992 campaign, Clinton catchphrases such as “ending welfare as we know 
it” and making welfare “a second chance, not a way of life” were repeated again and again. To Clinton and 
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the New Democrats, welfare was an easy and strategic target. It was universally condemned by the public, 
whose negative opinion of it seemed to go along with many of the typical Republican attacks on the 
Democratic Party or government in general, especially in terms of being wasteful, counterproductive, and 
too often providing “something for nothing.” Clinton’s anti-welfare rhetoric was thus a key aspect of his 
attempt to separate himself from the stereotypes of the “Old Democrats.” Overall, Clinton made five 
primary points against welfare: it was broken, it was hated by all, it worked as a trap, it undermined 
American values, and it was outdated. Each attack worked to reify the public’s already negative image of 
welfare, especially considering they were coming from a Democratic president who often boasted of his 
expertise on the welfare issue. 
 Clinton’s most basic attack on welfare was simply to explain that it did not work. In almost every 
speech concerning reforming welfare, Clinton used adjectives such as “broken” or “failed” to modify 
“welfare system.” Such comments combined with Clinton’s second primary point—that everyone hated 
welfare. Clinton often explained that “no one” liked the broken welfare system, and “every American” 
wanted reform.81 Once, at a Governors Leadership Conference, Clinton mentioned that welfare reform had 
become like “God, motherhood, and apple pie; everybody's for it,” adding, “And that's good.”82 Clinton 
specifically singled out both welfare recipients and taxpayers as groups particularly displeased with the 
current system. All in all, Clinton made it clear that the system had few, if any, supporters. 
The third primary point Clinton repeatedly made in criticizing the welfare system relied on the 
now-familiar “trap” metaphor, which Clinton invoked in practically every major speech about welfare. 
The use of the metaphor represents an interesting moderate argument. By using this analogy and linking it 
to the concept of dependency, Clinton was condemning the system from a conservative viewpoint. At the 
same time, however, he was removing much of the blame for that dependence from the person who was 
trapped: someone caught in a trap is typically not at fault (hence perhaps deserving of assistance). In other 
words, the trap metaphor helped place the locus of responsibility outside the individual and unto the 
system itself.  
 Clinton most significant attack on welfare focused on its alleged negative impact on key 
American values. During the 1994 State of the Union, for example, Clinton said the following when 
discussing the welfare system: 
It doesn't work. It defies our values as a Nation. If we value work, we can't justify a 
system that makes welfare more attractive than work if people are worried about losing 
their health care. If we value responsibility, we can't ignore the $34 billion in child 
support absent parents ought to be paying to millions of parents who are taking care of 
their children. If we value strong families, we can't perpetuate a system that actually 
penalizes those who stay together. Can you believe that a child who has a child gets 
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more money from the Government for leaving home than for staying home with a parent 
or a grandparent? That's not just bad policy, it's wrong. And we ought to change it.83
On several other occasions, Clinton argued that the welfare system “undermined,” did not “honor,” or was 
“inconsistent with” American values, but rather taught the “wrong values” and rewarded “wrong 
choices.”84 More than once Clinton argued that there was “no greater gap between mainstream American 
values and modern Government than we find in the welfare system.”85 The three values Clinton typically 
focused upon as being violated were work, family, and responsibility, all key values to Clinton’s “New 
Democrat” philosophy. In a 1995 radio address, for example, Clinton focused on those three values while 
attacking the current system: 
It doesn't honor our values of work and family and personal responsibility. . . . The 
current system must be replaced. Instead of requiring people to work, now it penalizes 
people who go to work. Instead of strengthening families, now it gives teenagers a 
separate check to leave home, leave school, and set up their own households. Instead of 
demanding responsibility, it lets too many parents who owe child support just walk away 
without paying. That's not right, and it's time to change it.86  
Similarly, during his 1995 State of the Union address, Clinton explained that “[n]othing has done more to 
undermine our sense of common responsibility than our failed welfare system. . . . It rewards welfare over 
work. It undermines family values. It lets millions of parents get away without paying their child 
support.”87  
While Clinton would explain that welfare “discouraged work,” he also often explained in more 
detail, as shown during the discussion of Clinton’s depiction of the welfare recipient, that the welfare 
check was only a minor reason for people to stay on welfare, and that the whole system—including the 
lack of health care and affordable child care—contributed to the disincentive to work. Similarly, the 
connection between welfare and anti-responsibility was heavily tied to weak child support provisions, not 
just welfare. In other words, welfare was only part of those two stories. As a result, Clinton discussed 
welfare’s anti-family impact to a much greater degree that the other two values. Clinton’s speeches often 
included short jabs at welfare, claiming it did such things as  “destroy[ed] families,” “aggravated some of 
the worst pressures in the breakdown of the family in this country,” “encouraged families to break up,” or 
“pull[ed] families apart.”88
Clinton’s final point against welfare focused on how the system was simply out of date. Here 
Clinton played off his “expertise” on welfare and explained how the system was created with good 
intentions, but was no longer appropriate due to economic and social changes. In response to a question 
during an appearance in August of 1993, for example, Clinton provided an extended commentary on 
welfare’s historical development: 
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The original welfare system was set up to deal with an American society that existed 
about 50 years ago, where nearly everybody who wanted to work could find some kind 
of job at some low level, but they could find some kind of job. There were very few 
women in the work force, if they were in the home and they had children. And the 
typical welfare recipient in the beginning was, let's say, a West Virginia miner's widow, 
60 years ago. The husband gets killed in the mines. They live up in the hills and hollows 
of West Virginia. The woman has a rough-grade education. She's got three or four kids, 
no way to go to work, no job to find, and the welfare supports the kids. Then there was 
another typical welfare recipient that represents about half the people on welfare today, 
for whom welfare should exist, the people who hit on hard times. Suddenly a spouse 
dies, and there's two little children in the home, and you can't work. Or you lose a job, 
and you can't get another one, and you run out of unemployment benefits. In other 
words, about half the people on welfare only stay for 4, 5, 6 months, and then they get 
off. Those are the people we would all want a welfare system for, because they fall 
through the unemployment system cracks or they need support or they have little 
children. They can't be working because they have a whole slew of them or whatever. 
Increasingly, however, there are people on welfare whose parents were on welfare, 
whose grandparents were on welfare, who never have worked, and who basically can 
stay on forever as long as they have children under a certain age, because welfare's 
proper name is Aid to Families with Dependent Children, AFDC, that's what it means.89
Later, announcing his welfare proposal in June of 1994, Clinton explained that the welfare system was 
“started for the right common purpose of helping people who fall by the wayside,” and “still works that 
way for some. . . . [b]ut for many the system has worked to undermine the very values that people need to 
put themselves and their lives back on track.”90 Again, in a December 1994 radio address, Clinton 
reaffirmed that welfare “was set up for all the right reasons,” and still helped an “awful lot of people,” but 
for “millions and millions” it was “broken badly.”91 In October of 1994, Clinton quoted FDR’s famous 
line that the “dole” was a “a subtle destroyer of the human spirit,” and again emphasized that “[n]o one 
ever intended for it to work this way.”92 Simply put, Clinton explained, welfare was a “system that was 
designed for another age” or “designed for a population different from the population now on welfare.”93 
He returned to the image of the “coal miner’s widow” as the original intended recipient of welfare again in 
September of 1995 and July of 1996.94
  This line of reasoning perhaps worked to justify or at least soften the criticism that Clinton was 
advocating the end of a program begun by FDR by dissociating the criticism of the current system from its 
original intention. This intent was perhaps made clear during a press conference after Clinton announced 
he would sign the bill in July of 1996. A reporter asked Clinton if he was concerned that he, as a 
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Democrat, was “helping to dismantle something that was put in place by Democrats 60 years ago.” 
Clinton’s response returned again to the argument that welfare had outlived its usefulness due to changing 
times: 
No. No, because it was put in place 60 years ago when the poverty population of 
America was fundamentally different than it is now. As Senator Moynihan—you know, 
Senator Moynihan strongly disagrees with me on this, but as he has pointed out 
repeatedly, when welfare was created the typical welfare recipient was a miner's widow 
with no education, small children, husband dies in the mine, no expectation that there 
was a job for the widow to do or that she ever could do it—very few out-of-wedlock 
pregnancies and births. The whole dynamics were different then. So I have always 
thought that the Democratic Party should be on the side of creating opportunity and 
promoting empowerment and responsibility for people, and a system that was in place 
60 years ago that worked for the poverty population then is not the one we need now. . . . 
. But the nature of the poverty population is so different now that I am convinced we 
have got to be willing to experiment, to try to work to find ways to break the cycle of 
dependency that keeps dragging folks down.95
In this response in particular, the connection between Clinton’s criticism of the current system and his 
goals for the new system are clear. The purpose of welfare, as advocated by Johnson, Nixon, and Carter, 
needed to change from maintenance of unemployables to a vehicle that encouraged and assisted 
individuals to become self-sufficient.  
 In conclusion, Clinton’s criticism of the welfare system mirrored those of his predecessors in 
many ways, especially in terms of attacking its negative impact on work and family, and practically 
avoiding any mention of any positive impact. Clinton’s criticisms, however, should be considered more 
devastating, especially compared to Nixon and Reagan, because he was not only a Democrat, but a 
Democrat who continuously boasted of specific expertise concerning welfare policy. Clinton’s assault on 
the welfare system likely worked to erode the burden of proof for advocates of change, and essentially 
established that any change was justified, or at least would be better than the current system. Once the 
Democrats lost control of Congress and began pushing their own version of welfare reform, this notion of 
any change enjoying the advantage of presumption likely worked against Clinton’s opposition to 
Republican proposals. While Clinton’s criticisms painted him into a corner concerning the 1996 bill, they 
nonetheless also worked to deflect attention from the welfare recipients themselves. Once again, it was the 
welfare system, not the people, that deserved the most condemnation.  
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Clinton’s Welfare Reform Rhetoric 
 
 Within the frame established by Clinton’s construction of the welfare system as the problem, the 
first step in implementing his solution was simple: ending welfare as we knew it. The phrase, repeated 
perhaps more often than any other in Clinton’s rhetoric, was rather ambiguous. It called for an end to the 
current welfare system, but did not clearly identify its replacement. Considering the public’s disdain for 
“welfare,” however, the phrase was likely received well by the masses. Once again, due to the sustained 
attack on welfare for the past twenty years, practically anything would be preferable to the present system 
in the eyes of most Americans. Overall, Clinton, like Johnson, Nixon, and Carter before him, wanted 
welfare to serve as a bridge to independence rather than a trap that fostered dependence. His plan to make 
that happen, however, differed somewhat from what his predecessors envisioned. Clinton welfare reform 
proposals represented an application of Clinton’s New Democratic “New Covenant” model, which called 
for a reciprocal relationship between the government and the poor, with the former providing opportunity 
but expecting responsibility from the latter. By using this philosophical framework, Clinton was able to 
call for tough requirements on the nation’s poor (such as work requirements, welfare time limits, and anti-
teen pregnancy provisions), while still pursuing traditional progressive goals (such as health care reform, 
minimum wage increases, and more funds for child care, job training, and the like). This examination of 
Clinton’s vision of welfare reform will first examine how Clinton defined new goals for the program, then 
how he discussed the various policy components on each side of the responsibility-opportunity dyad.  
 Clinton’s welfare rhetoric reveals that by “ending welfare as we know it” he meant to transform 
welfare from a program that tended to cause dependency and undermine work and family to one that led to 
independence and honored those values. This transformation was expressed in a number of different ways. 
Most commonly, Clinton discussed how he hoped to make welfare a “second chance, not a way of life.” In 
doing so, he was implying that the receipt of welfare had become a way of life for many, and that his new 
proposals would represent an escape from that life. In other occasions, he explained the transformation as 
a move from welfare to work, a welfare check to a paycheck, dependence to independence, or dependence 
to dignity. Welfare’s new purpose would be to “empower” people, to “liberate” welfare recipients, and to 
be a “path” or “bridge” to a job.96
 The most important transformation Clinton envisioned with his new welfare program concerned 
the system’s impact on American values. Once again, Clinton focused on two values in particular: work 
and family. Rather than undermine those values, the new welfare system would now “honor,” “embrace,” 
“reward,” “restore,” “promote,” and “reflect” them. Welfare reform would be “pro-work” and “pro-
family.” Of the two, work was clearly recognized as the most important value for welfare to uphold. 
Welfare reform would “first and foremost” be about work, the “best social program ever invented.”97  
While Clinton certainly placed work front and center when discussing welfare reform, he was also careful 
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to interject the importance of honoring family, often acknowledging that requiring work indiscriminately 
could harm families. After reiterating the importance of work, Clinton would often state that welfare 
reform was “also” about family, and that he did not want to hurt children. Again and again, he set a dual 
goal of welfare as helping people to succeed both as workers and parents, or at work and at home, and 
rejected the idea of forcing people to choose between the two. He wanted welfare to require and reward 
work, but also enable “people who work to be responsible workers and good parents at the same time.”98 
After the 1994 elections that put the Republicans in power led to several Republican welfare reform 
proposals, Clinton would often reject the proposals on the basis that while they supported work, they did 
not sufficiently support family.  
 In order to realize the dual pursuit of these goals, Clinton relied on the opportunity-responsibility 
rhetoric of the New Covenant. Clinton argued that by providing real opportunity and expecting 
responsibility, government would honor both work and family. Providing opportunity meant individuals 
would receive help to acquire necessary education and skills to qualify for jobs, they would have the 
needed child care, health care, and child support to be able to take those jobs without harming their family, 
and, finally, those jobs would both exist and pay enough to support their family. Responsibility would then 
require those individuals to take advantage of those opportunities by requiring work, as well as expecting 
“responsible” behavior concerning family, such as avoiding unwed pregnancies, having young mothers 
stay home and continue their education, and forcing deadbeat parents to support their children. This 
opportunity-responsibility concept was often summarized neatly by two key phrases repeated often by the 
president. The first was Clinton’s call for the “hard simple rule” that “everyone who can work, must 
work,” which was echoed in his Georgetown address, his Nomination Acceptance address, the 1994 State 
of the Union, and the 1995 State of the Union, among others.99 The second, repeated in most of the same 
texts, was Clinton’s belief that “people who work hard and play by the rules should not live in poverty.” 
During an exchange with reporters concerning the Earned Income Tax Credit in 1993, Clinton clearly put 
the two together, arguing that “[w]e ought to have two principles that operate in this country: People who 
can work should work, but if they do work, their families at home shouldn't be poor.”100
 Clinton’s rhetoric concerning the reciprocal relationship between opportunity and responsibility 
and the specific policy instruments concerning each represents a critical point of analysis. In particular, the 
question of which side was predominant essentially dictates the ideological perspective of Clinton’s 
proposals. Which of the two was more necessary? How far was each condition from being realized? How 
difficult would it be to provide true opportunity and expect responsibility? Clearly, the two parties tended 
to differ on the answers to those questions. Republicans, especially the House Republicans who took over 
Congress in 1994, tended to argue that ample opportunity already existed, and that the primary missing 
ingredient was individual responsibility. The traditional Democratic position, however, was that true 
opportunity was lacking for many of the nation’s poor, and that focusing on individual responsibility was 
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simply a thinly veiled and unfair attack on the disadvantaged. In other words, Republicans focused on the 
need for more responsibility from the undeserving poor, and Democrats on the need for opportunity for the 
deserving poor. As a New Democrat, Clinton clearly hoped to bridge the gap between these two 
perspectives with his New Covenant rhetoric.  The purpose of the New Democrat position, after all, was to 
reinvigorate the progressive nature of the Democratic Party in part by undermining the negative stereotype 
that Democrats were unconcerned about personal responsibility, while still pursuing the goal of 
government playing a key role in providing opportunity.  
 
Requiring Responsibility 
 
 The key policy aspects of the responsibility side focused on the work requirements and time 
limits to welfare. These aspects were mentioned early in his 1992 campaign, were the key components of 
his 1994 proposal, and were considered uncontroversial to Clinton when included in the Republican 
proposals in 1995 and 1996. Clinton often explained that the tough work requirements and time limits 
were a point of common ground between him and the Republicans, and that he felt comfortable being 
“very tough” on requiring people to work.  
Additional policy aspects tied to responsibility included toughening the child support provisions 
and various anti-teen pregnancy proposals. Clinton was consistent on the child-support provisions, which 
were aimed at increasing the number of collections made from deadbeat parents. This was another policy 
area that was considered uncontroversial. Attempting to reduce teen pregnancy, however, represented a 
point of conflict. While all generally supported the goal, the appropriate role of government in such efforts 
was controversial. Clinton relied on responsibility rhetoric heavily in addressing the need to improve 
families, announcing that the government would not “subsidize irresponsible or reckless behavior.”101 Yet 
another Clinton catchphrase during this time period was that “governments don’t raise children, parents 
do.”102 He called on parents to take responsibility for their children, and expressed serious concern with 
the various statistics that revealed the “explosion” of births to unmarried parents, the breakdown of family 
life, and the fact that so many children were having children.103 As a response, Clinton called the 
prevention of teen pregnancy and out-of-wedlock births a “critical part” of welfare reform.104 Announcing 
his welfare proposal in June of 1994, Clinton discussed the problem of teen pregnancy and out-of-wedlock 
births at length: 
We should encourage teen parents to live at home, stay in school, take responsibility for 
their own futures and their children's futures. And the financial incentives of the welfare 
system ought to do that instead of just the reverse. We have to change the signals we are 
sending here. We also have to face the fact that we have a big welfare problem because 
the rate of children born out of wedlock, where there was no marriage, is going up 
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dramatically. The rate of illegitimacy has literally quadrupled since Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, now a Senator from New York, first called it to our attention 30 years ago. 
At the rate we're going, unless we reverse it, within 10 years more than half of our 
children will be born in homes where there has never been a marriage. We must keep 
people from the need to go on welfare in the first place by emphasizing a national 
campaign against teen pregnancy, to send a powerful message that it is wrong to 
continue this trend, that children should not be born until parents are married and fully 
capable of taking care of them.105
Sending the bill to Congress a few days later, Clinton explained that the bill included a “national campaign 
against teen pregnancy and a national clearinghouse on teen pregnancy prevention” which would include 
grants for 1,000 middle and high schools in disadvantaged areas to develop “innovative teen pregnancy 
prevention programs.”106  In 1995, he called for a policy that required teen mothers to sign a work 
contract, and then stay home and continue school to receive benefits.107  He also encouraged giving states 
flexibility to determine new methods to reduce teen pregnancy. While Clinton did support these various 
means of reducing teen pregnancy, he balanced this sort of rhetoric with concerns of hurting innocent 
children. He rejected, for example, proposals that would prohibit funds to teenage mothers or would send 
the children of some welfare recipients to orphanages, attacking such ideas as “extreme right wing” and 
“ideological extremism.” 108  
 
Providing Opportunity 
 
On the other side of the scale was Clinton’s call to provide opportunity. The level of additional 
policies that were considered necessary in order to fulfill the opportunity side of the dyad was very telling 
information. Since Clinton was planning on requiring former welfare recipients to work in the hope that 
they would become self-sufficient, a number of potential barriers must be considered. For example, for a 
welfare recipient to become self-sufficient, a job must first exist; the individual must have the necessary 
education and skills to be qualified for the job; the job must pay enough to foster self-sufficiency, which 
would perhaps require additional funds or programs for child care, health care, and transportation; and, 
lastly, the person would have to accept the job and work. Clinton’s early rhetoric essentially argued that 
the work requirements and time limits would only be instilled if the structural barriers were removed. In 
addition, Clinton’s early rhetoric seemed to understand that many of those structural barriers did in fact 
exist for many welfare recipients. He often explained, for example, the difficulty of leaving welfare for 
low wage work due to the importance of health care and the need for child-care. He also explained that 
many of the single mothers on welfare were uneducated and lacked skills, and acknowledged that the 
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limited nature and quality of low wage labor. As a result, Clinton often provided a laundry list of policies 
that would need to precede any time limits or work requirements for welfare.   
The primary goal Clinton continuously expressed from the opportunity side was to “make work 
pay.” Overall, Clinton sought to improve the relative value of low-wage work versus welfare by increasing 
the value of the former, rather than decreasing the value (or increasing the stigma) of the latter, as his 
predecessors seemed to attempt. As Clinton put in during a conference in Chicago in July of 1993: “It is 
hard to lecture people, to say, ‘Well, don't be on welfare; go to work,’ if you don't reward work.”109 Here 
Clinton’s rhetoric spilled over from a focus on welfare reform specifically and brought in the key related 
issues such as minimum wage and the Earned Income Tax Credit. Clinton considered increasing the EITC 
in 1993 a “critical first step” and the “most important thing we can do” in fixing the welfare system.110 He 
argued the increase would “remove all the financial incentive to prefer welfare to work,” be the “best 
incentive to stay off welfare [he] ever heard,” and the “the biggest incentive for people we have ever 
provided to get off welfare and go to work, to reward work and family and responsibility.”111 In 1995, 
Clinton pushed hard on a minimum wage increase, identifying it as a “key” to welfare reform and arguing 
that it would also be an incentive to leave welfare.112 Much of the defense of the minimum wage increase 
was based on the need to “make work pay” or “reward work.” Clinton finally signed the minimum wage 
increase into law just a few days before signing the welfare bill. 
Beyond simply increasing the monetary benefits of work, Clinton supported a rather extensive list 
of expensive policy instruments all designed to help low-wage workers, especially those who may be 
forcibly removed from welfare. Clinton’s original plan previewed in his 1992 campaign book Putting 
People First and then finally announced in June 1994, for example, included increased spending for child 
care, child support, health care, transportation, housing, job training, minimum wage, and the Earned 
Income Tax Credit. Whereas Clinton’s original plan did require the establishment of time-limits to the 
welfare provisions, it was also accompanied by a guarantee of a “dignified and meaningful community 
service job,” a guarantee of “affordable quality health care,” and a guarantee of a working wage (all three 
of which were not included in the 1996 bill he eventually signed).113 Like Nixon and Carter before him, 
Clinton’s proposal to “end welfare as we knew it” would cost more, not less, taxpayer money. However, 
although Clinton did often mention the need for these secondary programs in his various addresses, they 
rarely were the focus and thus most likely were not included as his rhetoric was filtered down to the 
nightly news, morning papers, and congressional hallways. As Clinton advisor George Stephanopoulos 
and Department of Labor secretary Robert Reich would later acknowledge, while the soundbites of ending 
welfare, requiring work, and demanding individual responsibility were designed to redefine the 
Democratic Party by garnering the headlines, the fine print concerning the price tag was not.114
 After the Republican takeover of Congress, Clinton’s opportunity rhetoric tended to backtrack. 
Before the mid-term elections, Clinton rejected the feasibility of cutting welfare without money for 
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significant training and support, and often emphasized the need to provide public jobs if necessary. In 
1995 and 1996, Clinton retreated to a more defensive position in which he primarily criticized the 
Republican welfare bills for lacking child care provisions and thus being “tough on children,” without 
specifying exactly how the bill should be changed.115  
Perhaps the most critical area in which Clinton seemed to backtrack was on the issue of whether 
some sort of job would be guaranteed or not. Early in his administration, Clinton would argue that after 
two years with additional child care, health care, and job training, individual would be required to work in 
either private or public jobs, implying that public jobs may be developed for the exiting welfare 
recipients.116 Often he specifically acknowledged the difficulty of requiring work when work may not be 
available, admitting “It's going to be hard for me to make those work if at the end of all this work to get off 
welfare, there isn't a job.”117 In an interview with Wisconsin media on July 20, 1993, the issue of whether 
jobs would be guaranteed or not to welfare recipients took center stage. First, Clinton explained the 
importance of having work available for his welfare reform to succeed, saying, “if we're going to call an 
end to welfare after 2 years, we have to know that there will be work available. So if there is not a private 
sector job we're going to have to offer work as an alternative to welfare.”118 Clinton was then asked by 
someone in the audience what would happen to those who did not have jobs. The president responded by 
saying: 
I think we have to provide community service type jobs if there are no private sector 
jobs available in order to justify cutting off the benefits. I don't think you can do it in any 
other way. You can't tell people they have to work if there are no jobs. Once they get 
into the work force, then if they lose their jobs and get them back, they'll be like other 
people, they'll have access to unemployment. But for people who have not been in the 
work force, I think there has to be some sort of access to community service jobs if the 
private sector jobs aren't there.119
During the 1994 State of the Union address, Clinton explained that under his welfare plan, after providing 
support, job training, and child care for up to two years, anyone who can work must work “in the private 
sector wherever possible, in community service, if necessary.”120 The possible reliance on “community 
service jobs” was repeated to the National Governors’ Association meeting a week later.121 At the end of 
February, Clinton simply said that “there will be a job there, and you must take it. You must go to work, 
but there will be a job there.”122 Announcing his proposal in June 1994, he mentioned those required to 
work would work in the private sector “if possible” or in a “subsidized job if necessary.”123 The following 
day, Clinton clarified his view on public jobs further, saying:  
if you want to require them to go to work after a certain period of time, it seems to me 
you have to be willing to either say they're going to do a public service job—not make-
work, but work for the city or for the county—or that you will help to subsidize their job 
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in the private sector to make it attractive to hire them, because otherwise you'll be 
cutting people off benefits in areas where they will not be able to get jobs in the private 
sector.”124  
In October of 1994, Clinton reiterated that there had to be jobs available once work requirements were 
enforced, again mentioning public jobs, community service jobs, and incentives for the private sector.125 
Finally, during an interview on BET in November of 1994, Clinton simply stated that “you can't tell 
somebody they've got to go to work unless there is work for them to do.”126  
 As these various comments reveal, Clinton’s original plan involved instilling work requirements, 
but only when work was essentially assured. Throughout 1995 and 1996, however, Clinton’s early concern 
for requiring work without guaranteeing jobs seemed to dissipate. As the various Republican proposals 
were made, all of which did not include any sort of guarantee of jobs, Clinton tended to focus his attack on 
the lack of child care provisions or what he saw as extreme measures against teen pregnancy. The few 
occasions that Clinton did discuss the lack of funds for jobs or job training in the Republican proposals 
were all during 1995. In a letter to congressional leaders concerning welfare reform released in March, for 
example, Clinton reiterated that the central goal of welfare reform must be moving people from welfare to 
work, and expressed his concern for the lack of funds for child care and job training, concluding that 
“[w]hen people just get cut off without going to work, that's not welfare reform.” Clinton did not, 
however, make any mention of providing public jobs.127 A month later, during his weekly radio address, 
Clinton returned to his earlier themes, briefly mentioning the need for job programs, but again stopping 
short of repeating his earlier condition of ensuring the availability of a job: 
First, cutting costs is the primary goal of the Republican welfare bill. By arbitrarily 
cutting future welfare costs the Republicans get money to pay for their tax cuts. Well, I 
agree we need to cut costs, but we also have to be sure that when people leave welfare 
they have the education, training, and skills they need to get jobs, not simply to be off 
welfare and turn to lives of crime or to remain in poverty. If we cut child care, how can 
we expect mothers to go to work? If we cut job training, how will people learn to work? 
If we cut job programs and these people can't find jobs in the private sector, how can we 
require them to work? My top priority is to get people off welfare and into jobs. I want 
to replace welfare with work, so people earn a paycheck, not a welfare check. To do 
that, we have to take some of the money we save and plow it into job training, 
education, and child care. I want tough welfare reform, but we've got to be practical. If 
we're going to make people on welfare work, we have to make it possible for them to 
work. If we're going to make people self-reliant, we have to make it possible for them to 
support themselves. We can be tough, but we've got to be practical.128
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By June of 1995, Clinton’s critique narrowed again. In messages on June 6 and then July 1, he focused 
solely on the lack of child care funds in the Republican proposals, in the latter calling child care a “crucial 
element” that was missing from the congressional bill.129 When vetoing the Republican bill in December 
of 1995, Clinton again did not mention job training or job provisions, but focused again on the lack of 
child care and cuts to funds for disabled children and school lunches.130 Throughout 1996, the existence or 
development of jobs for exiting welfare recipients was simply not an issue in Clinton’s welfare rhetoric. 
In summary, Clinton’s own proposals to replace the ailing welfare system were strongly based on 
the reciprocal relationship between responsibility and opportunity that represented the heart of the New 
Democrat philosophy. The responsibility side of the equation called upon the poor to help themselves and 
avoid detrimental behaviors, and tended to mirror many of the traditional conservative arguments that 
blamed the poor for their poverty. Interestingly, however, Clinton rarely modified his catchword of 
responsibility with the adjectives “individual” or “personal,” which would have emphasized their 
conservative nature more strongly. Clinton then balanced such comments with his call to provide 
opportunity, which mirrored a more traditional liberal perspective. Within this call for opportunity, Clinton 
supported a number of policies that would assist the poor in becoming more self-sufficient. Although 
Clinton attempted to balance both sides of the responsibility-opportunity dynamic, it is clear that the 
balance was not consistent in Clinton’s welfare rhetoric from the 1992 campaign to the 1996 bill. Clinton 
tended to stay firm on his call for responsibility, but the corresponding call for opportunity seemed to 
decrease as time went by, especially in terms of the provision of public jobs to those recipients removed 
from welfare and unable to secure employment on their own. In the end, Clinton decided to sign a bill into 
law that did not include many of the opportunity-based provisions he had deemed critical at the beginning 
of his term in office. Indeed, the bill Clinton signed was actually estimated to save $55 billion over seven 
years, a far cry from Clinton’s original proposal, which had a price tag of additional $9.3 billion over its 
first five years. 
 
1996 PRWORA: The Rhetoric of Transformation 
 
 On August 22, 1996, Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act during a ceremony in the Rose Garden. This section focuses on the address Clinton 
gave during the signing ceremony. The importance of this speech is not tied to its actual impact, for few 
likely heard or read the speech. Rather, its importance lies in Clinton’s particular framing of the potential 
impact of the legislation. In the speech, Clinton argued that by finally changing welfare from a vehicle of 
dependence to one that focused on making the poor independent, the bill would trigger a transformation of 
not only the poor themselves, but the entire manner in which the nation approaches the issue of poverty.   
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 At the beginning of the speech, Clinton offered many of the same themes he had developed 
during the five previous years. Before the president spoke, Lillie Harden, a former welfare recipient who 
was actually the subject of Clinton’s favorite anecdote concerning the child who was happy to have an 
answer to questions about his mother’s employment, had addressed the audience. Clinton began his speech 
by once again telling her story and honoring two other former welfare recipients who “worked their way 
from welfare to independence.” After these introductions, he re-established his typical frame for the 
purpose of the welfare reform: 
What we are trying to do today is to overcome the flaws of the welfare system for the 
people who are trapped on it.  We all know that the typical family on welfare today is 
very different from the one that welfare was designed to deal with 60 years ago.  We all 
know that there are a lot of good people on welfare who just get off of it in the ordinary 
course of business, but that a significant number of people are trapped on welfare for a 
very long time, exiling them from the entire community of work that gives structure to 
our lives. Nearly 30 years ago, Robert Kennedy said, "Work is the meaning of what this 
country is all about.  We need it as individuals, we need to sense it in our fellow citizens, 
and we need it as a society and as a people."  He was right then, and it's right now. From 
now on, our nation's answer to this great social challenge will no longer be a never-
ending cycle of welfare, it will be the dignity, the power and the ethic of work.  Today, 
we are taking an historic chance to make welfare what it was meant to be: a second 
chance, not a way of life. 
This opening statement thus included an attack on the system using the trap metaphor and the 
outdated claim, a limited defense of welfare recipients, and a glorification of the value of work.  
 Clinton then moved into his justification for signing the controversial bill, which at first 
attempted to situate the bill in comparison to the two that he had vetoed, rather than comparing it to the 
prior law or to the traditional Democratic Party position.131 Then, after mentioning the “historic chance” he 
was taking four separate times, Clinton launched his new strategy with the following words:  
Let me also say that there’s something really good about this legislation. When I sign it 
we have all to start again. And this becomes everyone’s responsibility. After I sign my 
name to this bill, welfare will no longer be a political issue. The two parties cannot 
attack each other over it. Politicians cannot attack poor people over it. There are no 
encrusted habits, systems and failures that can be laid at the foot of someone else.  This 
is not the end of welfare reform, this is the beginning. And we all have to assume 
responsibility.  
Clinton had spent the last five years placing the blame on welfare, extolling the conservative watchwords 
of responsibility, and trying to rehabilitate the individual ethos of the welfare recipients. Once the bill was 
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signed, he essentially told America that the problem (welfare) no longer existed, and then turned the same 
values he had been pushing for the poor (responsibility) onto the nationwide audience.  
 Clinton then made a similar move with the value of work, telling the gathered crowd: 
Now that we are saying with this bill we expect work, we have to make sure the people 
have a chance to go to work.  If we really value work, everybody in this society—
businesses, non-profits, religious institutions, individuals, those in government—all have 
a responsibility to make sure the jobs are there. These three women have great stories.  
Almost everybody on welfare would like to have a story like that.  And the rest of us 
now have a responsibility to give them that story.  We cannot blame the system for the 
jobs they don't have anymore.  If it doesn't work now, it's everybody's fault—mine, 
yours, and everybody else.  There is no longer a system in the way. 
Here the ideograph of work, often used before the signing as the glorified antithesis of welfare and for 
many practically a “code word” for threatening and blaming the “idle poor,” had now become a 
commodity that society owed the poor. As Clinton would later remark in his 1997 State of the Union, the 
soundbite that “everyone who can work, must work” had been transformed into “now each and every one 
of us has to fulfill our responsibility—indeed our moral obligation—to make sure that people who now 
must work, can work.”  
The appeal of “There is no longer a system in the way” made Clinton’s argument perfectly clear: 
the red herring of welfare was no more. Whereas once scholars could argue that “blaming welfare for the 
nation’s continuing economic ills deflect[ed] attention from the failure of the market economy to provide 
enough work at livable wages for everyone,”132 Welfare, after all, was a rather inexpensive way to deal 
with many of the symptoms of the poverty problem (such as hunger). It rarely, however, solved the 
problem, and seemed to cause its share of new problems. By placing a limit on welfare, America would 
now be called to face the realities of the situation. In this sense, the nonpoor were perhaps as addicted to 
welfare as the poor supposably were.  
 Clinton later returned to the need for society to live up to its responsibilities, saying, “But let me 
say again, we have to build a new work and family system.  And this is everybody's responsibility now.” 
He demanded that  “what we have to do now is to make that work a reality.” Again, Clinton utilized the 
same conservative ideographs of work, family, and responsibility that were used to attack the welfare 
system to justify increased efforts to assist the poor. Although his arguments had changed, the overarching 
values used to justify them remained entirely consistent.  
Clinton then told the story of a pastor in North Carolina who had agreed that he would hire 
welfare recipients if provided wage supplements by one of the new programs. Clinton followed the story 
with a broader appeal, again focusing on the responsibilities of the wider society: 
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I think there are people all over America like that. That's what I want all of you to be 
thinking about today -- what are we going to do now?  This is not over, this is just 
beginning.  The Congress deserves our thanks for creating a new reality, but we have to 
fill in the blanks.  The governors asked for this responsibility; now they've got to live up 
to it.  There are mayors that have responsibilities, county officials that have 
responsibilities.  Every employer in this country that ever made a disparaging remark 
about the welfare system needs to think about whether he or she should now hire 
somebody from welfare and go to work.  Go to the state and say, okay, you give me the 
check, I'll use it as an income supplement, I'll train these people, I'll help them to start 
their lives and we'll go forward from here. Every single person needs to be thinking -- 
every person in America tonight who sees a report of this who has ever said a 
disparaging word about the welfare system should now say, "Okay, that's gone.  What is 
my responsibility to make it better?"  
The anecdote of the welfare mother, therefore, had been transformed into the anecdote of the good, albeit 
self-interested, citizen, and the call to responsibility had clearly shifted from the poor to the nonpoor.  
Lastly, in the peroration, Clinton summarized the day with a return to the soundbite that began it 
all: 
Today, we are ending welfare as we know it.  But I hope this day will be remembered 
not for what it ended, but for what it began -- a new day that offers hope, honors 
responsibility, rewards work, and changes the terms of the debate so that no one in 
America ever feels again the need to criticize people who are poor on welfare, but 
instead feels the responsibility to reach out to men and women and children who are 
isolated, who need opportunity, and who are willing to assume responsibility, and give 
them opportunity and the terms of responsibility. 
After these final words, Clinton, with the three former welfare mothers at his side, signed the bill into law.  
 In all, four symbolic transformations took place in the speech: (1) welfare recipients were 
transformed from hated, isolated, dependent scapegoats into prideful, working poor striving for self-
sufficiency, and thus, most importantly, from the undeserving to the deserving ranks; (2) governmental 
anti-poverty efforts were transformed from “welfare”—a despised system of cash benefits believed to 
cause dependency and undermine American values whose very title drastically swayed opinion polls—to a 
conglomerate of programs more firmly in tune with the positive and bipartisan values of work, 
responsibility, family, and opportunity; (3) the welfare debate had been transformed from a mean-spirited 
stalemate in which both sides employed caricatures of the other and took advantage of the voicelessness of 
the poor into a civilized deliberation focused on how best to move the former welfare recipients into the 
workforce and revitalize those areas where progress had yet to reach; and (4) the relationship between 
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America’s poor, its nonpoor, its business world, and its government was transformed from one which the 
federal government merely sent a monthly stipend to the poor to one in which the entire nation was called 
upon to accept its responsibility and live up to the ideals of providing work and opportunity in return for 
responsibility.  
 The first two transformations reveal how Clinton sought to take advantage of both public 
predispositions and the framework he had established in his earlier rhetoric. Rather than challenge the 
hatred of welfare and the notion of the deserving/undeserving line, or attacking the middle class 
assumptions of the poor, Clinton worked to shift the entire situation to one that fit the dominant beliefs of 
the relevant audiences and took advantage of their predispositions. 133  Clinton’s approach toward the 
welfare recipients especially reveals the strategic use of polling. Recall that polls had shown that 66 
percent believed the government should spend less on welfare, while 57 percent believed the government 
should spend more on assistance to the poor, and 41 percent had a negative view of welfare recipients, but 
only 4 percent had a negative view of the poor. The legislation, as introduced by Clinton, had suddenly 
transformed the nation’s welfare recipients into the nation’s poor, and thus from hated to respectable, 
undeserving to deserving. According to Clinton advisor Dick Morris, the move was calculated to “usher in 
a sixties-like era of commitment to helping poor people.”134 Clinton’s positive construction of the poor and 
the focus on the obligations of the nonpoor in the speech also worked to distract from the text of the bill 
itself, which was written primarily by Republicans and focused much more on controlling the negative 
behavior of the poor.135  
Ending welfare also removed the point of focus, and allowed Clinton to redefine the situation. 
Whereas before the invocation of work, responsibility, and family could be interpreted as veiled attacks on 
the poor, afterwards they were explicit challenges to the nonpoor to live up to their self-proclaimed ideals. 
Whereas before welfare undermined “mainstream values,” afterwards anything less than a system that 
would provide sufficient and dignified jobs for the former welfare recipients could now be charged with 
undermining those same values. From one perspective, a “work requirement” was a harsh demand on the 
poor; from another, it was a guarantee of employment that obligated government and the nonpoor.   
 The third transformation focuses on another important aspect of Clinton’s centrist style: the 
attempt to neutralize the polarizing effect of two party partisan politics. Many scholars have attacked the 
polarized state of public discourse in general and debate concerning welfare in particular.136 By enveloping 
governmental anti-poverty efforts in the values of work, responsibility, and family, Clinton encouraged 
common ground by arguing for traditional liberal ends through traditional conservative means. In addition, 
by symbolically removing the scapegoat of welfare, Clinton neutralized a typical conservative tactic that 
often included a direct attack on the image of the poor. During the period from 1960 to 1990, somehow the 
public debate had shifted from a concern with how to solve the problem of poverty to one that focused on 
the costs and benefits of one specific proposed solution to the original problem. Unable or unwilling to 
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expose the fallacy of the red herring of welfare dependency, Clinton simply removed it from the debate 
completely. With the controversy surrounding the solution out of the picture, the debate could arguably 
return to the more important question of what to do about the original problem—poverty.   
The final transformation speaks to much broader issues of American political culture and the 
meaning of citizenship. Clinton called upon the American community as a whole to confront the problems 
faced by the poor, especially the welfare poor who had now essentially become the part of the working 
poor. Interestingly, Clinton did not simply rely on this idealistic sense of duty to bring the American 
community together. His vision was not one that simply relied on an altruistic notion of human nature. The 
anecdote he told concerning the pastor receiving government incentives to hire the former welfare 
recipient represents an example of the historical tactic of redirecting self-interest toward the common 
good, an argument eloquently developed as the role of government in the Federalist Papers. It too 
represented a centrist argument that denied the extremes of expecting sufficient altruism or assuming only 
self-interest, and thus justified an activist view of government between the extremes of solving and 
causing all problems. This construct later served as the basis for Clinton’s Welfare-to-Work incentive 
programs and his 1999 New Poverty tour.  
In summary, Clinton’s address at the signing ceremony revealed an important, yet subtle shift in 
his rhetoric of welfare. It was consistent with his pre-signing rhetoric, but considering the bill essentially 
“ended” welfare, the focus changed from the problems of welfare to the new challenges of the newly 
“liberated” and the new responsibilities on the nonpoor. Clinton could still rely heavily on the same values 
he had been glorifying—work, responsibility, and family. All in all, it seems like Clinton justified signing 
the bill even though it did not include the opportunity supporting elements he had promised earlier in his 
term due to the “historic chance” to transform welfare from its outdated form to one focused on work. 
Clinton was also told by Dick Morris that signing the bill would assure him re-election, thus the president 
likely believed that while he could not pass a bill at this time with a better balance of responsibility and 
opportunity, if he signed it now and was subsequently reelected, he could more easily provide more 
opportunity during the next four years.  
 
Bill Clinton and the Dilemmas of Poverty 
 
 Due to his New Democrat philosophy, Bill Clinton was likely predisposed to addressing the 
dilemmas of poverty differently than his predecessors.  A key aspect of the New Democrat perspective 
focused on moderation and the balancing of opposing values. Simply put, Clinton was more likely to not 
only recognize that the dilemmas existed, but would also be more comfortable discussing the dilemmas 
and attempting to negotiate the tensions they caused. Indeed, considering the particulars of the welfare 
debate, it was no surprise that welfare reform would become a key issue within Clinton’s 1992 campaign 
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and his subsequent term in office. The welfare debate had clearly suffered from polarization in which both 
sides seemingly spoke past each other, seemingly oblivious of the points made by the opposition. In 
addition, Clinton was known as a being a “policy wonk” in general, and had extensive experience with 
welfare reform as governor, making it more likely that he would understand the complicated particulars of 
the issue. As a result, Clinton tended to speak much more to both sides of each dilemma throughout his 
first term.  
 
Equality versus Freedom 
 
 Clinton’s New Democrat philosophy addressed the equality-freedom dilemma head on, though 
with different terminology. Rather than focus on the values of equality and freedom, however, Clinton 
primarily discussed the alternative values of responsibility and opportunity. The reciprocal relationship 
between these two values—the New Covenant—defined the basis for the role of government in general, 
and served as the foundation of Clinton’s vision of welfare reform in particular. By arguing that 
government’s role was to insure opportunity while citizens were expected to act responsibly—especially 
in terms of work ethic and meeting the obligations of family—Clinton was also establishing another way 
to balance freedom and equality. Both equality and positive freedom (“freedom to”) were served by 
insuring all citizens have some opportunity to succeed. Balancing the provision of opportunity with the 
expectation of responsibility worked to limit the role of government, and thus served negative freedom, or 
“freedom from.” In other words, “hard working Americans” would not be expected to carry the weight for 
those who choose to stay idle. The addition of responsibility thereby worked to deny notions of equal 
results or simple entitlement.  
 The primary catalyst for the development of the New Democrats and the Democratic Leadership 
Council was the perception by a group of primarily southern Democrats that the Democratic Party had 
strayed from its roots, and had either abandoned the responsibility side of the compact, or had at least 
allowed the Republicans to convince many Americans that they had. Thus adding more of a sense of 
responsibility to public policy was a key part of the New Democratic platform. In the public mind, the lack 
of responsibility was perhaps most evident in regard to welfare and its perceived negative impact on both 
the work ethic and family stability. Applied to welfare, the “simple compact” of the New Covenant thus 
justified both an extensive role of government as well as strict requirements on welfare recipients. In this 
way, the New Covenant was a return to the philosophy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, updated for a 21st 
century world. Clinton, like Roosevelt, rejected the dole, that “subtle destroyer of the human spirit,” for all 
the able-bodied, a group whose ranks had expanded considerably since 1935 as women and single parents 
were now common in the workforce. Of course, Roosevelt’s attack on the dole should not overshadow his 
determination to provide meaningful work and security for the able-bodied, which was the main thrust of 
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many of the New Deal programs. Clinton’s original plans for welfare reform sought the same combination 
of resisting the dole but rewarding work, and he hoped the legacy of the 1996 bill would be that it made 
rewarding work more politically viable. 
 
Deserving versus Undeserving 
 
 Clinton’s depictions offered an interesting mix in terms of the deserving/undeserving line. His 
most important depiction, that of welfare mothers, was primarily positive but not overwhelmingly so. He 
worked to explain that their motivation for welfare was not based on greed or laziness but a complicated 
set of circumstances primarily brought about by the welfare system’s perverse incentives. He also argued 
that their values were mainstream, especially in terms of their desire to work and raise their families. 
Overall, however, Clinton never attempted to identify an external attribution to the original cause of their 
poverty. Although Clinton never directly criticized welfare mothers, he did offer a number of indirect 
comments that brought their effort and past behavior into question. He consistently argued that welfare 
should be a “second chance, not a way of life,” but he never specifically addressed the circumstances of 
the first chance. He also defended the children of welfare recipients by asking people not to punish them 
for the “sins” or “mistakes” of their parents, thereby explicitly placing the blame for the situation on 
something in the welfare recipient’s past. Clinton basically focused on the welfare mother’s future 
potential, rather than what may have occurred in the past. In sum, there was generally no external 
attribution for the original receipt of welfare, but there was an external attribution for the inability to leave 
, and there was substantial support for the idea that with some help, the welfare recipients could be, and 
wanted to be, self-sufficient. 
 Clinton’s secondary depictions were more clearly situated on the deserving/undeserving 
distinction. Clinton’s primary villain was the deadbeat parent, which did at times work to deflect blame 
from the welfare recipient. Clinton’s most sympathetic figure was the poor child, which worked in the 
opposite manner of the deadbeat parent. The image of the poor child represents the epitome of the 
deserving poor, but Clinton never clearly developed the image, mainly relying on simply mentioning the 
existence or growth of poor children, or attacking Republican proposals due to their potential negative 
impact on children. Overall, considering Clinton often pitted the innocence of the poor child to the 
mistakes of the welfare recipient, implicating blaming the parents for the poverty of the children in the 
process, the net effect of invoking children may have been to decrease the sense that the welfare poor were 
undeserving. Clinton’s last depiction of the working poor was also situated within the deserving ranks, and 
Clinton clearly attempted to highlight the unfairness of the fact that so many American families worked 
full time but remained in poverty. The sympathetic image of the working poor was key to Clinton’s 
proposals to raise the Earned Income Tax Credit and the minimum wage, and would become even more 
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critical in Clinton’s justification for signing the welfare bill in 1996, which transformed the welfare poor 
into the working poor. 
 
Help versus Hinder 
 
The help-hinder dilemma was perhaps the area where Clinton’s expertise could best be presented. 
Rhetorically, he did not disappoint, as he exhibited an understanding of the government’s ability to both 
assist and harm the poor, though he remained rather one-sidedly negative about welfare specifically. The 
most important point made by Clinton here was his criticism that the welfare system was outdated. 
Clinton’s point was that as originally designed, the welfare system perhaps helped its intended audience, 
but as the social and economic world changed—especially in terms of women working more and the 
increased number of employed single parents—the system began to work against the poor.  Despite having 
social scholars tied to the administration that would argue that while welfare certainly had its flaws, it 
nonetheless had some valuable positive impacts on many. Clinton was never as complimentary. He would 
admit that the welfare system still worked “as intended” for a few, but its primary impact had now become 
detrimental for most.137 Rather than discussing any of the positive impacts of welfare, Clinton focused 
almost exclusively on the system’s negative impact on work, family, and responsibility. 
 Beyond welfare, however, Clinton discussed a number of programs that could help the poor. 
Essentially all the various programs supported under the value of “opportunity,” including child care, job 
training, public jobs, and education. Following his opportunity-responsibility philosophy, Clinton often 
focused on programs that combined government action with citizen expectation, especially in terms of the 
government providing additional rewards for positive individual or social behavior. With such programs 
Clinton could highlight programs in which government worked as a “partner.” The EITC and minimum 
wage are two key examples that focused on increasing the benefit of positive behavior such as work, as 
well as, Clinton would argue, family and responsibility. Other programs, such as those that provide 
stipends to businesses that hire welfare recipients or invest in low-income areas, worked similarly to 
redirect self-interest toward the common good. Clinton supported a number of these programs, if not 
through national proposals then through allowing states the flexibility to experiment. As he promised in 
his signing ceremony address, Clinton focused more on such programs during his second term, like his 
Welfare-to-Work partnership.   
 Overall, Clinton’s rhetoric revealed an understanding that governmental efforts can work both 
ways. He criticized welfare for no longer working as intended and producing perverse incentives, but then 
labeled other government programs as vital to his redefinition of welfare, especially those that helped 
“make work pay.” The key to effective social policy was often finding the right balance between providing 
opportunity and requiring responsibility. In a way, in following the New Democrat philosophy, Clinton 
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sought to revitalize progressive government by shifting effort and focus away from programs seen as 
wasteful or counterproductive to government programs that enjoyed both more popularity and had shown 
more success. Many of those tended to include a partnership between government and citizens through the 
use of public incentives to encourage beneficial private choices. His shift from welfare to low-wage work 
assistance programs like minimum wage, the EITC, and child care was perhaps the most important of 
these. Clinton realized that for too long welfare and its perceived failures had become a key symbolic 
program of “government” which had likely strongly contributed to the broad dissatisfaction of government 
as a whole. In this way, “ending” welfare and replacing it with more popular programs could likely have 
some positive overall effect on perceptions of the effectiveness of government overall.  
 
Politics versus Policy 
 
 Lastly, the politics-policy dilemma is integral to understanding Clinton in general and especially 
in terms of his rhetoric of welfare. Clearly Clinton’s signing of the 1996 welfare bill generated significant 
controversy and caused significant backlash from the political left. In general, three viable perspectives 
have emerged concerning Clinton’s actions from the perspective of the tensions between politics and 
policy. The first is a story of institutional weakness. Here Clinton’s use of welfare reform as a tactic to 
regain moderate votes in the 1992 campaign backfired when the Republicans took over Congress during 
the mid-term elections. Clinton’s inability to remove welfare reform from the agenda or significantly alter 
the specifics of the Republican bill to match his original proposals thus becomes another example of the 
weakness of the power of the presidency in the face of congressional and popular opposition. Playing 
defense and fighting for his political existence, Clinton was thus “forced” to sign a bill he disagreed with 
in order to insure reelection and keep the office away from Republican hands. Said differently, the 
institutional limits of the office resulted in a situation where Clinton could not overcome the political 
demands of the office in order to pursue his policy goals. 
The second perspective follows a similar ultimate path but tells a familiar story of political 
opportunism rather than institutional weakness. Clinton, playing the role of “Slick Willie,” was simply a 
Machiavellian intent on personal victory and devoid of principle. Clinton thus chose the issue of welfare 
reform during the 1992 campaign because it pandered to the beliefs of his most important target audience: 
the white middle class voters who had abandoned the Democratic Party. In 1996, Clinton merely remained 
true to form, signing the legislation in order to insure his continued political success despite any disparate 
policy consequences. Once again politics trumps policy, but here the blame is more individual to Clinton 
rather than institutional. 
Although this analysis uncovers evidence that supports both these positions, perhaps the primary 
contribution of this analysis as a whole lies in its discernment of the third view: Clinton’s hopeful story of 
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pragmatism. From this perspective, Clinton originally tried to achieve both his political goals of getting 
elected and reconstructing the Democratic party and his policy goal of providing better assistance to the 
disadvantaged by making the popular promise to end welfare while, with considerably less fanfare, also 
supporting increased spending on the various secondary programs. With the failure of his health care 
reform and the Republican victory in 1994, Clinton’s political goal of getting re-elected became much 
more difficult, and thus the politics-policy balance likely shifted toward the former. As a result, Clinton 
agreed to sign the welfare bill despite the considerable retreat from his original proposals (and thus his 
policy goals) in order to reassure re-election. At the same time, Clinton believed signing the bill into law 
would make the future pursuit of his policy goals much easier in terms of helping the poor, due to both the 
rhetorical transformation he outlined in the signing day speech, as well as the simple fact that he would be 
president for four more years rather than a Republican.  
This third interpretation thus relies primarily on the argument that the 1996 law would change the 
nation’s “culture of anti-poverty” from one hostile to welfare recipients into one amenable to helping the 
working poor. Clinton argued that such a change would not only benefit the poor, but would potentially 
lead to the revitalization of progressive government as a whole. Clinton’s welfare legacy will ultimately 
depend on the long term impact of the 1996 bill on both welfare recipients and the political climate 
surrounding welfare and poverty issues. In the future, scholars should investigate in more detail the extent 
to which the four rhetorical transformations Clinton discussed in his signing day address were merely 
symbolic gestures that served as some form of diversion or personal rationalization, or whether the law 
truly managed to induce significant positive changes in the manner in which the country approaches its 
poorer citizens. The viability of this third perspective is examined in further detail in the concluding 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION  
 
 From 1963 to 1996, five American presidents waded into the murky waters of enduring American 
paradoxes and placed welfare or poverty near the top of their political agendas. The first, Lyndon Johnson, 
promised an end to poverty in the United States, and the last, Bill Clinton, promised to end welfare as it 
was known. The former was unable to complete his charge, the latter, at least to some extent, did. In 
between, three presidents were primarily met with frustration as they tried to reform a welfare system that 
suffered from almost universal disapproval.  
 This longitudinal analysis of the rhetorical efforts of these five presidents on behalf of their 
policies reveals a number of important insights. Six key points are offered and supported here in the 
conclusion: 1. All five presidents invoked essentially the same ideal of equal opportunity and, to a lesser 
extent, the concept of living wages. 2. After Lyndon Johnson, poverty as an issue became an afterthought, 
whereas welfare and its negative impact dominated discussion of these issues. 3. The presidential 
discussion of welfare and its impacts were consistently one-sided and tied more closely with questionable 
public opinion rather than scholarly analysis. 4. The presidents presented a wide variety of relevant 
characters, but overall expressed rather similar positions on the main distinctions. The presidents were 
generally sympathetic to unemployables, the unemployed, and the working poor; mostly avoided 
discussing poor children; and primarily focused upon a mixed image of the welfare poor that while 
predominately negative was also rather hopeful. 5. Seen through the lens of the four paradoxes of poverty, 
it is clear that the presidents as a whole were out of balance toward hinder rather than help, and, to a lesser 
extent, toward undeserving rather than deserving, while the ideal of equal opportunity expressed by the 
presidents worked to balance equality and freedom. The potential impact of the obvious gap between this 
ideal and the real, however, was neutralized by the focus on the hindering aspect of welfare and the 
undeserving nature of welfare recipients. As a result, the policy-politics dilemma was often negotiated 
through a more conservative path. 6. As argued by Clinton, the 1996 welfare law should have the effect of 
significantly altering the rhetoric and politics of welfare and poverty, essentially removing the red herring 
of welfare and the accompanying undeserving image of the idle poor and shifting the focus back to 
poverty and the more sympathetic image of the working poor. To support these six conclusions, I will 
review and analyze the findings of the earlier chapters by returning once more to the four paradoxes of 
poverty.  
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Equality and Freedom: The Universal Ideal of Equal Opportunity 
 
 The first key finding of this analysis is that all five presidents essentially invoked the same 
ideal—equal opportunity—and, for the most part, supported a rather significant role for government to 
fulfill that ideal. The presidents varied in the degree of specificity applied to the concept of equal 
opportunity, but nonetheless they all seemed to support the idea that everyone should have the opportunity 
to succeed. True to the overriding individualism dominant in American ideology, this ideal was often 
closely associated with the expectation that every American also had the responsibility to work to realize 
this ideal. The distinction between equal opportunity and equal results, therefore, was to lie in individual 
effort. 
 The ideal of equal opportunity represents a natural balance between the competing American 
values of freedom and equality. To offer equal opportunity to all is to provide equality by offering positive 
freedom at a hopefully minimal cost of negative freedom. Said differently, the government should only 
violate the freedom of individuals enough to insure equal opportunity for all. Both political parties agree 
on the ideal of equal opportunity, they only differ in terms of the manner and degree of governmental 
action to insure it. That question is in turn clearly influenced by beliefs concerning the degree to which 
equal opportunity is naturally provided by the market, and the degree to which government unnaturally 
adds barriers to equal opportunity.  
Of the five presidents examined in this study, Lyndon Johnson by far was the most focused on the 
gap between the ideal of equal opportunity and the reality for America’s poor. Johnson attacked the 
hypocrisy of a rich nation with such ideals accepting continued poverty. He expressed the goal of 
providing every person who wanted a job and was willing to work with a “chance to get a decent job” and 
the “right to earn a living.” He defined the “fundamental objective of the nation” as providing full and fair 
opportunity for all citizens to develop to the best of their abilities. Johnson clearly envisioned a critical 
role of government, in particular the federal government, in fulfilling these goals. To Johnson, the primary 
purpose of government was to expand and insure opportunity. Based on these beliefs, Johnson declared his 
War on Poverty. To Johnson, in sum, equality was being violated due to the very existence of poverty.  
Richard Nixon expressed a similar overriding ideal as Johnson, but differed in terms of his 
perception of the gap between the ideal and the real, and the best way to close that gap. Like Johnson, 
Nixon argued that government had a clear role in providing an “equal chance at the starting line” and that 
everyone should have a chance to go as high as their talents can take them. Nixon agreed that the goal was 
to guarantee an opportunity and a fair chance to be rewarded for work. Nixon disagreed with Johnson’s 
attack on American hypocrisy, however. Nixon glorified the American free enterprise system for the 
results it had achieved, bragging that the United States had more income equality than any other nation. 
Nixon recognized that a gap still existed, but it was not as drastic or shameful as Johnson had framed it. In 
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addition, Nixon added to Johnson’s late attack on the negative impact of the welfare system and placed 
significant blame on that system, as well as its recipients, for the gap. As a result, the immediate role of 
government to insure equal opportunity shifted away from providing opportunity in terms of education, 
training, better environments, and less discrimination, and more to reducing the negative impacts of 
welfare and rehabilitating the idle poor.  
Jimmy Carter’s rhetoric in this area was somewhat inconsistent. The most distinctive aspect of 
Carter’s rhetoric concerning the role of government involved his cautiousness. Carter spoke often of the 
limits of government and the need for more efficiency and competence. On the other hand, Carter not only 
supported the ideal of equal opportunity, but at times he expressed that abstract ideal in a much more 
concrete manner than his predecessors. Specifically, Carter argued for a guarantee that every family with a 
full time worker would earn adequate wages to finance a family—known as a living wage—as well as a 
guarantee of a job for at least one person in every family. He argued that a job was a basic human right. At 
times, however, he softened these guarantees, offering instead an “opportunity” for a job to all those that 
were able-bodied. Carter’s inconsistency also showed in his actions surrounding the Full Employment Act. 
Carter signed the bill, but his lack of support during its path through Congress likely contributed to its 
status as primarily a symbolic gesture with little policy impact. Carter also did not spend much political 
capital exposing the gap between these ideals and reality. Curiously, he did at one point reveal the extent 
to which the working poor were making insufficient funds, but that remained only one brief exception to 
his usual focus. Indeed, Carter, like Nixon, focused much more on the evils of welfare than the problem of 
poverty. Nonetheless, Carter’s call for guaranteed jobs for all the able-bodied and his call for that job to 
provide a wage sufficient enough to support a family were very strong and specific expressions of the 
ideal of equal opportunity.  
Ronald Reagan’s anti-government ideology was clear from the beginning, but he nonetheless 
supported the same ideal. Reagan argued that guaranteeing equal opportunity was within the legitimate 
role of government. Equal opportunity was identified as a “hallmark” and “principle” of the nation. While 
Reagan accepted that ideal and perhaps even the gap between the ideal and real, his focus was clearly on 
placing blame for the gap upon government itself. The welfare system and its connection to dependency 
was perhaps his strongest example. Reagan’s ideology was a return to the pre-New Deal laissez-faire 
ideology that equal opportunity would naturally be provided by the free enterprise system, with some 
assistance from volunteers and community ties, as long as government did not interfere. The role of 
government, therefore, was to get out of the way.  
Lastly, Bill Clinton’s New Democrat philosophy placed considerable focus on reconceptualizing 
equal opportunity. Clinton’s opportunity-responsibility dyad worked primarily to emphasize the 
importance of individual responsibility to the workings of equal opportunity, in part because of the 
Democratic Party’s perceived abdication of such responsibility. By placing such a renewed focus on 
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individual responsibility, however, the New Democrats believed they could in turn reinvigorate the call for 
opportunity. Indeed, Clinton often invoked the need to live up to the “American dream,” and, like Carter, 
Clinton often put a concrete face on equal opportunity by establishing the specific ideal that any family 
with a full time worker should earn enough to pull the family out of poverty. Unlike Carter, however, 
Clinton was very consistent in the expression of the ideal, repeating it again and again throughout his first 
term. Clinton also spent considerable effort in exposing the gap between this ideal and the fact millions of 
American families lived in poverty despite a full-time worker. Although he was unable to achieve that 
ideal, he did move the country closer to it with the expansion of the EITC and increases to the minimum 
wage, and in his second term with the increase in medical care to the children of the working poor, child 
tax credits, and Welfare-to-Work programs. Like his predecessors, Clinton also placed significant blame 
on the welfare system for causing dependency and thus violating equal opportunity, although he did 
temper this criticism somewhat by spreading part of the blame to the relative value of low-wage work 
compared to welfare. 
In sum, all five presidents, whether Republican or Democrat, expressed the same high ideal of 
equal opportunity for all Americans. They differed on how close the nation was to realizing that ideal and 
how best to close the gap, but nonetheless recognized an overall role for government in seeking that ideal. 
Equal opportunity is an abstract ideal, but both Carter and Clinton did provide concrete manifestations of 
it, arguing that families with full time workers should earn enough to escape poverty. This goal, also 
known as a living wage, is strongly supported by the American public in opinion polls, with polls on the 
question returning over ninety percent agreement.1 The importance of the consistency with which this 
ideal was supported lies in its rejection of social Darwinism and extreme individualism and its acceptance 
of an optimistic and progressive ideal. Of course, the ideal, both in presidential rhetoric and opinion polls, 
is tied closely to the importance of work for the able-bodied. Work was glorified by all the presidents as 
the primary means through which equal opportunity is to be realized. Each president also seemed to 
recognize that the nation was falling short of its ideal, although each provided a different mix of reasons 
for this failure, with the welfare system most commonly identified as a critical barrier. 
 
Help vs. Hinder: The War on Welfare 
 
 The help versus hinder paradox focuses on the difficulty of designing programs that provide 
assistance to targeted groups while avoiding unintended consequences that may either cause harm to them 
or attract others that do not need the programs. A key point derived from how these presidents discussed 
the impact of anti-poverty programs is that beginning with the later years of the Johnson administration 
and continuing all the way until the 1996 changes, the presidents in this study focused overwhelmingly on 
welfare’s negative impacts, rarely discussing any positives, much less actually discussing poverty on its 
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own (Table 1). In addition, their critiques focused almost exclusively on more conservative attacks on 
welfare, including a number of claims that were presented matter-of-factly despite being considered 
controversial in the scholarly literature. The presidents thus helped to reinforce negative public beliefs—
many would say misconceptions—about welfare programs that were not clearly supported by research. 
 
 
Table 1: Importance of Major Anti-welfare Arguments by President 
President Anti-work Anti-family Dependency Waste/Fraud/ 
Abuse 
Excessive Cost 
Johnson Low None Low Low None 
Nixon High High Moderate Moderate High 
Carter Moderate Moderate None Moderate Moderate 
Reagana Moderate High High High High 
Clinton Moderate Moderate Moderateb None Low 
a Reagan focused on the waste, fraud, and abuse of all government programs from 1980 to 1986, and then focused on more on the 
welfare system’s impact on dependency and family from 1986 to 1988. 
b Clinton did not tend to speak of “dependency,” but nonetheless did rely quite heavily on the “trap” metaphor when criticizing 
welfare.  
 
 
 Whereas the presidents were almost exclusively negative when discussing the welfare system as 
it operated at the time, they did admit to the potential for positive impacts—or perhaps at least a reduction 
in their negative impacts—if it was altered according to their designs. Most of the new proposals offered 
by the presidents involved a redefinition of the purpose of welfare from income maintenance and 
sustenance to rehabilitation in terms of moving welfare recipients into work. Indeed, the framing of the 
purpose of rhetoric is clearly a key issue of analysis, not only because almost every president sought to 
redefine its purpose, but also because the presidents tended to misrepresent welfare’s original purpose. 
Such misrepresentations likely contributed to welfare’s unpopularity, as the programs were often 
condemned for not accomplishing goals they were not designed to address.  
 Lyndon Johnson somewhat represents the exception to the rule, but not to the extent many may 
assume. Johnson was certainly optimistic concerning the positive potential of government programs early 
in his administration, but, like the others, he tended to limit his optimism to his own new Great Society 
programs. In addition, he offered some of the same criticisms of the welfare system that his successors 
would make throughout the next thirty years. In introducing his proposals, he often dissociated them from 
the “dole,” identifying the dole negatively as handouts, exploitation, an opiate, and a waste. He even 
promised that his Great Society would result in the “end of the dole.” In 1967 and 1968, he attacked 
welfare due to its link to dependency, and how it penalized work. Overall, Johnson’s War on Poverty 
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clearly was meant to represent a departure from the traditional welfare system. Johnson differed from the 
other presidents not in his criticism of welfare, but rather in his broader problem definition and the target 
audience for his policies. Whereas Nixon, Carter, Reagan, and Clinton focused on the welfare population, 
Johnson focused on the poor overall, which represent a much greater number than those on welfare. 
Poverty, not the welfare system, was the primary issue for Johnson. The welfare system was still deemed 
problematic, it was simply not the point of focus. The irony of the War on Poverty was that while Johnson 
attacked the dole and designed his programs to be distinct from welfare, one of the primary results of his 
programs was an extraordinary increase in the welfare rolls. That increase and the costs associated with it 
helped raise welfare reform’s position on the public agenda.  
 Richard Nixon wasted no time in setting his sites firmly on the growing welfare system. Nixon 
gave the only nationally televised address ever solely focused on the welfare system on August 8th of his 
first year in the White House.2 In that speech alone he called the welfare system a “colossal failure,” a 
“quagmire,” a “huge monster,” and an “antiquated, wheezing, overloaded machine.” Of the five presidents 
examined, Nixon was clearly the most rhetorically hostile to the welfare system. His attack focused on its 
counterproductive tendencies toward work and family, but also included how welfare caused dependency, 
demeaned the poor, and suffered from waste and abuse. Nixon was troubled about welfare’s growing costs 
and its impact on the economy. He even blamed the violence of the race riots on the false hope provided 
by Johnson’s promises and programs to the disadvantaged. Welfare, he argued, supported a “welfare 
ethic” that was un-American and “breeds weak people.”3  Nixon sought to replace welfare with his Family 
Assistance Plan, which, due to its family income floor, work incentives, and simplified administration, 
would presumably avoid many of welfare’s fatal flaws. Thus while he strongly attacked the welfare 
system, he still supported significant government action. Like Johnson, Nixon also understood that 
replacing welfare with a program that supported the transition to work would be more expensive than the 
current system. 
 Even though he was a Democrat, Jimmy Carter continued the barrage on welfare. His attack was 
not as wide-ranging as Nixon’s and his anti-welfare rhetoric was not nearly as frequent, but nonetheless he 
was certainly more focused on welfare’s flaws than any of its positive impacts or poverty in general. 
Carter relied on welfare as a campaign issue in 1976, and like Nixon, offered his own major plan to 
completely “overhaul” the current system. Carter’s attack on welfare was three-pronged, addressing 
welfare’s anti-work, anti-family, and inefficient nature. Interestingly, Carter’s criticism focused on 
welfare’s mismatch with the able-bodied, which he identified as only ten percent of its clientele. Carter 
accepted that welfare did indeed work as intended for those that could not work. He offered to replace 
welfare with the Program for Better Jobs and Income, which split its recipients into those two groups, 
offering dignity and compassion to unemployables, and better opportunities through work incentives, 
income supports, and public jobs for those that could not work. After first promising that his plan would 
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not require additional funds, Carter fell in line with Johnson and Nixon after realizing that changing the 
nature of welfare for the able-bodied would inherently cost more. 
 A significant aspect of Ronald Reagan’s ideology and persona was tied up in his belief that 
government caused more harm than good. To Reagan, government was the problem, and the cause of a 
myriad of economic and social ills. From the beginning of his first presidential campaign, Reagan strongly 
attacked the wasteful and counterproductive nature of government programs as a whole. Reagan did not, 
however, significantly discuss welfare’s particular ills during his first six years, in part because of the 
strategy he used to defend his cuts. Reagan primarily focused on how the programs were not needed by 
many of their recipients, rather than arguing that they were ill-fitted to the able-bodied, as Johnson, Nixon, 
and Carter had argued. Changing welfare to serve the able-bodied, as those three presidents realized, 
would cost more, a path Reagan certainly sought to avoid. Starting with the 1986 State of the Union, 
however, Reagan shifted and began to focus more specifically on welfare’s perverse incentives, especially 
its link to dependency and its negative impact on families. Reagan would eventually sign the Family 
Support Act of 1988, which did further the connection between welfare and work, but in retrospect was 
poorly funded and hardly worked to realign welfare toward self-sufficiency.4 In the end, Reagan’s rhetoric 
was consistent with his predecessors in terms of focusing primarily on the negative aspects of government 
programs in general and the welfare system in particular.  
 Bill Clinton added to the assault on welfare, and made his promise to “end welfare as we know it” 
a key plank in his 1992 campaign. Considering he was a Democrat and often boasted of his expertise in 
this policy area from his days as governor and on welfare reform committees, Clinton’s critique must be 
considered especially powerful. Clinton placed substantial blame on welfare for the problems of the poor, 
calling welfare one of the worst failures of government. His specific criticisms departed somewhat from 
the other presidents, but the overall impact was similar: welfare did not work, undermined American 
values, was often counterproductive toward work and family, and was supported by noone. Perhaps 
Clinton’s most relevant critique was that welfare was outdated. Clinton explained, for example, how 
welfare was originally intended to serve only those that could not work or were expected to stay home to 
care for their children, and had no other form of support. Clinton relied on Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s 
representative anecdote concerning the “West Virginia miner’s widow” on a few occasions to illustrate his 
point. Welfare had been “set up for the right reasons,” but in a nation with millions of single working 
parents, it was no longer ideally suited to its purpose.  
 Clinton’s plan to fix welfare involved adding some work and behavioral requirements as well as 
increased spending in a number of other areas, including child care, job training, EITC, and either public 
employment or subsidies to private employers who hire former welfare recipients. Said differently using 
Clinton’s preferred terminology, in order to work properly, anti-poverty programs needed to provide a 
much better balance between expecting responsibility and providing opportunity. Work, he argued, must 
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pay. Within his new proposals, therefore, Clinton certainly assumed an important and useful role for the 
government, albeit balanced with expectations from the beneficiaries of the programs. Once again, it was 
clear that properly redefining welfare toward self-sufficiency would come with a significant price tag.  
 All five presidents were thus rather consistent in their criticism of the welfare system and all 
hoped either to shift focus to other programs better suited to serve the able-bodied poor, or significantly 
alter the welfare system in order to better address the current situation. Through the lens of the help-hinder 
paradox, the presidents clearly focused on the hinder side of things when it came to the welfare system, 
but were nonetheless rather optimistic about the consequences of these government programs if only 
certain reforms were made. In other words, welfare specifically was the problem, not government. 
Whereas Reagan did attack government in general rather harshly from 1980 to 1986, he nonetheless 
continued to accept the ideal that government had a role in assuring equal opportunity, and from 1986 to 
1988, he supported various welfare reform proposals that included a significant role for government, 
although Reagan tended to prefer that inclusion occur at lower levels of government.  
 Compared to the scholarly research on poverty, the overall image of welfare presented by the five 
presidents was problematic. Overall, it was skewed in three ways: many of the specific negative attacks 
concerning perverse incentives were overstated, the depiction focused predominately on the conservative 
critiques while being silent on the liberal critiques, and the depiction generally was very limited in terms 
of outlining any positive impacts.  
 Examining the first point, a copious amount of research exists examining the consequences of 
welfare, with numerous contradictory findings. In general, however, it is clear that many of the cause and 
effect arguments the presidents were making as if they were fact were actually rather unclear. Four of the 
primary attacks on welfare that were consistently applied from the end of the Johnson administration until 
the signing of the 1996 bill accused it of being anti-work, anti-family, causing dependency, and 
excessively costly. While offering limited support for each, the research does not clearly substantiate these 
four charges.  
 While the welfare system could certainly act as a disincentive to work, the degree it actually 
influenced individual decisions to work or not is unclear. In her summary of research in this area, 
economist Rebecca Blank argued that while cash transfers did lead to less work, the effect was not large.5 
Without welfare more people would work, but the amount of additional work would not be substantial. In 
addition, placing all the blame for the decision to choose welfare over work on the welfare system greatly 
simplifies a complicated situation. Additional factors beyond the cash payment may include the lack of 
education or skills, child care, transportation, and/or viable jobs. Other than Clinton, the presidents tended 
to explain simply that welfare created a perverse incentive to remain idle because it was more attractive 
than work. While welfare was perhaps more attractive than work, such a judgment is relative and thus 
should consider the pros and cons of both variables. The presidents tended to focus only upon welfare’s 
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negatives and work’s positives, and remained silent concerning welfare’s positives and work’s negatives. 
As a result, the gap in value between the two seemed drastic.   
 Whereas welfare’s anti-work tendency was perhaps merely overstated and oversimplified, the 
assumption that the welfare system significantly harmed families, a key criticism for all the presidents 
after Johnson, is more controversial. Welfare was continuously blamed for encouraging the breakup of 
marriages or discouraging their onset, as well as encouraging additional out-of-wedlock births. The 
charges made some logical sense, as the presidents often explained, since the rules of eligibility often 
required recipients to not have viable wage-earners in the household, and additional children resulted in 
higher stipends. The research, however, is inconclusive concerning these cause and effect relationships. 
The assumption that women have children in order to increase their welfare check is especially 
questionable. For one thing, the increase in funds is low, considering the cost of an additional child.6 As 
explained by one welfare director in 1993: “[a]nyone who thinks that a woman goes through nine months 
of pregnancy, the pain of childbirth and 19 years of rearing a child for $45 more a month . . . has got to be 
a man.”7
Statistics clearly show that out-of-wedlock births greatly increased during the 1970s and 1980s 
before leveling off somewhat in the 1990s, but that trend was also true for the general population, not just 
welfare recipients. In addition, the average size of AFDC families actually decreased from 4 in 1969 to 2.9 
in 1990.8 Research also shows that fertility rates do not correlate with differences in the levels of stipends 
from state to state or during different time periods.9 In an extensive review of the literature in this area 
published in the Journal of Economic Literature, Robert Moffit concluded that “the most notable 
characteristic of this literature” was the “failure to find strong benefit effects.”10  
 The charge that welfare was a trap that caused dependency is also not clearly supported by the 
literature. Moffit’s review did conclude that the level of benefits is “negatively and significantly related to 
the probability of leaving AFDC, positively and significantly related to the probability of entry onto the 
AFDC rolls,”11 but, once again, the impact of these correlations is unclear. In general, the research shows 
that while there is some long term receipt, in most cases welfare spells are temporary. David Ellwood, who 
would later serve in the Clinton administration, showed that half of the spells on welfare lasted no more 
than two years, and only ten percent lasted longer than a decade.12  Rebecca Blank’s review concluded that 
there was little evidence that welfare was “addictive.”13  Blank explained that the small percentage of 
long-term recipients often had characteristics that served as major barriers to self-sufficiency. Welfare, in 
other words, was not the sole or even the primary cause of their dependence. The research also questions 
the concern over welfare’s intergenerational transmission. Research shows that only a quarter or a third of 
daughters of welfare mothers also end up on the rolls themselves.14  
Welfare’s link to dependency has been a particular target of liberal critics. Nancy Fraser and 
Linda Gordon argue that “dependency” is the “single most crucial term in the current U.S. debate about 
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welfare reform” and a key part of the ideological attack against the poor. They described it as a term that 
“leaks a profusion of stigmatizing connotations—racial, sexual, misogynist, and more.”15 In 1993, Lucie 
B. White attacked the link, writing: 
The myth is that welfare itself is the problem at the root of entrenched 
“intergenerational” poverty. According to the myth, it is welfare policy—rather than the 
more complex historical, structural, economic, and psycho-cultural dynamics of 
poverty—that causes families, especially those headed by women, to be and to remain 
poor.16
Beyond the specific question of whether welfare receipt is correlated with dependency, welfare was 
essentially designed with the assumption that its recipients would be dependent, so the charge is somewhat 
misplaced in the first place. 
 Lastly, Nixon, Carter, and Reagan all attacked welfare’s cost. Examining such a charge is 
difficult because it is often unclear what programs are included when “welfare” is discussed. Most often 
welfare presumably refers to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which became Temporary 
Aid to Needy Families (TANF) with the 1996 changes. But some may use welfare as a generic term for a 
number of other means-tested programs, including food stamps, housing assistance, and supplemental 
security insurance. If only AFDC/TANF is at issue, however, the overwhelming concern on the cost is a 
bit puzzling, especially when compared to the cost of other large budget items. Comparing federal outlays, 
unemployment insurance and social security has been more expensive than AFDC every year since 1961. 
Outlays for AFDC were passed by Medicaid and housing assistance in 1974, food stamps in 1979, SSI in 
1991, and EITC in 1996.17 The cost of welfare certainly increased at a high rate from the 1960s through 
the 1980s, but it still never became a significant percentage of the overall budget, and the rate of increase 
was similar to other programs. Writing in 1990, admittedly before the expansion of AFDC in the early 
nineties but nonetheless insightful, Theodore Marmor, Jerry Mashaw, and Philip Harvey showed that 
federal AFDC spending as a percentage of total federal spending actually decreased with time, moving 
from a high of 5.7 percent in 1972 to 1.7 percent in 1987. As a percentage of total federal spending on 
social welfare programs, AFDC dropped from 12.4 percent in 1972 to 3.6 percent in 1987.18 In 1987, 
AFDC represented less than two-fifths of one percent of GNP.  
This over-emphasis on welfare’s cost is typical not just of presidential rhetoric, but of public 
rhetoric about welfare in general. It seems clear that since welfare was unpopular, it become a common 
target in tax revolts and other criticisms of the increasing cost of government, while more expensive but 
more popularly supported programs were spared. As a result, public opinion polls consistently reveal that 
the American public greatly overestimates the cost of welfare.19  
 In sum, four of the five major attacks on welfare have some support in the research literature, but 
overall that support is limited and inconsistent. Even the fifth charge, concerning waste, fraud, and abuse, 
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can be questioned.20 Perhaps the best way to explain the misrepresentation is to assume that the nation’s 
poor may certainly face a situation that is difficult to escape and that runs counter to work and family, but 
the presidents clearly placed too much blame on the welfare system for these problems. The welfare 
system represented only one aspect of the situation, and likely not the most important.  
 The second issue with the president’s depiction of welfare concerns its overemphasis on the 
conservative critiques compared to the relative silence on the typical liberal critiques.  Of course, in 
general those on the left would tend to focus on poverty, inequality, and discrimination rather than 
welfare, but they do nonetheless have a distinct view of the problems with the welfare system. A main 
concern for liberals is the continuing negative stereotypes of welfare recipients, namely that they are lazy, 
promiscuous, and predominately minorities. While the presidents did not reinforce these stereotypes too 
strongly, they also never refuted them, despite evidence that the public perception of welfare recipients 
was distorted.21 The attack on welfare from the political left also tends to focus on the inadequacy of 
benefits and the geographic inequality of benefits. The typical welfare benefit, for example, does not 
approach bringing the recipient’s family to the poverty line. Unlike social security, AFDC was never 
indexed to the cost of living, therefore the relative value of the benefits continuously decreased with time. 
Historically, due to the role of states and local communities in setting rates, serious inequalities exist when 
benefit levels are compared. In high benefit states such as Alaska, California, and Wisconsin, the average 
payment in 1998 neared or exceeded $500 a month, while in low benefit states such as Mississippi, 
Alabama, and Texas, it was often below $200. 22 These gaps far exceed any sense of a cost of living 
adjustment. Overall, the presidents rarely mentioned these criticisms of welfare. Clinton at times discussed 
the decreasing value of the welfare stipend, but did not do so within the framework of a critique. Nixon’s 
FAP and Carter’s PBJI would have decreased these geographic inequalities, but neither president spent 
much rhetorical energy in highlighting the problem.  
 Lastly, the presidents were also mostly silent concerning any positives derived from the welfare 
program. They did at times admit that welfare did help those who could not work, but their rhetoric overall 
distracted from such notions. Rebecca Blank outlined three overall lessons she learned from her extensive 
economic analysis of welfare and poverty issues. The third of these lessons was: 
“Nothing works” seriously misinterprets history and ignores the real successes we have 
achieved. It also ignores thirty years of knowledge about what works and what does not, 
accumulated through observation, experience, and program evaluation. . . . . many of 
these programs are doing exactly what they were designed to do.”23   
In his book Poor Support, Ellwood summarized his years of work on the issue, writing, “somewhat to our 
surprise, welfare did not seem to deserve much blame for these phenomena [poverty, family 
disintegration]. Indeed, the research suggested that welfare had done a lot to protect families and children, 
and the unintended negative effects were quite modest. Welfare seemed to do far more good than harm. . . 
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. But the message didn’t sell very well. People hated welfare no matter what the evidence.”24 Marmor, 
Mashaw, and Harvey echoed a similar sentiment in their America’s Misunderstood Welfare State: 
Persistent Myths, Enduring Realities, arguing that the nation’s social welfare efforts were “taking a bum 
rap….however successful in practice, are now particularly portrayed as failures, almost never as sources of 
pride.”25 Blank adds that the positive impact of these programs are often underestimated because of a 
focus on the number of individuals that are brought out of poverty. Such a view of the impacts is very 
limited, because the modest benefits received by welfare recipients rarely push them over that specific 
threshold. However, all recipients receive an increase in income that can significantly close the poverty 
gap and increase their standard of living. Welfare also allows welfare mothers to stay home with their 
children, an obvious point that is rarely mentioned as well. Commenting on the overall public and 
scholarly discussion of welfare, Blank concluded by stating: “The claim that these programs have failed is 
not based on the evidence. We have talked far too much (and often incorrectly) about the failure of 
antipoverty programs and not enough about their real successes.”26 This analysis of presidential rhetoric 
reveals that for the most part the American presidents have contributed to these misconceptions.  
 In summary, the presidential discussion of welfare and poverty from roughly 1967 to 1996 was 
dominated by a very narrow aspect of the overall issue: the conservative perspective concerning welfare’s 
negative impacts. After Johnson turned his focus to the Vietnam War in the late 1960s, poverty essentially 
disappeared from presidential rhetoric. As many have commented, the War on Poverty became the War on 
Welfare. For the most part, the complicated tangle of disadvantages Johnson described as the cycle of 
poverty did not fade away in reality, but certainly did so in presidential rhetoric. In addition, the 
presidential rhetoric matched the general public (mis)conceptions. While it would be difficult to argue that 
there was a direct cause and effect relationship between the president’s rhetoric and public opinion in 
causing this misconceptions, a case could be made that the presidents, considering their access to research 
and the power of the bully pulpit, missed an opportunity to correct them.27
 Viewed through the lens of the help-hinder paradox, the presidents overwhelmingly focused on 
the potential for government anti-poverty programs to hurt its recipients rather than help them. The 
presidential critiques, however, focused primarily on how the programs worked at the time. All the 
presidents were much more optimistic about the potential for government to help, if only the programs 
were altered in various ways. The key alteration overall was a shift in focus from sustenance to work and 
opportunity. In the end, therefore, especially after the “end” of welfare in 1996, the extensive, and 
somewhat distorted, attack on AFDC’s flaws became rather moot, and all that was left was the optimism 
surrounding the new role of government anti-poverty efforts. Said differently, the 1996 law worked to 
swing the pendulum from favoring the hinder side to favoring the help side of the paradox. For thirty 
years, welfare had been judged harshly and somewhat unfairly for not doing what it was not designed to 
do. Now, the actual and assumed goals of the government’s anti-poverty efforts would finally match.  
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Deserving versus Undeserving 
 
 The five presidents in this study presented an interesting array of characters when discussing 
welfare and poverty issues. Although the specific characters and labels each invoked varied, the overall 
categories were rather consistent. Overall, five character groups are particularly relevant: the welfare poor, 
the working poor, the unemployables, the unemployed, the hard-core poor, and the poor child (Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2: Importance of Primary Characters in  
Presidential Poverty/Welfare Rhetoric 
 Welfare 
recipients 
Working 
Poor 
Unemployables Un-employed Hard-Core 
Poor 
Children 
Johnson  Minor Moderate Moderate a Majorb  
Nixon Majorc Moderate Moderate    
Carter Moderate Minor Moderate Minord   
Reagan Major e  Moderate f Moderate   
Clinton Major Major   Minorg Moderate 
a frictionally unemployed, b hard core unemployed, c  idle loafers, d positive image of recently unemployed heads of household early, 
unemployed teens late, e welfare cheats, welfare dependent, and the rationally not needy, f  the truly needy, g some discussion of 
“underclass” 
 
 
Welfare Recipients 
 
First, clearly the most complicated and inconsistent image was that of the welfare mother, which 
tended to vacillate between highly negative and somewhat sympathetic views. This image was the most 
common and the most important to consider. Public opinion polls consistently show a generally negative 
image of welfare recipients, although that negativity has softened since 1996.28 In his 1999 book Why 
America Hates Welfare, Martin Gilens argued the hatred of welfare is primarily rooted in the public’s 
perception, influenced by consistently negative and stereotypical media portrayals,29 that “most people 
currently receiving welfare are undeserving.” Gilens identified the “the most important single component” 
of this belief is the assumption that “most welfare recipients would rather sit home and collect benefits 
than work hard and support themselves.”30  Thus the perceived lack of commitment to the work ethic 
among the welfare poor, Gilens concluded, was a key belief fueling the American distaste of welfare 
programs as well as the split between the support for the “poor” but not “welfare recipients.” Research on 
welfare recipients, on the other hand, shows many of them do work, and overall do not have a value 
system very different from the non-poor.31  
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Considering the state of public opinion, the presidents were in a similar position as when they 
discussed welfare: a significant gap seemed to exist between public opinion and more substantive 
research. Within this context the presidents provided a wide variety of depictions of welfare recipients. 
Johnson rarely discussed welfare recipients, Nixon primarily attacked them, and Carter, Reagan, and 
Clinton all provided mixed depictions. Nixon’s depiction of the welfare poor was clearly the most 
negative, as he directly attacked their work ethic. He often contrasted “welfare loafers” to hard working 
taxpayers, thereby reinforcing the negative public image of welfare recipients. After Nixon, Reagan was 
perhaps the most negative toward welfare recipients, although he did not seem nearly as negative as is 
generally assumed. Reagan did at times discuss welfare cheaters, and on two specific occasions invoked 
the infamous image of the welfare queen. When discussing his experience with welfare reform in 
California, he made a number of ambiguous statements about “paper people” and recipients scurrying 
away once the “lights were turned on.” However, in order to defend his argument that many of the welfare 
poor were “not needy” and diminish attacks on him regarding his “harming” of the poor, Reagan needed to 
avoid presenting on overly negative image. Of his three depictions of the welfare poor, the welfare cheat 
was less frequent than the welfare dependent or the rational not needy. In addition, Reagan’s main ire was 
reserved for bureaucrats rather than the poor. Overall, Reagan’s rhetorical attack on the poor in particular 
seemed to be exaggerated in public memory and liberal scholarly treatises. He made negative comments 
here and there, but such comments were overshadowed by comments placing the blame on the system 
itself, or defending the recipients in various ways. Ironically, one of the reasons for this misperception of 
Reagan’s rhetoric may lie in the liberal critique of Reagan which sought to paint him as more anti-poor 
than he was, and thus likely highlighted any negative comments he made. True to expectation, Democratic 
presidents Carter and Clinton tended to avoid the harsher images of the welfare recipients, but nonetheless 
did not provide overly strong defenses. Both tended to imply at times that welfare recipients were 
choosing not to work. Carter, for example, did use the label “cheaters” to refer to welfare recipients, while 
Clinton often defended poor children by indicting the parent’s  “mistakes” or “sins.”   
All four of the presidents after Johnson also tended to provide some positive statements 
concerning welfare recipients, although not as consistent as the negative statements. From time to time, for 
example, they all mentioned that many were willing to work if given a chance. The idea that welfare 
recipients were victims trapped in a bad system was perhaps the most consistent image across the 
presidents. That image was rather neutral, as it provided an external attribution for continued welfare 
receipt, but also depicted them as rather powerless and weak. Clinton worked the hardest to rehabilitate the 
image of the welfare recipient by explaining the difficult situation they faced and the rational reasons 
behind their stays on welfare. He argued that they indeed did hold the American values of work, family, 
and responsibility dear, and, like all good Americans, hated welfare. Similar to the three presidents before 
him, Clinton placed much of the blame on the system, not the recipient.  
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Similar to the lack of discussion of welfare benefits, however, there was also a surprising lack of 
discussion concerning welfare mothers in their role as mothers. Examining the images of welfare mothers 
from the Progressive Era to the 1960s, Robert Asen chronicled how the dominant image moved from 
being focused on the mother as caregiver during the Progressive Movement to confronting the historical 
tension between work and family during the 1960s. While the debates struggled with the contradiction in 
roles, however Asen argued that the Nixon administration “stressed work” and “deprivileged the nurturing 
qualities of mothers as caregivers.”32 This analysis shows that after Nixon, the trajectory away from 
motherhood and toward work clearly continued. Clinton at times discussed the goal of having welfare 
mothers succeed both at home and at work, but never provided any sympathetic accounts of welfare 
mothers as mothers.   
In the end, the image of the welfare recipient did seem to soften from Nixon to Clinton. Similar to 
the critique of welfare, the presidents seemed pessimistic about the past, but optimistic about the future. 
The presidents did not strongly challenge the public’s negative preconceptions of welfare recipients, and 
in some cases may have reinforced it, but for the most part after Nixon the poor were rarely the target of 
direct criticism. The presidents perhaps implied that welfare recipients had made some questionable 
choices in terms of family planning or work ethic, but nonetheless they were primarily depicted as having 
the intent and potential to escape welfare and become self-sufficient with a little help from some 
combination of carrots and sticks. Here Reagan’s image of the “not truly needy” is particularly relevant. 
Reagan had shifted away from Nixon’s welfare loafer, and even further from William Graham Sumner’s 
drunkard in the gutter where he ought to be, and presented a rather optimistic image of the poor. Following 
the work of Charles Murray, the conservative attack was now focused on the welfare system, not the poor, 
who were merely acting rationally considering their options or were simply trapped in a bad system. This 
optimistic image was perhaps too optimistic in the sense that many of the poorest recipients lacked the 
skills to be self-sufficient, but it nonetheless helped instill confidence in the possibility of alternative 
programs other than welfare to be successful. Clinton then followed Reagan, pushing the same story that 
the poor had the requisite work ethic, but only needed a chance to escape the trap and then the support to 
endure outside of it. Put simply, the problem would be not the people, as long as they are given a real 
chance.  
The 1996 law made a major impact on the future relevance of the “welfare recipients” label. By 
ending welfare, welfare recipients symbolically became “former welfare recipients,” or, ideally, the 
working poor. Of course, the new TANF rolls remain populated by individuals receiving benefits and not 
yet working—still over 2 million families in 2004—but the new rules prohibit more than two consecutive 
years of receipt or five total years in a lifetime, thereby at minimum it makes welfare recipients a 
temporary category. The law did allow up to twenty percent of the total number on the rolls to be exempt 
from those time limits, but those exceptions were not widely known or discussed. As a result, welfare 
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recipients are now actually perceived as less abundant than they actually are, whereas for the past thirty 
years, they had been perceived as much more plentiful then they actually were, considering many of the 
poor never actually received welfare.    
 
The Working Poor 
 
The second primary depiction was that of the working poor. The working poor were not 
discussed nearly as frequently as the welfare poor. When discussed, however, they were universally 
depicted in a positive manner. This positive image matched the public conception of the working poor, 
which was overwhelmingly viewed as the deserving poor. Public opinion polls support the idea that those 
who work full time should not be in poverty.33 The very existence of the working poor has even been 
labeled as “America’s contradiction.”34 In addition, polls also show that Americans “significantly 
overestimate federal poverty thresholds.” Whereas the poverty level for a family of four is actually 
$17,650, almost seventy percent of respondents to a 2000 poll estimated that such a family would need at 
least $35,000 to make ends meet. Another twenty-three percent estimated at least $25,000, meaning 
eighty-nine percent of the respondents would consider a significant additional portion of America’s 
working people as the working poor.35 As a result of this generally “deserving” image of the working poor, 
the public support programs perceived as helping the working poor rather strongly.  
The working poor were minor characters in Johnson’s rhetoric as he focused primarily on the 
hard-core unemployed. To Nixon, the working poor, which he often labeled the “forgotten man,” was 
presented as the converse of the idle working poor. Nixon defended his FAP in part because it would be 
much fairer to the working poor, who had for too long been ignored. Ironically, one of the reasons often 
cited for the failure of the FAP was the criticism that it would add millions to the welfare rolls. Carter’s 
plan worked similarly, designed to encourage work in part by supplementing the income of the working 
poor. Carter also admitted that three-fourths of America’s poor families with children had at least one 
worker. Such a statistic would likely surprise many people, and should have worked to highlight the gap 
between Carter’s own goal of a guaranteed job that provided a sufficient living wage to working families. 
Carter, however, did not press the issue much.  
Other than the increase to the EITC in the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the Reagan years were tough on 
the working poor. The 1981 OBRA worked to cut back a number of reforms that had expanded from 
welfare recipients to the working poor, such as income disregards. Reagan, however, actually did not use 
the term “working poor,” though his “rational non-needy” would essentially meet the criteria. Reagan thus 
framed the working poor not from the perspective of how their labor fell short of pulling them out of 
poverty, but from the perspective of their acceptance of government programs that, according to Reagan, 
they did not need. The rational not needy was not a highly negative image; its primary function was to 
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criticize the workings of the welfare system. Thus while Reagan’s policies certainly made life more 
difficult for the working poor, rhetorically he avoided them more than attacking or praising them. One 
could argue, therefore, that Reagan was able to cut programs for the working poor in part because he 
framed them as the welfare poor.  
Lastly, Clinton discussed the working poor and working families more than all the other 
presidents combined, mostly while campaigning for increases to both the EITC and the minimum wage. 
Clinton’s original welfare proposal and his framing of the impact of the 1996 law both relied partly on his 
goal of “making work pay” in order to reduce reliance on welfare. Again and again he cited the fact that 
eighteen percent of America’s workers remained in poverty, another figure that would likely surprise most 
Americans. He labeled the working poor “America’s heroes” on a number of occasions.  
Overall, whereas the presidential depiction of the working poor was consistent with the positive 
image they enjoyed in public opinion, they were generally not a major focus. With all the attention on the 
welfare system and its flaws, the working poor were simply not a primary subject of conversation. Reagan 
avoided the term altogether, and Johnson’s focus was clearly elsewhere. The FAP and the PBJI would help 
the working poor, but both presidents tended to discuss their impact on the welfare poor rather than the 
working poor. Although Clinton certainly discussed the working poor more than the other presidents, his 
depiction remained limited. He did not, for example, place a strong focus on the working poor in major 
addresses, and the references to the working poor tended to decrease when the EITC or minimum wage 
was not near the top of the political agenda.  
 
The Unemployables 
 
The third primary depiction among the five presidents centered on those individuals who could 
not be expected to be self-sufficient, traditionally termed the “unemployables.” All the presidents 
consistently supported the idea that government should provide generously for the helpless, especially if 
their misfortune was beyond their control. This division between the unemployables and the able-bodied 
echoed back to the days of the New Deal. FDR originally sought to provide sustenance to unemployables, 
and some form of work to the able-bodied. These original policy positions have remained consistent. 
Opinions differ, however, concerning who is rightfully in each group. The most difficult and controversial 
question, indeed perhaps the single most important issue concerning anti-poverty policy, is in which group 
single mothers with young children should be included. In FDR’s day, that was not a question, but starting 
in the 1960s, the assumption that mothers should not be expected to work became more and more 
controversial.  
Interestingly, each president in this study tended to provide a list of groups that would be 
considered unemployable and thus morally eligible for aid, and often specifically called for generous 
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increases in their support. Johnson called for a “compassionate program” for those who cannot “take full 
part in the competitive race,” and included “the aged, the handicapped, the mentally retarded, the 
illiterates, the dropouts, the unemployed and their dependent children, the uneducated.”36 Nixon never 
used the term “unemployables,” but nonetheless spoke often on the need to care for those who “cannot 
care for themselves.” He was particularly vocal about the need to be generous to these individuals, and 
even criticized the low level of benefits helping them. His list included “the sick, the disabled, the blind, 
the needy children and the dependent elderly, the mothers who must care for their children, and cannot 
work.” Single mothers, therefore, were included. Nixon’s FAP specifically exempted “mothers of 
preschool children” from the work requirements.37 After the FAP had died, Nixon passed Supplemental 
Security Insurance to help care for the “aged poor, the blind, and the disabled” that “America has always 
cared for.”  
 Carter did not focus as much on unemployables, but nonetheless presented a similar list of those 
not expected to work under his plan. Carter included “those unable to work due to age, physical disability 
or the need to care for children six years of age or younger.”38 Thus in 1977, the mothers of young 
children were still considered unemployable. In 1980, Reagan employed the term “truly needy” to identify 
unemployables. Despite Reagan’s anxiety concerning government, he too supported the need to take care 
of the “the poverty stricken, the disabled, the elderly, all those with true need.”39  Reagan did not, 
however, discuss whether or not women with young children would be considered in true need. Lastly, 
Clinton rarely discussed unemployables, as he focused on those that could work. In the 1996 bill, states 
were given the the option to exempt women with children under one, and women with children under six 
could not be penalized if they could not find adequate child care. 
 Overall, the presidents tended to maintain FDR’s original distinction between the able-bodied and 
the unemployables. Regardless of political ideologies, all the presidents supported the role of government 
in helping those who could not help themselves. Interestingly, the Aid to Dependent Children (later 
AFDC) was originally created to serve solely unemployables, at that point primarily widows with children. 
By the Nixon administration, many of the adults on AFDC were either divorced or never married women. 
They were thus less sympathetic, and, in a new world of working single women, considered capable of 
work. The creation of the SSI program took away disabled children and their strongly sympathetic image 
from AFDC, further diluting its unemployable status that had already been lessened by the growth of 
social insurance programs for the aged such as social security and Medicare. As argued by Michael Katz 
and Lorrin Thomas, “As one group after another of the worthy poor left public assistance for social 
insurance, those who remained inherited the degraded mantle of outdoor relief….[and] become the 
undeserving poor.”40  By the time Clinton signed the 1996 welfare bill, the adult recipients of AFDC were 
simply no longer considered unemployables.  
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The Unemployed 
 
 The unemployed represents another generally sympathetic figure to the non-poor. Three aspects 
of the image helps their cause. First, they are often seen as in the condition only temporarily. Indeed, 
words such as “temporarily,” “cyclically,” or “frictionally” are often used to modify “unemployed.” The 
unemployed are thus not dependent on help, but merely need a stopgap. The second aspect that defined the 
unemployed is that they are viewed as workers that, often due to factors outside of their control, are 
between jobs and thus need and deserve some assistance. They are perceived, therefore, as having the 
proper work ethic. Lastly, the support the unemployed receive is derived from a social insurance program 
rather than an entitlement program. Similar to social security, the perception is thus that the unemployed 
paid into the program themselves. Unemployment insurance, therefore, is not perceived as an income 
transfer. As explained by Nixon, unemployment insurance is an “earned benefit. . . . . Accordingly, there is 
no demeaning of human dignity, no feeling of being ‘on the dole,’ when the insured worker receives 
benefits due.”41
 The public’s sympathetic view of the unemployed is clear in the literature. Martin Gilens’ work 
actually shows that the public’s sympathy for the poor increases as the unemployment rate increase.42 Said 
differently, when the public assumes a greater percentage of those suffering from poverty are in that 
situation due to unemployment, they are more sympathetic to the poor as a whole. When unemployment is 
high, significant pressure is placed on the government to act, further evidence that unemployment is 
perceived as an external attribution. It is clear, for example, that the New Deal was at least in part a 
political possibility because of the unprecedented level of unemployment. It was exceedingly difficult at 
the time to blame individuals for their poverty when half the nation was out of work. Since the New Deal, 
unemployment insurance has generally remained a popular program. In times of high unemployment, 
Congress has often extended the time period for the receipt of unemployment benefits, usually without 
much political controversy.  
 Due in part to their perceived temporary status, the unemployed were not a major figure in the 
rhetoric of the five presidents. Like the unemployables, the presidents would at times mention the 
unemployed, dissociating them from the long-term poor or welfare poor, and simply reaffirming the need 
to support them. In general, beyond extending benefits as necessary during troubling economic times, the 
presidents seem to be satisfied with the workings of the unemployment system. Johnson’s War on Poverty 
did not call for any major changes in the unemployment system. Nixon rarely even mentioned the 
unemployed. In the 1976 campaign and early in his time in office, Carter did discuss in some detail a very 
sympathetic image of recently unemployed heads of household and the difficulties they faced. Carter 
utilized the image to attack Ford, who was the incumbent during a time of high unemployment. Carter did 
not, however, clearly identify a policy to address that problem. By the time Carter began to focus on PBJI, 
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he no longer relied on that particular depiction. Toward the end of his presidency, Carter placed some 
focus on the image of the unemployed youth. Unfortunately for Carter, that image likely did not share the 
same sympathy as the unemployed in general, especially considering Carter sought to focus on minority 
unemployed youth. Carter’s call for new programs to help them eventually fell silent. 
 Reagan was perhaps the most sympathetic to the unemployed. Reagan supported many of the 
assumptions about the unemployed. He expressed, for example, an environmental attribution for their 
predicament and confirmed their desire to work. He explained that he personally “ached” for the suffering, 
and built identification with them by referring to his family’s experience with unemployment during the 
Great Depression. Reagan did not, however, push policies to help the unemployed despite high levels of 
unemployment. Reagan’s sympathy for the unemployed was perhaps necessary then to counteract his 
inaction.  
Lastly, Clinton actually did call for reform to the unemployment system. Clearly influenced by 
the work of his Secretary of Labor at the time, Robert Reich, Clinton sought to redirect the focus of the 
unemployment system from temporary income maintenance to “re-employment.” The proposal in many 
ways mirrored Clinton’s plans for welfare reform. Citing the changes in the nature of modern work, 
especially the decline in manufacturing jobs and the impact of globalization and technology, he believed 
the unemployed would have to be retrained in new areas of work. Throughout the end of 1994 and the 
beginning of 1995, Clinton discussed the topic often, but beyond holding a Conference on Reemployment 
in February of 1995, nothing significant was ever accomplished in this area. In summary, the deserving 
image of the unemployed remained generally stable and uncontroversial through this time period. 
 
The Hard Core Poor 
 
 The final two characters relevant to this discussion, the hard core poor and poor children, were 
absent from most of the presidents’ rhetoric. Johnson’s most important character was what he labeled the 
“hard core unemployed,” which he dissociated from the “frictionally unemployed” due to the former’s 
long term status. Johnson depicted the hard core unemployed with a very clear external attribution. They 
were characterized by never having had a chance at life, and being mired in a cycle of poverty that 
included the lack of jobs, bad housing, poor schools, lack of skills, discrimination, and ultimately 
hopelessness. Due to the particularly difficult situation from which these poor suffered, economic growth, 
the typical American anecdote to poverty, was not considered sufficient, hence the need for Johnson’s new 
War on Poverty programs.  
Johnson’s hard core unemployed became the “underclass” of the 1980s and 1990s. The term 
underclass was introduced to most Americans in a 1977 Time magazine article, and was described there as 
“a large group of people who are more intractable, more socially alien and more hostile than almost 
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anyone had imagined. They are the unreachables: the American underclass. . . . made up mostly of 
impoverished urban blacks, who still suffer from the heritage of slavery and discrimination.”43 Much like 
Johnson’s hard-core unemployed, the underclass were perceived as having lost hope, thereby rejecting the 
middle-class values of work and family. Underclass poverty was thus different than other kinds of poverty. 
As a result, the underclass was firmly and almost exclusively within the realm of the undeserving poor. 
Whereas Johnson focused on the environmental factors that caused the hard core unemployed to lose hope, 
the underclass label focused much more on individual attitudes and behaviors, especially those behaviors 
that defied social norms, and disregarded the environmental factors that may have led to those attitudes 
and behaviors. 44 Writing in 1992, Christopher Jenks argued that the negative label of the underclass was 
dominating the discussion of poverty, and thus “instead of blaming poverty on society, as we did in the 
late 1960s, we are now more inclined to blame poverty on the poor.”45 The image of the underclass was 
certainly detrimental to support for anti-poverty programs, as they clearly heightened the sense that the 
millions that were being spent were being wasted on the undeserving.  
The image of the underclass had a very strong racial component, and was primarily identified 
geographically with America’s inner-cities. Both of these perceptions would have clearly disappointed 
Johnson, who worked hard to counteract the assumptions that his hard core unemployed were 
predominately African American and urban. These perceptions work to make the underclass seem more 
foreign (and dangerous) to the non-poor, thus reducing the possibility of identification and sympathy. In 
the public mind, there is also some overlap between the underclass and the welfare poor—one assumed 
characteristic of the underclass is long-term welfare receipt—and the degree of that overlap would clearly 
influence the degree of support, or lack thereof, for helping the welfare poor. 
Interestingly, despite its important place in both the scholarly literature and the media, the term 
underclass was almost entirely absent from presidential rhetoric. Its use began in 1977, but Carter and 
Reagan each only used the term exactly once.46 Clinton, whose “favorite sociologist” was William J. 
Wilson, who wrote often about the underclass, did use the term more frequently.47 One of Clinton’s many 
catch phrases called for policies that would “expand the middle class and shrink the underclass.” He 
associated these two goals with raising the minimum wage, increasing EITC, and reforming welfare. He 
would only briefly mention the underclass beyond that catch phrase, however. The most detailed he ever 
was concerning them was when he defined them as “the people who are permanently trapped in poverty, 
the children living in the big cities.”48 Clinton, therefore, did not address the complicated tangle of 
pathologies typically discussed in the underclass literature. For him, “making work pay” would be enough 
to end the permanence of the underclass condition.   
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The Child in Poverty 
 
The final primary depiction, that of the poor child, was mostly absent from the rhetoric of these 
presidents. Only Clinton discussed children in this context, and his depiction was rather limited. The 
image of the poor child is inherently sympathetic, and Clinton especially relied on that trait when 
criticizing Republican welfare proposals in 1995 and 1996. But Clinton did not develop the depiction of 
the poor child in much detail, and in some ways utilized its innocence to heighten the lack of innocence of 
their parents in comparison. At times children would make brief appearances in stories told by Johnson 
and Carter concerning the hard core unemployed or the recently unemployed head of household, 
respectively, but the focus again was typically not on the child, but rather the parent. Such stories worked 
in the opposite manner of Clinton’s, as they attempted to develop sympathy for the parents by highlighting 
their inability to care properly for their children due to circumstances beyond their control. 
Overall, however, it is clear that the presidents tended to avoid relying on the image of children 
when discussing welfare or poverty, despite the high percentage of children in poverty and on the welfare 
rolls. Indeed, children represent more than two thirds of the welfare case load.49 Nonetheless, the 
depictions of welfare recipients consistently gave the impression that they were predominately adult and 
able to work.  
While the specific image of the child was rather rare, the use of “family” indirectly appealed to 
the same core beliefs concerning the innocence of children. When invoking their version of the ideal of 
equal opportunity, for example, both Carter and Clinton specified that “families with children” and a full-
time worker should not be in poverty. Many of the policies that have improved the income of the working 
poor only apply to families with children, and significantly increases depending on how many children are 
in the household. Writing in 1993, Peter Edelman, who served in the Clinton White House and resigned 
after Clinton signed the bill, considered the poverty rate among children and questioned the assumption 
that the public would naturally perceive children as deserving. Capturing an important truth about poverty 
politics, he wrote that “whatever our rhetoric, what we actually do for particular children depends upon 
what we think of their parents.”50 In the end, one must question the inherently deserving image of the child 
and the clear hesitance of relying upon it. Currently children only enter the discussion when it concerns the 
issue of child care. Increasing child care subsidies was one area that Clinton held somewhat firm in his call 
for providing opportunity in welfare reform during his retreat from 1994 to 1996, and it continues today as 
one of the policy areas that Democrats are pushing for additional funds in discussions concerning the 
reauthorization of the 1996 law. 
 
 
 
 246
The Deserving – Undeserving from 1963-1996 
 
 Perhaps the primary lesson derived from the characters discussed by Johnson, Nixon, Carter, 
Reagan, and Clinton from 1963 to 1996 is that FDR’s New Deal dissociation between unemployables and 
the able-bodied has endured and resurfaced. The only significant change has been the move of single 
mothers from the former to the latter. Working with that distinction, the presidents were consistently 
sympathetic to the working poor, the unemployed, the unemployable, and poor children. The first two 
represented the able-bodied that were either working or had been working until circumstances out of their 
control prevented them from continuing. The latter two represented unemployables that deserved 
generosity. While these four were all depicted in a positive manner, they were rarely the focus of 
discussion for long, either in presidential rhetoric or in the public conversation in general.  
 Predominately missing from the presidential rhetoric since Johnson was a sophisticated image of 
the poor that outlined numerous and varied individual and environmental barriers they faced. To his credit, 
Johnson did not shy away from attempting to educate the American people on the cycle of poverty, 
although his overly optimistic rhetoric envisioning the end of poverty likely distracted from that message. 
As argued by Robert Asen, however, after Johnson the public vision of the poor narrowed considerably. 
Rather than discussing poverty as “a multifarious phenomenon affecting diverse types of people,” most 
Americans began to focus primarily on one aspect of poverty: dependency on welfare.51  
The primary image of poverty throughout these years was thus the welfare recipient. That very 
fact does not bode well for the poor, as their public image was consistently negative. The presidential 
image of the welfare recipient never strongly challenged this negative image, but only Nixon’s rhetoric 
closely mirrored it. Perceptions concerning Reagan’s attack on the poor seemed somewhat exaggerated, as 
his primary point concerning the welfare poor was that they did not need help, not that they did not 
deserve help. In addition, the inherent optimism in Reagan’s depiction worked against the pessimism of 
the culture of poverty thesis and the dominant assumptions of the underclass. The welfare poor were not 
hopeless. Clinton then built on Reagan’s optimism by presenting the welfare mother as ready and willing 
to work. These positive images of the potential of the welfare recipient are critical to the public support of 
expensive policies to help them move from welfare to work.  
These positive images also facilitated the final shifting of the welfare mother from the ranks of 
the unemployables to the able-bodied poor. As Clinton explained in his address at the signing ceremony, 
the 1996 welfare law transformed the welfare poor into the working poor, and essentially did away with 
the former category altogether. Viewed in light of the past thirty years of welfare rhetoric, this 
transformation is revolutionary. The primary image of poverty since the presidency of Richard Nixon 
suddenly did not exist. In the years since 1996, it seems clear that the image of the working poor has filled 
that void, a phenomenon that certainly bodes well for the poor. Similar to the switch in the dominant 
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perception of the hinder-help paradox from the former to the latter, the dominant assumptions concerning 
the poor switched from the undeserving side to the deserving side of this paradox. Indeed, all the 
remaining categories—the working poor, the unemployed, the unemployables, and children—are all 
considered the deserving poor. Whether or not that switch is maintained will play a significant role in 
future deliberations concerning anti-poverty policy.  
A final important note concerning the depiction of the poor is the lack of discussion concerning 
the connection between poverty, welfare, and race. Johnson actively tried to keep his War on Poverty from 
being perceived as targeted toward African Americans, knowing such a perception would harm it 
politically. After Johnson, however, the presidents rarely addressed race in the context of poverty and 
welfare. Such an absence is notable because while minorities are statistically overrepresented in the 
poverty ranks when compared to their proportion in the population overall, that overrepresentation is itself 
then strongly overestimated by the public, who tend to perceive poverty and especially welfare as 
predominately minority issues. As Gilens has shown, the racial coding of welfare and welfare recipients is 
a significant cause for their unpopularity.52 The presidential reticence on this issue, therefore, can be 
interpreted two ways. If the presidents did focus on race while discussing welfare, they would have likely 
reinforced the misconception. On the other hand, by ignoring the mistaken belief, they allowed it to 
continue.  
 
Policy versus Politics: The Transformation 
 
  All five presidents in this study placed welfare or poverty high on their political agendas and 
attempted to alter significantly the manner in which the nation addresses these problems. The difficulties 
faced by each certainly lend support to the notion that the policy-politics dilemma is particularly acute for 
these issues. Johnson took advantage of a unique political and economic situation that briefly turned the 
tables and actually made attacking poverty a positive political issue, but that window closed abruptly in 
the late 1960s, and in the end Johnson’s War on Poverty has practically become a foil for anti-government 
forces to point to as the ultimate failure of government. Nixon and Carter both presented policies that 
would have redefined the welfare system, but despite their moderate designs that appealed to both the 
liberal and conservative assumptions, neither could overcome the political barriers to make them law. 
Reagan perhaps was the most successful in achieving some of his policy goals early in his time in office, 
again taking advantage of an ideal political situation, but by the time he left, the trajectory of public 
spending that he initially slowed had returned in force. Clinton did fulfill his campaign promise to end 
welfare as we knew it, but only after retreating significantly from his original proposal. Overall, stories of 
political failures clearly dominated any sense of successes. 
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 During this so-called “retrenchment era” in social policy, most commentators would agree, and 
opinion polls would support, that the conservative assumptions concerning poverty and welfare grew in 
importance and popularity from the late 1960s into the 1990s.53 Those beliefs—including fears of moral 
decline, broader acceptance of free market ideology, the increasing rejection of the politics of identity and 
entitlement, and, above all, a general anti-government disposition and a corresponding pessimism 
concerning the consequences of any government action—certainly made the negotiation of the politics-
policy dilemma more difficult for Democrats than Republicans concerning poverty. These beliefs often 
crystallized in the negative public image of welfare recipients and welfare itself. For much of the time 
period examined in this study, welfare was considered much more of a social problem than poverty, a 
telling phenomenon considering that welfare was originally designed as a treatment for poverty. This 
change in ideology, the conservative revolution, is therefore blamed by many on the left for the harsh 
treatment of the poor and the acceptance of expanding inequalities.  
  Despite the growing prevalence of these beliefs and the cynicism of the 1980s and 1990s, the 
traditional American ideal of equal opportunity and its corresponding sympathy for the poor has persisted. 
The politics-policy dilemma works both ways in American politics. It makes it difficult to take from the 
non-poor to help the poor, especially if both the poor and the government are perceived negatively, as they 
both were during much of this time period. On the other hand, it also punishes politicians for harming the 
deserving poor. Consider, for example, the amount of rhetorical energy Reagan had to expend defending 
himself and his policy cuts.  
 Consider, for example, that all five presidents regardless of their political ideology expressed the 
same ideal: equal opportunity.  The differences among Johnson, Nixon, Carter, Reagan, and Clinton all 
therefore resided at a lower level. This overarching ideal of equal opportunity, often invoked as the 
American dream, remains a powerful and progressive force in national politics. The conservative 
revolution did not reject this ideal, in actuality by rejecting the inherent pessimism of traditional 
conservatism, it actually strengthened it. In the end, a critical question emerges. If the ideal of equal 
opportunity is universal, and the gap between that ideal and the real is rather obvious, how is the gap 
justified? Said differently, how do the American people in general, and their presidents in particular, 
manage the inconsistency between this ideal and their behavior of allowing inequality to continue. 
 Particularly relevant to this question is the theory of cognitive dissonance developed originally by 
Leon Festinger in 1957, considered the “most widely investigated social psychological theory of its era.”54 
Cognitive dissonance addresses those situations in which an individual’s beliefs and behaviors are 
inconsistent. The three basic assumptions of Cognitive Dissonance theory are that (a) people have a need 
for cognitive consistency, an assumption that grew out of Fritz Heider’s Balance Theory55; (b) when 
cognitive inconsistency exists, such as when beliefs clash with behaviors, people experience psychological 
discomfort; and (c) that psychological discomfort motivates people to resolve the inconsistency and 
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restore cognitive balance. Festinger in turn argued that individuals can resolve their cognitive dissonance 
by either changing their belief, changing their behavior, or adding new cognitive elements to somehow 
cope with the imbalance. The first two solutions are rather straightforward, whereas the third opens up a 
wide range of possibilities. Indeed, the human mind can be very creative when it comes to finding ways to 
justify imbalances. The inherent egoism evident in human nature identified by many psychologists would 
also lead one to assume that in general, individuals would seek out coping strategies that make them feel 
better about themselves while requiring the least amount of effort.56
 A useful typology to consider the range of possibilities within Festinger’s third option was 
introduced by Robert Abelson. Abelson outlined four primary modes of resolution of “belief dilemmas” 
that cause “intrapersonal conflict.” Abelson’s typology would later serve as the foundation for B.L. Ware 
and Wil Linkugel’s rhetorical theory of apologia. Abelson’s four modes were: denial, bolstering, 
differentiation, and transcendence. Beyond Abelson’s original four, two more relevant: avoidance and 
projection. These six strategies represent the primary ways in which an individual can attempt to cope with 
an inconsistency between a belief and a behavior without actually changing one or the other. 
 Denial and avoidance are rather self-explanatory. Bolstering involves framing, as the individual, 
using selective exposure to information, focuses primarily on how the behavior is consistent with other 
beliefs, in order to overshadow the particular belief that it violates. As explained by Abelson, bolstering is 
a “mechanism for not eliminating the imbalance entirely but for drowning it out, so to speak.”57  Projection 
involves shifting the blame to a third party or circumstances outside the individual’s control. The behavior, 
in this sense, was involuntary, therefore the inconsistency is justified. Differentiation uses the process of 
splitting the behavior into two types, one highly negative and one more subdued, and then dissociating 
from the negative while admitting to the lesser charge. Differentiation works in part through the persuasive 
workings of the contrast effect, the human tendency that perception is greatly affected by that to which it 
is immediately compared. In comparison to the highly negative behavior, the perceived depravity of the 
secondary behavior is lessened. Like bolstering, differentiation admits to the inconsistency, but limits it 
through the comparison. Lastly, transcendence is the opposite of differentiation. As explained by Ware 
and Linkugel, using transcendence individuals “psychologically move the audience away from the 
particulars of the charge at hand in a direction toward a more abstract, general view.”58 The importance of 
the specific inconsistency is lessened due to the comparison of the much broader view.59
Cognitive dissonance and the modes of resolution were developed with a focus on individual 
decisions and inconsistencies, but nonetheless can be applied to broad public beliefs such as the ideal of 
equal opportunity. Societies are, after all, collections of individuals. The key question stated above asked 
if the ideal of equal opportunity is universal, and the gap between that ideal and the real is rather obvious, 
how is the gap justified? Equal opportunity thus represents a public belief, and the behavior is the 
toleration of the lack of equal opportunity, namely that exhibited by the existence of significant poverty. 
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As a result, cognitive dissonance should exist in the minds of the American people.  Using Festinger’s 
original three ways to address cognitive dissonance, the people can change their belief and reject the ideal 
of equal opportunity, they can attempt to change the behavior and attack poverty, or they can utilize one or 
more of the six coping strategies to reduce their discomfort. The ideal of equal opportunity is significantly 
engrained in the American psyche, and is not likely to be abandoned, therefore the first option can be set 
aside.  
Examining the public discourse of poverty in general and the rhetorical efforts of these five 
presidents in particular, the use of a number of the coping strategies are evident. Interestingly, Lyndon 
Johnson, influenced by the work of authors such as Michael Harrington, worked to increase the 
discomfort Americans should feel concerning the existence of poverty. Johnson’s hypocrisy appeals 
directly served to heighten the inconsistency between American ideals and the reality for many of the 
nation’s disadvantaged.  Johnson, therefore, hoped to take advantage of the feeling of discomfort he 
highlighted, avoid the various coping strategies, and push for a change in behavior. Johnson’s strategy 
worked well at first, as America seemed to agree with Johnson’s aversion to poverty amongst plenty, and 
supported his War on Poverty, albeit briefly. From the late 1960s until 1996, however, the discussion of 
poverty was characterized much more by coping strategies that sought to minimize any feelings of 
inconsistency. Three in particular stand out: projection, differentiation, and avoidance.  
 Projection was clearly the most important coping strategy used throughout this time period. The 
lack of equal opportunity was acknowledged, even advertised, but the blame for that inconsistency was 
projected directly onto the welfare system. By blaming welfare for poverty, the solution to the 
inconsistency involved changing welfare, not any other behaviors or systems. Through projection, 
welfare’s impact on the work ethic and family disintegration explained the development of the underclass, 
and helped distract from any other framings of poverty and inequality. Welfare, not poverty or inequality, 
caused dependency and violated freedom. Supporting the welfare system thus represented the behavior 
causing the inconsistency, not accepting poverty. Welfare thus served as the red herring, drawing all the 
negative attention to itself. This strategy was used by all the presidents, and was the primary claim in 
Reagan’s attack on the welfare state. Again, if government would simply get out of the way, the free 
market would naturally create equal opportunity, and America’s beliefs and behaviors would once again 
be “in balance.”  
 Whereas projection focused blame on the welfare system, the use of differentiation identified the 
welfare recipient as the scapegoat. The cognitive element of denying equal opportunity was thus split into 
two elements, the denial of opportunity to the deserving poor and the denial of opportunity to the 
undeserving poor, and welfare recipients, in the public mind, were predominately considered undeserving. 
Individuals could thus admit to the lesser charge while rejecting the other. They implied, in other words, 
that equal opportunity did exist for the deserving poor, or otherwise managed to avoid that question 
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altogether. From this perspective, the existence of poverty was blamed on the welfare poor, who 
squandered their opportunity due to laziness, poor family choices, drug use, or some dispositional 
attribution. Poverty thus represented unequal results due to unequal effort, and equality of opportunity 
remained intact. Once again, all the presidents relied on this strategy somewhat, or at least did not strongly 
attack the public’s reliance upon it, and Nixon invoked it the most strongly. He attacked the poor for 
choosing to “loaf” rather than work, even if the job involved menial labor. Although each president did 
rely on differentiation to some degree, it was clearly secondary to the projection upon the welfare system. 
In most cases, the system’s set of perverse incentives was blamed more than the individual’s morality in 
making the choice to join or stay on welfare. 
Avoidance would involve the degree to which the inconsistency is actually discussed, or how 
high on the media or political agenda the issues of poverty and inequality reside. Although each of the four 
presidents after Johnson placed welfare reform high on their agenda, for the most part none of the four 
significantly discussed poverty itself. Considering the various characters each depicted, the poor were 
minor characters unless discussed as welfare recipients. The complicated images of poverty present in 
Johnson’s rhetoric did not reappear. The presidents rarely discussed the growing evidence of inequality 
between the rich and the poor. While all the presidents did support the goal of equal opportunity, and 
expressed various specific applications of that ideal such as work guarantees and living wages, they rarely 
put much emphasis on the inconsistency between those ideals and reality. 
 The remaining three coping strategies were not as evident during this time period, and only 
transcendence would seem to have much potential. Denial would involve denying that poverty represents 
the violation of equal opportunity, which would be a difficult case to make without relying on one of the 
other coping strategies to reframe poverty. Bolstering would involve focusing on the various positives to 
the lack of equal opportunity that would thereby justify or drown out the negative. Possible arguments 
here could be that the existence of poverty keeps wages low and creates an incentive structure for the poor 
to behave properly. The critique of welfare policy from Frances Fox Piven, for example, accuses the 
political right of such hidden motives. Similar but less controversial are arguments that allow for the 
existence of some unemployment in order to keep inflation low, but that belief is likely accepted due to the 
temporary perception of unemployment. Thus while some examples of bolstering can be identified, is does 
not seem to be a very strong possibility.  
Lastly, transcendence would involve moving away from the particulars of American poverty and 
inequality and focusing on a broader plane. In the age of globalization, such strategies could be rather 
impactful. Indeed, one of the difficulties for anti-poverty advocates in the United States is to justify the 
focus on national poverty when in comparison to many of the world’s poor, the American poor are rather 
well off. Alternatively, perhaps combining the strategies of avoidance and transcendence, broader issues 
often capture the national agenda and relegate poverty to the background. The American people have thus 
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been distracted from poverty by the various wars and scandals during this time period that have 
transcended concern over poverty. War in particular works to decrease focus on poverty, as the cognitive 
split between the poor and the nonpoor is replaced with a focus on the alternative “us” and “them” 
represented by Americans and their enemy. Concern over inequality, it would seem, also stops at the 
water’s edge. One must not go to the extreme of various “wag the dog” theories to understand the power 
of a war to transcend concerns about the relative income increases of the bottom quartile as compared to 
the top quartile. Indeed, the 1996 law has been up for reauthorization since 2002, but in the aftermath of 
9/11, lawmakers have been preoccupied elsewhere, and have repeatedly extended it on a yearly basis. 
 The relevance of this analysis of the various coping strategies lies in the impact of the 1996 
changes on the available strategies. Simply put, the law rendered the two most important coping strategies 
of the last thirty years moot. Symbolically, welfare and welfare recipients no longer existed.  As explained 
by Clinton in his signing day address, the primary image of government anti-poverty efforts was 
transformed from the despised welfare system which was perceived at best as ineffectual and at worst as 
counterproductive to a number of other programs which all enjoyed much more popular support. 
Considerable energy had been expended shifting the blame for poverty upon the welfare system, and with 
its removal, the inconsistency could no longer be justified in that way. The corresponding glorification of 
work that continued throughout this time period should only add to the pressure to make work pay. At the 
same time, again as Clinton explained, welfare recipients were transformed from their enduring 
undeserving image into the sympathetic image of the working poor. The coping strategy of differentiation 
was thus eclipsed by the removal of the negative element, and, once again, the inconsistency could no 
longer be justified in this way. Either new coping strategies would have to be developed, or Americans 
would have to face the inconsistency.  In summary, the potential impact of the 1996 law is to alter the 
policy direction of the politics-policy dilemma precisely because it shifted the dominant perceptions 
concerning the deserving-undeserving and help-hinder paradoxes. From the late 1960s until 1996, the 
barriers precluding helping the poor dominated the discussion. The 1996 law eliminated two of the most 
important barriers, and now it could be argued that not providing significant assistance to the working 
poor could be politically hazardous. 
There is considerable support that the manner in which the nation sees the poor has changed since 
the passing of the 1996 bill. As David Zarefsky has written, the success of social policy is dependent on “a 
conducive rhetorical climate . . .of optimism about the feasibility and value of social change.”60 Whereas 
such a climate was plainly not present in 1992, or since the late 1960s for that matter, an argument could 
be made that such a climate now exists.61  Such questions are beyond the scope of this analysis, but some 
preliminary points can be made.  
The most obvious effect of the 1996 law was the amazing reduction in the number of welfare 
recipients. Between January of 1994 and June 1999, the caseloads were cut in half, from 5 million to 2.5 
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million.62 Scholars disagree on the particular impact of each cause, but in general agree that the causes of 
the decline were threefold: the new welfare rules (many of which had already been in effect before 1996 
due to state waivers approved by Clinton), a robust economy that produced millions of jobs, and the 
“massively increased aid to low-income workers.”63 The third cause should not be underestimated. Simply 
put, Clinton pursued his promise of “making work pay” vigorously, and the Republican Congress often 
readily agreed. Clinton had already passed an EITC increase in 1993 and raised the minimum wage in 
1996. In 1997, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 signed by Clinton included the Child Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP) which expanded coverage to the working poor. Clinton’s Welfare-to-Work coalition, a 
group of companies that have promised to work to hire welfare recipients, grew to 20,000 employers 
strong and hired 1.1 million former recipients at one point.64  The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, a 
Republican proposal, provided a $500 tax credit per child, although by making the credit nonrefundable it 
helped the near poor and the middle class more than the poor themselves, since the poor rarely owed 
income tax due to the EITC. Because the state block grants for TANF were set at a rate of spending from 
1992-1994, states ended up having significant surpluses in funds due to the plummeting rolls which in 
many cases were used to develop more welfare to work programs and to help provide more child care 
funds.  
As a result of these programs, the increase in spending for the poor since the 1996 law is 
astounding. Spending on CHIP, Medicaid, child care, and EITC went from $11 billion in 1988, to $32.8 in 
1992, to $66.7 billion in 1999. Child care spending alone increased from $933 million in 1996 to over $3.3 
billion in 2000. As noted by Blank and Ellwood, “The EITC increase alone was nearly as large as the total 
amount the federal government was spending on AFDC when Clinton took office.”65 Amazingly, all these 
improvements were accomplished despite the fact that Clinton’s second term was dominated by scandal, 
which precluded his focus on these issues.  
 These increases have continued into the administration of George W. Bush. His rhetoric, at least 
during the 2000 election and early in his presidency, was more sympathetic to and focused on positive 
images of the poor than former Republican presidents. During a 2001 commencement speech, for 
example, Bush noted that 12 million American children still lived in poverty, and declared that “[w]elfare 
as we knew it has ended, but poverty has not.”66 Bush’s own welfare reform proposal has focused more on 
additional work requirements rather than increased spending to help the working poor, a disappointment to 
those on the left, but Bush has not pushed hard on those reforms, and for the most part has not criticized 
the massive increases in spending. Bush has also focused upon faith based initiatives as potential tools to 
address poverty, a policy that has drawn criticism from many on the left as well. Bush’s tax reform, 
however, was rather generous to the working poor, as he increased the Child Tax Credit from $500 to 
$1000, increased its refundable status for the working poor, and expanded EITC for married families.67
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 The combination of the welfare changes, strong economy, legislative action, and increased 
spending has also resulted in a remarkable increase in the overall income of the working poor. These 
changes also clearly impacted the comparison between receiving welfare and working for minimum wage. 
In 2000, David Ellwood analyzed the difference between working and not working for a single mother of 
two in 1986 and 1996, using 1996 dollars. According to Ellwood, in 1986 non-working single parents 
could receive $8,459 from AFDC, while single parents working full time would essentially have $10,464 
remaining after paying taxes and child care. In 1996, single nonworking parents could receive $7,501 in 
TANF funds, while single parents working full time could take home $14,630 after taxes and child care 
support.  From 1986 to 1996, therefore, the difference in income between welfare and minimum wage 
work increased from $2,005 to $7,129. In addition, due to the development of CHIP, workers no longer 
would have to lose health coverage for their children when leaving welfare.68 The change in the tax burden 
of the poor, especially those with children, has also declined dramatically. In 1970, a family with one child 
was bracketed at a 9 percent rate. In 2002, that rate was negative 11.9. The differences increased with each 
additional child as well.69 As a result of these programs, in 1999, child poverty was at its lowest level—
19.6 percent, or 14 million children—since the government began measuring it in 1979.70 By 2002, it had 
dropped to 16 percent, or 11 million. 
Significant evidence exists that despite rising costs, the public continues to support these 
programs for the working poor very strongly. In a report from the American Enterprise Institute, a 
conservative think tank, polls from 2001 were reviewed that showed over eighty percent support for a 
number of policies that benefit the poor, including improving schools in low income areas, expanding job 
training programs, expanding day care subsidies, increasing the minimum wage, spending more on 
medical care for the poor and increasing tax credits to the poor.71 Polls that split the opinion of 
Republicans and Democrats show that the gap between the two on these issues is rather minor.72 Polls also 
show that there have been significant declines in public frustration with poor people, as well as a 
“noticeable decline in hostility” toward welfare recipients.73 Of course, perhaps the most important 
symbolic impact of the 1996 law was the shift in the representative character for these issues from the 
“undeserving” welfare poor to the “deserving” working poor, which tapped into the historical 
differentiation between the two in the polling data. This shift also worked to reduce the public’s 
identification of these issues with minorities, because while welfare and welfare recipients were strongly 
associated with race, the working poor and the programs that assisted them were not, as Gilens’ research 
attests.74  
In addition, the impact of the removal of these welfare and welfare recipients from the discussion, 
the first two “transformations” outlined in Clinton’s signing day speech, could very well have resulted in 
the triggering of the remaining two: the transformation of the welfare debate from a mean-spirited political 
game to a constructive bi-partisan dialogue concerning the best methods to help the former welfare 
 255
recipients become self-sufficient, and the transformation of the relationship between the poor and the non-
poor from simple maintenance and estrangement to mutual responsibility and identification. By focusing 
on helping individuals become self-sufficient through work, anti-poverty advocates now have the ear of 
both political parties. The political incentives for Democrats to paint Republicans as hateful of the poor 
and for Republicans to identify Democrats as the party of entitlements and welfare queens no longer exist.  
The impressive growth of the “Living Wage Movement” may also be a signal of the new 
relationship between the poor and the non-poor. By 2002, over 100 cities had living wage ordinances and 
another 100 additional campaigns were active across the nation. In many cases, these campaigns have 
created strong new coalitions of the working poor, women’s groups, religious organizations, civil rights 
organizations, and labor unions, and have provided a critical revitalization of the latter.75 Robert Asen 
argued in the conclusion of Visions of Poverty that what was needed to help the poor was more inclusive 
political community. Asen strongly criticized the passing of the 1996 bill, arguing it “signaled a retreat 
from community, from a national commitment to one another’s well being.”76 I would argue, however, 
that it may very well be that law that ultimately spurs the creation of such of a stronger national 
community. The devolution of the design for welfare programs to the state level better allows for grass-
root movements to make an impact. Whereas before a significant gap existed between the negative 
stereotype of the welfare poor and the nonpoor, often preventing identification, the present gap is much 
narrower. Again, sending a federal check to the poor to sustain them for the month requires no community. 
Providing skills, creating jobs, and making those jobs accessible and adequate will.  
In sum, it is obvious that the political climate concerning poverty has changed. As summarized 
by Blank and Ellwood in their examination of Clinton’s legacy concerning America’s poor: 
These changes transformed the political discussion about welfare and the programmatic 
organization of public assistance. Devolution to the states has given state governors 
much greater involvement in program design and oversight. The perceived success of 
work-oriented programs has led to political support for welfare-to-work programs and 
for welfare reform among a broad spectrum of political leaders. Five years after welfare 
reform was passed, many people are invested in making it succeed . . . . Sharp criticism 
of welfare mothers—so-called welfare bashing—has receded as well, as more recipients 
combine work and income. Public support for the current work-oriented programs 
appears to be relatively strong.77  
These changes are even evident in the research on poverty. For years, as argued by Alice O’Connor in 
Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History, 
poverty research has been dominated by “individual failings rather than structural inequality, of cultural 
and skill ‘deficits’ rather than the unequal distribution of power and wealth.”78 In recent years, however, 
the research has also turned its focus to what works to encourage self-sufficiency and what problems 
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remain which still must be addressed. Now conservative scholars have a vested interest in showing how 
welfare reform can move recipients into sustainable work and are better off without welfare. Many liberal 
scholars, while at first focused on attacking Clinton for signing the bill and predicting mass hunger, have 
now begun to recognize, albeit with caution, the positive potential of the new political environment. 
Lastly, perhaps the most important change overall is the shift from the pessimism and cynicism of 
the 1970s and 1980s concerning the poor and government’s ability to help them. If anything, the 
plummeting rolls have provided evidence that government can do something right. Instead of being 
enveloped in negativity, the noble pursuit of America’s ideal of equal opportunity is once again benefiting 
from a connection with one of the nation’s most powerful emotions: optimism. 
Despite all the progress and optimism, significant questions and concerns remain. The new reality 
for the poor is clearly not without its flaws, including the increasing racialization of the poor, the 
worsening of the condition of the most destitute, and the questionable sufficiency of the jobs the former 
recipients are finding.79 The public has perhaps been too focused on the number leaving welfare, and not 
enough on what is happening to them once they do.  Some studies show that up to 40 percent of the former 
recipients are not working.80 Many of those working are in jobs with low wages and little possibility for 
upward mobility, and their loss in benefits at times exceed their earnings from work, leaving them worse 
off.81 Most of the improvements hailed by the laws proponents have occurred during a time of economic 
prosperity, and recently with the economy in recession the welfare rolls have begun to climb back up. It is 
also clear that those that have remained on welfare are likely the hardest cases, with the most barriers to 
employment and self-sufficiency. For many of these more difficult cases, the five year lifetime limits on 
receipt are only now approaching.  
Whereas the condition of the working poor has improved, low-income wages still do not meet 
living wage standards. The trend of the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer has continued.82 And 
while record lows in the number of poor children should certainly be celebrated, 11 million children 
remain in poverty in the richest nation in the world. The poverty rate for single female-headed families 
remains over thirty percent. The relative value of low-wage jobs in the U.S. compared to the median wage 
still lag behind those in continental Europe.83 Equal opportunity, in other words, remains an ideal, not the 
reality. More progress is necessary, and if progress is to continue, anti-poverty advocates must preserve 
the current focus on the gaps between the real and the ideal—namely the lack of living wages and the 
continued existence of child poverty—and utilize the discomfort of the public concerning these apparent 
violations of equal opportunity to push for additional changes. The primary threat to the continuation of 
the current environment resides in the development or return of coping strategies that would once again 
distract the public from closing that gap. While the 1996 law at least symbolically eliminated the power of 
blaming the poor and blaming welfare for poverty, they could certainly rise again, or alternatives could 
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take their place. Indeed, the coping strategy of avoidance is perhaps the most powerful at this time, as the 
nation keeps its focus on the war on terrorism and away from its unfulfilled promises.  
 
Moving Forward 
 
In closing, I would argue that a key aspect of preserving the new rhetorical climate will be to 
uphold the bi-partisan cooperation evident now for helping the working poor. As a communication 
scholar, I believe the polarization in the debates concerning poverty during the 1970s and 1980s 
significantly harmed the poor. For years, the dominant perceptions were that, depending on one’s political 
preference, the Democrats were for the poor and the “evil” Republicans for the rich, or alternatively the 
Republicans were pro-work and pro-family and the “immoral” Democrats rejected both. Such assumptions 
only harm the poor and heighten the political barriers to providing them assistance. This analysis showed 
that more often than not presidential rhetoric concerning welfare and welfare recipients was rather flawed, 
either matching skewed negative public assumptions or allowing them to continue unchallenged. While 
the presidents deserve criticism for the inaccuracies in their portrayals, the end of welfare essentially made 
them rather irrelevant. The most important aspect of the new political environment for anti-poverty is that 
it is focused on the working poor, an exceedingly positive image for both the liberal and conservative 
ideologies.  
In order to maintain this bi-partisan climate, both sides must come to certain realizations. Liberals 
must resist the assumption that conservative calls for work, family, and responsibility are some sort of 
code for attacking or controlling the poor or minorities. They must realize that family decisions are not 
merely personal choices, but have real economic impacts, and thus to encourage two-parent families and 
discourage out-of-wedlock births is not judgmental, but critical to the well-being of children and to the 
realization of equal opportunity. Liberals should also avoid focusing on the poor as powerless victims and 
instead embrace the conservative optimism concerning the potential of all Americans as long as they 
receive ample support.84  
Conservatives, in turn, must be more mindful of the gaps between the ideal and the real. 
Reducing welfare and replacing it with workfare will not be enough; the work must be stable, pay 
sufficient wages, have some long term potential, and not harm families. They must realize that the 
situation for former welfare recipients is more complicated than simply choosing to go to work, and that 
ending welfare and providing true opportunity will cost money, not save it, especially if the economy 
falters and jobs are not readily available. They must realize that not all of the poor are able-bodied, or 
sufficiently ready for work. They will also have to face their ideological dilemma of glorifying family 
values while at the same time requiring a single mother with young children to work.  
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Fortunately for the poor, both sides seem to accept many of these lessons already. Ultimately, the 
true ideal of equal opportunity is unfortunately an unreachable goal. Actual equal opportunity would 
essentially require the abolition of family and massive income re-distribution. Nonetheless, the quest to 
close the gap between the ideal and real as much as possible remains exceedingly noble, and, more 
importantly, rather feasible in the current political environment. The impact of the 1996 law and the 
increases in support to the poor in the years following have closed that gap for many poor Americans, 
especially those able to work, in part because the flawed and distracting negative image of the “welfare 
recipient” was symbolically eradicated. The next realistic step to closing that gap is to eradicate another 
category, the working poor. At that point, the American dream will be closer to reality than it has ever 
been.  
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